Posted on 07/01/2007 8:58:07 AM PDT by TrebleRebel
Is this a “petty matter”?
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB61/
Meselson had finally came around to the view long held by the intelligence community when he published his final findings on the case in November 1994 in the journal Science.(9) Meselson was prepared to conclude that the cause of death was airborne anthrax spores released from a military installation, He also concluded the size of the release was between a few milligrams and a gram, leaving open the possibility it was the result of defensive biological warfare research, a conclusion contested by U.S. intelligence analysts, who argued the release must have involved pounds of anthrax, based on prior studies into the dispersal of biological agents. As Dr. William C. Patrick, the veteran of over 30 years as a biological weapons researcher at Fort Detrick, Maryland and expert on anthrax dispersal noted later, he and other experts “hooted” when Meselson presented his release estimates.(10) The U.S. intelligence position was also supported by Ken Alibek, who said Compound 19 was involved in the “industrial” production of anthrax. Regarding the actual cause of the release, information later obtained from people involved with the Soviet biological warfare effort revealed that the cause of the anthrax release in Sverdlovsk was the failure by maintenance personnel to replace a critical filter in a vent serving the anthrax production facility.
GMU Administration no doubt is concerned that consideration of the infiltration that occurred will prevent the regional BL-3 facility from being built.
But Assistant General Brian W. needs to understand that sometimes the way to best address a problem is to be proactive and get ahead of it by taking the lead in addressing it, acknowledging it etc.
A continued lack of forthrightness — if sanctioned in any way by the Administration as it has been up until now — could lead to critical information from being shared with the FBI.
To not answer basic questions relating to biosecurity on the campus in the past is the surest way to lose the facility that has been proposed.
So for him, for example, not have confirmed Ali’s room number to me was a mistake IMO. His reaction instead should have been to signal that the Administration was going to be gung-ho about ferreting out facts relating to any possible past infiltration.
Instead, for example, ATCC fired a highly qualified scientist, shortly after hiring the scientist, upon the complaint of lax security relating to ATCC facilities and inventory of pathogens.
Any facility targeted by Ayman Zawahiri would have been vulnerable. No one will blame GMU unless the original vulnerabilities are then coupled with continued defensiveness and obfuscation.
It’s never too late GMU to embrace the forthcoming approach to its own advantage.
Is GMU in an easy position? No. But it is never wrong to do the right thing. Never too late. In crisis management, when you find you can’t keep the lid on something, what you do is take it off the fire so it doesn’t boil over.
Better to have a red cell lay out the problem than for the public to learn of it as the result of Atef and Saif Adel’s and Ayman’s “Green Team” or “Greendale
School.”
You’ve heard the saying, “It’s never the crime, it’s the cover-up.”
Here, when the possible crime was by a third-party, and GMU would only have been the victim, the old maxium applies with special force.
This 10 year sentence reported today is yet another sympathetic case relating to Falls Church and the Dar al-Arqam center where Ali Al-Timimi was imam. Right or wrong, it seems that the federal officials feel that some of these people know information that could be helpful in counterterrorism efforts that they are not sharing. “The information Mr. Benkahla has in his head is far more important than the sentence he will receive,” the prosecutor said.
The reality perhaps is that there is no little reason to think Benkahla would have occasion to know anything of importance. In the event of any operation, it likely would have been strictly compartmentalized. Lashkar-e-Taiba had not been designated as a terrorist entity in 1999 when Benkala attended. And so while it is significant that Dhiren Bharot (al-Hindi) were alum, it is assuming a lot that Benkala would know anything.
Benkala had been had been acquitted in the Virginia Paintball cases. He then was snared by what defense call a perjury trap that had been sprung. The 10 years resulted only upon terror enhancement.
Jonathan Turley, a defense lawyer with expertise in national security law, said the government’s aggressive pursuit of Benkahla “shows that the Justice department continues to circumvent jury decisions.”
“They have shown that they’re willing to manipulate the system at any cost” said Turley, who is representing al-Timimi on appeal. “It’s an abuse of the system.”
If supporters of Ali, however, want to avoid such shadow boxing by the government, they should have basic questions answered. They should turn on the lights. For example, what mathematical support work did Ali do for the Navy that required a high security clearance. I believe I asked Attorney Turley and got no response. There likely is a very innocuous answer.
As for those secretly working to acquire a remote controlled plane for LET after it had been designated, they of course should have avoided assisting an entity designated as terrorist unless they were willing to have the law enforced.
As for the precise case at bar, any lawyer advising him in 2004 should have advised him to tell the truth or plead the fifth. There should be no free passes for perjury as it undermines the judicial system.
Va. man gets 10 years in precedent-setting terror case
By MATTHEW BARAKAT | Associated Press Writer
July 24, 2007
http://www.dailypress.com/news/local/virginia/dp-dc—terror-paintball0724jul24,0,977566.story
Given Ali’s proximity, for example, to the Alibekov formula for weaponizing anthrax — 20 feet perhaps? GMU won’t say — this purchase of an unmanned aerial vehicle perhaps was an additional reason the federal government came down hard on these folks even though it perhaps it was just intended to be used in reconnaissance.
‘Virginia Jihad’ Member Sentenced to 121 Months in Prison
http://www.prnewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT=104&STORY=/www/story/07-24-2007/0004631882&EDATE=
The individuals he was asked about included eight individuals from Dar Al-Arqam in Falls Church, VA who either obtained jihad training from Lashkar-e-Taiba or otherwise associated with the group in Pakistan, another from Dar Al-Arqam who joined Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia in 2003, two specially designated global terrorists, and an individual suspected of being an aide to Abu Musab al Zarqawi and affiliated with Al-Qaeda of Iraq.
Two of the individuals attended jihad training camps run by Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan in 2000. One was in a training camp on 9/11. Four others left for training after 9/11 allegedly on the urging of GMU’s Ali Timimi.
Mr. Benkahla was studying at the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia rather than playing paintball in Northern Virginia.
“Lashkar-e-Taiba was designated a terrorist organization by the United States in December 2001. After that time, Ali Asad Chandia, Masaud Khan,
and Seifullah Chapman assisted Lashkar-e-Taiba official Muhammad Ajmal Khan in his attempts to acquire for the organization materials including
software to control an unmanned aerial vehicle, Kevlar, and night vision goggles.”
In Benkahla’s trial this year, it was revealed for the first time that, in 2004, Masoud Khan told the FBI that Lashkar-e-Taiba had previously solicited him to case a chemical plant in Maryland.
Did LET ask Ali to case or infiltrate GMU’s Center for Biodefense?
Was the bacteriologist Abdul Qadoos Khan, in whose home KSM was captured, associated with LET? He was a leader of JI.
Anthrax spraydrying documents were found on the laptop seized in that home. KSM denies that it was his computer — he says it the computer Mustafa Hawsawi, who was arrested the same day. Before departing for the UAE in early 2001, Al-Hawsawi had worked in the Al Qaeda media center (Al Sahab (Clouds) in Kandahar . (The JLo Letter delivering the anthrax to AMI in Florida had little pink and blue clouds on it).
Earlier this week the Washington Post reported that Marri was in telephone contact with him and received money from this guy, Al-Hawsawi, the guy KSM ties to the anthrax spraydrying documents.
The WP suggests some sort of link between (Timimi’s charity) IANA and Marri.
Al-Hawsawi was a facilitator for the 9/11 attacks and its paymaster, working from the United Arab Emirates, sending thousands to Bin Al-Shibh in the summer of 2001. After 9/11, he returned to Afghanistan where he met separately with Bin Laden, Zawahiri and spokesman Abu Ghaith. KSM worked closely with al-Hawsawi and it would make perfect sense that the computer with the anthrax spraydrying documents is actually al-Hawsawi’s. The fact that the anthrax spraydrying documents were on that computer, however, and that he had worked under KSM and Ayman in Kandahar in 2000, serves to suggest that the undated documents pre-dated 9/11, particularly given that extremely virulent anthrax was later found in Kandahar. At the same time, it suggests that Al-Hawsawi has personal knowledge relevant to anthrax.
In another related case, Warsame in Minnesota has been held 3 1/2 years pretrial without a trial. Prosecutors say that the case is complex — international conspiracies involving matters of national security are just that way, they say.
Suspected Terrorist Asks To Be Released (MN)
WCCO.com ^ | 7/24/07 | Darcy Pohland
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1871071/posts
All we can do, given our busy lives and overburdened brains, is to try to keep it simple — and have a couple easy questions relating to GMU answered. What mathematical support work did Ali Al-Timimi do while at SRA International that required a high security clearance.
And was he really only 20 feet away from the Alibekov formula as I’ve suggested?
Putting the biosecurity issues at GMU in context, at Lawrence Livermore, the man meeting with representatives of the OBL-associated terror group in the Philipines was a HVAC maintenance worker with the highest of three clearance levels (badge and keypass). He wasn’t Salafist. He wasn’t even muslim — his brother was the pious fellow, a former roommate of Bin Laden. He had computer savvy and unexplained bank account deposits. Lawrence Livermore had started a program in summer of 1998 to combat OBL anthrax threat after the CIA seized the EIJ military commander’s computer (Mabruk) that Spring. Mabruk and al-Nashar confirmed Ayman’s determination to weaponize anthrax for use against US targets.
As another example, pious Aafia Siddiqui walked past unsecured Vollum at Brandeis every day in the Volen Complex. She later married KSM’s successor.
Bottom-line: the issues facing GMU are no different than facing many institutions.
http://www.bracscientific.com/4.html
Analysis of Anthrax Bioterrorism in the United States Based on Open Source Information
Summary and Conclusions
The anthrax letter attacks against the United States were a tactical innovation in the use of biological warfare agents. While causing billions of dollars of damage, it nevertheless was not a mass casualty attack since only 5 people were killed and 17 sickened while over 30,000 were placed on prophylactic antibiotics.
These attacks were the first intentional use of highly refined Bacillus anthracis spores that were a dry powder and highly aerogenic. Despite conflicting evidence presented in open sources, the anthrax spores sent to Senators Daschle and Leahy were a highly developed product. Because their surface properties where modified in several different ways, it gave them the ability to become easily airborne without traditional dissemination devices. It is highly likely that the spore surface modification components were the products of a national level BW program with a significant history of research and development.
The common assertion that the attacks were a warning from a U.S. domestic source about the potential dangers of bioterrorism is rejected as not plausible. The most likely explanation of the intentions of the attackers was both a warning and demonstration of their capability. The nature of the warning message in the anthrax envelopes is consistent with Sunni Islamic extremist groups’ interpretation of the Salafist religious principles, which require a warning with such an attack when it is not a ‘martyrdom operation’. Given the record of Al Qaida’s numerous declarations and public pronouncements, it is possible that this message was directed not only to the United States but to its Islamic followers in other countries as a show of strength.
Canada has had serious threats related to anthrax but it is unclear if there are any connections to the U.S. anthrax attacks. Fortunately, letters in Canada did not have the critical bacterial component. With respect to Canadian security, some key information about the spore preparations was released which may have a direct bearing on proliferation concerns related to anthrax weapons.
Introduction and Questions
While there are many descriptions of the main details of the anthrax attacks, several important questions remain unanswered. Given the sensitive nature of the circumstances and implications, it is likely that certain significant pieces of information will not be revealed. This report is an analysis of information available from open sources in order to attempt to answer the following questions:
What were the intentions of the anthrax attacker(s)?
Does the answer to question (1) give indications to the identity of the attackers or does it rule any potential groups out?
Does the nature of the spore preparation give any information about the source of the spores?
Can comparison of the U.S. anthrax attacks to any other anthrax incidents help assess the nature of these attacks?
What are the connections and impact on Canadian security?
Intentions
Statements to the public by the FBI indicate that the current working theory is that a domestic perpetrator was responsible for the attacks. Some commentators have made a case that the anthrax attacks were the work of a current or former scientist or contractor with ties to the U.S. Biodefense community. The intention of this person was to demonstrate the potential dangers of a bioterror attack to the U.S. Government and thereby increase defense expenditures or give increased emphasis to bioterror or WMD preparation. On the surface this may seem plausible but on closer examination it falls short.
Persons familiar with U.S. bioterror preparations would know that since 1994, U.S. government officials at the highest levels have been gravely concerned about countries such Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Syria that have developed or were in the process of developing WMD. As well these countries were known sponsors of terrorist groups. Within that problem, there was special concern about biological agents and their potential use for covert attacks. Examination of open source documents clearly demonstrates this trend right until the discovery of the first anthrax case in Florida, in October 2001.
The possibility of covert attacks with WMD weapons that caused mass casualties was the nightmare scenario that responsible officials had dreaded and drove many of their actions. In 1996 President Clinton signed a Presidential Directive directing a significant effort to counter these types of scenarios. The U.S. Department of Defense had made counterproliferation a top priority since 1994. Their objective was to deny, disrupt, delay and destroy WMD capabilities and their delivery systems of hostile countries or subnational groups.
Given the repeated declarations and rising concern related to WMD attacks, it is highly unlikely that a domestic anthrax attacker was trying to draw attention to the potential problem of bioterrorism.
Another argument that has been made that supports a domestic origin for the anthrax attacks concerns the strain of anthrax used in the attack. For example, Marilyn Thompson in her book on the anthrax attacks claims that the Ames strain has a ‘U.S. military’ origin and therefore supports a domestic origin for the attacks. However, it is known that this particular strain while used by the U.S. military for defensive testing has been widely exchanged. The Former Soviet Union’s biological weapons program had over 2000 strains of anthrax. For bacteria and virus strains in general, there was a free market especially before 1996. Until that time, there were over 60 international culture collections, which offered various strains of anthrax and other microorganisms for a nominal fee or exchange. After 1996, new restrictions in the U.S. limited these activities on select pathogens.
After nearly three years of investigation, there has been no reported evidence other than the envelopes, the threatening letters and bacterial contents of the letters. The official FBI investigation Amerithrax has been reported to be the largest investigation in FBI history. Clearly, an investigation of this sensitivity may preclude release of information that may adversely affect it. If it was a domestic criminal act, the chances are that the FBI would have made more progress in the case than it appears to have to date. Therefore, it appears it is unlikely to be a domestic crime.
Much of the debate in the open literature concerning the messages in the anthrax letters is based on the assumption that the letters cannot be taken at face value. The central argument is that violent Sunni Islamic extremist groups would never warn that anthrax spores were in the envelope. These arguments are a crucial misreading of Sunni Islamic extremist groups’ motives and methods. A fundamental part of their campaign is the numerous attempts to legitimize themselves as the true Islamic holy warriors and take on the mantle of a transnational Pan-Islamic movement. In 1998 Osama Bin Laden declared war on the United States and allies within a fatwa. The Sunni Islamic extremist groups put much effort in trying to justify their struggle in terms of their interpretation of Islamic principles. Again while many focus on the Wahabi influence on Al-Qaida, there are strong overtones of the Salafist tradition. Giving a warning may be consistent with this tradition. It should be remembered that the Sunni Islamic extremist groups have many ‘constituencies’ within many countries. It may have been a show of strength or a test to see the reaction of these supporters when they used biological agents.
In public testimony in 2002, the Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet stated that by 1998, Al Qaida had publicly declared its intentions to use CBRN weapons against the U.S. and its allies and that it was a ‘religious duty’ to acquire such weapons.
Therefore, the simplest explanation of the intentions, taking the letters included with the anthrax at face value, is also the most likely.
Nature of the Spore Preparations
Could the actions of the anthrax attackers be an example of tactical innovation in the use of high-grade anthrax spores? While causing billions of dollars of damage, it nevertheless was not a mass casualty attack since only 5 people were killed and 17 sickened while over 30,000 were placed on prophylactic antibiotics. The Laboratory Response Network in charge of bacterial testing performed over 150,000 tests for anthrax. It is reported that its personnel and technical capacity was stretched during those critical months in 2001. The widespread contamination of buildings clearly indicated that something was very special about the spores contained in some of those envelopes.
It was reported that Dr. Elisa Harris a former National Security Council official under President Clinton, said that she ‘hoped that it was a U.S. scientist that mailed the anthrax since the alternative that foreign countries or groups could produce this grade of anthrax was even more troubling’. While it may be difficult to disagree with her reasoning, this highlights a critical point. The composition of the spores sent to Senators Daschle and Leahy had very special properties. It is the nature of these properties that has an important bearing on the subsequent analysis.
Dr. Alan Zelicoff of the Sandia National Laboratory was quoted as saying with respect to anthrax preparations which are dry, consist mainly of a single spore, and are surface charge modified to make them highly aerogenic, as the ‘keys of the kingdom’. To clarify the significance, this refers to anthrax spore formulations with the following characteristics:
1) A concentration in the range of a trillion spores per gram;
2) high spore viability (greater than 90%);
3) monodisperse size distribution (greater than 80% in the size range of 1 to 5 micrometers); and,
4) chemical modification of spore surface and surface charge modified to enhance their air suspension time.
The implied danger of this kind of capability is that it would be an ideal anthrax weapon. The Dascle/Leahy anthrax had some of the characteristics of advanced treatments that suggest weaponization.
In the statements of people who developed biological weapons (most notably Ken Alibek and William Patrick) it was noted that it was not common to have an electrostatic charge on the spores from the former U.S. and Soviet Union’s biological weapons programs. Furthermore, they stated that charges on the spores caused clumping and inefficient delivery. In fact, it may be a misconception that the presence of an electrostatic charge causes clumping. The main cause of clumping is short range molecular forces (called van der Waals forces) that only operate over tens of angstroms (one nanometers equals 10 angstroms). These are very small distances relative to spore size (roughly 10,000 angstroms or 1 micrometer). There is evidence that the attractive forces can be blocked effectively by adding a uniform coating of silica microspheres or nanoparticles. This results in a very different kind of anthrax spore, especially if an electrostatic charge is added by a second chemical modification. The spores now have two modifications - the net-like-charge causes the spores to mutually repel one another forming a spontaneous aerosol. As a secondary effect the charged particles adhere to lung alveoli more efficiently leading to increased infection. While there are disputes about whether the spores were modified as described above, it is clear from their dispersion patterns and characteristics that they were highly aerogenic.
The advanced additives and processes used to potentially weaponize the anthrax provide a several potential clues for scientific forensic evidence. Conceivably, it could be used to trace the spores to a specific laboratory that manufactured them. This assumes that there is access to the laboratory in question for comparison. The silica itself contains signature elemental impurities and morphological uniqueness that can allow identification of the manufacturer.
There is strong evidence that the surface properties may be a critical feature of the spore preparation. The surface charges of the spores were modified in a sophisticated way to both increases their tendency to get airborne and stay airborne. Spores that have the tendency to float in air rather than settle out will act like a gas which would greatly increase their ability to be inhaled by people and thus infect them.
Given the sophisticated nature of the surface spore modification and its apparent difference from past U.S. and Soviet Union anthrax weapons, the evidence points to biological weapons programs in other countries.
Comparison to other Anthrax Incidents
There are two important events that need to be considered. The first is the Sverdlovsk anthrax epidemic of 1979. The second was the attempts by the Japanese Aum Shinryko to disperse anthrax from the roof of their headquarters. There have been extensive reviews of both events, however my purpose is to compare salient facts in order to shed light on the anthrax bioterror attacks.
It was reported that about 100 people died from inhalation anthrax in April to May 1979 in Sverdlovsk in the former Soviet Union after a release of anthrax from a ‘highly secured military facility’. Of course the Soviet officials denied the aerosol release and maintained that contaminated black market meat was to blame. It was only in 1992 after the breakup of Soviet Union, that Boris Yeltsin stated that it was an accidental release from a military facility.
After the sarin gas attacks, it was revealed that the Japanese cult Aum Shinryko tried several times to aerosolize liquid preparations of B. anthracis. They used an aerosol generator on the top of building. No injuries were reported from the spraying but people nearby complained of unusual odors coming from the cult headquarters.
Dr. Paul Keim of Northern Arizona University used DNA technology to show that the strain of anthrax bacteria used by Japanese cultists in the attempted biological attacks in 1993 was the non-virulent Sterne strain. This strain was obtained from a U.S. agricultural company, which sells it as a vaccine. As well, Dr. Keim showed that people who contracted anthrax in April 1979 in Sverdlovsk were infected with up to four different strains of B. anthracis bacteria. This does not occur naturally and corroborates the statement made by Boris Yeltsin that the anthrax outbreak was the result of an aerosol release from a government facility.
While the use of dry preparations of anthrax to contaminate large areas and kill people is a rare event, does the above information make it more likely that the anthrax used in the U.S. attacks was from a national biological weapons program? While it is more likely that the anthrax was from a national BW program, it gives no indication of which country could be the source. The FBI gave a 2-year window for the age of the anthrax spores used in 2001 based on carbon dating. During this time Iraq, Iran, North Korea and Syria had biological weapons programs as well as other countries.
Information on Al Qaida Biological programs
Information from the interrogation of senior Al Qaida members has been reported that has a bearing on the anthrax attacks and future biological programs. In late 2003, renewed concern about anthrax resulted from the questioning of senior al Qaida agents in U.S. custody. It was reported that after his arrest in March, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, one of Al Qaida’s top operatives, confirmed to U.S. officials that Al Qaida, and particularly its second in command, Ayman al- Zawahiri, an Egyptian physician, is attempting to or has acquired biological agents, particularly anthrax. There have been numerous confirmed reports that Al Qaida agents have inquired about renting crop-dusters. It was feared that their objective was to spread chemical or biological agents, especially anthrax.
Mohammed also revealed that until the U.S. attacks on Afganistan, Al Qaida’s anthrax program was based in Kandahar, Afghanistan, and was led by two men: Riduan Isamuddin, known as Hambali, and Yazid Sufaat, a Malaysian member of Jemaah Islamiyah, an Al Qaida-affiliated group. Sufaat, who received a degree in biological sciences in 1987 from California State University at Sacramento, was a technician in the Malaysian military. Sufaat tried to acquire anthrax, but according to Hambali and Mohammed, Sufaat was not able to procure the Ames strain used in attacks. Other unconfirmed reports suggest that Sufaat was involved in obtaining anthrax samples from North Korea through the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for Al Qaida. Sufaat was arrested in 2001 as he tried to re-enter Malaysia. He has reportedly confirmed numerous details about Al Qaida’s effort to develop anthrax and other biological agents. Hambali, who like Sufaat fled to neighboring Pakistan after the United States invaded Afghanistan has revealed some details about Al Qaida’s biological programs. He was arrested in Thailand and has been cooperating with U.S. officials. It was reported that Hambali had been trying to open a new biological weapons program for Al Qaida in the Far East when he was arrested.
Does any of this information preclude previous conclusions in this review? For example, if Hambali or Sufaat claim they did not possess the Ames strain but possibly had other strains of anthrax, this would suggest that their programs were not involved in the anthrax bioterror attacks. This supports information, which indicates that the capabilities of Sunni Islamic extremist groups lag their intentions with respect to anthrax bioterrorism.
In Bob Woodward’s book “Bush at War” George Tenet Director of Central Intelligence is quoted as saying, “I think its AQ” meaning Al Qaida. “I think there’s a state sponsor involved. It’s too well thought out, the powder’s too well refined. It might be Iraq, it might be Russia, it might be a renegade scientist,” perhaps from Iraq or Russia.
While there has been much speculation about transfer of biological materials from countries that sponsor terror to terrorist groups, it is a difficult subject in terms of assessment. Clearly some matters cannot be resolved with open source information. It has pointed out that changes in the strategic environment may have led to less state-sponsored terrorism, but it has also made it better hidden when it does occur, because of the higher potential costs.
Relevance to Canadian Security
While Canada has had several anthrax threats, the most serious was a threatening letter sent to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration on January 30, 2001. While the text of the message has not been revealed for security reasons, there are reports, of unknown reliability, that the letter was connected to Sunni Islamic extremist groups. Thus, Canada is not immune to these types of coercive threats whatever their source. The Canadian Government has taken actions to address these problems. This has included studies by DRDC Suffield to examine the spread of bacterial spores in closed environments with anthrax stimulants and potential countermeasures.
The Canadian Government has made efforts to counter proliferation of biological weapons a top priority. Information in the open literature concerning the anthrax attacks has revealed new levels of details related to the potential weaponization of anthrax spores. While many of the details are not explicit, certain key points, most notably information about the surface charge of anthrax spores, may provide clues to the weaponization process. In all likelihood, a sophisticated research and development program would still be needed to verify that the modified spores would work as intended.
Hmm. Yet another organization misled by bulls**t printed in the media. Ho hum. This is old, old, old, old, old, old, old, old, old, old, old, old, old, old, old, old, old, old, old, old, old, old, old, old stuff.
I wonder when that article was written. There doesn't seem to be any date associated with it. I wonder if they realize they still have it on-line.
You undoubtedly posted it as some kind of "proof" of your beliefs. The number of people who believe in something has nothing to do with whether it's true or not. At one time, everyone on earth thought the earth was flat. That didn't make it flat. No matter how high you pile crap, it's still crap.
Okay. The answer to that question is in the article:
After nearly three years of investigation, there has been no reported evidence other than the envelopes, the threatening letters and bacterial contents of the letters. The official FBI investigation Amerithrax has been reported to be the largest investigation in FBI history. Clearly, an investigation of this sensitivity may preclude release of information that may adversely affect it. If it was a domestic criminal act, the chances are that the FBI would have made more progress in the case than it appears to have to date. Therefore, it appears it is unlikely to be a domestic crime.
So, it's about three years old. The last two sentences in the quotation above seem to illustrate the author's prejudiced reasoning.
But why did Meselson tell C&E News that AFIP did not publish a spectrum of silica when they DID publish a spectrum of silica?
After thinking about it a bit, I wondered how many people actually worked for "Brac Scientific Consulting." So, I checked.
As I suspected, it's just one guy: Timothy Victor Brac.
Or more correctly: It's just one guy with an opinion ... and a web site where he can voice his opinion without concern for facts.
And the FACTS are that AFIP published a spectrum of silica.
And the FACTS are that Meselson was wrong about Sverdlovsk, Yellow Rain and Operation Tailwind.
The lucid Brac piece states:
“While Canada has had several anthrax threats, the most serious was a threatening letter sent to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration on January 30, 2001. While the text of the message has not been revealed for security reasons, there are reports, of unknown reliability, that the letter was connected to Sunni Islamic extremist groups.”
The biothreat analysis folks at GMU should bear down on this January 30, 2001 as it is key background. The letter related to the detention and announcement of a bail hearing for the former manager of Bin Laden’s farm, Mahmoud Mahjoub. He was an EIJ shura member (i.e., he was a muckety-muck). He was a member of the Vanguards of Conquest, a violent faction that focuses on targeted assassination. I think of it as the EIJ military wing now led by Ayman.
On January 23, 2001, Mr. Justice Nadon issued an order holding that the Court did not have jurisdiction to decide the constitutional and Charter issues raised by detainee and dismissed that part of the motion. A letter was received January 30, 2001 at the Citizenship and Immigration Office threatening to use anthrax. It was sent to Immigration Minister Elinor Caplan who had co-signed the detention certificate. Authorities suspected that the letter was sent by militant islamists in protest over the detention of Mahjoub, who ran Bin Laden’s farm in Sudan. Mahjoub had been sentenced in absentia to 15 years in prison in 1999 by Egyptian authorities for his involvement in Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Now, he was being detained without charges under an order co-signed by Immigration Minister Caplan and threatened with deportation. The postmark has never been publicly identified. Separately, hoax letters were also sent to American businesses and a Walmart in Saanich, British Columbia.
Suspecting him of being a shura member of the Vanguards of Conquest and Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Canadian intelligence officials alleged Mahjoub had significant contacts with persons associated with international Islamic terrorism including Osama Bin Laden, Ahmad Khadr, Essam Marzouk, Vanguards founder Ahmed Agiza, and Osama Bin Laden’s principal procurement agent for weapons of mass destruction Mubarak Al Duri. Al Duri, while living in Tucson, Arizona was acquainted with Wadi al Hage who is in U.S. custody for the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Africa. Al Duri also resided in British Columbia and may have been associated with Marzouk, who trained the 1998 embassy bombers.
When the letter was received in January 2001, the letter was sent by Department of National Defence jet to the Canadian Science Center for Human and Animal Health in Winnipeg for examination. Authorities also sent the filters from the Jean Edmonds building’s ventilation system. Authorities said they were treating it as a possible terrorist act against the department and noted that it “was the first time a government department has been targeted in this way.” The Ottawa alert came after one of the employees working in the Minister’s office opened a plain white envelope at 11:15 a.m. on Tuesday. The employee discovered powder and a piece of paper in the envelope. Police refused to reveal from where it had been mailed. One source said the letter was unsigned and “mostly gibberish.” (Indeed, the Fall 2001 letters might be described as mostly gibberish, and certainly the JLo letter could be.) An internal government memo distributed to staff said “an initial analysis of the envelope revealed some traces of bacteria.”
A Canadian defense research team undertook to assess the risk. The report titled “Risk Assessment of Anthrax Threat Letters” issued September 2001. In contrast to a 1998 study by William Patrick that had been requested by Dr. Hatfill’s employer SAIC, the Canadian study found considerable exposure to those in the room resulted when such a letter was opened. Bacillus globigii spores (in dry powder form) were donated by the US Department of Defense (Dugway Proving Ground, Utah). Stock concentration powder was -1 x 10 11 cfu/gm. The anthrax sent to the Senators had a smaller particle size —tending toward a unfiorm 1 micro, subject to clumping that easily broke apart. Bacillus globigii (BG) spores are routinely used as a simulant for Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) spores. “The letter was prepared by putting BG spores in the center of a sheet of paper, folding it over into thirds, placing the folded sheet into the envelope and sealing using the adhesive present on the envelope. The envelope was then shaken to mimic the handling and tumbling that would occur during its passage through the postal system.” The aerosol, produced by opening the BG spore containing envelope, was not confined to the area of the desk but spread throughout the chamber. Values were almost as high at the opposite end of the chamber, shortly after opening the envelopes. 99% of the particles collected were in the 2.5 to 10 mm size range.
More than 80% of the B anthracis particles collected on stationary monitors were within an alveolar respirable size range of 0.95 to 3.5 µm. Thus, the simulant performed very well. Those who continue to argue that the Daschle product was so advanced beyond what the US could do are mistaken. Indeed, the more notable question is why such a good product was prepared in response to a threat letter sent to an immigration minister. The reason perhaps is that authorities knew that it was Al Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad that had reason to send the letter. Mahjoub was a member of the Vanguards of Conquest. The CIA and CSIS apparently knew that the Vanguards of Conquest would use the good stuff.
Bail was denied by decision on October 5, 2001. Then the “real deal” was sent just as had been promised. Zawahiri never makes a threat he doesn’t intend to try to keep.
The CIA knew EIJ intended to use anthrax and knew Al Qaeda was getting technical assistance from scientists. So the specifications provided by Dugway perhaps involved treated fumed silica and a spraydryer (with a last critical step reserved to be done at Dugway) likely were based on what Al Qaeda might send with a little help from their friends. Iraq had a one-step drying process. Chris-Hansen, the outside contractor, did not use that though they could have.
The Canadian experiments in 2001 — after the anthax threat letter received in connection with the detention of OBL’s farm manager and Zawahiri’s friend — showed that if anthrax spores were finely powdered, a letter could release thousands of lethal doses of the bacteria within minutes of being opened. Furthermore, large amounts of material leaked out of sealed envelopes even before they were opened. By then, more than two dozen federal government employees knew of the Canadian studies, which showed that a real anthrax threat letter was a far more dangerous weapon than anyone had believed. Within days, a dozen more people were informed of the now highly relevant experimental findings. Now one FBI squad was focused on people who may have known of the study — such as Dr. Steve Hatfill. The other squad was focused on rounding up the usual Al Qaeda suspects for interrogation.
After 22 months in solitary confinement with no charges leveled, Mahjoub’s next bail hearing, held on May 10, 2003, was out of an Arnold Schwarzenegger movie. “Some 60 officers, including heavily armed Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) dangling submachine guns, patrolled the courthouse.” There had not been such a raucous motorcade — numerous motorcycles and related vehicles, complete with helicopter hovering overhead — through the Toronto streets, since the last time the local hockey team won the big championship. At the heart of his claim at his hearings was the not entirely unfounded argument that he would be tortured by Egyptian authorities if he were deported there. Bail again was denied by decision of a Federal Court Justice in late July 2003 in In the Matter of Mohamed Zeki Mahjoub v Minister of Citizenship and Immigration,
Mahjoub was found to have falsely denied knowing a Marzouk, an EIJ operative who is currently serving a 15-year jail sentence in Egypt for his involvement in Sunni Islamic terrorism including his training role in connection with the U.S. Embassy bombing in Nairobi, Kenya. Mahjoub was also found to have stayed for 3 weeks with Ahmed Said Khadr, after he first arrived in Canada in 1995. Khadr helped finance the 1995 car bombing of the Egyptian Embassy in Pakistan and was killed in Pakistan.
Brach astutely writes:
“The central argument is that violent Sunni Islamic extremist groups would never warn that anthrax spores were in the envelope. These arguments are a crucial misreading of Sunni Islamic extremist groups’ motives and methods. A fundamental part of their campaign is the numerous attempts to legitimize themselves as the true Islamic holy warriors and take on the mantle of a transnational Pan-Islamic movement. In 1998 Osama Bin Laden declared war on the United States and allies within a fatwa. The Sunni Islamic extremist groups put much effort in trying to justify their struggle in terms of their interpretation of Islamic principles. Again while many focus on the Wahabi influence on Al-Qaida, there are strong overtones of the Salafist tradition. Giving a warning may be consistent with this tradition. It should be remembered that the Sunni Islamic extremist groups have many ‘constituencies’ within many countries. It may have been a show of strength or a test to see the reaction of these supporters when they used biological agents.”
Yes, indeedy. Ayman in 1999 was actively polling folks on this and related issue.
The Koran and hadiths provide extensive guidance on the honorable conduct of warfare. One of the leading non-muslim expert on the subject was Princeton’s Bernard Lewis. Another was GMU’s Ali Al-Timimi. For years, Princeton University Middle Eastern history Professor Emeritus Bernard Lewis’ writing on the clash between islam and the west would be translated by the Muslim brotherhood and handed out as pamphlets outside of mosques. After the 1998 “Crusaders” statement by Bin Laden and Zawahiri, Lewis wrote an article “License to Kill, Usama Bin Ladin’s Declaration of Jihad,” in Foreign Affairs: “Obviously, the West must defend itself by whatever means will be effective. But in devising strategies to fight the terrorists, it would surely be useful to understand the forces that drive them.”
After 9/11, Lewis, a professor emeritus at Princeton University, admonished the Pentagon Defence Policy Board to consider how much worse the devastation could have been on Sept. 11 if the terrorists had used a weapon of mass destruction —such as Iraq was said to possess. In a September 27, 2001, in an Op Ed in the Wall Street Journal, the 87 year-old historian explained the use of biochemical weapons by Al Qaeda: “the laws of jihad categorically preclude wanton and indiscriminate slaughter. The warriors in the holy war are urged not to harm noncombatants, women and children, ‘unless they attack you first.’ Even such questions as missile and chemical warfare are addressed, the first in relation to mangonels and catapults, the other to the use of poison-tipped arrows and poisoning enemy water supplies. Here the jurists differ— some permit, some restrict, some forbid these forms of warfare. A point on which they insist is the need for a clear declaration of war before beginning hostilities, and for proper warning before resuming hostilities after a truce.
As Ali Al Timimi once explained: “Modern warfare did not exist during those times when they wrote those classical books of fiqh.” The old principles therefore must be relied upon to guide the issue in new times.
Spokesman al-Kuwaiti was giving a plain warning in the Fall 2001 letter claimed — not disclosed until 2006 — that the green light had been given for US -bio attack (1) from folks that were US-based, (2) above suspicion, and (3) with access to US government and intelligence information. “The Truth about the New Crusade: A Ruling on the Killing of Women and Children of the Non-Believers,” by Ramzi bin al-Shibh, argues that “the sanctity of women, children, and the elderly is not absolute” and concludes that “in killing Americans who are ordinarily off limits, Muslims should not exceed four million noncombatants, or render more than ten million of them homeless.” Spokesman Abu Ghaith used the same figure in June 2002 in arguing in favor of the moral right to use biological or chemical weapons.
A book commemorating the September 11 “raid” was published by Majallat al-Ansar and consisted of four essays. It addresses the importance that any attack comply with the laws of Sharia.
While purporting not to want to get entangled in a discussion of the legal technicalities, the author then addressed at length why the attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon was justified under the laws of sharia.
Vince Cannistraro, a former chief of CIA counter-terrorist operations, discussed the requirement of warning under the laws of jihad on NPR in connection with the Al Qaeda audiotape by Bin Laden that aired shortly before the November 2004 election. In the case of anthrax, Ayman Zawahiri likely considers that the warning required under the laws of jihad has been given.
Zawahiri is the grandson of and quite proud of the well-known “Pious Ambassador,” who was President of Cairo University. Dr. Zawahiri is reserving himself a spot in a bad place by reason of his botched analysis of the hadiths and teachings of Mohammed governing warfare (no women, children, noncombatants etc.) The same principles prohibit attacking livestock, crops or wells. Judging by the interpretive texts, it would seem that Al Qaeda and the anthrax mailer has violated the Quran and hadiths by killing noncombatant women and children, and even the aged. It cannot be persuasively argued that those noncombatant women and children and the aged attacked the jihadists first. An infant visiting ABC was infected by the anthrax. Before the military tribunal, KSM says the koran forbids killing children. He noted that warfare is guided by the koran and hadiths. Thus, the harshest judgment may await true believers in another world.
The head of Egyptian Islamic Group, who approved of Sadat’s assassination and was released after a quarter-century in prison, said of 9/11:
“The killing of businessmen is forbidden by Islamic law and the World Trade Center was all businessmen. The killing of women and children and old people is forbidden by Islamic law and many of those were killed in the building. The killing of Muslims is prohibited by Islamic law and there were more than 600 Muslim men and women in the Trade Center among those killed.
These are innocent and intelligent spirits and Bin Laden and those with him will have to account for them...and God knows.”
Ed writes:
“I wonder when that article was written.”
Let’s update Brach’s discussion a bit with respect to the material he covered.
First, as to Tenet. Tenet this year wrote:
”Al-Qa’ida spared no effort in its attempt to obtain biological weapons. In 1999, al-Zawahiri had recruited another scientist, Pakistani national Rauf Ahmad, to set up a small lab in Khandahar, Afghanistan, to house the biological weapons effort. In December 2001, a sharp WMD analyst at CIA found the initial lead on which we would pull and, ultimately, unravel the al-Qa’ida anthrax networks. We were able to identify Rauf Ahmad from letters he had written to Ayman al-Zawahiri. Later, we uncovered Sufaat’s central role in the program. We located Rauf Ahmad’s lab in Afghanistan. We identified the building in Khandahar where Sufaat claimed he isolated anthrax. We mounted operations that resulted in the arrests and detentions of anthrax operatives in several countries.”
”The most startling revelation from this intelligence success story was that the anthrax program had been developed in parallel to 9/11 planning. As best as we could determine, al-Zawahiri’s project had been wrapped up in the summer of 2001, when the al-Qaida deputy, along with Hambali, were briefed over a week by Sufaat on the progress he had made to isolate anthrax. The entire operation had been managed at the top of al-Qai’da with strict compartmentalization. Having completed this phase of his work, Sufaat fled Afghanistan in December 2001 and was captured by authorities trying to sneak back into Malaysia. Rauf Ahmad was detained by Pakistani authorities in December 2001. Our hope was that these and our many other actions had neutralized the anthrax threat, at least temporarily.”
—Former CIA Director George Tenet in his May 2007 book Center of the Storm
Second, as to Hambali.
Hambali was arrested in mid-August 2003 in Thailand. After being shipped to Jordan, where he was harshly interrogated, Hambali eventually began providing information about Al Qaeda’s anthrax production program. He told interrogators old interrogators that the terror network had succeeded in producing what author Ron Suskind describes as an “extremely virulent” strain of anthrax before the September 11 attacks. In the autumn of 2003, Suskind reports, U.S. forces in Afghanistan found a sample of the virulent anthrax at a house in Kandahar. Pulitzer Prize winning author Ron Suskind writes: “One disclosure was particularly alarming: al Qaeda had, in fact produced high-grade anthrax. Hambali, during interrogation, revealed its whereabouts in Afghanistan. The CIA soon descended on a house in Kandahar and discovered a small, extremely potent sample of the biological agent.” He continued: “The anthrax found in Kandahar was extremely virulent. What’s more, it was produced, according to the intelligence, in the months before 9/11. And it could be easily reproduced to create a quantity that could be readily weaponized.”
Based on the additional information being provided in 2003, authorities also captured two mid to low level technicians —an Egyptian and a Sudanese. President Bush has explained that these mid-to low level technicians were part of a Southeastern Asian based cell that was developing an anthrax attack on the United States. Laurel and Hardy were named Barq and Wahdan.
Sufaat wrapped things up in the Summer of 2001, according to Tenet, and briefed Hambali and Zawahiri over the course of a week. That’s the ominous note — along with Tenet’s report that the planning was in parallel with 9/11 planning and that Ramzi bin-AlShibh had a CBRN role.
Third, as to the unconfirmed but credible report of the anthrax packets seized in January of this year.
Amerithrax Agents checked the Kabul area in May 2004 but came up empty, sources said. In November of that year, on additional information, agents spent weeks searching an area in the Kandahar mountains, several hundred miles outside of Kabul, but again found nothing. In January 2007, a Taliban spokesman was captured. An Afghanistan governor says his residence contained anthrax powder packets. According to a report by the Aghan Islamic Press Agency, as monitored by the BBC. the powdered anthrax was intended for mailing to government officials. The former Taliban spokesman quietly told a camera that he was “on a mission” when he was arrested.
Hanif also claimed that Mullah Omar was living in Quetta under the Pakistan ISI’s protection. The Washington Post once focused on the ISI’s failure to cooperate with the microbiologist and food production expert Rauf Ahmad who was helping Ayman — and noted that I had publicly associated him with the documents provided by the Defense Intelligence Agency first. But no paper has yet addressed the ISI role in connection with suppressing information about the prosecution (or lack thereof) of bacteriologist Abdul Qadoos Khan, in whose home KSM was reportedly arrested. Nor has anyone addressed its suppression, in this context, of the whereabouts of Aafia Siddiqui. (It’s my understanding that the ISI has her and the children and that she is under house arrest).
It’s perfectly understandable why the ISI would not want to cooperate — having worked closely with the Taliban for years at the urging of the US. Moreover, the political risks are very real given the unpopularity with the Pakistan public of pursuing respected professionals who are sympathetic to Al Qaeda. But no failure on the part of the ISI to cooperate with the FBI or CIA on the subject of an attack using aerosolized anthrax should be countenanced. Same for Egyptian security.
Brach asks:
“Can comparison of the U.S. anthrax attacks to any other anthrax incidents help assess the nature of these attacks.”
After the anthrax threat in January 2001 described in a post above, the most pertinent learning on the issue of modus operandi concerns the al Hayat letter bombs of 1997, in connection with which the FBI suspects the Vanguards of Conquest (the military wing of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad).
A memo seized in the 1995 arrest proposed flying an explosive laden plane into CIA headquarters. Anyone reading the Washington Post in the mid-1990s read about the plan to fly a plane into CIA headquarters over their morning coffee. The earlier plot to fly an airliner into the Eiffel tower by some Algerians connected to Bin Laden was also notable. It’s important that as a country we learn from our mistakes and not pay short shrift to the evidence on the issue of modus operandi relating to Zawahiri’s planned use of anthrax. Would the militant islamists resort to an attack that merely involved use of mailed letters?
This was not the first time the Egyptian islamists sent letter bombs to newspaper offices in connection with an attack on the World Trade Center. If EIJ is not responsible, someone knowledgeable about their modus operandi was doing a damn good job at framing them.
NPR set the scene. It was January 2, 1997, at 9:15 a.m. at the National Press Building in Washington, D.C. The employee of the Saudi-owned newspaper Al Hayat began to open a letter. It was a Christmas card — the kind that plays a musical tune. It was white envelope, five and a half inches by six and a half inches, with a computer-generated address label attached. It had foreign postage and a post mark — a post mark in Alexandria, Egypt. It looked suspiciously bulky, so he set it down and called the police. Minutes later they found a similar envelope. These were the first two of four letter bombs that would arrive at Al Hayat during the day.” A fifth letter bomb addressed to the paper was intercepted at a nearby post office. They all looked the same. Two similar letter bombs addressed to the “parole officer” (a position that does not exist) arrived at the federal penitentiary at Leavenworth. It seemed evident how some Grinch had spent the holidays in Alexandria, Egypt.
Egyptian Saif Adel (Makawwi), thought to be in Iran, was involved in military planning. Adel was a colonel in the Egyptian Army’s Special Forces before joining Al Qaeda. He helped plan the 1998 attacks on the US embassies in Africa. He was also a planner in the attack on the USS Cole and has served as the liaison officer between Hezbollah and Al Qaeda. Adel assisted Atef, who had overall responsibility for Al Qaeda’s operations. There was part of a long-running disagreement with Saif Adel (Makawwi) and Ayman, however. As Attorney Al-Zayyat has said, Makkawi had many times claimed responsibility for operations that were carried out inside Egypt but when the perpetrators were arrested, it would be al-Zawahiri’s name whose name they shout loyalty to from the docks. Some would even say they did not know a person named Makkawi. After the letter al-Hayat letter bombs were sent in January 1997, Saif Adel (Makawwi) gave a statement denying responsibility on behalf of the Vanguards of Conquest. He got admonished by the unnamed but official spokesman for the Vanguards organization — chastising him as not being authorized to speak for the organization (or even being a member).
On January 7, 1997 Col Muhammad Makkawi purporting to be speaking for the Egyptian Vanguards of Islamic Conquest denied responsibility for sending the letter bombs. He said: “Those are messages of admonishment. There is no flirtation between us and the Americans in order for us to send them such alarming messages in such a manner.” Makkawi said that “the Vanguards of Conquest “are heavyweight and would not embark on such childish actions.” US press and political commentaries had hinted at the Vanguards of Conquest organization’s involvement in these attempts. In his statement to `Al-Hayat, Makkawi added “I am surprised that we in particular, and not other parties, should be accused of such an operation.”
But then someone else credited with being the Vanguards official spokesman denounced Makkawi’s authority to speak for the group, referring to the January 5th statement it had made denying responsibility. This other claimed spokesman said “We welcome any Muslim who wants to join us, and if Makkawi wants to [join us], he will be welcomed to the Vanguards march, but through the organizational channels. But if words are not coupled with actions, we tell him: Fear God, and you can use a different name other than the Vanguards to speak on its behalf.”
The FBI would not speculate as to who sent the letters or why. But this was your classic “duck that walks like a duck” situation. As NPR reported at the time, “analysts say that letter bombs are rarely sent in batches, and when they are it’s generally prompted by politics, not personal animus.” Al Hayat was a well respected and moderate newspaper. It was friendly to moderate Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt — just as, say NBC and CBS. That, without more, was accurately discerned by observers at the time as sufficient to make the newspaper outlet a target of the militant islamists. The newspaper, its editor explained, does not avoid criticizing militant islamists. The Al Hayat Editor-in-Chief explained: “We’ve been opposed to all extremists in the Arab world, especially the fundamentalists.” Mohammed Salameh, a central defendant in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, was sent to Leavenworth in 1994. The other three Egyptian extremists convicted in the bombing were sent to prisons in California, Indiana and Colorado. Like the blind sheik, Abdel Rahman, Salameh had complained of his conditions and asked to be avenged. The Blind Sheik was particularly irked that the prison officials did not cut his fingernails.
Rahman was convicted in 1995 of seditious conspiracy, bombing conspiracy, soliciting an attack on an U.S. military installation, and soliciting the murder of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. His followers were indicted for plotting to bomb bridges, tunnels and landmarks in New York for which Rahman allegedly had given his blessings. The mailing of deadly letters in connection with an earlier attack on the World Trade Center, was not merely the modus operandi of militant islamists, it was the group’s signature — it’s their calling card. Khaled Abu el-Dahab, a naturalised American, from Silicon Valley in a confession detailed in a state security document from Egypt’s defense ministry dated October 28, 1998, explained that he was trained to make booby-trapped letters to send to important people, as well as asked to enroll in American aviation schools to learn how to fly gliders and helicopters. He was a friend of Ali Mohammed, a former special forces officer in the Egyptian army and former US Army Sergeant.
After the Al Hayat letter bombs to newspapers in DC and NYC and people in symbolic positions, in January 1997, both the Blind Sheikh and his paralegal, Sattar, were quoted in separate articles in Al Hayat (in Arabic) denying that they or their supporters were responsible. The Blind Sheikh commented that al Hayat was fair and balanced in its coverage and his supporters would have no reason to “hit” them. Sattar noted that the bombs were mailed on December 20, one day before the brief in support of the blind sheik on appeal. He questioned whether someone (like the FBI) was trying to undermine the appeal’s prospects. For its part, al Hayat reporters, editor and owner were not expressing an opinion — though the owner did lay out various possibilities (e.g., Iraq, Iran etc.). The owner of the paper had commanded Saudi forces during the Persian Gulf War, when Bin Laden was so upset about American troops on the Arabian peninsula. Moreover, al Hayat had recently opened up a Bureau in Jerusalem, giving it a dateline of Jerusalem rather than al Quds, which some thought blasphemous. But none of the possibilities would plausibly explain why the letter bomb was sent to Leavensworth where three of the WTC 1993 defendants were imprisoned, including Ramzi Yousef’s lieutenant who had asked that his mistreatment be avenged. (That was the criminal genius who returned to Ryder to reclaim his deposit after blowing up the truck at WTC). Egyptian security officials claimed that said that the letters were sent from outside of Egypt, the stamps were not available in Egypt, and that the postmark was not Alexandria as reported. Whatever the place of mailing, the sender likely was someone who was upset that KSM’s and Ramzi Yousef’s associates had been imprisoned, to include, most notably, the blind sheik. Whoever is responsible for the anthrax mailings, it is a very good bet that they are upset the blind sheik is detained. That should be at the center of any classified profile of the crime.
On December 31, 1996 Mohammed Youssef was in Egypt — having gone to Egypt months before. The al Hayat letter bombs related to the detention and alleged mistreatment of the blind sheikh and the WTC bombers were sent 10 days earlier — on the Day of Measures. In 2006, he was named as co-defendant with Hassoun, Daher, Padilla and Jayyousi. Youssef was born in Alexandria. Do authorities suspect the “Florida cell” of being involved in the al Hayat letter bombs? Kifah Jayyousi’s “Islam Report” over the years — distributed by Adham Hassoun in Florida and Kassem Daher in Canada — expressed outrage at detention/extradition due to terrorism law and also what he perceived as attacks on his religion by some newspapers. His headlines on the internet groups blazed “Just In! First Muslim Victim of New Terrorism Law!: US Agents Arrest Paralegal Of Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman Without Charge Prepares To Hand Him To Egyptian Regime,” soc.religion.islam, dated April 27, 1996 and “Islam Report (Newspaper Attacks Our Religion! Act Now!,” soc.religion.islam, Apr. 16, 1996
In connection with the January 1997 letter bombs, Ayman got the know-how to send sophisticated electronic letter bombs from Iraqi intelligence according to one item from the highly controversial Feith memo. In the al Hayat letter bombings, Ayman allowed the finger to be pointed at Libya. In the Amerithrax letters, he allowed the finger to be pointed to a United States biodefense insider. Tenet in his May 2007 book included Saif Adel as among “al-Qa’da’s leadership to the group’s highly compartmentalized chemical, biological, and nuclear networks.”
In September 2006, in a Sahab Media production called “Knowledge is for acting,” there is a clip in which Al Quds editor Atwan refers to his visit with OBL in 1996 (see his 2006 book The Secret History of al Qaeda) and he says that Bin Laden was planning to attack America “and America prisons in particular.” That was an apparent reference to the Al Hayat letter bombs sent to newspapers and prisons in January 1997. There were recurrent references to Abdel-Rahman in the tape.
Turning to Brac’s discussion of the forensics, it was at a break from a briefing before a Congressional subcommittee in December 2001, Dr. Richard Spertzel and Dr. Dr. Ken Alibek discussed access to the Ames strain and the method of weaponization. They might just as well have been demonstrating how to palm a basketball — with Dr. Alibek agreeing with Dr. Spertzel on the likely general method but saying it is easier than Dr. Spertzel may think.
GMU’s Dr. Bailey said the presence of silica is significant, but he declined to say why, citing national security concerns.
“I don’t think I want to give people - terrorists - any information to help them, said Dr. Charles Bailey, a scientist at Advanced Biosystems Inc. and former commander of the Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases.
According to an article in the New England Journal of Medicine, “Scanning electron microscopy of the spores used in the Senate office attack showed that they range from individual particles to aggregates of 100 [microns] or more. Spores were uniform in size and appearance and the aggregates had a propensity to pulverize (i.e., disperse into smaller particles when disturbed).” A scientist from the FBI Laboratory, Dr. Doug Beecher, in a July 2006 issue of “Applied and Environmental Microbiology” reports that:
“a widely circulated misconception is that the spores were produced using additives and sophisticated engineering supposedly akin to military weapon production. The issue is usually the basis for implying that the powders were inordinately dangerous compared to spores alone. The persistent credence given to this impression fosters erroneous preconceptions, which may misguide research and preparedness efforts and generally detract from the magnitude of hazards posed by simple spore preparations.”
Harvard University Matthew Meselson reviewed the language before publication. “The statement should have had a reference,” editor-in-chief of the microbiology journal told a trade periodical. “An unsupported sentence being cited as fact is uncomfortable to me. Any statement in a scientific article should be supported by a reference or by documentation.” Footnoted or not, the two sentences provide the best and authoritative insight on the question of the method of processing since the mailings. The two sentences essentially said what Dr. Alibek had been saying: “’[J]ust because you have a sophisticated product doesn’t mean the technique has to be sophisticated.’ “ Silica in the culture medium would not be a sophisticated “additive” but would serve to concentrate the agent.
Importantly, and related to the FBI’s close study of the medium used to grow the culture, the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology detected silica. The Daily News (New York) reported on October 30, 2001
[USAMRIID Major General John] Parker did disclose that the anthrax in question contained silica, a common substance found in sand and quartz.
“I don’t know what the significance of it is,” Parker said.
Former Russian bioweaponeer Ken Alibek and Harvard biologist Matthew Meselson have opined that there was no special silica coating observable in the Scanning Electron Microscope (”SEM”). images they saw. The presence of any silica, Drs. Meselson and Alibek say, may have come from the environment because of the special tendency of anthrax spore coats to attract silicon. (The lead FBI scientist Dwight Adams relied on the study provided the FBI by Meselson in briefing the Congress in November 2002.) Indeed, the silica may have been in the culture medium and then removed as described by patents filed by researchers at Dr. Alibek’s Center for Biodefense at GMU. Dr. Alibek reports that, like Dr. Patrick, he was also given a polygraph.
In a March 31, 2003 public exchange sponsored by the Washington Post, in response to my written question submitted in advance, Kenneth Alibek, former head of Russia’s biological program, to include its anthrax production program, said: “This anthrax wasn’t sophisticated, didn’t have coatings, had electric charge and many other things.” In other responses, he further explained: “There was no special need to add silica to this anthrax. Presence or absence of silica says nothing about whether it was state sponsored.”
US bioweaponeer William Patrick gave it a 7 out of 10 -— calling it professionally done but not weapons grade. In an interview with CBS, William Patrick explained that he had been given a polygraph in June 2002 about the anthrax letters. He reports that “The FBI that they wanted me to become a part of their inner circle of—of experts, and that in order to become a part of that inner circle of technical experts, that I’d have to pass a polygraph test.” In fact, he has not been quoted since, as he often was in 2001. Thus, this was a good indication of what scientific information the FBI credits or at least that they credit his expertise.
On April 11, 2003, Scott Shane reported that reverse engineering “carried out at the Army’s biodefense center at Dugway Proving Ground in Utah, raises the disquieting possibility that al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups could create lethal bioweapons without scientific or financial help from a state.” Quoting one outside bioterrorism expert. “It shows you can have a fairly sophisticated product with fairly rudimentary methods.” At last report, the reverse engineering reportedly was not able to recreate the identical product.
Lisa Bronson, deputy undersecretary of defense for technology security policy and proliferation, has said that commercially available equipment used to make powdered milk could be used to make powderized anthrax. A spray dryer is used in chemical and food processing to manufacture dried egg, powdered milk, animal feed, cake mixes, citrus juices, coffee, corn syrup, cream, creamers, dried eggs, potatoes, shortening, starch derivatives, tea, tomatoes, yeast, and — last but not least — yogurt. Washington State University also has an informative discussion on the web. Making dried milk is not rocket science and doesn’t require a PhD. But, if experience is any guide, Al Qaeda has PhD’s and even rocket scientists who are sympathetic to its cause (indeed, even the father of Pakistan’s atomic bomb).
Here is a further Q&A from a March 31, 2003 exchange sponsored by the Washington Post, in response to a written question I submitted in advance to Kenneth Alibek, one of the world’s best known bioweaponeers and the former head of Russia’s biological program:
Q: Could someone expert in making dried milk make the product used in the Daschle and Leahy letters?
A: Let tme answer in this way — yes, actually, it would be the same techiquie to make a pwdered anthrax, but at the same we shouldn’t overestimate the complexity of making it. My opinion is this — in order to make the powder there is no need to have sophisticated equipment. Such a small amount, keep in mid that the people who did it could have very simple equipment and very simple procedure.”
Indeed, Katie Crockett, Ken’s assistant, explained that the reason encapsulation may have been done is to avoid the need for sophisticated equipment (whereas silica would not be used in the case of anthrax given
that due to the greater viability resulting from the exosporium, it is not being used to cushion a blast or to absorb moisture. TrebleRebel, see the discussion in the patent relating to VanderWaals forces. You have not yet addressed the second patent for me — the Bailey/ Morozov patent.
A key fact is that of the exosporium, which is a loose-fitting protein envelope surrounding about 7-10 spore coats that overlay the cortex, had traces of silica. The exosporium is the spore’s outermost layer. The silica was not dispersed inside of the B. anthracis spore coats and cortex under the exosporium. Ari Fleischer discusses the silica in the anthrax in his book Taking Heat. He reports that he had argued at length with ABC News over its story that the additive was bentonite (which arguably was characteristic of the Iraq program) — and explains that from the start he had told ABC that it was silica, not bentonite, that had been detected. The suggestion that AFIP experts did not know the difference between silica and silcon is not well founded, and the scientist who performed the EDX specifically told the journalist that oxygen was also detected in ratios consistent with silicon dioxide.
One potential lead that was reported in the press concerned a $100,000 piece of equipment bought by someone from Pakistan paying cash who had it delivered to 215 Main St. in Ft. Lee, NJ, one mile from where pilot Nawaf al-Hazmi lived. Nawaf attended a critical meeting with Yazid Sufaat, the biochemist working on anthrax, in January 2000. The United States alleged in its indictment of Zacarias Moussaoui that on or about April 1, 2001, Nawaf al-Hazmi was in Oklahoma (at the same time Zacarias Moussaoui was in Norman, Oklahoma). The individual from Karachi who had ordered the processor pled guilty to a check kiting scheme that raised the funds used to purchase the processor. The purchaser, Syed Athar Abbas from California and then New Jersey, used the name Arthur Abbas in making the purchase. The front company was Computers Dot Com, a computer peripherals wholesaling firm, owned by Abbas. A Syed Athar Abbas (with records showing a different age and a different social security number) had a computer peripherals wholesaling firm named Mixun Solutions, also based in Karachi. Mixun Solutions went defunct after the New Jersey Syed Athar Abbas was arrested. According to the database PACER, he had initially been denied bail because he turned in two expired passports but failed to turn in the third. The New Jersey Syed Athar Abbas was given back his passport after serving a 15 month sentence.
The Homeland Security Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack, held a hearing in July 2005 on “Engineering Bio-Terror Agents: Lessons from the Offensive U.S. and Russian Biological Weapons Programs.” The hearing evaluated Al Qaeda’s ability to develop and use catastrophic biological weapons — such as weaponized anthrax — as part of the Subcommittee’s broader review of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) bio-threat assessment activities. The hearing also examined the known biological warfare capabilities developed by the U.S. and Russian offensive programs, and the potential of those capabilities being utilized in future terrorist attacks. Witnesses at the hearing included: Dr. Kenneth Alibek, Executive Director, Center for Biodefense, George Mason University; Dr. Roger Brent, Director and President, Molecular Sciences Institute; and Dr. Michael V. Callahan, Director, Biodefense & Mass Casualty Care, CIMIT/Massachusetts General Hospital.
As Dr. Michael V. Callahan, Director, Biodefense & Mass Casualty Care, CIMIT/Massachusetts General, explained:
“It is also important to note that the people who participated in that exercise used all open source information, they used the U.S. Patent Office and they used out of print microbiology testbooks. It is a scary, incredible thing, and it is not just theoretical, it has already been capitalized both
in laboratory modeling and in actual experience. I refer you back to the intelligence community’s information on the American anthrax attack in 2001, which we won’t discuss here.”
Kathryn Crockett, Ken Alibek’s assistant, wonderfully summarized these issues in her 2006 thesis, “A historical analysis of Bacillus anthracis as a biological weapon and its application to the development of nonproliferation and defense strategies.” She expresses her special thanks to Dr. Ken Alibek and Dr. Bill Patrick. Dr. Patrick consulted with the FBI and so the FBI credits his expertise. Dr. Alibek’s access to know-how is beyond reasonable dispute. Dr. Crockett successfully defended the thesis before an esteemed panel that included USAMRIID head and Ames strain researcher Charles Bailey. She says that scientists who analyzed the powder through viewing micrographs or actual contact are divided over the quality of the powder. She cites Gary Matsumoto’s “Science” article in summarizing the debate. She says the FBI has vaccillated on silica.
“Regarding the specific issue of weaponization, according to several scientists at USAMRIID who examined the material, the powder created a significant cloud when agitated meaning that the adhesion of the particles had been reduced. Reducing the adhesion of the particles meant that the powder would fly better.” She explains that “The most common way to reduce electrostatic charge is to add a substance to the mixture, usually a silica based substance.”
On the issue of encapsulation, she reports that “many experts who examined the powder stated the spores were encapsulated. Encapsulation involves coating bacteria with a polymer which is usually done to protect fragile bacteria from harsh conditions such as extreme heat and pressure that occurs at the time of detonation (if in a bomb), as well as from moisture and ultraviolet light. The process was not originally developed for biological weapons purposes but rather to improve the delivery of various drugs to target organs or systems before they were destroyed by enzymes in the circulatory system” (citing Alibek and Crockett, 2005). “The US and Soviet Union, however, “ she explains, “used this technique in their biological weapons programs for pathogens that were not stable in aerosol form... Since spores have hardy shells that provide the same protection as encapsulation would, there is no need to cover them with a polymer. “ She explains that one “possible explanation is that the spore was in fact encapsulated but not for protective purpose. Encapsulation also reduces the need for milling when producing a dry formulation.” By reducing the need for milling, she means permits greater concentration of the biological agent. If the perpetrator was knowledgeable of the use of encapsulation for this purpose, then he or she may have employed it because sophisticated equipment was not at his disposal.”
My consulting military scientist who has made anthrax simulants described the patents as relating to an encapsulation technique which serves to increase the viability of a wide range of pathogens. In other words, his reaction was “wow”! To use technical jargon, his reaction was “ Ohmigosh!”
In “connecting the dots” one would want to consider whether any supporter of the militants had access to the know-how of this encapsulation technique. I’ve posed the question whether Ali Al-Timimi (another GMU grad student at the department), had access to such know-how. The work of a team of GMU students who have red teamed the question suggests that access to know how at such an institution is a very real possibility. The efforts corroborate a PhD presently being finalized. A supporter of the Taliban who was working with Bin Laden’s spiritual mentor, Al-Timimi was a Salafist imam sentenced to life plus 70 years for sedition and exhorting some young men to go abroad and defend their faith. We might also consider whether any supporter of the militants has expertise in such polymerization or encapsulation relating to drug delivery, such as biochemist Magdy al-Nashar. He studied in North Carolina in 2000. His lawyer allegedly is a key conduit between Ayman Zawahiri, head of Al Qaeda’s anthrax weaponization program, and jihadis in Egypt. The lawyer, according to Egyptian security officials, was head of the so-called “Egyptian Project.”
Ali Al-Timimi was a graduate microbiology student at George Mason University, where famed Russian bioweaponeer and former USAMRIID head Charles Bailey on March 14, 2001 filed a patent involving the use of hydrophobic silica in permitting greater concentration of biological agents. I have uploaded at http://www.anthraxandalqaeda.com a Floor Plan for the First Floor of Discovery Hall at George Mason University. The First Floor that intermingled the Center for Biodefense/Hadron and the GMU/ATCC computational sciences people.
Proliferation of know-how serves to proliferate opportunities for access to that know-how. The documentary evidence establishes that Ayman Zawahiri was determined to use weaponized anthrax against targets in the US in retaliation for the rendering of senior EIJ leaders to places like Cairo.
The FBI scientists have been able to distinguish between water isotopes ratios in the anthrax. Brian Williams reports that investigators have told NBC that the water used to make the spores came from the Northeastern United States. researchers have been able to establish that anthrax grown in water in the Northeastern United States is distinguishable from anthrax grown in water from the Southeast and Pacific Northwest. In one published anthrax study, researchers grew Bacillus subtilis, a harmless bacteria that resembles Bacillus anthracis, using local water from five different U.S. cities. The scientists were able to distinguish those grown in various cities. The method can be used to narrow the number of possible origins of the water based on the number of oxygen and hydrogen isotopes. Similarly, a press release announced in September 2003 that University of Maryland researchers have developed a technique to help the FBI track the origins of deadly anthrax spores by identifying the medium used to grow it. The FBI asked Maryland professor Catherine Fenselau to turn her mass spectrometry lab to the forensic task of sleuthing how bacillus spores, such as anthrax, are prepared.
Interviewer Kestenbaum said: “Ehleringer is now creating a map showing how the isotope ratios of water vary anthrax was grown, it may rule some places out.” As defined by the Census Bureau, the Northeast region of the United States covers nine states: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. A scientist explained the research in an NPR interview in 2004.
I infer from the NBC report that from the isotope ratios, authorities believe either that the anthrax was grown in one of the yellow (or perhaps light green) areas, but not one of the dark green, blue or red areas. (What about NYC? — perhaps someone who knows how to insert pictures could upload the ratio isotope map) The yellow swath includes much of the Northeastern United States — places like Syracuse, NY but also places like Ann Arbor and Minneapolis. If that is the isotope ratio range, Islamabad and Baghdad can be excluded. Pretty much all foreign locations apparently can be excluded, along with places with comparable oxygen isotope ratios such as Central New Jersey, Maryland and Ohio. Locales with such excludable ratios include Pakistan (Lahore), Iraq (Baghdad), and Singapore. In Canada, pretty much only the adjacent parts of Canada above Northeastern US (e.g., parts of Ontario and Quebec) match the yellow swath that the scientists found distinguishing. The authors of one of the key articles noted that they couldn’t distinguish between North Carolina and Ohio — the dark green. Similarly, they can’t distinguish between Central New Jersey and North Carolina (again, the dark green). The key studies in the peer reviewed literature indicate that they were funded by the Central Intelligence Agency.
Ehleringer and his colleagues published a March 2007 article titled “Stable isotope ratios of tap water in the contiguous United States” in “Water Resources Research, Vol. 43 (pdf available upon request). The study was funded by the “federal government.” The raw data survey results have been embargoed by the federal government.” ( I believe the agency would usually be identified). In other water isotope ratio studies the funding agency was identified as the Central Intelligence Agency or whatever agency it was. (It varied). Perhaps this March 2007 study was funded by the Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation and was done specifically for the purpose of laying the scientific groundwork of a prosecution in Amerithrax. While Helen W. Kreuzer-Martin, the Maryland scientist in a study published in April 2007 titled “Stable Isotope Ratios and the Forensic Analysis of Microorganisms,” was looking at the nutrients in the culture, the Utah scientist in this study is looking at the tap water. The DOJ/FBI likely hopes to put all the data together with the more familiar reasons to suspect someone (means, motive, modus operandi and opportunity), and put on a case that to a moral certainty proves it was committed by the perp(s) — where otherwise, absent the scientific evidence, there is a lack of a “smoking gun.” Here, based on this new science, there apparently is thought to be a smoking petri dish
The March 2007 isotope ratio study explains: “Here we present results from the first national-scale spatiotemporal survey of stable isotopes in tap water. The new data show that tap water samples exhibit high levels of spatially coherent isotope ratio variation that can be related to commonality in patterns of water source and postprecipitation history for water resources in different parts of the country. A strong relationship exists between tap water isotope ratios and those of annually averaged local precipitation (as estimated by geostatistical modeling), but robust differences between tap water and precipitation isotope ratios also exist in many parts of the United States. These patterns can be related to regional tendencies in water resource selection and water history, including patterns likely related to high-altitude dominated sources, seasonally based recharge, and evaporative loss from natural or artificial surface reservoirs. Our data provide the first evidence that large, spatially distributed isotope sample networks offer the potential to identify and characterize the magnitude and regional relevance of such processes within complex human-hydrological systems. ... We synthesize our data as a set of predictive tap water isotope ratio maps that, when interpreted with respect for the limitations of the underlying data, should benefit future water resources research efforts as well as fields such as ecology and forensic sciences where understanding of large-scale patterns of hydrological isotope ratio variation is increasingly important.”
By looking at the oxygen, hydrogen and deuterium geospatial distribution, you can more precisely identify the geospatial location where the water came from. For example, the deuterium map might be relied upon to eliminate an ambiguity left by the range indicated by the oxygen and hydrogen maps.
I sometimes mistakenly typed his name Brach rather than Brac perhaps because his analysis was like hard candy — perhaps a wonderful old fashioned peppermint stick that can be cherished for a long time — for the mind.
At the time he possibly wrote his analysis (but note it was first scanned by the google spider in April 2007), he was a member of the International Society for Computational Biology, which emphasizes the role of computing and informatics in advancing molecular biology and biology.
His background seems similar to Dr. Ali-Al Timimi who was in bionformatics. Dr. Les Baillie explained the importance of bioinformatics in understanding the medical response to anthrax infection to a gathered crowd that included Ayman Zawahiri’s scientist, Rauf Ahmad, who had infiltrated UK biodefense conferences at Ayman’s request.
Dr. Brac explains: “Since 2000 there has been an explosion of interest in bioinformatics and this is an area I have been closely monitoring. As a result of increasing computing power combined with the systematic incorporation of biological sequence information into publicly available databases, we are in the middle of another revolution in biological information. The publication of human genome has accelerated this interest and the consequences are only beginning to be realized. While there is great promise for research and commercial purposes, there will be a great impact both positive and potentially negative on questions related to biological warfare.”
“On the positive side,” he notes, Dr. Paul Keim of Northern Arizona University used this type of technology to show that the strain of anthrax bacteria used by Japanese cultists in attempted biological attacks in 1993 was the avirulent Sterne strain.”
On the possible negative side, I’d note that Al-Timimi read “Genome Technology” during his trial.
Dr. Brac’s notes his strength in open source intelligence:
“I would like to highlight my strongest knowledge, skills and abilities that bear directly on questions related to biological security. I would rate my strongest capabilities as follows:
1) a high level of knowledge regarding potential biological and toxin warfare agents;
2) a high-level knowledge regarding open source information sources that have a bearing on intelligence assessments;
3) a high level of knowledge as it relates to scientific and technical assessment of new science and technology; and
4) a strong ability to examine critical scientific and technical issues by means of investigation, collection, analysis and producing a finished product.”
After he apparently wrote his analysis, the Defense Intelligence Agency produced documents bearing heavily on his analysis. They show a scientist corresponding with Ayman who is consulting with an expert on tricks relating to weaponization — and taking a long visit at a lab with 1000s of pathogens. Virulent pathogens.
So an underlying issue for years has been: after Rauf Ahmad’s first visit to a lab that contained nonpathogenic anthrax, what lab did he visit for an extended visit that contained 1000s of pathogens. Moreover, what was the result of his export paperwork.
I have scanned copies of some 1999 documents seized in Afghanistan by US forces describing the author’s visit to the special confidential room at the BL-3 facility where 1000s of pathogenic cultures were kept; his consultation with other scientists on some of technical problems associated with weaponizing anthrax; the bioreactor and laminar flows to be used in Al Qaeda’s anthrax lab; and the need for vaccination and containment. He explained that the lab director noted that he would have to take a short training course at the BL-3 lab for handling dangerous pathogens. Rauf Ahmad explained that his employer’s offer of pay during a 12-month post-doc sabbatical was wholly inadequate and was looking to Ayman to make up the difference. After an unacceptably low pay for the first 8 months, there would be no pay for last 4 months and there would be a service break. He had noted that he only had a limited time to avail himself of the post-doc sabbatical.
I also have uploaded a fuller copy of earlier correspondence from before the lab visit described in the typed memo. The Defense Intelligence Agency provided the documents to me, along with 100+ more, pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (”FOIA”). It turns out you just have to ask nice.
Yazid Sufaat got the job handling things at the lab instead of Rauf Ahmad. More importantly, Zawahiri, if keeping with his past experience, would have kept things strictly compartmentalized — leaving the Amerithrax Task Force much to do.
“The most common way to reduce electrostatic charge is to add a substance to the mixture, usually a silica based substance.”
This is not correct. Silica does NOT reduce electrostatic charge. Instead it modifies the surface of the spores, creating artificial asperities. In this form the spores are less attracted to one another (and to solid surfaces) by omnipresent van der Waals forces. Electrostastic charge (net-LIKE-charge) is actually DESIREABLE to make a good aerosol powder. This is pointed out both in the Science article and by Brac.
I would direct your attention to “An automated front-end monitor for anthrax surveillance systems based on the rapid detection of airborne endospores,” Biotechnol Bioeng. 2007 May 18, by Yung PT, Lester ED, Bearman G, Ponce A.
Pun To Yung 1, Elizabeth D. Lester 1, Greg Bearman 2, Adrian Ponce 1 2 *
1California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125
2Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, CA 91109
*Correspondence to Adrian Ponce, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125.
Anthrax attacks were simulated using aerosolized Bacillus atrophaeus spores in fumed silica, and corresponding ... intensities were monitored as a function of time and correlated to the number of airborne endospores collected.
Yes, so what? What doea that have to do with silica and an electrostatic charge?
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