Posted on 02/26/2007 4:18:14 PM PST by DAVEY CROCKETT
http://www.norwalkcitizen-news.com/topstories/ci_5548210
City Teens Charged in Fatal Shooting
By Jeanne Goodman
Article Launched: 03/29/2007 11:42:49 AM EDT
Just hours after the March 22 shooting of 22-year-old Bridgeport resident Edgar Sanchez Jr., police apprehended the two teens believed to be responsible for his murder.
Victor Smalls, 16, of 133 Monterey Place and Jimmie Kave Jr., 17, of Waterbury were arrested at Smalls' apartment early in the morning of March 23.
According to press releases issued by the Detective Bureau, police received a 911 call at 1:53 p.m. March 22 reporting that a man was on the ground on Grove Street suffering from a gunshot wound. Officers responding to the scene found Sanchez, who had been shot once in the abdomen. Sanchez was transported by ambulance to Norwalk Hospital, where he was pronounced dead at 2:35 p.m. An autopsy was performed by the chief medical examiner's office March 23.
Members of the Detective Bureau assumed the investigation, and the crime scene was processed. Detective Louis Denaro, the lead investigator, along with Detectives Lee Young and Alex Tolnay, "followed up several investigative leads that were developed with the assistance of officers from the Patrol Division, Community Policing and the Special Services Division," one of the releases states. The leads led to the search of Smalls' apartment, "which yielded two handguns
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and the subsequent arrest of two individuals for the possession of the handguns," states the release.
Smalls and Kave initially were charged with the carrying of a pistol or revolver without a permit and held in lieu of bonds of $250,000 each.
Members of the Detective Bureau continued the investigation into the night and at 1:25 a.m. secured warrants for the arrests of Smalls and Kave on charges of murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Because the teens are charged with Class A felonies, their names are not being withheld by police.
Mayor Richard Moccia and Police Chief Harry Rilling announced the arrests during a press conference at City Hall last Friday. The pair praised members of the Police Department for their quick response and apprehension of the suspects and thanked the public for assisting with the investigation.
"It's always unfortunate when you lose a life in an urban city," Moccia said. "The loss of life is regrettable. The speed and professionalism of our Police Department is the one positive aspect of this."
Rilling agreed. "This was a very, very highly coordinated response to this incident. It gives me tremendous satisfaction as the chief of this fine Police Department to recognize the individuals who are really responsible for bringing this to at this point a successful conclusion."
Rilling singled out Lt. William Lowe, who was the commanding officer initially assigned to the scene, Lt. Thomas Kulhawik, Sgt. Paul Vinett, Sgt. George Weir, Officer Sue Holland and Sgt. Art Weisgerber, who all responded to the shooting.
With information provided by residents, "we were quickly able to piece together an approach to finding the people who were responsible, getting a perimeter set up around the building where these people had gone," Rilling said. "This is something that we haven't experienced much of in the past."
Police often find that people are reluctant to get involved and have "no-snitch rules," he said. "But this is a classic example of what can happen when people choose to get involved, and it's time that the people in the community were mad enough to say, 'That's it, we're not going to take it anymore. We're going to get involved. We're going to work with the police,' and you can see the results."
The case is not yet closed, Rilling pointed out. "There's still a lot of work that needs to be done there's a lot of evidence to analyze; there's a lot of things that need to happen afterward but we're very comfortable with the amount of evidence" and testimonies secured, he said.
Weisgerber added, "Basically, from the onset of the case, citizens of the community did help as far as helping to identify where the possible suspects may have fled to." The search of the apartment took place soon after the shooting, Weisgerber said. "Callers had actually given us a building, doorway area and possibility of several apartments."
The motive for the shooting is still under investigation, Weisgerber said. Multiple shots were fired, and Sanchez is believed to have been alone at the time.
Rilling said the shooting is believed to have been "an isolated incident." It was not clear whether the suspects knew Sanchez, he said.
Smalls and Kave are now being held in lieu of $500,000 bonds. They are scheduled to appear in Stamford Superior Court on Thursday.
March 30, 2007 Anti-Terrorism News
(Pakistan) Eleven more killed in Pakistan clashes - between Pakistani
tribesmen and foreign Al-Qaeda militants
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070330/wl_sthasia_afp/pakistanafghanistanuzbekistanqaedaunrest_070330073948;_ylt=AvCCeBNTLWCvhLJQpm30fKTzPukA
Pakistani Taliban blow up video shops - seeking to impose Islamic law
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070330/wl_sthasia_afp/pakistanafghanistantalibanblastmedia_070330104912;_ylt=AhbdzMH1HfPiSQzap.erX5jzPukA
Pakistani Islamic Schools Are Rife With Extremism, Group Says
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601080&sid=ao5JDt0jIGNs
(Pakistan) Talibanization of society: Madrassa students getting
leniency
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\03\30\story_30-3-2007_pg1_5
(Afghanistan) 1 NATO soldier killed in Afghanistan
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070330/ap_on_re_as/afghan_violence_14;_ylt=AhCfwS.8QnCm0XblVaxpmCrOVooA
(Afghanistan) Taliban leader threatens to kill Afghan hostage: TV
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20070329/wl_nm/afghan_italy_hostage_dc_1;_ylt=AtegsS1FkxtYFb4577rzooLOVooA
(Iraq) Coaltion forces detain Iraq bomb suspect
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070330/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq_070329233720;_ylt=AqgFBYanLf.F_1j1zrK7uqBX6GMA
(Iraq) Roadside bomb kills US soldier in Iraq
http://www.meadowfreepress.com/ViewArticle.aspx?id=10450&source=2
(Iraq) Radical Shiite Cleric Muqtada al-Sadr Makes Scathing Attack
Against U.S., Calls for Mass Protest in Statement
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,262660,00.html
(Iraq) Militiamen return to Sadr City
http://www.washingtontimes.com/world/20070329-111343-9535r.htm
(Iraq) Death toll rises to 82 from Thursday Baghdad blasts in Al Shaab
market
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/focusoniraq/2007/March/focusoniraq_March201.xml§ion=focusoniraq
(Iraq) Nearly 400 killed in Iraq March bloodletting
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/A_bloody_March_for_Iraq_as_nearly_400_killed_in_bloodletting/articleshow/1834510.cms
(India) Muslim rebels kill five Hindus in Kashmir
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20070330/india_nm/india292695_1;_ylt=AvqqBIU5lVy3qBsw_LppVtw1NXcA
Bangladesh executes six top Islamic militants
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070330/wl_afp/bangladeshattacks_070330103913;_ylt=Aqkdyj4a_GAvNL9ImTGoc5NTQMQA
(Somalia) Insurgents shoot down Ethiopian helicopter in Mogadishu
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070330/ts_afp/somaliaunrest_070330110437;_ylt=AiqUO1eMrF3j.Q1Q_3C92RSQLIUD
(Sudan) Top officials: U.S. to impose Sudan sanctions soon
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/africa/03/29/USsanctions.Sudan.reut/index.html
(Sudan) Police arrest armed Sudan Airways hijacker
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17868048/
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=2994308
Palestinian Schoolbooks Say Fighting Israel "Is Islamic Duty"
http://www.adnki.com/index_2Level_English.php?cat=Religion&loid=8.0.400221662&par=0
Israel says it can destroy Iran's missiles
http://www.upi.com/NewsTrack/Top_News/israel_says_it_can_destroy_irans_missiles/20070330-014852-3827r/
(Iran/UK) Iran TV Channel Airs Footage of British Sailor's 'Apology'
for Entering 'Iranian Waters'- second video of sailors
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,262643,00.html
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070330/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iran_britain_34;_ylt=AhtMZwM5dBu46A6gkWLrWChSw60A
(Iran/UK) British foreign minister dismisses Iranian letter on
prisoners
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/03/30/europe/EU-GEN-EU-Iran.php
(Iran/UK) Blair livid as hostage letter seeks withdrawal from Iraq
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article1588818.ece
(Iran/UK) Captured Britons may face show trial in Iran
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/03/30/wiran30.xml
(Iran/UK) Turkey: Iran may consider freeing sailor
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070330/ap_on_re_mi_ea/british_seized_turkey_2;_ylt=AhK8tl2rDs5My50MtFS_fFftfLkA
Iranians: "All Britain has to do is to admit they made a mistake"
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article1588817.ece
(Iran/UK) How Britons were conned by Iranian gunboat trick
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article1582544.ece
(Iran/UK) Is a U.S.-Iran War Inevitable? Commentary by Robert Baer
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1604546,00.html
(Iran) The Arab Press Assesses the Likelihood of a U.S. Strike Against
Iran
http://memri.org/bin/latestnews.cgi?ID=SD152707
(Indonesia) Explosives seizure 'dwarfs Bali bomb'
http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,21476649-1702,00.html
Australian Hicks must explain guilt at Guantanamo
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20070330/ts_nm/guantanamo_dc_2;_ylt=ApBmncZLGp5L9OKA5oZvXRAwuecA
Australian Terror detainee Hicks faces less than 20 years
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070330/ap_on_re_la_am_ca/guantanamo_hicks_6;_ylt=Akuij6G.LqmGPok6lsuJWXQTv5UB
(Australia) Hicks may come home free, says Hockey
http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,21473457-1702,00.html
(Guantanamo Bay) Hearing: Jemaah Islamiah man Mohamad Farik Amin Zubair
courier for al-Qaeda - Zachary Abuza quoted
http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2007/3/30/courts/17261145&sec=courts
(USA) Defense Secretary Gates calls for Guantanamo closure
http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/03/29/guantanamo.gates.ap/index.html
(Spain) Al-Qaeda video threating Spanish troops ‘genuine’
http://www.expatica.com/actual/article.asp?subchannel_id=81&story_id=38267
Sweden: Moroccan terror suspect to be extradited to Germany
http://islamineurope.blogspot.com/2007/03/sweden-moroccan-terror-suspect-to-be.html
UK resident to be freed from Guantanamo
http://www.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/0,,873826,00.html
(Ireland) Four arrested in anti-terror swoop
http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local-national/article2406755.ece
(Sri Lanka) Fresh violence in Sri Lanka kills 13
http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070330/wl_sthasia_afp/srilankaunrestlead_070330095835;_ylt=AgTkGTjawRPrnt.yzvakOestM8oA
Analysis: Al Qaeda, Penny-Pinchers?
http://blogs.abcnews.com/theblotter/2007/03/al_qaeda_pennyp.html
Analysis: Risks grow of terrorists getting nukes
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1173879211871&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
Analysis: America unprepared for 'likely' nuke attack -- Public
awareness campaign is only hope, says 3-year University of Georgia study
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=54920
Other News:
(France) Two jailed over riot at French subway station
http://www.expatica.com/actual/article.asp?subchannel_id=25&story_id=38286
Sweden: Islam is and will be a European religion
http://islamineurope.blogspot.com/2007/03/sweden-islam-is-and-will-be-european.html
'UK anti-Semitism can't be ignored
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1173879212816&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
(Germany) New law gives asylum rejects failed asylum seekers chance to
stay in Germany
http://www.expatica.com/actual/article.asp?subchannel_id=26&story_id=38233
(Germany) Holocaust archive ready to open files to public
http://www.expatica.com/actual/article.asp?subchannel_id=26&story_id=38230
(Netherlands) Parliament wants ban on Blood & Honour
http://www.expatica.com/actual/article.asp?subchannel_id=1&story_id=38257
* Gaza Sewage Deaths Caused by
Sand Theft *
Yesterday's deaths from sewage negligence probably had
many causes, but here is where the Mayor of Gaza City
laid the blame:
Construction of a new plant did not appear to have been
affected by year-old international sanctions on the
Palestinian Authority. The Gaza City mayor blamed the
collapse on local people digging dirt from an earthen
embankment around the structure and selling it to
building contractors.
* Teddy Kollek was a British
Informer *
Zionist leader Ze'ev Jabotinsky once remarked that the
Zionist leadership spent more effort opposing him than
they did in creating the state. This is consistent with
today's news that declassified documents show that
legendary Leftist mayor Teddy Kollek was responsible
for the arrest by the British of many right-wing Jewish
activists:
Recently-declassified British intelligence information
indicating that the late Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek
aided British authorities in the 1940's crackdown
against the Jewish underground movement, was a long
awaited outing of "hushed up" history.
The declassified document, which was first reported in
the Yediot Aharonot daily, confirmed that Kollek
supplied the names of dozens of Jewish underground
activists to the British during the mandate period.
"Kollek's senior position in the Jewish Agency at the
time, gave him access to sensitive information that the
British wanted," said Yossi Kistir, the director of the
IZL museum in Tel Aviv.
"The position of the Hagana at the time, eager to gain
the confidence and support of the British, was not to
allow any activity by splinter groups and they actively
collaborated with the British, giving them lists of
names of the Jewish organizations," said Yizhak
Avinoam, a former Irgun commander in Jerusalem. "The
British documents are historic confirmations for the
actions that the Hagana, in general, and Mr. Kollek in
particular took against the Jewish underground," he
said.
Prof. Yehuda Lapidot, a former Irgun member, who has
written a book about the Hagana's cooperation with the
British, said that even though Kollek admitted to
assisting the British government - boasting about his
cooperation in a historical letter to a British paper -
successive Israeli governments tried to keep the issue
away from the public.
"Until Begin's election victory in 1977, they tried to
erase this chapter from the history of the Jewish
people," Lapidot said, noting that in the first decade
of the Jewish state this episode did not appear in
Israeli history books.
The Yediot report said that the Foreign Ministry had
asked the UK to freeze the publication of the Kollek
file until his death.
* Muslims Beat Christian
Evangelist to Death *
No Muslim will condemn this savage incident because it
is encouraged by normative Islam. At the same time,
there will continue to be no known opposition to Muslim
proselytizing anywhere in the world. Does anyone else
see an imbalance here?
The Washington-DC based human rights group,
International Christian Concern (ICC) has just learned
that an Ethiopian evangelist named Tedase was beaten to
death by militant Muslims on Monday, March 26th, as he
and two young women were on a street evangelism
assignment in Jimma, Ethiopia. This marks the second
time in six months that Christians residing in
Southeast Ethiopia have been attacked and killed by
extremist (Wahabbi) Muslims.
On Monday afternoon Tedase and two female coworkers
were conducting street evangelism on Merkato Street in
Jimma, Southern Ethiopia. Merkato Street runs by a
Wahabbi Mosque. As the team was walking by the Mosque,
a group of Muslims exited the Mosque and began to run
after them to confront them. Tedase's female coworkers
ran away from the mob but Tedase continued on. The
Muslims caught up with Tedase, pulled him into the
mosque, and savagely beat him to death. Sources from
Jimma reported that Tedase was beaten with a calculated
intention to kill him.
Our sources also reveal that Jimma Christians were
conducting an evangelism campaign, and news of the
outreach was spreading among Jimma residents as well as
militant Muslim groups in the area. The Muslims that
belonged to the Wahabbi sect purposefully beat Tedase
to death as a message to Christians that they are ready
to combat evangelism.
* House Republicans Vote to Protect
'John Does' from Islamist Lawsuits *
House Republicans tonight surprised Democrats with a
procedural vote to protect public-transportation
passengers from being sued if they report suspicious
activity -- the first step by lawmakers to protect
"John Doe" airline travelers already targeted in such a
lawsuit.
Republicans said the lawsuit filed by six Muslim imams
against US Airways and "John Does," passengers who
reported suspicious behavior, could have a "chilling
effect" on passengers who may fear being sued for
acting vigilant.
Rep. Peter T. King, New York Republican and ranking
member of the House Homeland Security Committee,
offered the motion saying all Americans -- airline
passengers included -- must be protected from lawsuits
if they report suspicious behavior that may foreshadow
a terrorist attack.
"All of our lives changed after September 11, and one
of the most important things we have done is ask local
citizens to do what they can to avoid another terrorist
attack, if you see something, say something," said Mr.
King.
"We have to stand by our people and report suspicious
activity," he said. "I cannot imagine anyone would be
opposed to this."
Mr. King called it a "disgrace" that the suit seeks to
identify "people who acted out of good faith and
reported what they thought was suspicious activity."
Islamists are constantly on the attack and on this one,
Republicans quickly turned to defense. The only
Democrat involvement in this incident was to help fuel
the hype over the imams' trumped-up "Islamophobia"
charges.
Remember, the complete stories and much more can be
found by visiting the IRIS blog at:
http://www.iris.org.il/blog.html
Iranian Students Statement on Possible Release of Brits
Iranian Students Release Statement Protesting Possible Release of British Detainee
Originally published on 3/29/2007 by Iranian Students News Agency (Internet Version-WWW) in Persian
Tehran, 29 March: Students from Tehran universities protesting the likely release of a British sailor arrested in Iran's waters and an announcement on freezing economic ties with our country have released a statement.
According to Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA), the full statement of the students who had gathered outside the Foreign Ministry on Thursday [ 29 March] reads:
Once again the sinister and unclean regime of Britain was embarrassed, and the arrest of 15 British aggressors once again proved to the world that the satanic awe of Britain could be smashed. The 15 aggressors have been arrested and have explicitly admitted that they entered Iran's waters.
It is still fresh in our memories that British and American aggressors were arrested a few years ago and unfortunately were [later] released. It was proven today that it is neither goodwill nor accident; rather it was about espionage and disruption of the country's security. Any kind of flexibility or failure to let the legal proceedings run their course will further embolden them. So none of the spying aggressors should be released and any talks regarding them [their fate] should come after trial in a court of law and execution of the verdict.
The sinister regime of Britain has announced that it is suspending all economic ties with the Islamic Republic. Not only do we welcome such a measure, but we seek an end to all diplomatic relations with the old fox [Britain]. Without a doubt, the Islamic Revolution student movement will seriously follow up its demands.
: Tehran Iranian Students News Agency (Internet Version-WWW) in Persian -- university student press agency; produces politically moderate reporting with emphasis on student activities; promotes political awareness of seminary and university students; headed by 'Ali Yusefpur, managing director of conservative daily Siyasat-e Ruz; partially government-funded with a student editorial staff; licensed to the government-created University Jihad institution
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/dossier/childsoldiers/editorial/
Child Soldiers
Even in peacetime, children are prepared for war. The Hangzhou cadet military school in China has given military training to thousands of youth aged 11-13. © Xinhua/Gamma.The most commonly agreed upon definition of a child soldier is based on the “Cape Town Principles” from 1997 and describes a child soldier as “any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members. The definition includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and for forced marriage and does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried arms.”
In 2006, the UN estimated that over 250,000 children served in armed groups as well as governmental armed forces in dozens of conflicts around the globe. According to the 2005 Human Security Report by the University of British Columbia, about one-third of child soldiers are serving in Africa. Despite most media attention focusing on child soldiering in Africa, this phenomenon is in fact a global one, with children actively participating in armed conflicts in Asia, Latin America, Europe and the Middle East. Countries in which children serve or have served in armed forces and groups include Afghanistan, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Somalia, Uganda, Sri Lanka, Colombia, Chechnya, Myanmar, Nepal, Northern Ireland, the Philippines and Sudan.
An African study quoted in Peter W. Singer’s Children at War (2005) found that 60 percent of children under arms were 14 years old or younger and according to a 2006 United Nations University policy brief, up to 40 percent of the children associated with armed groups worldwide are girls.
The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers has drawn attention to the fact that by being exclusively linked to participation in armed conflict, the number excludes a possibly equivalent number worldwide who have not been involved in armed conflict but are under 18, in uniform and have a formal army record.
Over the past decade, non-governmental organizations have successfully campaigned for the establishment of a legal framework prohibiting even the voluntary recruitment of under 18 year olds into armed forces and constituting the participation of children under 18 in combat a war crime.
The estimated number of 250,000 to 300,000 children have been continually involved in armed conflict since 1996. Hence, the number of young adults who experienced armed conflict as members of armed groups during their childhood is far higher, since, by definition, for the same person to be a child soldier today (as well as 10 years ago), the child would have to have been recruited at the age of seven. In fact, the relatively slight changes in numbers of child soldiers at any given moment during the last decade underlines the urgent need to end recruitment, the only measure by which child soldiers could effectively be made a phenomenon of the past within the next decade.
Dana Landau
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/dossier/childsoldiers/topics/
Child Soldiers
International Law
12 February 2002, Red Hands Since Graça Machel’s seminal report "The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children," which was published in 1996 at the request of the Secretary General of the UN, there has been unprecedented progress in the UN’s agenda for the protection of children affected by and involved in armed conflict. There has been a strengthening of the international child protection infrastructure and the birth of a legal framework, international consensus and commitment to end the use of child soldiers. However, this legal framework does not prevent children from being recruited and serving in armed forces and groups, mainly because there are, thus far, no effective measures to enforce compliance with international legal standards while the conflict is underway. The existing legal standards most notably enable post-conflict courts and tribunals to prosecute the use of child soldiers. Nevertheless, in the course of cease-fire negotiations those responsible are often granted immunity and therefore go unpunished.
The following is a chronological overview of the developments in legal protection of children in armed conflict.
Timeline
*
1977: A minimum age for soldiers is mentioned in a legally binding document for the first time. The Additional Protocols to the four Geneva Conventions prescribe governments to refrain from recruiting any person who has not attained the age of 15 into the armed forces. Before this there was only a UN General Assembly declaration on the protection of women and children in emergency and armed conflict.
*
1989: The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) was adopted by the UN General Assembly and opened for signature. Its Article 38 reinforces the minimum age of 15 for recruitment, with recruitment restrictions now applying in peacetime as well, and for all international and internal levels of conflict. The CRC quickly becomes the most widely ratified human rights treaty in the world. It comes into force a record 9 months after it was opened for signature. To this day, the only two countries not to have ratified it are Somalia and the USA. The CRC unites three usually separate parts of international law, namely human rights law, international humanitarian law and juvenile justice law, into one comprehensive document. It is based on the principles of best interests of the child, non-discrimination, which, importantly in the issue of child soldiers, suggests gender sensitivity and participation.
*
1998 (July): The Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court (ICC) defines the recruitment of children under 15 and their deployment in combat as a war crime. Some 120 governments adopt the statute.
*
1999: The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, enters into force after the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) adopted it in 1990.
*
1999: The Maputo Declaration on the Use of Children as Soldiers is adopted at an African conference discussing the issue of child soldiers held in Maputo, Mozambique. The declaration calls for an end to use and recruitment of soldiers younger than 18.
*
1999 (June): The International Labour Organisation (ILO) adopts the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention 182. It commits states to prohibit the worst forms of child labor, which include the use of children in armed conflict. A child is defined as any person under 18 years of age. This is the first time that 18 is set as a minimum age for recruitment in an international treaty. It is also the first specific, legal recognition of child soldiering as a form of child labor. The convention comes into force in November 2000.
*
2000 May: The UN General Assembly adopts the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. It raises the minimum age at which a person can participate in armed conflict from 15 to 18 years and establishes a ban on compulsory recruitment of under-18s. However, it leaves a loophole for voluntary recruitment, due in part to objections of US and UK who regularly recruit volunteers from the age of 17. It is harsher on non-state entities, forbidding any recruitment and deployment of children under 18. This document has the potential to contribute significantly to the protection of children from becoming child soldiers. Nevertheless, its only monitoring mechanism is the examination of the reports that states are obliged to submit, detailing the measure that have been taken for implementation by the Committee on the Rights of the Child. In light of the widespread lack of consistent birth registration, the Optional Protocol, in force since 2002, raised the minimum age to 18 and mainly serves to protect the very young children, who at the age of 12 could be passed off as 15, but hardly as 18. It is also the first binding legal document obliging states to demobilize, rehabilitate, and reintegrate former child soldiers and offer technical and financial assistance to that end. Even the US, after its ratification of the Optional Protocol in December 2002, stopped deploying 17 year olds into combat zones. And the UK, that still recruits volunteers from the age of 16, did not send any children under 18 to Iraq in 2003.
During the last decade there have been several UN Security Council Resolutions concerning children in armed conflict that qualify the violations of children’s rights as constituting a threat to international peace and security. This classification is a step toward possible mandatory action against children’s rights violations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The UN extends its commitment to providing for the establishment of a monitoring and reporting system on children in armed conflict in these Security Council resolutions.
The UN has also established the attachment of Child Protection Advisers (CPA) to peace keeping operations, e.g. in Sierra Leone, as part of the central staff of a UN field mission. This ensures that children’s rights remain a main concern.
In practice, the Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) are pioneers in the field of making children’s rights the subject of prominent attention in international criminal law and accountability mechanisms.
Children as Victims and Perpetrators
When post-conflict tribunals prosecute the perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity, a different dimension of the question of child soldiers arises. Child soldiers are often perpetrators of such crimes, while at the same time victims of child recruitment, which in itself represents a war crime. Most child soldiers are coerced to commit atrocities and they subsequently suffer from trauma. Child soldiers should therefore be understood first and foremost as victims in need of support and rehabilitation.
There are, however, cases in which children voluntarily become soldiers and commit war crimes while in control of their actions and are neither coerced nor drugged. How should these children be treated in post-war tribunals and, more generally, in international law?
The International Criminal Court (ICC) has no jurisdiction to prosecute persons under the age of 18, and will not prosecute individuals for crimes committed by them when they were below the age of 18, as was decided in 2004. National laws on the issue differ from country to country. In practice, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) is the only international court that has the jurisdiction to try child soldiers, however, it has deliberately chosen never to do so.
There is, however, a danger of warlords increasingly delegating atrocities and war crimes to child soldiers, if juveniles committing these crimes are systematically exempt from prosecution. The challenge at hand is to find a solution based on a possible separation of accountability and criminal responsibility.
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs are part of the formal procedure following a peace agreement. The three stages aim to facilitate former combatants successful return to civilian life.
Disarmament describes the first stage at which small arms and weapons are collected. Combatants are stripped of their weapons through a trade-in system, which offers them money or participation in vocational training in exchange for their weapons.
As a second step, ex-combatants are assembled and registered during demobilization. This includes the discharge of military structures and preparation for a return to civil life.
Finally, reintegration is the stage at which former soldiers adapt to civil life. The aim is to ensure social and economic assimilation. This can be done through personal empowerment of and financial incentives to former combatants.
With few exceptions, DDR programs are available only to a small percentage of children who need them. In some conflicts, both parties (governmental and other forces) deny their use of child soldiers. As a result, children are not included in the formal demobilization process and miss out on any kind of support for their re-entering civilian life.
DDR programs are narrowly conceived as opportunities to disarm factions, based on a "one man, one gun" system. Surrendering weapons as a condition for eligibility often leads to the exclusion of children, especially girls, from DDR programs. It is encouraging that the principle of children’s eligibility to enter the DDR process irrespective of whether they present themselves at the assembly point with weapons has been applied in the design of the DDR program for Sierra Leone.
Disabilities, often resulting from mine or bullet injuries during service in the armed group and other health problems, including sexually transmitted diseases, complicate a child’s participation in DDR programs.
In a country recovering from war, there are very few prospects and opportunities for former child soldiers, most of whom lack education and professional skills and are sometimes socially stigmatized by their past. There is a real danger of re-recruitment after children are released from an armed group. In this context, many children have fought for both sides of a conflict.
Even after participating in the DDR process, most demobilized child soldiers return to an environment that is probably worse, from when they were recruited. In nearly all cases where demobilization of children is attempted during a continuing armed conflict, re-recruitment of some former child soldiers occurs. Such cases include Northern Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone and Sudan. Fear of re-abduction can keep children from returning home, which further complicates DDR efforts.
For DDR programs to work, education and vocational opportunities need to be linked with economic security of the families, who are also worn down by the conflict. Otherwise armed crime becomes the only way of economic survival.
Shortcomings in DDR Efforts
Girls often fail to benefit from DDR programs, because they go unnoticed as child soldiers, never owned their own weapon or have it taken away before the disarmament process begins. They are rarely formally enlisted for demobilization. In Mozambique, the UNHCR and the International Save the Children Alliance report that females accounted for only 1.5 percent of all demobilized combatants, while 40 percent of the children that the UN Office for Humanitarian Assistance found at the sites of military bases during the war were girls.
Those children who played less visible roles in armed forces and groups have in many situations been neglected in DDR programs. This is due to the mistaken equation of "child soldier" with "combatant". For example, in March 2000, the UN Security Council noted that the DDR process in Angola had inadvertently excluded some children, particularly girls, by making the surrender of weapons the criterion for eligibility in the programs. Some girls and young women face additional barriers to participation in DDR programs, particularly if they have been sexually involved with members of armed forces or groups. These men may consider them their wives or property, and block their demobilization.
Communities have ostracized girls for having been sexually abused or carrying babies from rebel leaders. Instead of being treated as victims, these girls are called prostitutes. Child mothers are especially socially stigmatized by their past, and their participation in the DDR process is almost impossible.
Given the widespread problems of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases, DDR programs should include a health check-up and education on health issues. Injuries and substance abuse must also be addressed.
One of the aims in DDR processes with children is their reunification with family and community. Here, the role of community leaders and local healers in ending the social stigmatization of former child soldiers is crucial. Traditional cleansing rituals can help reintegrate children into their communities.
Consequences for Children
Former child soldiers have been deprived of many of the normal opportunities for physical, emotional and intellectual development. The Machel report describes how these children "find it difficult to disengage from the idea that violence is a legitimate means of achieving one’s aims." The transition to a non-violent lifestyle proves demanding, and children have to unlearn the expectation that their needs can be satisfied immediately. For children and young people who have experienced a sense of power and belonging within armed forces and groups, peace can come as a disappointment, especially if they are expected to return to traditional roles in hierarchical societies segregated by age and sex.
Anger towards positions of authority is common among these children and young adults, and they are at a higher risk for juvenile delinquency.
Former child soldiers suffer from severe physical and psychological trauma from their experience in armed conflict. DDR efforts need to take these into account and recognize that, in addition to young people adapting to often displaced and reconfigured communities, communities also need to recognize and accept how girls and boys have changed through their experiences as child soldiers.
26 March 2007
Inside Egypt's nuclear debate
An internal Egyptian nuclear debate and international pressure will be crucial in determining whether Egypt quietly drops its atomic plans or pushes on with the program.
By Dominic Moran in Tel Aviv for ISN Security Watch (26/03/07)
A wave of nuclear announcements since September have contributed significantly to a growing sense of regional crisis in the Middle East, raising the specter of a future nuclear arms race.
Egypt is believed to have the most highly developed nuclear research program amongst Arab states and it is the current debate within the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) over the merits of atomic power that holds the key to whether this new wave of proliferation will build or abate.
President Hosni Mubarak's son Gamal, who heads the NDP's powerful Policies Committee, announced at the movement's fourth annual conference in September that Egypt planned to restart its moribund nuclear energy program.
Work on the site of an intended 1,000MW reactor at El-Dabaa 100 kilometers west of Alexandria was halted in 1986 in the wake of the Chernobyl disaster and Egyptian nuclear studies have since centered on two small research reactors near Cairo.
ISN Security Watch spoke with prominent Egyptian nuclear and strategic relations experts on the sidelines of a major conference on the nuclear issue held at the new Alexandria library last week.
Energy security
While international attention has focused on the potential dual-use nature of future Egyptian reactors, nuclear fuel and associated technologies, Egyptian officials have remained adamant that their country has no intention of breaking its long-standing opposition to WMD proliferation in the Middle East.
Professor of Nuclear and Inorganic Chemistry at Cairo's Helwan University, Dr Abdel Hakim Kandil, told ISN Security Watch that the decision to go nuclear was purely "economic."
Responding to Greenpeace advocacy at the conference for the rapid development of renewable energy sources rather than atomic power, Kandil said, "We have to look into solar energy, wind energy but with these a lot of research needs to be done[…]."
Egyptian power generation currently relies on oil and natural gas, with indigenous reserves expected to be depleted in between 30-40 years.
Opponents of nuclear development told the Alexandria symposium that nuclear industry projections as to development costs and energy output were greatly understated and that nuclear fuel prices would rise in coming decades. Egyptian proponents hit back, arguing that renewable energy technologies do not currently provide an answer for extending generation capacity, vital to economic development.
"If you think about a five percent development rate in Egypt, it is a must that you look into some kind of source of energy that everyone has used," Kandil said. "In the OECD [Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development] countries 34 percent of their energy comes from nuclear power. So why is it good for you and not for us."
Prestige and popular politics
It is no accident that the Egyptian nuclear announcement came at a time when the NDP was seeking an adequate response to the political rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and a further vehicle for the expected ascension of Gamal Mubarak to the presidency in 2011.
The Egyptian nuclear program provides a focal point for public pride in the nation's technological achievements and future potential in a wider social context marked by growing political repression and the seeming reversal of recent civil reforms.
The nuclear program is also a salient symbol of national sovereignty vis-à-vis the US and European nations, which are increasingly portrayed in political discourses as seeking to prevent Egypt from assuming its natural role as a major regional player.
"Egypt is a central country in the region and for our people here to feel some sort of inferiority with regard to the Iranians or Israelis this affects their morale very much," said Major-General (ret) Dr Mohamed Kadry Said, military and technology advisor to Cairo's Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies.
"I think when they said that we will think of that [nuclear generation] again the response was very positive from the public," he said, adding, "I think the government at that time needs this kind of support."
Vice-president of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Mohamed Shaker, told ISN Security Watch, "I think in Egypt itself it is a mixed feeling; some are afraid of nuclear power, that it will bring with it spent fuel, it will effect our ecology. And there are others who are very enthusiastic about it and they believe that we should not be slower [or more] backward than others who have gone before us."
Shaker - who presided over the landmark 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty conference, securing the pacts indefinite extension - confirmed that supporters viewed the nuclear program as a symbol "of national prestige and look at it as energy security - that we need nuclear [power to] diversify our [generation] sources."
While the resumed atomic energy program may serve as a source of pride in a society increasingly rived by political conflict and blighted by widespread poverty, corruption and bureaucratization it is unlikely to provide the palliative to ensure future regime stability. The program may in fact act to undermine NDP control should predicted costs escalate exponentially, as some analysts expect.
Failure to report
Egypt has sought to allay the fears of its Western allies that the inherent dual-use nature of some nuclear technologies would leave it in a position to move quickly to a nuclear weapons capacity.
Egyptian officials have sought to prevent any comparisons with the controversial Iranian program through committing to the import and re-export of nuclear fuel for future reactors.
"You have agreements with the people who supply you with the [nuclear] fuel. We do not have [uranium] enrichment technology in Egypt," Kandil said.
In January 2005, the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) alleged “a number of failures by Egypt to report” on the history of its atomic research program. The IAEA also discovered particles of actinides and fission products near a nuclear facility, which experts believed may indicate hidden plutonium separation work.
An Associated Press (AP) report at the time quoted unnamed diplomatic sources who said that "secret nuclear experiments" had been conducted "that could be used in weapons programs."
"We did not decide yet what kind of reactor we are going to use. I would say we should go into a reactor that can work with natural uranium," Kandil said.
"We have rocks in Egypt that have some hundred-parts-per-million of uranium. We can use our resources," he added, in a statement unlikely to quiet international concerns.
Israel and Iran
Regional tensions loom large over the Egyptian nuclear announcement.
Shaker disagrees. Asked if Iranian nuclear development had contributed to the Egyptian decision he said, "No, because I think [the decision] emanates from the fact that we really won't have oil and gas in 40 years."
He allowed that there are those who "look at it from a different angle; that it would allow us one day to catch up with the Israeli on the nuclear weapons capabilities."
Shaker questioned the security utility of any potential nuclear weapons program, noting that the Israeli nuclear program "did not dissuade us in […] 1973 […] from launching a war to regain our territory."
Recent months have seen a significant rise in anti-Israeli sentiment in Egypt, exacerbated by Israeli excavation work near Jerusalem's Al-Aqsa Mosque and allegations that Israeli minister Binyamin Bin Eliezer was involved in the murder of Egyptian prisoners of war.
A series of increasingly vitriolic debates in Egypt's People's Assembly have included calls from NDP legislators to tear up the peace treaty with Israel. MP Mohamed el-Katatny told the house: "That cursed Israel is trying to destroy Al-Aqsa mosque […] Nothing will work with Israel except for a nuclear bomb that wipes it out of existence."
While the domestic media has focused on the resumed atomic program as a step towards military parity with Israel, the lack of recent significant technological developments in the Israeli program and a contemporary spike in tensions over Iranian nuclear intransigence make it clear that the latter played a key role in Egyptian decision-making.
Said explained that Iran and Egypt had taken different diplomatic and political paths in the last 30 years.
"Egypt went on the path of peace and integration and globalization so the two roads were always conflicting on many political issues," Said said. "We have relations with the Israelis, they do not. We were part of the multilateral talks, they refused that."
"In Iran at the moment there is a street named after the man who killed Sadat. So this shows it is very difficult to go with them on the same lines. This is why on security issues I think there are always some doubts."
"The problem also is that Iran has a very heavy shadow on the Gulf," Said continued. "We are totally on the side of the Gulf counties and any threat against them - perceived or not perceived - Egypt should consider it."
In an interview with an Egyptian newspaper on 11 January, Mubarak warned "there is no way Egypt will sit quietly and watch other regional powers achieve nuclear weapons."
Piece of the pie
With lucrative contracts for anywhere between three to 10 reactors on the line, fierce international competition has already started to supply the Egyptian nuclear program.
Asked about Mubarak's visit to China and Russia in the immediate wake of September's nuclear announcement, Said opined, " I do not think that the Russians and the Chinese will contribute too much [to the Egyptian program]."
Questioned on which countries might be interested in playing a role in Egypt's revived program, Shaker said, "They may all be interested […] We have this agreement with South Korea, we have an agreement with all the major [Korean] suppliers. With the Chinese we don't have yet an agreement but with the Russians I think we have something."
"My reading is that in order for Egypt to start safely and to start with international approval I think it will be a Western country [chosen] to engender faith in the program; that the program is geared for peaceful purposes."
Asked to characterize the US response to the Egyptian nuclear announcement Shaker said, "The first level was a declaratory level, "We are not against any Egyptian ambitions to go in this direction."
"Then when it will come to [US aid at] the practical level, I heard that some people came here to Egypt who are ready to help in anything," he intimated.
"When it comes to money I think this will be another story. And this I think will be a critical point."
A recent Kuwaiti newspaper article claimed that Egypt had succumbed to intense US pressure and agreed to quietly drop its nuclear plans.
Interim decision
"The final decision has not been made yet on reactivating the nuclear power program. It is a preliminary decision. It is still being discussed in the ruling party and in the Higher Council of Energy," Shaker revealed.
"I think we haven't solidly settled down on a big strategy, what we want," he added, noting that Egypt currently exports natural gas. "Do we want to sell the gas and then invest in nuclear power or keep the gas and delay the nuclear power now and invest in gas? But at the same time we need extra foreign currency, so it's a dilemma."
The internal Egyptian nuclear debate and international pressure will be crucial in determining whether Egypt quietly drops its atomic plans or pushes on with a program that would likely constitute a bridgehead signaling wider regional nuclear proliferation.
Dr Dominic Moran is ISN Security Watch's senior correspondent in the Middle East.
Related entries from the ISN Publishing House
Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Near and Middle East - After the Iraq War 2003
Middle East Briefing, Nr. 9: The Challenge of Political Reform - Egypt After the Iraq War
Egypt: Politics in the New Millennium
Latest entry on the ISN Blog
IR/IT News Review
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Online version provided by the International Relations and Security Network
A public service run by the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich © 1996-2004
28 March 2007
Shaping EU homeland security
The shape of a new coordinating body for EU security research is mired in national differences over the extent of a harmonized European approach to the sector.
By Brooks Tigner in Berlin for ISN Security Watch (28/03/07)
Strong public-private coordination of the EU’s homeland security research agenda across many areas of national government is needed to effectively combat terrorism, says the European Commission, which plans to propose a new coordinating body in the coming weeks.
But the idea does not sit comfortably with all member states, most notably the UK. Moreover, with 27 nations now arrayed around the EU’s policymaking table, it could be too unwieldy to take rapid decisions since it is supposed to represent stakeholders from government, industry and the research/university sector in roughly equal proportions, according to European industry sources.
"If every member state big or small insists on having one person from all three sectors, then that's going to be an awfully large 'advisory' committee," a Dutch high-tech researcher told ISN Security Watch during the conference. They'll have to come to some compromises if they want to take rapid or effective decisions."
Modus operandi
The idea for a new European Security Research & Innovation Forum (ESRIF) was unveiled here during a two-day conference on 26-27 March organized by Germany, which hold the EU's rotating presidency, to discuss the union's forthcoming security research and technology priorities, worth €1.4 billion during 2007-2013. Funded by the EU's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7), the money will be used to support technology development projects aimed at protecting Europe's citizenry, critical infrastructures and borders against attack.
"Security research in Europe is now at an important crossroad and it would be unacceptable that EU and national security research run alongside one another without coordination," Gunter Verheugen, European Commissioner for Enterprise and Industry, told the conference on 26 March.
"Our respective [EU and nationally funded] projects must avoid duplication. We need a pan-European platform in the field of European civil protection to coordinate this: the European Security Research and Innovation Forum. We do not want the incredible duplication of effort in other research sectors and we do not want the low level of effectiveness we see in defense spending brought into this field. We want value for money," he said.
He said the ESRIF would offer a framework where private sectors could work together easily. "A number of stakeholders think that a jointly drafted strategic research agenda can be the central reference for work in this field. It would create a common modus operandi and we are ready to launch it the next few weeks. National programs must be made to work more closely," declared Verheugen.
Anxious industry, hesitant governments
For its part, industry is already jockeying to organize the supply side to the equation and to feed its ideas into the ESRIF. The creation of the EOS - the European Organisation for Security - was also announced during the conference as an initiative of the Brussels-based lobby, the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association.
The EOS will bring together security supply companies, infrastructure operators and users to "provide support to the study, development and implementation of security solutions to the challenges faced by the European Union and its member states," it said in a press statement.
Where there's money, industry will obviously respond.
But whether participation in the ESRIF on the government side will unfold as smoothly as Verheugen would like it to remains to be seen.
The EU member state with probably the biggest security concerns about terrorism is the UK, and it is not enthusiastic about an approach to homeland security research that involves tight coordination between national ministries and an oversight role for the Commission.
Angela Singh, head of the UK Home Office's counter-terrorism science unit, welcomed the ESRIF's creation but said it should focus on three things: identifying requirements for European security research; supporting security customers and suppliers to encourage innovation; and improving linkages from research through to capability.
There was no mention about working with other national ministries: "We don't often take account of the needs at the front line of security users, so we will be listening to them more closely so that any solutions identified [for support by the UK government] are realistic in terms of being delivered. Thus, in the next two to three years we will be working more closely with business and academia," Singh told the conference.
Privately, one EU official told ISN Security Watch that the UK wanted the Commission "to stick to funding FP7 projects as they come in, and that's it."
By contrast, a growing number of other member states, with France in the lead, want new lines of communication - and coordination - established between their ministries regarding homeland security issues, including security research and technology.
Supports urge rapid action
Informing the conference about his government's plan to spend €123 million on security research during 2007-2010, Wolf-Dieter Lukas, director general of Germany’s federal Ministry of Education and Research, said "we will not promote individual technologies; we want a holistic approach. And we're open to cooperation with companies from other EU and non-EU countries."
Roland Schenkel, director of the Commission’s Joint Research Centre, said technological capabilities with pan-EU application were critical as the threats to Europe’s security continued to grow more sophisticated.
"It is not sufficient to address only today's threats. The more we create security, the more [that terrorists] will find new ways to test it," he told the conference.
Pointing to the fragmentation in communications systems preventing emergency first responders within and between EU countries from talking to one another, he said "we urgently need standardization across Europe in security technology development."
Franco Frattini, European Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security, hammered home the same argument.
"Terrorists and organized criminal networks care nothing about borders. They will attack wherever they think they can get the maximum effect. Our response in Europe has to be as effective as they are," he told participants. "This means we need joint surveillance capability for maritime and coastal authorities. We need our law enforcement and security agencies to share information with each other. Too often security dialogue is limited to bilateral dialogue due to sensitivity of sharing data. But this is changing. And we need advanced technologies, which is why we welcome a European approach to security research."
Closing the military-civilian gap
But Frattini also touched on a sensitive issue that few policymakers in Europe openly admit: that the historical distinction between defense and civil security policies and technologies makes little sense today.
"US experience shows that traditional separation between 'hard' and 'soft' technologies - military versus civil - is closing. We have to do the same in Europe, where government support efforts made by industry, and where the economy supports the role of governments in the fight against terrorism," he said.
While other Commission officials were careful to emphasize the civil nature of the security technologies they will seek under the FP7 spending program, it is no secret that many - if the not the vast majority - of Europe's homeland security technologies will be directly taken or derived from military ones. These include satellite surveillance and communications, highly calibrated targeting technologies such as see-through-walls radar systems and detection of biological, chemical and nuclear threats.
Without exception, these are capabilities either deployed or being developed by NATO and other armies around the world.
NATO's Defense Against Terrorism program created in 2004, for example, has identified 10 categories of technologies and capabilities necessary to protect the allies against attack. A number of these will be deployed in urban settings or in mixed military-civil sites such as ports and harbors, and also lend themselves to conversion to civil application.
The EU and NATO are discussing how the two organizations should tighten the coordination and exchanges of expertise in the area of homeland security technologies, but the EU still has internal political obstacles to resolve before this can take place.
Based in Brussels, Brooks Tigner has reported on European and transatlantic security and defense issues since 1992, with particular emphasis on NATO and the EU's rapidly evolving military and homeland security policies. He is a regular contributor to the US weekly, Defense News, and editor of SECURITY EUROPE, a new monthly newsletter focused on European homeland security policy, technology and business.
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Online version provided by the International Relations and Security Network
A public service run by the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich © 1996-2004
29 March 2007
Somali chaos: Clans, Islamists, foreigners
A date is set for a reconciliation congress, but a surge in violence and the chaos posed by clan power struggles, insurgent fighting and foreign meddling present serious challenges.
By Abdurrahman Warsameh in Mogadishu for ISN Security Watch (29/03/07)
Heavy fighting around the Somali capital with has left 12 people killed and more than 20 others wounded. The fighting broke out on Thursday, as clan insurgents and Ethiopian troops attempted to take new positions in the capital.
Hospital sources and local residents in Mogadishu confirmed the death toll for ISN Security Watch on Thursday.
Ethiopian helicopters dropped several bombs near an insurgent stronghold in Mogadishu, just hours after the gun battle broke out, witnesses said.
Ethiopian tanks and attack helicopters are attempting to crack down on insurgents ahead of a mid-April national reconciliation congress in Mogadishu. Residents said at least one Ethiopian tank was hit by a rocket and was immediately towed from the area by Ethiopian soldiers. This report has not been independently confirmed by ISN Security Watch.
The sound of heavy artillery and machine-gun fire could be heard throughout the city, and columns of thick black smoke could be seen billowing from various parts of the capital, where the fighting has been fiercest. More people have begun to flee battle areas, seeking refuge in other locations of the capital. In some neighborhoods, public transport has been halted due to the violence.
On Thursday, Ahmed Diriye, spokesman for the Hawiye clan, told local radio that Ethiopian troops had breached the ceasefire agreement signed a week ago between clan elder and Ethiopian officials. The agreement led to a relative calm in the capital until Thursday.
"They started to move troops to our houses. They will be responsible for all that happens," he said.
The latest violence brings the past week's death toll to nearly 40, with some 200 others wounded - most of them civilians caught in the crossfire.
On 23 March, a Belarusian cargo plane chartered for African Union (AU) peacekeepers was shot down over Mogadishu shortly after it took off from the government airport. The plane's 11 crew members, all Belarusians, were killed.
Though Somali officials issued an immediate statement saying that technical problems were suspected, Belarusian authorities said the plane was hit by a surface-to-air missile.
During the past weeks, thousands of civilians have fled the capital as a result of the fierce fighting and near daily shelling duel between insurgents and government soldiers backed by Ethiopian troops. A recent UN report estimates that more than 400,000 civilians may have fled Mogadishu to the internally displaced camps in the southern regions.
Who is fighting whom?
While the interim government blames Islamist militants, who earlier last year had control over the capital and much of the country for a brief period, there are indications that the latest violence involves the Hawiye clan rather than Islamist forces.
The government accuses remnants of the ousted Islamist movement of being behind the recent spate of attacks on Somali government and Ethiopian troops in the country. However, further complicating matters, the leaders of a major clan, the Hawiye, which inhabits southern Somalia, including the capital, say they are dissatisfied with the government and that their militias are resisting its attempt to spread its authority throughout the capital. The Hawiye elders accuse the government forces of being exclusively from the president’s clan, the Darood, and are trying to disarm them.
The government had expressed reluctance over the ceasefire signed between Ethiopian troops and Hawiye elders last week, and continues to accuse the clan leaders of serving as a cover for the Islamists – an accusation vehemently denied by clan elders.
Clan spokesman Diriye told local radio that interim President Abdullahi Yusuf was seeking to subjugate Somali clans to his own clan. He said the interim government's soldiers were from the northeastern self-autonomous region of Puntland where Yusuf had been regional president before being elected president of Somalia.
The clan leaders also attempted to reach out to Ethiopian troops with a warning. "We warn Ethiopian soldiers not to be misled and used against us," said Abdullahi Sheikh Hassan, an independent Hawiye politician in Mogadishu. "This president has a clan vendetta against us and we shall defend ourselves."
On Thursday, however, in response to the bombing of an insurgent stronghold, elders of the Hawiye clan accused the Ethiopians of breaching the ceasefire agreement.
peacekeepers
In the meantime, in contrast to Ethiopian troops in Somalia, the AU peacekeeping mission (AMISOM) has distanced itself from involvement in the fighting, with spokesman Captain Paddy Akunda telling local radio last week that his troops were not battling insurgents or government forces because "peacekeeping" rather than "peacemaking" was the mission's mandate.
A challenging reconciliation
The surge in violence comes as the beleaguered interim Somali government has set 16 April as the date to hold the much anticipated national reconciliation congress in Mogadishu. Questions of security, choosing the participants and deciding the congress' agenda are likely to delay the congress, however.
The transitional government in Mogadishu, which lacks adequate military and security forces, has pledged to pacify the lawless and chaotic capital in time for the congress - a promise that was followed almost immediately by an upsurge in violence.
The government says more than 3,000 delegates from inside and outside the country will attend the congress "to reconcile different clans in the country." It ruled out the participation of the defeated Islamists in the congress.
Many in the international community, including the US, agree with the government's move to bar the Islamists from participating in the congress, but many are also urging the government to give the more moderate Islamists some sort of role.
However, various opposition groups maintain that the congress should address political issues and open the door for a new power sharing agreement to heal the rifts in Somali society, which is not only polarized along clan lines but also along political and ideological lines.
Interim Somali Interior Minister Mohamed Mohamoud Guled told ISN Security Watch that the deposed Islamist group could not attend the congress as a movement, but were welcome to participate as members of their respective clans.
"They [the Islamists] are a spent force no longer to be reckoned with, and after all, this is not a political congress; it is a conference for clan elders to solve their age-old clan differences," Gulled said.
Though the congress' date is just weeks away, and the security situation in the capital is worsening, the interim government insists it can take control and deal with the necessary logistics in time. However, many are doubtful. The clan complexity and ideological divide among Somalis, coupled with the presence of different armed groups, including foreign troops, makes the convening of the reconciliation congress more of a challenge than the government, which has been weak from the start, can likely handle.
Abdurrahman Warsameh is a Mogadishu-based journalist.
The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author only, not the International Relations and Security Network (ISN).
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Online version provided by the International Relations and Security Network
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FAA Releases Updated Fact Sheet On Oversight Of Repair Stations
Says Agency Has "Tough" Standards
Below is the FAA's updated Fact Sheet on use of outsourced repair
stations,
released Thursday in connection with the House Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee, Subcommittee on Aviation, hearing on FAA
oversight
of outsourced air carrier maintenance.
Repair stations are closely regulated and monitored by the FAA. The
agency
requires air carriers to ensure that their contract maintenance and
training
programs, and the contractors themselves, fully comply with federal
regulations. There are approximately 4,227 domestic and 694 foreign
FAA-certified repair stations.
Tough FAA Standards for "Outsourced" Maintenance
Some air carriers contract out ("outsource") aircraft maintenance. For
example, it may be more efficient to have an original manufacturer
perform
engine overhauls, repair of components or warranty work. Airlines must
meet
stringent FAA requirements if they rely on contract maintenance.
Air carriers have to ensure that all contractors follow the procedures
specified in the air carrier’s maintenance program.
Air carriers must list all contractors on a vendor list; only
substantial
maintenance providers have to be approved in the air carrier’s
operation
specifications.
FAA must approve use of any non certificated contractor. The airline
must
show that the provider has the capability, organization, facilities and
equipment to perform the work.
Eyes on Repair Stations
Both the air carrier and the FAA inspect work done at repair stations.
The
air carrier conducts oversight through its Continuing Analysis and
Surveillance System, which requires audits of the facilities working on
the
carrier’s aircraft.
The FAA does at least one comprehensive, in-depth inspection every year
at
each repair station inside the United States. The inspection
requirement
comes from the National Work Program Guidelines (NPG) order issued
annually,
and is based on risk analysis of results from the previous year’s
surveillance. The NPG establishes a base level of surveillance data
that
should be evaluated, including areas such as facilities, maintenance
processes, technical data and training programs.
FAA inspectors perform on-site visits and review air carrier audits. An
FAA
inspector is not required to give notice prior to an inspection. But as
a
practical matter, the repair station may be notified to ensure the
right
people are available and any necessary coordination between the repair
station and remote facilities or contractors is accomplished.
FAA inspectors have comprehensive guidance for checking each of 15
safety
areas. As each area is inspected, an assessment is recorded in a
national
database. The FAA uses the assessments to retarget resources and
develop the
following year’s inspection program.
The inspector presents any issues found to the repair station
informally
during a briefing prior to leaving the facility. A formal letter of
findings
follows, and the FAA may start enforcement actions for violations of
regulations.
Oversight of Foreign Repair Stations
Many US air carriers rely on foreign repair stations outside the United
States for at least some of their maintenance. These facilities are
certified annually by the FAA, and a repair station may lose its
certificate
if it does not comply with FAA requirements.
The agency only certifies the number of foreign repair stations it can
effectively monitor. Oversight is conducted by FAA inspectors assigned
to
International Field Offices in London, Frankfurt, Singapore, New York,
Miami, Dallas and San Francisco.
FAA standards for foreign and domestic repair stations are the same.
Just as
for domestic repair stations, the FAA conducts at least one
comprehensive,
in-depth inspection annually for renewal of the repair station’s
certificate. The FAA notifies a repair station prior to an inspection
to
meet the repair station’s security requirements, make sure the
appropriate
personnel are available, and allow the facility to do any needed
coordination with remote work sites or contractors. The agency also
notifies
the appropriate U.S. embassy and the country’s national aviation
authority.
Using risk analysis tools, FAA inspectors identify potential safety
hazards
and target inspection efforts on areas of greatest risk. During the
inspection, the FAA verifies that the facility and personnel are
qualified
to perform the maintenance functions requested by the air carrier or
listed
in their operations specifications. The entire inspection is done
during a
single visit; the size and complexity of the repair station may require
several days and several inspectors to complete the work.
The United States has country-to-country Bilateral Aviation Safety
Agreements with France, Germany and Ireland. These agreements eliminate
duplicate efforts by the FAA and the national aviation authorities, and
specify that each authority perform certification and surveillance
activities on behalf of the other. The FAA audits these national
aviation
authorities, reviews their inspector guidance materials, inspector
staffing
levels and training programs, and performs joint repair station audits
with
the authorities’ inspectors. Under these agreements, the FAA conducts
sample inspections of repair stations located in these countries. In FY
2006
the FAA performed sampling inspections at 21 percent (35) of the 165
affected repair stations.
FMI: www.faa.gov
aero-news.net
MOSCOW AND PYONGYANG STRUGGLE TO AGREE ON DEBT WRITE-OFF
During rare talks in Moscow on March 23, Russia fell short of delivering on its earlier pledges to forgive Pyongyang much of its Soviet-era debt. The debt write-off was viewed as Russia's economic incentive to encourage more North Korean cooperation with international efforts to defuse the controversy around Pyongyang's nuclear program. As Pyongyang's cooperation was slow to materialize, so, too, were Russian promises to write off the debt.
Convening its fourth formal meeting, the Inter-governmental Commission on Economic and Technical Cooperation was expected to tackle the debt issue. However, the head of Russia's technical supervision agency Rostechnadzor, Konstantin Pulikovsky, who co-chairs the commission, announced that a debt forgiveness deal remained some time off.
The commission discussed the debt issue, but a final decision would be made by the two countries' leadership, Pulikovsky said after talks with the North Korean delegation, headed by deputy Foreign Trade Minister Lim Gen Man. "North Korea bluntly and openly said that the DPRK was not able to repay the debt" and suggested making a "political decision" on this issue, he said. The commission released a statement saying that finance ministries would continue talks, aiming at reaching an agreement by the end of 2007 (Interfax, RIA-Novosti, March 23).
During the Cold War, Pyongyang was a leading recipient of Soviet loans, and the government still owes Moscow about 4 billion “transferable rubles,” an accounting device previously valued at between $2 billion and $7 billion. Russian officials have argued that the debt issue was a major obstacle hindering the development of bilateral economic ties. However, Russia and North Korea had not had any debt negotiations for more than five years.
In December 2006, the Russian and North Korean finance ministries discussed a possible debt write-off. In January, Moscow indicated plans to forgive Pyongyang its debt owed to the former Soviet Union. Russia's Vneshtorgbank and North Korea's Trade Bank reportedly agreed to re-estimate the debt at $8 billion including interest, and both sides were said to have agreed in principle in December to write off some 80% of the debt. However, hopes for an agreement proved premature.
Nonetheless, Russian officials still came up with some optimistic pronouncements. Pulikovsky appeared to imply that the meeting itself was an achievement per se. Although the commission is supposed to meet annually, the last meeting was held in Pyongyang on October 20, 2000. The fifth bilateral meeting is expected in 2008 in Pyongyang.
The talks produced some encouraging signs in efforts to revive economic and trade cooperation, which have been nearly frozen for the past six years. In the first half of 2007, Russia and North Korea plan to finalize agreements on transportation, customs, and labor cooperation (Interfax, Itar-Tass, March 23).
The North Koreans reportedly suggested raising Russian coal exports to 600,000 tons/year, but requested an installment payment schedule, a condition hardly acceptable to Russian suppliers. The inter-governmental commission said that Gazpromneft had expressed interest in upgrading the Synri refinery, Russian Railways pledged to upgrade the Khasan-Rajin rail link, while Russia's Eurocement Group proposed modernizing the Sunchon cement plant. Both sides also indicated plans to launch a wood processing joint venture in Amur region, where North Korean workers would produce some 720,000 cubic meters of finished products a year (Interfax, Itar-Tass, March 23).
Both sides reportedly discussed energy cooperation, including possible Russian electricity exports to North Korea and joint construction of power plants in DPRK. North Korea sought Russian assistance in upgrading the Pyongyang 400 megaWatt (mW) and Pukchan 1,600 mW thermopower plants, originally built with Soviet aid. Pyongyang also suggested Russian companies consider building an East-Pyongyang 100 mW thermopower plant. Finally, Russia's Unified Energy Systems reportedly expressed interest in building a Vladivostok-Chondin power transmission line (Interfax, RIA-Novosti, March 23).
The Russian and North Korean Ministries of Agriculture pledged to work out an agreement on veterinary and sanitary controls to boost trade in food products. Both sides also agreed to convene a joint commission on fishery in the fourth quarter of 2007 to discuss how to use and protect bio-resources (Interfax, March 23).
In sum, Moscow and Pyongyang pledged to develop economic ties, but the two countries will be starting from a very low level. Trade turnover between Russia and North Korea reached $210 million in 2006, with Russian exports amounting to $190 million, while North Korean exports were estimated at some $20 million in 2006. Russia still exports timber, coal, petroleum products, and nitrogen fertilizers, while North Korea mainly exports its cheap labor resources and seafood to Russia.
If Moscow had dangled the possibility of a debt write-off to encourage North Korea to demonstrate more flexibility at the six-party nuclear talks on Pyongyang's nuclear program, the exercise failed. The latest round of the six-party negotiations ended up with yet another exercise of North Korean obduracy.
Not only did Moscow table its idea to forgive Pyongyang's debt, Russia warned its bankers against providing financial services to Pyongyang. There were no official requests to Russia to help settle the issue of North Korean funds in Macao, deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov said on March 22. However, he warned Russian banks against dealing with North Korean money. "I would not recommend Russian banks and organizations to take part in these operations" (Interfax, Itar-Tass, March 22). In sum, the Russian government pledged to expand economic ties with North Korea but simultaneously suggested cautiousness in dealing with Pyongyang.
--Sergei Blagov
From Jamestown.org
Not so fast: Cases against scientists re-opened
By Rita Beamish, The Associated Press
Inland Valley Daily Bulletin
Article Launched:03/30/2007 12:00:00 AM PDT
U.S. criminal investigators are re-examining cases against 103 scientists at the National Institutes of Health, most of whom were cleared in previous ethics probes or received light reprimands or warnings over conflict-of-interest complaints.
Following strong criticism from Congress, the investigative arm of the Department of Health and Human Services also has begun a review of conflict-of-interest policies at the NIH, one of the world's premier medical research centers.
The review affects not only government scientists but also the way that NIH oversees grant recipients who perform research at universities or other nonfederal institutions.
The decision by the inspector general for the Health and Human Services Department to re-examine cases against 103 employees at the NIH suggests the earlier investigations were mishandled, said Rep. John Dingell, D-Mich., chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee.
"The inspector general is taking a much-needed closer look," Dingell said. "Even if only a few of those cases result in criminal prosecution, it is clear that NIH bungled the investigation the first time around."
A spokesman for the inspector general declined to discuss new case reviews. The NIH also declined to comment.
The inspector general, Daniel Levinson, disclosed the re-examinations and broader policy review in a letter to Rep. Joe Barton of Texas, the top Republican on the House Energy and Commerce Committee.
The earlier ethics reviews led to full-blown investigations by the inspector general in two cases. NIH's internal probe found no violations in more than half of the cases overall.
However, Levinson's team now has concluded that "potential conflict-of-interest concerns existed with 103 NIH employees." Its investigators and attorneys "are presently examining these cases to determine whether investigation is warranted," according to Levinson's letter.
NIH had referred the 10 most serious cases to the inspector general, who investigated two. Those cases led to one misdemeanor conflict-of-interest plea in federal court by an Alzheimer's researcher who was sentenced to community service and forfeiture of $300,000.
NIH's toughest sanction was a 45-day suspension for a person who failed to seek approval for his outside work and failed to report outside income of $474,730. A handful of others received suspensions of a few days for similar infractions while still others received written or oral warnings.
Lawmakers in recent years have complained that NIH is lax in policing of scientists earning outside money. NIH cracked down in 2005 with a new policy that bans employees from accepting consulting fees, stock or stock options from drug or biotech companies.
Under previous rules, the researchers were allowed to earn outside income but were required to obtain prior approval from NIH. They also could not accept pay for work that overlapped their government projects. The 103 cases in question occurred under those rules, going back to 1999.
"It's good that they have now decided to engage in a full-scale examination of the NIH's ethics operations and program," Barton said.
Ethics advocates said they hoped new reviews would reveal any conflicts that might have tainted past medical research.
"Who knows how much damage these conflicts of interest have done to the NIH mission of protecting the public's health?" said Ned Feder, a former NIH scientist who works now with the private Project on Government Oversight. "A review of the facts and the policies is long overdue."
Current rules covering NIH employees do not apply to the outside researchers who receive NIH grants. Grant rules stipulate that outside institutions enforce their own conflict-of-interest policies and voluntarily report any conflicts.
NIH looked into the potential conflicts after congressional investigators reported nearly three years ago that many government researchers were making thousands of dollars from drug and biotech companies but failing to disclose that outside income as required.
At a hearing last September, lawmakers criticized NIH for light penalties meted out and criticized the inspector general for letting NIH's internal probes be the final word. Most of the cases involved failing to ask permission or follow procedures for doing outside work.
http://www.dailybulletin.com/news/ci_5553054
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB55/index1.html
[Links on site to the different parts]
The September 11th Sourcebooks
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 55
Edited by Jeffrey Richelson and Michael L. Evans
September 21, 2001
Return to full page
Jump to the documents
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and the abortive attack (possibly aimed at the White House or Camp David) that resulted in the crash of a jetliner in Pennsylvania has resulted in a new and extraordinary emphasis by the Bush administration on combating terrorism. During the last ten days key administration officials, particularly President Bush, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and Secretary of State Colin Powell, have repeatedly emphasized that their long-term objective is the destruction of terrorism – a goal to be achieved by the death or apprehension of terrorists, the destruction of their infrastructure and support base, and retaliation against states that aid or harbor terrorists.
Terrorism, however, was hardly ignored in previous administrations. In fact, at the beginning of the Reagan administration, Secretary of State Alexander Haig announced that opposition to terrorism would replace the Carter administration’s focus on advancing human rights throughout the world. Although opposition to terrorism never really became the primary focus of the Reagan administration or successor administrations, each of these paid signifiacnt attention to the issue and produced many important documents that shed light on the policy choices faced today. Terrorism has been the subject of numerous presidential and Defense Department directives as well as executive orders. Terrorist groups and terrorist acts have been the focus of reports by both executive branch agencies (for example, the State Department, CIA, and FBI) as well as Congressional bodies – including the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Congressional Research Service. The General Accounting Office has also produced several dozen reports evaluating the U.S. government’s ability to prevent or mitigate terrorist strikes, including, one just yesterday, September 20, 2001.
The following documents, some of which were obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, include assessments of the terrorist threat and a CIA profile of Usama bin Ladin, presidential and Defense Department policy directives, the details about U.S. response to specific terrorist attacks, and evaluations of U.S. government preparedness to deal with terrorism.
I. Terrorism and Usama bin Ladin
II. Congressional Research Service reports
III. General Accounting Office reports
IV. Department of Defense Directives, Instructions and statements
V. Presidential Directives and Executive Orders
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.
I. Terrorism and Usama bin Ladin
Document 1
CIA, Usama bin Ladin: Islamic Extremist Financier, 1996.
This CIA assessment, released to the media in 1996, provides background information on bin Ladin, including his involvement in the resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and how he became a prominent figure in supporting the resistance. It also provides information on the nature of his terrorist activities – including the Islamic Salvation Foundation (Al-Qaida), collaboration with other extremist groups.
In addition, the profile traces bin Ladin’s commercial activities since 1989, such as his construction company’s role in the building of a modern international airport near Port Sudan, as well as support to a number of terrorist endeavors. It reports that by January 1994 bin Ladin was helping finance three terrorist training camps in the northern Sudan.
Document 2
CIA Biography, Mohammad OMAR, December 21, 1998.
Released to the media in 1998, this CIA document provides information on the birth, education, and professional career of the present leader of the Taliban, which included time as a subcommander of a faction of the Afghan resistance.
Document 3
Department of Defense, DoD USS Cole Commission Report, Executive Summary, January 9, 2001.
Among the terrorist attacks linked to Usama bin Ladin is the October 12, 2000 attack on the USS Cole, a destroyer, while it was in the port of Aden, Yemen. A small dinghy carrying explosives rammed the Cole, killing 17 sailors and injuring 39 others. The DoD commission established to investigate the incident issued findings concerning organization, antiterrorism/force protection, intelligence, logistics, and training as well as a number of recommendations to help prevent a future attack.
Document 4
Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject:Review of USS COLE (DDG-67) Attack Reports and Suggestions for Additional Recommended Actions, January 9, 2001.
This memorandum from Secretary of Defense William Cohen was sent to General Henry Shelton, the Chairman of the JCS, along with the full report of the DoD USS COLE Commission. The memorandum reviews force protection measures and initiatives taken in recent years, noting creation of a Joint Staff component to focus on force protection and counter-terrorism issues. In addition, Cohen asks for Shelton’s recommendations concerning implementation of the commission’s recommendations.
Document 5
U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, April 2001.
For over a decade the Department of State, with assistance from the CIA, has been publishing a yearly volume detailing international terrorist activity in during the previous year.
Excerpts from the most recent volume include the sections on the year in review, the Middle East and state-sponsored terrorism. Subsections of the Middle East section dealing with Lebanon and Saudi Arabia also discuss the activities of Usama bin Ladin.
Document 6
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Terrorism in the United States 1998, 1999.
This unclassified report, prepared by the FBI’s Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit covers a variety of topics. It discusses the guidelines under which the FBI investigates terrorism in the United States – a topic that has already become the subject of debate in the aftermath of the September 11 attack.
It also reviews both terrorist incidents, the investigation of incidents, and incidents prevented during 1998. It notes that after the August 7 bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa, the FBI “quickly focused investigative attention on terrorist financier Usama bin Ladin and his terrorist network Al-qaida.” “Significant events” include indictments, trials, convictions as well as the creation of plans to establish a National Domestic Preparedness Office.
The first part of the “In-Focus” section discusses the threat from WMD (weapons of mass destruction) – which had been the preeminent fear before the events of September 11. That section also discusses the investigation of the embassy bombings as well as the challenge of protecting “critical national infrastructures” and military installations.
Document 7
Press Release, Sen. Arlen Specter, Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Finds Khobar Towers Bombing “Not the Result of an Intelligence Failure,” September 12, 1996 w/att: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report.
On June 25, 1996, a truck bomb exploded outside the Khobar Towers housing complex in Saudi Arabia, killing 19 U.S. military personnel and wounding 515 people, including 240 U.S. personnel. The Senate intelligence committee and its staff examined whether the attack’s success was due to an intelligence failure. It examined a number of issues, including collection, analysis, the production of vulnerability assessments, and dissemination. Its primary conclusion was that “The Khobar Towers tragedy was not the result of an intelligence failure.”
II. Congressional Research Service reports
Document 1
Raphael Perl, Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, September 2001).
Released only two days after the September 11 attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center, this CRS report reviews recent terrorist acts and threats and considers a range of U.S. policy options – including diplomacy, economic sanctions, covert action, monetary rewards, extradition and the use of military force. The paper notes that recent events will force policymakers to reconcile the sometimes conflicting goals of security and civil liberties.
The report also suggests a number of potential policy tools and reform measures that might be implemented, questioning whether the current counterterrorism policymaking process – channeled largely through the National Security Council – is subject to appropriate congressional oversight, and also whether it places too much emphasis on state-sponsored actions at the expense of those acts committed by independent groups. The document also reviews the seven countries currently listed on the State Department’s “terrorism list,” suggesting that the government might also develop an “informal watchlist” for countries – including Afghanistan, Pakistan and others – that do not qualify for the terrorism list but merit some scrutiny.
Document 2
Kenneth Katzman, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2001, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2001).
This CRS study, published on September 10, 2001, profiles a large number of terrorist groups and their activities as well as the subject of state-sponsored terrorism. It includes discussions of radical Islamic groups (including Al-Qaida), radical Jewish groups, leftwing and nationalist groups, other non-Islamist organizations, five nations (Iran, Syria, Libya, Sudan, and Iraq) and means of countering terrorism in the region.
The summary begins with the observation that “Signs continue to point to a decline in state sponsorship of terrorism, as well as a rise in the scope of [the] threat posed by the independent network of exiled Saudi dissident Usama bin Ladin.”
Document 3
Jeffrey D. Brake, Terrorism and the Military’s Role in Domestic Crisis Management: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, April 2001).
This CRS study reviews current legislation and policies that govern the military’s role in support of law enforcement in a domestic terrorism crisis and examines some of the issues confronting the executive branch and Congress. Before turning to the military role, the report examines national level and FBI crisis management structures. Discussion of the military role involvements investigation of DoD policy, possible requests for technical assistance (including disposition and transportation of a weapon of mass destruction) and requests for tactical assistance (in situations of armed conflict or a threat to public safety).
Document 4a
National Commission on Terrorism (NTC), Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism, June 5, 2000.
Document 4b
Raphael F. Perl, National Commission on Terrorism Report: Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, February 2001).
On June 5, 2000, the National Commission on Terrorism (NTC), a congressionally mandated group, issued its report, Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism. The report argued for a more aggressive U.S. strategy in combating terrorism – specifically, a proactive intelligence and law enforcement authority to collect intelligence about terrorist plans and methods, employing sanctions against all states that support terrorists, disrupting non-governmental sources of terrorist support, planning to respond to WMD (weapons of mass destruction) terrorist attacks, and improved integration of individual agency counterterrorism programs into a comprehensive national counterterrorism plan. The report also recommended designating Afghanistan as a state sponsor of terrorism and imposing sanctions on the regime.
Document 4b, produced by the Congressional Research Service, notes and examines the concerns expressed by some over the possible consequences of implementing the report’s recommendations with regard to civil liberties, the relationship with U.S. allies, and U.S. trade relations.
Document 5
Raphael Perl and Ronald O’Rourke, Terrorist Attack on USS Cole: Background and Issues for Congress, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, January 2001).
This CRS study provides a brief background on the October 12, 2000 attack on the USS Cole and examines a number of issues confronting Congress in the aftermath of the attack, including procedures used by U.S. forces to protect against terrorist attacks, intelligence related to potential attacks, and overall U.S. anti-terrorism policy.
Document 6
Raphael E. Perl, Terrorism: U.S. Response to Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania: A New Policy Direction? (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, September 1998).
In the aftermath of the August 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the United States launched retaliatory strikes against training bases and infrastructure in Afghanistan used by groups affiliated with Usama bin Ladin as well as plant in Sudan that the U.S. charged was involved in producing a critical nerve gas component. This Congressional Research Service report asserts that the attacks represented the first time that the “U.S. had unreservedly acknowledged a preemptive military strike against a terrorist organization or network.”
The report went on to examine whether the strikes represented a new policy direction and the issues such a policy shift would raise, including U.S preparedness for domestic and overseas attacks, possible cost in human lives, and potential restrictions on civil liberties.
III. General Accounting Office reports
Document 1
GAO, Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations, September 20, 2001, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2001).
This report, scheduled for release in September 2001 even before the attacks in New York City and Washington, provides a comprehensive summary of U.S. government efforts to prepare for and prevent terrorist attacks.
The report evaluates the adequacy of the current counterterrorism leadership and coordination as well as efforts to conduct a "national threat and risk assessment," finding that agencies "have not completed assessments of the most likely weapon-of-mass-destruction agents and other terrorist threats." Other issues addressed by the report concern progress made in coordinating the national response to domestic terrorist incidents and risks to computer systems.
Document 2
GAO, Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency, November 1998, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1998)
This document reports on progress in implementing the Domestic Preparedness Program, legislation that designated the Department of Defense (DoD) as the lead agency in preparing the nation for terrorist attacks using weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Among other things the act called upon DoD to provide training and support to federal, state and local personnel engaged in emergency response operations. The program resulted from 1996 congressional hearings that focused on efforts to better coordinate interagency counterterrorism operations. The review finds that the training and support provided to domestic response teams by the Department of Defense have generally helped prepare cities to handle terrorist attacks involving chemical or biological weapons. The report does note, however, that “the FBI and the intelligence community conclude that conventional weapons will be terrorists’ weapons of choice for the next decade.”
Document 3
GAO, Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism Operations, May 1999, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1999).
This report, an unclassified version of an earlier classified report, discusses several issues related to the coordination of interagency counterterrorism operations, exercises and programs to assess lessons learned. Among other findings, the report concludes that agencies have not resolved several critical command and control issues, including jurisdictional issues pertaining to Department of State involvement in “highly sensitive missions to arrest suspected terrorists overseas.” The report also evaluates interagency counterterrorist exercises that have been carried out as called for in Presidential Decision Directive 39, finding that neither domestic nor international crisis exercises included scenarios of “no-warning terrorist attacks.”
Document 4
GAO, Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Federal Counterterrorist Exercises, June 1999, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1999).
This report provides a statistical breakdown and review of the 201 counterterrorism exercises that occurred in the three years since the signing of Presidential Decision Directive 39. The report finds that few of the exercises involved “no-notice” deployments of personnel and resources. In addition, very few of these exercises dealt simultaneously with the twin issues of crisis management—stopping the attack—and consequence management—caring for the injured. More than two-thirds of the scenarios dealt with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the rest responding to conventional weapons and explosives.
Document 5
GAO, Combating Terrorism, Observations on Growth in Federal Programs, June 9, 1999, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1999).
This report, delivered as testimony before a congressional committee, reviews federal preparations to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks in the U.S. and around the world. The bombings of the World Trade Center in 1993 and the federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995 increased concerns about domestic terrorism, refocusing efforts that had been primarily concerned about “international terrorism and airline hijacking.” While the threat of a terrorist attack using chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons continues to grow, the report highlights “the very critical distinction between what is conceivable or possible and what is likely in terms of the threat of terrorist attack,” noting that conventional explosives and weapons remain the most likely terrorist threat facing the U.S.
Document 6
GAO, Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources, July 26, 2000, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000).
In this testimony delivered before a congressional committee, the GAO reviews its efforts to help the U.S. agencies involved with counterterrorism strategy prioritize and focus their resources. Based upon a review of classified intelligence reports, the GAO warns that public statements by U.S. government officials—including, on at least one occasion, the Director of Central Intelligence—often exaggerate the threat from CBRN weapons and “do not include important qualifications to the information they present.” Statements that highlight the relative ease with which terrorists can acquire and deliver CBRN weapons are not necessarily accurate and may have significant ramifications in terms of how counterterrorism resources are allocated. The GAO review notes that “terrorists would have to overcome significant technical and operational challenges” to successfully employ such weapons. The report recommends that the government improve its threat and risk assessment procedures to insure that counterterrorism resources are allocated based on “credible threats” rather than “vulnerabilities” and worst-case scenarios.
IV. Department of Defense Directives, Instructions and statements
Document 1a
DoD Instruction 2000.14, DoD Combating Terrorism Program Procedures, June 15, 1994.
Document 1b
DoD Directive 2000.12, DoD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AF/FP) Program, April 13, 1999.
Document 1c
DoD Instruction 2000.16, DoD Antiterrorism Standards, June 14, 2001.
These directives represent various aspects of DoD antiterrorism policy and activities since 1994. Document 1a specifies basic DoD policy and the responsibilities of DoD and military service officials – the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, military service secretaries, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands – for antiterrorism activities.
Document 1b provides a more detailed description of responsibilities for those officials, as well as enumerating the responsibilities of a number of other DoD officials, such as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Document 1c, in enclosure 3, specifies DoD antiterrorism practices, assigning responsibilities to a variety of individuals and agencies – such as the Defense Intelligence Agency being charged with setting the DoD Terrorism Threat Level.
Document 2
Statement by Brian Sheridan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of the Committee on Armed Services, Department of Defense and Combating Terrorism, March 24, 2000.
In his statement Sheridan focuses on the threat from terrorism, national policy on combating terrorism (including preemption and isolating states that support terrorism), DoD support and activity in combating terrorism, initiatives and projects, terrorism consequence management, as well as technology and research/development.
In the section on counterterrorism, Sheridan notes that DoD has “a number of rapid response elements,” including specialized military units on alert, Foreign Emergency Support Teams (FEST) and support to National Special Security Events (NSSE).
V. Presidential Directives and Executive Orders
Document 1
National Security Decision Directive 30, Managing Terrorist Incidents, April 30, 1982. Secret.
The first Reagan administration directive concerning terrorism specifies which government agency will serve as the lead agency in managing terrorist incidents – the State Department for international terrorism, the Justice Department for domestic terrorism, and the Federal Aviation Administration for hijackings within the United States. It also creates and/or specifies the functions of a number of White House/executive branch groups, such as the Terrorist Incident Working Group and Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism. The directive also directs that an Exercise Committee be established to develop a multi-year exercise program.
Document 2a
Extract of NSDD 138, April 1984.
Document 2b
Office of the Press Secretary, White House, Statement by the Principal Deputy Press Secretary, April 17, 1984.
Document 2c
Office of the Press Secretary, White House, To the Congress of the United States, April 26, 1984.
Document 2d
Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: President’s Anti-Terrorism Legislation, April 26, 1984.
On April 3, 1984 President Reagan signed NSDD 138, Combatting Terrorism, which went far beyond establishing responsibilities for different agencies. The secret directive itself has never been released, but an extract prepared by the NSC staff details some provisions of the directive – including increasing intelligence collection directed against groups or states involved in terrorism as well as expanding sanctions against organizations and states which support or export terrorism.
Documents 2b-2d represent the public side of the Reagan administration’s April 1984 counterterrorism initiative.
Document 3
NSDD 179, Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, July 19, 1985. Confidential.
NSDD 179 established a task force, to be headed by Vice President George Bush, to review and evaluate U.S. policy and programs in the counterterrorism area. In particular, the task force was to assess national priorities assigned to combat terrorism, especially concerning intelligence responsibilities; the assignment of responsibilities after a terrorist incident; and evaluate laws and law enforcement programs concerning terrorism.
Document 4
NSDD 180, Civilian Aviation Anti-Terrorism Program, July 20, 1985.
This 1985 directive directs immediate action by the Secretary of Transportation to expand the federal air marshal program, specifying measures to be taken within 14 days, 30 days, and 60 days. The first step was to provide air marshals for flights with the most severe threat of hijacking (based on city of origin), while the third step involved increasing the number of special agents “to provide continuing coverage at the most threatened locations throughout the world.”
The directive also called for specific actions with regard to assessing security effectiveness at foreign locations, research and development, foreign technical assistance, enhanced airline security training, crisis management, and coordination.
Document 5a
NSDD 205, Acting Against Libyan Support of International Terrorism, January 8, 1986. Confidential.
Document 5b
NSDD 205 Annex, Acting Against Libyan Support of International Terrorism, January 8, 1986. Top Secret.
NSDD 205 provides an example of the Reagan administration’s reaction to state-sponsored terrorism. The directive begins by noting that the “scope and tempo of Libyan-supported terrorist activity against western targets is widening accelerating” and that Libyan supported terrorism constitute an “extraordinary threat to the national security ... of the United States.” The directive goes on to specify a number of economic sanctions, including a total ban on direct export or import trade with Libya, and the initiation of global diplomatic and public affairs campaign to isolate Libya.
The top secret annex to NSDD 205 directs a number of military and intelligence measures directed against Libya – including deployment of a second Carrier Battle Group to the central Mediterranean and the conduct of operations in the Gulf of Sidra.
Document 6
NSDD 207, The National Program for Combatting Terrorism, January 20, 1986. Top Secret.
This directive is based on the recommendations of Vice-President Bush’s task force on combatting terrorism. In addition to stating basic policy guidelines, including a no-concessions policy, and reaffirming the situations in which various agencies become the lead agency in dealing with a terrorist incident, the directive orders implementation of a number of measures by the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, Director of Central Intelligence, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Secretary of the Treasury.
Measures to implemented included concluding agreements for more effective measures for apprehending, extraditing, and prosecuting terrorists; prepare legislation to make murder of a U.S. citizens abroad a federal crime, expand terrorism intelligence exchanges with foreign governments and the international terrorist informant program, and review the Freedom of Information Act to determine whether “terrorist movements or organizations are abusing its provisions.”
Document 7a
Executive Order 12947 of January 23, 1995, Prohibiting Transactions With Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process, Federal Register, Vol. 60, No. 16.
Document 7b
Executive Order 13099 of August 20, 1998, Prohibiting Transactions With Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process, Federal Register, Vol. 63, No. 164.
The first of these two orders – issued by President Bill Clinton – blocks the assets and business transactions of a specific list of “terrorist organizations” whose actions are believed to threaten the ongoing peace negotiations in the Middle East.
The second order was issued in 1998 following the terrorist attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and on the same day that President Clinton directed retaliatory missile strikes against suspected terrorist-related facilities in Afghanistan and Sudan. The second order amends E.O. 12947 to include Usama bin Ladin – the chief suspect in the embassy bombings – the Al-Qaida organization, and two other individuals on the list of terrorists whose assets and transactions are to be blocked. The order also drops the word “organizations” from the heading of the list, apparently because specific individuals are now targeted.
Document 8
PDD 39, U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, June 21, 1995, Secret.
The 12-page directive, which consists of at least four parts, focuses on reducing U.S. vulnerabilities, deterring terrorism, responding to terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction. The PDD directed the FBI to expand its counterterrorism program, the Secretary of Transportation to reduce vulnerability affecting the security of airports in the U.S., the DCI to lead "an aggressive program of foreign intelligence collection, analysis, counterintelligence and covert action," and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to coordinate consequence management activities. The directive also specified that "if we do not receive adequate cooperation from a state that harbors a terrorist whose extradition we are seeking, we shall take appropriate measures to induce cooperation. Return of suspects by force may be effected without the cooperation of the host government ..."
Document 9
Document 9: Executive Order 13129 of July 4, 1999, Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With the Taliban, Federal Register, Vol. 64, No. 129.
This order blocks assets and transactions connected to the Taliban, the radical Islamic political and military movement exercising de facto control over most of Afghanistan. The order notes that the Taliban provides safe haven in Afghanistan for Usama bin Ladin and his Al-Qaida organization “who have committed and threaten to continue acts of violence against the United States.” The Taliban thus “constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.”
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB58/
The September 11th Sourcebooks
THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION'S DECISION TO END
U.S. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAMS
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 58
Edited by Dr. Robert A. Wampler
October 25, 2001; Updated December 7, 2001
The September 11th Sourcebooks - Index
In the coming days the Archive will release subsequent volumes on lessons from the Soviet war in Afghanistan, U.S. policy and planning for "Low-Intensity Conflict," CIA guidelines on the recruitment of inteligence "assets," and the use of assassination in U.S. foreign policy.
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Perhaps the most troubling and terrifying development in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11th is the emergence of biological warfare as a real, instead of a potential, threat for our government and the public to confront. To provide the historical context for this new threat, the National Security Archive published on October 25, 2001 key declassified documents on President Richard Nixon's decision to halt the U.S. biological warfare program. In this updated briefing book, the Archive is making available the official history of the U.S. Army's activities in the U.S. biological weapons program (see Document No. 26). New revelations in the news now make this history even more vital to understand, since the mailed anthrax that has killed five Americans in recent weeks may have come from the U.S. program, not from foreign sources. According to William Broad in The New York Times (December 3, 2001),
"The dry powder used in the anthrax attacks is virtually indistinguishable in critical technical aspects from that produced by the United States military before it shut down its biowarfare program, according to federal scientists and a report prepared for a military contractor.
The preliminary analysis of the powder shows that it has the same extraordinarily high concentration of deadly spores as the anthrax produced in the American weapons program. While it is still possible that the anthrax could have a foreign source, the concentration is higher than any stock publicly known to be produced by other governments.
The similarity to the levels achieved by the United States military lends support to the idea that someone with ties to the old program may be behind the attacks that killed five people."(1)
The threat of biological attack is placing new strains upon the public health system, posing new challenges for those responsible for protecting against new threats, and fostering both public fear and uncertainty about personal safety and the risks of exposure to new terrorist biological attacks. The possibility that terrorists may obtain access to far more virulent biological agents, such as smallpox, eradicated decades earlier as a public health menace, but still existent in U.S. and Russian laboratories, further compounds the concerns and the challenge, as the possible U.S. source for the anthrax attacks underscores.
Even before the terrorist attacks of September 11th, international efforts to cage the biological warfare threat had made news in the U.S. and abroad. The Bush administration this past July decided not to sign the protocol to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention by providing monitoring and compliance provisions, citing the administration's doubts about the ability to verify compliance with the treaty and its concerns about the impact both on the ability to continue work on biological warfare studies deemed defensive, and on confidential business information. This decision elicited extensive criticism among scientists and arms control analysts.(2) Public attention was also drawn to the threat posed by biological warfare and the hidden history of U.S. efforts in this line by the publication of Germs: Biological Weapons and America's Secret War by New York Times journalists, whose findings were first given widespread publicity in an article published in the Times just one week before the terrorist attacks.(3)
The documents included in this briefing book shed light upon the decision made by President Richard M. Nixon in 1969 to end all U.S. offensive biological (and chemical) weapons programs, as well as upon the history of the U.S. program. Remarkably, neither Nixon nor Henry A. Kissinger, his National Security Advisor at the time, makes any mention of this decision in their memoirs. But at the time, the administration felt an urgent need to do something to address growing public criticism of U.S. biological warfare programs, fueled by the Vietnam War. One key critic was Kissinger's former Harvard colleague, biologist Matthew Meselson, who provided Kissinger with studies demonstrating the high risk and limited utility of biological weapons as part of the American arsenal.(4) The range of experimentation on human subjects carried out by the U.S. biological weapons program, as summarized by Jeanne Guillemin, a Boston College sociologist and the wife of Matthew Meselson, makes for chilling reading:
"The entire experimental legacy is dismaying, from the hundreds of dead monkeys at Fort Detrick to the spectacle of Seventh Day Adventist soldiers, the vaccinated volunteers in Project Whitecoat, strapped to chairs amid cages of animals in the Utah sunlight as Q fever aerosols are blown over them. Most chilling are the mock scenarios played out in urban areas: light bulbs filled with simulated BW agents being dropped in New York subways, men in Washington National Airport spraying pseudo-BW from briefcases, and similar tests in California and Texas and over the Florida Keys."(5)
Thinking was progressing along similar lines within the administration, as the documents reveal. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird recommended an NSC study of U.S. biological and chemical warfare programs in April 1969, again in light of anticipated criticisms of these programs (see Documents 1-3). Kissinger and his staff were equally convinced of the need, so May 28, 1969, studies were initiated to provide the basis for a new statement of U.S. policy. Throughout the summer and into the fall, the NSC worked on the study, submitted on November 10th (see Documents 6a and 6b), which presented the key policy issues and options for consideration. Soon after, Nixon would approve the recommended end of all U.S. offensive biological and chemical weapons programs, as set down in NSDM 35 of November 25, 1969 (see Document 8), though making provision for continued research aimed at defending against foreign biological warfare threats. With this decision, the administration also agreed to submit the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning biological and chemical weapons to the Senate for ratification (see Documents 10-11, 21), and in 1972 joined over 100 other nations in signing the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which banned the possession of biological weapons except for defensive research. Acting to maximize the anticipated favorable publicity and portray himself as a peacemaker, Nixon made the public announcement on November 25th at Ft. Detrick, and the next day had Kissinger brief the White House staff on this and other recent accomplishments to drive home the point that former president Lyndon Johnson "couldn't have gotten ... CBW," or other arms control accomplishments such as the nuclear non-proliferation treaty "because [he] didn't have the confidence of the people or the world leaders. [Nixon] Thinks this gives our house liberals something to think about."(6)
Nixon made a similar decision ending the U.S. toxins program in February 1970 (see Documents 16, 19 and 20). Pursuant to these decisions, the Department of Defense developed plans to destroy all the existing stocks of U.S. biological and toxin weapons, which at the time included over 200 pounds of anthrax (see Document 22). A subsequent report, the first in a series of annual reports on the U.S. chemical weapon and biological research programs, detailed the steps taken to implement Nixon's decisions (see Documents 24a and 24b).
As the discussions leading up to Nixon's decision and the initial annual report reveal, one important issue was the extent of continued defensive research that would still be required to maintain U.S. defenses against such weapons, and to what degree such research should remain classified. Within Kissinger's staff, concern was expressed early on about the need to obtain detailed information on the classified programs (see Document 23). As subsequent revelations made clear, continued classified biological warfare programs did continue, and the ordered destruction of biological and toxin agents was not as thorough as first believed. The book by the New York Times journalists details the subsequent history of U.S. classified research on biological warfare agents, one critical piece of which was provided by the Church Committee investigations into the activities of the CIA in 1975. As detailed in the committee hearings (see Document 25) and discussed in Germs, these hearings revealed that the CIA had long been involved in stockpiling biological agents for use in assassination attempts on foreign leaders, most notably Cuba's Fidel Castro, and had worked closely with Ft. Detrick in this program between 1952 and 1970. Equally troubling was the evidence that the CIA had maintained a small stockpile of biological agents and toxins in violation of Nixon's ban that were capable of sickening or killing millions of people. Among this stockpile was 100 grams of anthrax, as well as smallpox, Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis virus, salmonella, and clostridium botulinum, or botulism germs.(7)
Such revelations likely played a role as one important motivation for the Cold War biological warfare programs of the former Soviet Union, whose legacy is still creating problems for Russia and the world equal to or even greater than those posed by control of the Russian nuclear weapon stockpile.(8) Taken with earlier statements, such as that made in 1964 by the retired head of the U.S. biological warfare program, General J.H. Rochschild, that a Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe could be effectively stopped by disseminating aerosolized brucellosis bacteria over the USSR, and the difficulties surrounding a defensive program that left room for investigating offensive uses, these pieces of the biowarfare puzzle led Soviets to suspect the U.S. never gave up its biological weapons program.(9) As will be documented in another briefing book, the Soviet program produced the most deadly accident in biological warfare programs during the Cold War, the anthrax release at Sverdlovsk in 1979.
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.
There are declassified papers here to match your interests, take a quick look [if you do not click on anything, it is quick]:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
Includes Hungry:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/flashpoints/publications.html
Iran:
http://www.gwu.edu/%7Ensarchiv/iran/index.htm
Cuba:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/latin_america/cuba.htm
News:
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/
DOCUMENTS IMPLICATE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT IN CHIQUITA TERROR SCANDAL
Company's Paramilitary Payoffs made through Military's 'Convivir'
U.S. Embassy told of "potential" for groups "to devolve into full-fledged paramilitaries"
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 217
Edited by Michael Evans
For more information contact:
Michael Evans - 202/994-7029
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB217/index.htm
The cold war:
http://wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=topics.home
PINOCHET: A Declassified Documentary Obit
Archive Posts Records on former Dictator's Repression, Acts of Terrorism, U.S. Support
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 212
Edited by Peter Kornbluh and Yvette White
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB212/index.htm
U.S. National Archives Web Site Uploads Thousands of Diplomatic Cables
A Major Step for On-Line Research
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 188
For more information contact:
William Burr, Editor
202/994-7032
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB188/index.htm
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB190/index.htm
The Vela Incident
Nuclear Test or Meteoroid?
Documents Show Significant Disagreement with Presidential Panel Concerning Cause of September 22, 1979 Vela "Double-Flash" Detection
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 190
For more information contact:
Jeffrey T. Richelson - 202/994-7000
Posted - May 5, 2006
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB197/index.htm
How Many and
Where Were the Nukes?
What the U.S. Government No Longer Wants You to Know about Nuclear Weapons During the Cold War
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 197
Edited by William Burr
Posted - August 18, 2006
For more information:
Dr. William Burr/Thomas Blanton - 202/994-7000
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB46/
Documents Detail Histories of
Once Secret Spy Units
A National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book
Edited by Jeffrey T. Richelson
May 23, 2001
[They are reopening this case]
http://foi.missouri.edu/terrorintelligence/huttonreport.html
Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the Death of Dr. David Kelly C.M.G.
Warning: This pdf file is 337 pages long.
January 28, 2004, HC 247
He was in Iraq, looking for weapons, went home to England, went to the park and died.............
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