Posted on 02/26/2007 4:18:14 PM PST by DAVEY CROCKETT
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\03\18\story_18-3-2007_pg7_11
Judicial crisis will weaken army’s hold on power: Stratfor
WASHINGTON: Once the “dust settles”, President Gen Pervez Musharraf
might not be the only casualty in this crisis; the military’s hold on
power could also be weakened, according to a commentary released at the
weekend by the US news intelligence service Stratfor.
The agency’s analysis of the situation in Pakistan said that the
condemnation of the police action against a private TV channel by
Musharraf and other developments suggested that the government had gone
on the defensive as the controversy over the suspension of the chief
justice of Pakistan worsened.
Saying that clashes took place in several cities of Pakistan, including
Islamabad, the commentary noted that Musharraf apologised for what had
happened. “These events have further exacerbated the crisis, and have
put the government in such a panic mode that various state agencies are
starting to commit blunders. There seems to be a disconnect between
orders given from above and how they are being handled by subordinates.
After turning the legal community against it, the government has now
angered the media. All the while, Musharraf’s political opponents are
trying to exploit the situation,” said the commentary.
Stratfor noted that the Musharraf regime was also said to be trying to
cut a deal with the chief justice to resolve the matter. “Any
compromise, however, will not help the regime recover from this crisis.
In fact, it will only make matters worse for Musharraf, since it will
lead to the empowerment of the judiciary and opposition political
forces, the cooperation of which Musharraf needs in order to defuse the
crisis. The growing sentiment against the military-dominated regime
could force Musharraf into a corner, especially given that 2007 is
election year. Should Musharraf be forced to step aside, it is unlikely
that his successors in the military would take over. A caretaker
government would emerge and hold elections in three to six months, as
one did when the last military ruler of Pakistan, Gen Mohammed Ziaul
Haq, was killed in a plane crash in 1988.”
Stratfor recalled that in 1988, even though a civilian government took
power, the military establishment continued to control it from behind
the scenes. “This time around, it is unlikely that the military will be
able to do that – at least not to the degree it did in 1988. This is
because the corps commanders and agency heads who would form a
post-Musharrafian military hierarchy would be a group of young and
inexperienced generals – the result of Musharraf’s periodic reshuffling
of the deck and frequent promotions. Another Musharraf legacy is the
rise of a relatively free media, especially the proliferation of
private
television networks. This is opening up the country’s political culture
and eroding the military’s ability to control the political process.
There are too many moving parts in the current crisis to predict a
likely outcome. However, one thing is clear: once the dust settles,
Musharraf will lose sovereignty, whether he continues to rule or not,
and the military will be forced to share political power with civilian
institutions,” according to Stratfor. khalid hasan
FROM COLD PEACE TO COLD WAR?
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EGYPT'S MILITARY BUILDUP
Jeffrey Azarva*
Since the 1978 Camp David Accords, the Egyptian government has undertaken extraordinary efforts to modernize its military with Western arms and weapon systems. By bolstering its armored corps, air force, and naval fleet with an array of U.S. military platforms, the Egyptian armed forces have emerged as one the region's most formidable forces. But as the post-Husni Mubarak era looms, questions abound. Who, precisely, is Egypt arming against, and why? Has Egypt attained operational parity with Israel? How will the military be affected by a succession crisis? Could Cairo's weapons arsenal fall into the hands of Islamists? This essay will address these and other questions by analyzing the regime's procurement of arms, its military doctrine, President Mubarak's potential heirs, and the Islamist threat.
INTRODUCTION
In March 1999, then U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen embarked on a nine-nation tour of the Middle East to finalize arms agreements worth over $5 billion with regional governments. No state received more military hardware than Egypt. Totaling $3.2 billion, Egypt's arms package consisted of 24 F-16D fighter planes, 200 M1A1 Abrams tanks, and 32 Patriot-3 missiles.[1] Five months later, Cairo inked a $764 million deal for more sophisticated U.S. weaponry. Few in Egypt and the United States batted an eye.
For the government of Husni Mubarak, exorbitant military expenditures have always been the rule, not the exception. In the 29 years since the Camp David Accords, successive U.S. administrations have provided Egypt with roughly $60 billion in military and economic aid subsidies to reinforce its adherence to peace.[2] Under U.S. auspices, the Mubarak regime has utilized $1.3 billion in annual military aid to transform its armed forces from an unwieldy Soviet-based fighting force to a modernized, well-equipped, Western-style military.
Outfitted with some of the most sophisticated U.S. weapons technology, Egypt's arsenal has been significantly improved--qualitatively as well as quantitatively--in nearly every military branch. While assimilating state-of-the-art weaponry into its order of battle, the Egyptian military has also decommissioned Soviet equipment or upgraded outdated ordnance. This unprecedented military buildup, however, extends beyond the mere procurement and renovation of Western armaments; Egypt has been the beneficiary of joint military exercises and training programs with the United States dating back to 1983.
However, while the Egyptian leadership has professed its desire for peace and emphasized the deterrent nature of the buildup, its stockpiling of arms should arouse some concern. Already the most advanced army on the African continent, the Egyptian military faces no appreciable threat on its Libyan or Sudanese borders. Thus, some analysts believe it has been reconstituted with one purpose in mind: to achieve military parity with its neighbor across the demilitarized Sinai Peninsula--Israel.
Many Israeli policymakers, though, see Egypt's conventional military buildup in a different light. In their analysis, Egypt's self-perception as a regional power broker necessitates the creation of a potent military. While Egypt remains a hotbed of anti-Semitism nearly three decades after peace, for them, such rhetoric is intended only for domestic consumption. The mainstream Israeli defense establishment, by and large, shares this assessment, citing the Egyptian military's doctrinal flaws and questionable combat readiness as an impediment to renewed conflict.
Yet while battle plans are not being drawn up in Cairo, Egypt's muscle-flexing does raise an eyebrow when other factors are considered. As the Husni Mubarak era enters its twilight years, no real decision has been made concerning his successor, though his son certainly appears the frontrunner. While Egypt's Islamists are unlikely to usurp power anytime soon, a drastic change in leadership could spawn greater instability in the Egyptian-Israeli arena. Likewise, Egypt's failure to curtail endemic weapons smuggling on the Egypt-Gaza border--arms which are funneled to Palestinian terrorists--has fueled speculation among Israeli hardliners that Cairo may be girding for war.
The truth, of course, likely lies somewhere between these divergent viewpoints.
ARMING TO THE TEETH
In a November 1995 speech, President Husni Mubarak encapsulated the mission statement of the Egyptian military, declaring, "...The level of our armed forces is a source of pride for us all, and [they] are capable of deterring any danger threatening our national security."[3] Senior officials and generals in the Egyptian armed forces, such as Minister of Defense and War Production Field Marshal Muhammad Hussein Tantawi, have echoed similar sentiments that, while stressing the doctrine of deterrence, have explicitly stressed the importance of offensive capabilities. While not discounting the probability of armed conflict with Israel, Egyptian officials view such offensive-orientated capabilities as a means of enhancing Egyptian diplomacy, allowing it to operate from a position of strength. The Mubarak government sees this posture as a prerequisite for regional stability, inextricably linked to a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
However, diplomatic leverage alone cannot explain Egypt's buildup. As the main bastion of regime support, the military's strength serves Mubarak's interest in stability. Given the paranoia that pervades much of the ruling elite in Egypt and other Arab mukhabarat states, it is understandable that the Egyptian leadership views a strong military as its greatest asset. In this sense, Egypt's bloated defense budget represents a quid pro quo of sorts. Mubarak furnishes his military brass with weapons and pensions; in return, they refrain from dabbling in politics and pledge to safeguard his regime from external threats. Perhaps one can also frame the buildup in terms of domestic prestige. Owen L. Sirs writes that during the height of the 1960s, the government's military parades "...served as a sort of symbolic dialogue between the Egyptian regime and its people."[4] While today's demonstrations may lack the pomp and grandeur reminiscent of the Nasser era, they still serve to showcase the country's modernization and progress.
Other motives drive Egypt's strategic objectives as well. Ostracized by its neighbors in the 1980s for blazing a trail to peace, Egyptian leadership found vindication in the peace process of the 1990s. Yet with this historic opportunity came two distinct choices. As Robert Satloff notes, Egypt could either "...expand the circle of peace via widening Arab normalization with Israel or [choose] to follow a different path, one that views Israel as a fundamental challenge to Egypt's self-perception as a regional power... and makes anti-normalization a fixture of Egyptian policy."[5] Perhaps threatened by the Jewish state's regional assimilation and military prowess, Egypt has opted for the latter. Thus, it has embarked on a sustained campaign to contain Israel and alter the Middle East's balance of power.
Flush with billions in U.S. military aid since the 1980s, the Egyptian government has significantly revamped its conventional forces, paying particular heed to its armored corps, air, and naval forces. Today, Egypt, no longer a beneficiary of its erstwhile Soviet patron, can boast of a Western-style fighting force--comprised of 450,000 regular servicemen--that approaches the quantitative and qualitative levels of the Israeli military in certain sectors. Israel is, of course, more concerned with preserving its edge in the latter. That is, given the sheer size of Israel's Arab neighbors, it is imperative that the Jewish state compensate for its inevitable quantitative weakness by maintaining its advantage in weapons systems, training, and technological know-how.
Still, the qualitative gap has shrunk as Egypt catapulted itself into the upper echelon of Middle Eastern arms importers during the past decade. From 2001 to 2004 alone, Egypt paid $6.5 billion in arms transfer agreements, $5.7 billion of which was used to purchase U.S. weaponry.[6] During this period, Egypt supplanted Saudi Arabia as the primary recipient of U.S.-manufactured arms in the Middle East.[7]
Among Egypt's most noteworthy acquisitions has been its procurement of American-made M1A1 Abrams battle tanks, whose components are partly assembled on Egyptian production lines. When the U.S. Department of Defense first licensed production of the M1A1 tank (commensurate with the Israeli Merkava tank) in Egypt in 1988, the decision raised alarm in some U.S. and Israeli policy circles, given the sensitive transfer of technology involved, the method of co-production, and the fiscal constraints it would place on an already burdened Egyptian economy. Yezid Sayigh notes that this industrial strategy of in-country assemblage, prevalent in the Middle East, enables the arms importer to "...acquire the necessary production skills and military technology gradually, with the eventual aim of producing indigenous systems."[8] Israeli analysts believe that by the time the current contract is completed in 2008, Egypt's armored corps will have amassed 880 M1A1s.[9]
In 1999, Israeli defense officials became concerned when Egypt acquired 10,800 rounds of 120mm KEW-A1 ammunition for its Abrams battle tanks.[10] Composed of depleted uranium, this armor-piercing ammunition--long possessed by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)--was used by U.S. Abrams crews to decimate 4,000 Iraqi tanks and armored vehicles during Operation Desert Storm and is said to be able to neutralize any armor system in existence.[11] None of this is to mention Egypt's 835 upgraded and U.S.-made M-60A3 tanks that also saw action in the 1991 Gulf crisis.[12]
The influx of sophisticated, Western weapons into Egypt is not limited to the renovation of its armored corps. This buildup also extends to the Egyptian Air Force (EAF), which now sports roughly 220 F-16 fighter planes, in comparison with the approximately 240 F-16s in the Israeli arsenal.[13] Israeli strategic analysts, such as Ret. Brigadier General Shlomo Brom, are quick to point that while this margin has narrowed substantially since the 1980s, the status of the Israeli Air Force's qualitative edge should not be confused with quantitative parity in military platforms. "We say they aren't the same planes. The level of the pilots and the quality of the weapons systems are not identical," Brom stated.[14] There are also reports that Israel will be the first Middle Eastern state equipped with the F-22 and F-35, the F-16's successors.
Still, other IDF officials disagree with Brom's assessment and believe that the EAF's growth has forced Israel to alter its air combat techniques. Those critics point to the EAF's recent integration of 36 AH-64A Apache attack helicopters, each capable of carrying 16 laser-guided, anti-tank, Hellfire missiles.[15] It is worth noting, though, that while permitted to upgrade the Apaches to their more advanced prototype (the AH-64D), Egypt has been prevented from acquiring the helicopter's most coveted feature--the Longbow radar--which has first-rate target identification capabilities.[16] Nonetheless, the Israeli Air Force maintains only a handful more of Apaches than its Egyptian counterpart.
While apprehensive about the buildup of the Egyptian ground and air forces, some Israeli officials, especially Knesset Member Yuval Steinitz and former commander-in-chief of the Israeli Navy, Major General Yedidia Ya'ari, consider the overhaul of the Egyptian navy to be the most significant aspect of the military's modernization program. The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies' 2003-2004 Middle East Strategic Balance report notes that Egypt acquired two Knox class frigates and four Oliver Hazard Perry frigates from the United States in the 1990s.[17] Obtained as excess defense articles from the Pentagon, the Perry-class frigates are "capable of over-the-horizon combat and anti-submarine warfare."[18]
However, it was the November 2001 Bush Administration decision to sell Egypt 53 satellite-guided Harpoon Block II missiles, which can exploit Israel's lack of strategic depth by evading its current air defense systems, that has truly caused consternation in Jerusalem.[19] This purchase could signal a strategic shift in Egypt's naval doctrine--one that would allow it to project its open-sea capabilities even further in the eastern Mediterranean Sea and place a stranglehold on Israel's most important maritime lifelines. Though the U.S. State Department downplayed the missiles' offensive nature, one must remember that Egypt's geographic position gives its fleet--which maintains principal naval bases at Ras al-Tin on the Mediterranean and at Safajeh and Hurghada on the Red Sea--the capability to blockade both of Israel's sea links with the outside world.
The United States will likely continue to refrain from selling the Egyptian government advanced weapon systems that would allow the EAF, or any other branch of the Egyptian armed forces, to enjoy operational parity with their Israeli counterparts. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen said as much during his visit to the region in 1999, when he reassured then Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that the United States remained committed to "...Israel's qualitative edge and military capability to protect its own people."[20]
In the past, though, the United States has demonstrated a willingness to export some of its most sensitive military technologies to regional governments, as evidenced by the Clinton Administration's sale of the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range-Air-to-Air-Missile (AMRAAM) to the United Arab Emirates in 1998.[21] Prior to this transfer, only Israel had been cleared to purchase the AMRAAM among Middle Eastern states.[22] However, contracts were soon inked in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt, with the United States selling Cairo a lesser ground-launched version of the missile in 2000 only because of vociferous Israeli objections.[23] Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's blase reaction to these and other related developments belied Israel's true concern. In 2004, Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz and Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom vehemently opposed--and ultimately won restrictions on--a U.S.-AMRAAM sale to Jordan based on fears that the technology would eventually be sold to Egypt.[24] Though purchasing the AMRAAM system had once been the sole prerogative of NATO member states (and Israel), the flurry of U.S. sales to non-NATO Arab governments, including Egypt, signaled that U.S. arms transfer sales could indeed trump strategic promises.
WESTERN WEAPONS, SOVIET DOCTRINE?
While detractors of the gloom-and-doom scenario in the Israeli defense establishment will not dispute the Egyptian military's modernization, their sanguine assessments assume that it will be mired in its antiquated Soviet-style military doctrine for the foreseeable future. Undoubtedly, Egypt's military ranks are still characterized by a rigid command structure; one that strategic analysts say precludes the implementation of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)--a military concept espousing the use of precision-guided weaponry, information technology, and integrated command and control systems with real-time capabilities.
That the Egyptian armed forces have failed to fully adopt the RMA paradigm thus far is true. Even with continued American aid at current levels, the Egyptian armed forces would encounter a serious economic crunch in financing such an initiative. Yet that is not to say they do not possess some of the requisite skills. The military has been the beneficiary of numerous joint initiatives and training exercises with Western forces dating back to the large-scale "Operation Bright Star" maneuvers kicked off in 1983.[25] Held biennially in the Egyptian desert, "Bright Star" stresses interoperability and has exposed thousands of Egyptian military personnel to U.S. advanced training techniques and expertise in tactical ground, air, naval, and special operations.[26] Mubarak's deployment of 30,000 troops, including commando and paratrooper units paired alongside U.S. forces, into the Kuwaiti theater during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 illustrated Egypt's ability to apply RMA techniques in actual combat.[27]
U.S. programs such as Peace Vector and the International Military Education and Training initiative (IMET) have provided additional know-how to the Egyptian military in tactical training and weapons maintenance. Under the third installment of the Peace Vector program (PV III), which began in August 1991, Egyptian Air Force pilots have logged thousands of flight hours with their American counterparts in tactical operations.[28] Other projects in the PV III program have included the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' construction of a self-sufficient F-16 air base located in Ismailiyya, Egypt (adjacent to the Suez Canal and demilitarized Sinai), which can accommodate a population of up to 20,000 personnel.[29] Under IMET, 6,600 Egyptian soldiers have participated in U.S. military education courses since 1995 in an effort to instill U.S. values, doctrines, and procedures.[30]
Despite such assistance, logistical support, and extensive coordination, the mainstream Israeli defense establishment continues to perpetuate the belief that the Egyptian military's mere knowledge of the RMA doctrine does not necessarily imply its implementation. The Badr-96 and Jabal Pharon-98 exercises debunk this myth. In September 1996, the Egyptian armed forces staged a ten day maneuver near the Suez Canal, the largest operation of its kind since the late 1970s. The target of the exercise was explicit: Israel. Badr-96--the same code-name used for Egypt's crossing of the Suez Canal in the 1973 Yom Kippur War (Badr-73)--simulated a large-scale amphibious landing on the Sinai Peninsula coast by a mechanized infantry battalion.[31] Designed first to repel an Israeli attack, the battalion--coupled with border guards, paratroopers, and special forces--would then engage in a counteroffensive to seize control of the entire Sinai and penetrate Israeli territory.[32]
Hailed by the Egyptian media as a stern warning to Prime Minister Netanyahu, Badr-96 evoked stirring nationalistic sentiments from the 1973 war. The state-controlled newspaper al-Ahram was one of several media outlets to engage in saber-rattling. An editorial published by the paper's managing editor read "...The lessons of Badr-73 and Badr-96 take us back to the starting point... that the end of war does not necessarily mean the achievement of peace, and vice-versa."[33]
Similarly, the Jabal Pharon exercise on April 22, 1998 sought to create a scenario whereby the Egyptian Third Army, in conjunction with naval and air force personnel, conducted operations in the rugged terrain of the Sinai.[34] Once more, the target was the Israeli Defense Forces. On August 12, 2001, in the midst of the al-Aqsa Intifada and three days after a Hamas suicide bombing rocked Jerusalem, London's Sunday Times reported that a senior Egyptian official allegedly threatened to deploy the Egyptian Third Army into Sinai--at the late Yasir Arafat's behest--if Israel moved into the occupied territories to thwart Palestinian terrorism.[35] That another Badr-like exercise ensued the following month[36] at Ismailiyya should be sufficient evidence to suggest that the Egyptian military--which enjoys a symbiotic relationship with Mubarak and the state--feels constrained by the security measures imposed on it by the 1979 treaty. As a result, some Israeli officials see these exercises as an inherent Egyptian desire to remilitarize the Sinai. Whether that ambition translates into capability is contested, given the assertion of military experts that any successful military operation in the Sinai Peninsula requires RMA-style warfare.
It is here, precisely, where Egypt's acquisition of the M1A1 Abrams tank and the AH-64A helicopter could have dire consequences. As the tank battles of the 1967 and 1973 wars have illustrated, the peninsula is an ideal battleground for armored, mobile warfare. Theoretically, an Egyptian foray into Sinai, in which M1A1s are given aerial cover by AH-64A Apaches and F-16s, would enable mechanized forces to seize the strategic Mitla and Giddi passes in central Sinai before an Israeli counterattack. By controlling these access routes, vital for east-west movement, the Egyptian armored corps could then traverse the entire peninsula in a relatively short period of time.
This scenario, though, is not universally accepted. While the M1A1's superior long-range capabilities were put on display in the Iraqi desert in 1991 and 2003, Stephen A. Cook believes that the "...Egyptians are able to employ them [M1A1s] only as set battlefield pieces. This is a function of the fact that Egypt's land forces... cannot refuel and re-supply its forces beyond a limited range."[37] Other Israeli analysts counter that the Suez Canal zone's weak logistical infrastructure, which includes bridges (some of which are pontoons), ferries, and the Ahmad Hamdi tunnel, renders the movement of Egypt's M1A1s highly susceptible to an Israeli air attack with precision weapons.
THE DAY AFTER MUBARAK
Most Israeli policymakers, though anxious about the buildup on the Nile, portray Egypt as something of a paper tiger; one that derives too many rewards from peace to foolishly self-inflict death and destruction on its own people. Their conventional wisdom holds that President Mubarak's quarter-century of authoritarian rule has actually acted as a bulwark against not only those extremist elements in Egyptian society who wish death upon Israel, but against the military's adventurism as well. Even if that assumption were true, Egypt faces a looming presidential succession that could completely invalidate this strategic assessment. In 2003, Shaul Mofaz voiced his uncertainty over the matter, stating, "Within a few years Egypt's leadership might be replaced and the new regime might have a different attitude toward Israel."[38]
While President Mubarak at age 78 is in reputedly "good health," his fainting during a televised parliament session in 2003 and his sudden two-week absence for medical treatment abroad in 2004 paint a different picture of stability.[39] Mubarak has also eschewed pressure over the years to appoint a vice president, most recently during an April 9, 2006 interview with al-Arabiyya TV. Mubarak stated: "The constitution gives me the right of appointing a vice-president. The vice-president has no work except as he performs only directives of the president. This is the point and I'm not ready to appoint a vice-president..."[40]
Despite a constitutional provision specifying the temporary transfer of power to the speaker of parliament following the president's permanent incapacitation,[41] vice presidents have, in practice, assumed the mantle of leadership before. Thus, Mubarak's gambit in maintaining this vacancy has not only clouded the issue of succession, but has generated much unease in Egypt and elsewhere as well. In recent years, this decision appears to have cleared the path for heir apparent Gamal Mubarak, Husni's son and one of three deputy secretary-generals in his father's ruling National Democratic Party (NDP).[42] The liberal-minded Gamal continues to burnish his image at home and abroad. During the fourth annual NDP conference in September 2006, he proposed an Egyptian nuclear program and openly defied Washington's vision of a "new Middle East," stating: "We will not accept initiatives made abroad."[43] Still, his "inheritance" of the presidency is not a foregone conclusion.
In a January 1, 2004 press conference, the elder Mubarak reassured Egyptians that he would not emulate the "Syria model," which witnessed Bashar al-Asad's rise to power after his father's death in 2000. "We are not a monarchy. We are the Republic of Egypt... we are not Syria and Gamal Mubarak will not be the next president of Egypt," Mubarak declared.[44] Gamal echoed similar sentiments during 2005's "Cairo Spring," when his father introduced political reforms authorizing Egypt's first multi-candidate presidential election. Eager to shed the label of heir apparent, Gamal stated: "I am absolutely clear in my mind and the president's mind that this story of father and son has nothing to do with reality."[45]
Of course, actions speak louder than words in the Middle East. The recent consolidation of key policy positions by Gamal and his associates within the NDP belies such statements. However, in a country where the Free Officers Movement's 1952 coup d'etat still resonates--every president since has been drawn from the military's ranks--Gamal's non-military background could present a problem. Edward S. Walker Jr., a former U.S. ambassador to both Israel and Egypt, warns that if Gamal is truly bent on economic reform, "...the entire military and security structure could easily lose its privileges, its special treatment, its informal retirement benefits..."[46] Such a development, in which the Egyptian military loses its patronage, could loosen the government's reins on the armed forces and unnerve Israeli leadership. At the very least, the armed forces would be hard-pressed to accept such a monarchical-style transition.
Other potential successors do not elicit much Israeli confidence either where the military is concerned. One is current Defense Minister Muhammad Hussein Tantawi, who believes that only the "endless development of military systems and the arms race" will guarantee Egyptian national security.[47] Egyptian security sources revealed that had the 1995 plot to assassinate Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia succeeded, Tantawi, a Mubarak confidant for many years, would have become president "without a doubt."[48] Tantawi's advanced age and failing health, though, likely decrease his prospects of succeeding Mubarak.
General Omar Sulayman, the head of Egyptian intelligence, remains another candidate in the offing. Arguably the second most powerful man in Egypt, Sulayman, aged 70, raised his public profile considerably after he was handed the Palestinian dossier following the intifada's outbreak in 2000.[49] A career military officer and Mubarak's right-hand man, Sulayman was also responsible for quelling the Islamist insurgency in Egypt during the 1990s. Some Israeli policymakers suggest Sulayman's role as an interlocutor between the Palestinians and Israelis and between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, particularly during the 2003 hudna (cease-fire) negotiations, juxtaposes his tough anti-Islamist terror stance.
Sulayman has often met with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad terror chiefs in Cairo, Gaza, Ramallah, and Damascus--gestures which have not only conferred legitimacy upon such groups, but have also served to undercut a weakened and once-secular Palestinian Authority.[50] While he publicly sought to broker an unconditional cease-fire between Palestinian terror factions and Israel in 2003, as required by the Quartet's road map for peace, Sulayman privately demanded that the former only halt its attacks within the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and 1949 armistice lines for a period of six months.[51]
Though Sulayman did in fact engineer an official, albeit brief, cessation of violence on June 29, 2003,[52] his intervention came under close Israeli scrutiny. Oded Granot, an Israeli journalist, suggested that Sulayman's efforts were perhaps motivated more by an urge to "quiet" the Egyptian street during the Iraq War's infancy, lest anti-government protests break out, than by a genuine desire for peace. Israeli officials reserved harsher criticism for Sulayman. Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom believed that the general's efforts would implicitly endanger the Jewish state by creating a "ticking time bomb;" a respite that would allow Gaza's terrorist infrastructure to regroup and replenish via the Philadelphia Corridor and Sinai.
TUNNEL WARS
Seven weeks later, the hudna began unraveling. On August 19, 2003, a Hamas operative blew himself up while riding a Jerusalem bus.[53] At the same time, IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Yaalon reported that after the Israeli army discovered and destroyed several smuggling tunnels in Gaza, smoke billowed from their opposite end--in some cases from inside Egyptian military posts.[54]
No picture of Egypt's de facto strategy toward Israel can be considered complete without examining the Gaza tunnel phenomenon. While in past years the IDF and Israeli intelligence have monitored Egypt's conventional arms buildup with unease, their attention has often been diverted to another front where Cairo's true intentions have increasingly been called into question--the Egypt-Gaza Strip border.
On August 22, 2005, the Israeli government completed its disengagement from the Gaza Strip after 38 years of occupation. Israel's Disengagement Plan had called for the evacuation of all Jewish settlements and military installations in Gaza, with one exception. The plan stated that the IDF would not redeploy in the Philadelphia Corridor, an eight-mile border zone between Gaza and Egypt notorious for its arms-smuggling tunnels.
As disengagement approached, the decision to retain control of the corridor became untenable, despite the concerns of Israeli policymakers that withdrawing troops from the area, including the Rafah border crossing with Egypt, would result in the militarization of Gaza as a terror base. Israeli leaders determined that maintaining an Israeli presence in the border strip would be a lasting source of Palestinian and Arab antagonism and would undercut their government's claims of complete withdrawal. The Israeli government looked toward Cairo as the most viable alternative to patrol the border and stem the flow of contraband into Gaza. Though some Israeli officials remained skeptical of Egypt's commitment, the two governments signed the "Agreed Arrangements Regarding the Deployment of a Designated Force of Border Guards along the Border in the Rafah Area" on September 1, 2005.[55]
Pursuant to the agreement,[56] Egypt dispatched a border guard force to the corridor (comprised of 750 armed personnel) to replace the Egyptian police force mandated by the 1979 peace treaty. Permitted weaponry included assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, and machine guns.[57] Though subject to the treaty, which stipulates the Sinai Peninsula's demilitarization, the Agreed Arrangements raised fears in Israel over the Egyptian force's objectives in the Sinai and the overall stability of the peace agreement.
While observers often perceive the corridor's smuggling as an exclusive Palestinian enterprise, Israeli concerns have been augmented by what Major General Doron Almog, former head of the IDF's Southern Command, calls "a parallel Egyptian mechanism for smuggling and infiltration"[58] extending into Sinai and the mainland. Black market forces may often serve as the impetus for this mechanism--smuggling is a very profitable business--but in the end, it can only function with what Almog refers to as the "official acquiescence" of the Mubarak regime.
Several factors suggest that Egypt's failure to curb the influx of weapons at Rafah--a town physically straddling the Egyptian-Gazan border--is a product of inaction, not inability. First, an army general on active service presides over the Sinai governorate that stretches 100 miles behind Rafah.[59] In an authoritarian country like Egypt, where the armed forces are the guarantor of internal stability, the military is cognizant of all that goes on under its nose. Second, there are only two access roads in the Sinai; countering the movement of weaponry bound for Rafah should be a relatively easy undertaking. Finally, while the IDF's counter-smuggling operations in the corridor have almost always met fierce opposition from local inhabitants, Egyptian patrols encounter no such armed resistance in Egyptian Rafah.
The Egyptian military has proven capable of reducing the security threat in the past. When the Israeli military outpost of Termit, located in Rafah, came under attack in 2001, Egyptian Rafah was conspicuously quiet.[60] That is, despite the presence of illegal arms and Palestinians in that area of the city, Israeli soldiers were only ambushed from within Gaza. The Egyptian army had restrained all violent activity on its side of the border. In past years, it is also true that Egypt has arrested smugglers and detonated tunnels, but only when it has been politically expedient. Unfortunately, these instances are few and far between.
Yuval Diskin, head of the Shin Bet domestic security service, and Avi Dichter, minister of internal security, are two of the outspoken leaders in Israel sounding the alarm. On August 29, 2006, Diskin referred to the Sinai Peninsula and Rafah border area as a veritable "Garden of Eden" for weapons smuggling. On September 27, 2006, he again spoke of the exponential increase in smuggling since Israel's 2005 Gaza withdrawal, estimating that nineteen tons of weapons and explosives were burrowed into the strip during the past year. Holding Egyptian officials directly accountable, he said, "The Egyptians know who the smugglers are and don't deal with them. They received intelligence on this from us and didn't use it. We're talking about an escalation that is endangering us."[61] Three days after his remarks, four Egyptian policemen were caught attempting to smuggle ammunitions and hand grenades to Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.[62] Alluding to this incident and other tunnel discoveries, Dichter urged White House officials in October 2006 to ratchet up pressure on Cairo, criticizing its government's failure to employ the "considerable capabilities" at its disposal.[63]
Whether or not smuggling activities are officially sanctioned by the Mubarak government is irrelevant. What does matter is that the current regime's see-no-evil policy at Philadelphia--what Almog refers to as a "release valve for [Egyptian] public sympathy for the Palestinian armed struggle"[64]--significantly raises the stakes for Israel's national security by allowing arms and material to be pumped into Gaza at a dizzying rate.
THE ISLAMIST THREAT
Some suggest that Egypt's radical Islamist movement, closely allied with like-minded Palestinian groups, has been the prime beneficiary of the government's Philadelphia strategy. Not only has unimpeded smuggling at Rafah stoked the flames of Egypt's Islamist movement, it has permitted homegrown jihadists and those in the Palestinian territories the opportunity to attack the Mubarak government and Israelis simultaneously. The October 2004 suicide bombings at Tab'a, a popular resort location for Israelis in Egypt, were perpetrated by Sinai Bedouins and Hamas operatives.[65] A Palestinian group in Gaza, Monotheism and Jihad, physically trained an Egyptian terror cell in the use of explosives and firearms before carrying out the April 2006 bombings at Sinai's Dahab resort.[66]
That the corridor and its environs could become a personal fiefdom for Egyptian extremists is one reason that Israeli prognosticators fear an Islamist takeover in Cairo. Although considered improbable today, the specter of an Islamic revolution following Husni Mubarak's rule should not be dismissed. Coupled with the Egyptian military buildup, it would have grave consequences for regional security.
To be sure, the toppling of the secular Mubarak regime by Islamist extremists would have far-reaching effects. The extensive American aid and assistance programs would cease automatically. The Egyptian military's already shoddy weapons maintenance would be exacerbated. Jihadists would annul the 1979 treaty. Yet it would be wrong to assume that Egypt would thus become nothing more than a massive arms depot to which somebody had thrown away the key. Despite government efforts to the contrary, Islamists and the military have not always remained mutually exclusive entities.
Islamists from the Muslim Brotherhood's most violent offshoots--such as al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya and Jama'at al-Jihad--have had past success in infiltrating the military's ranks. Among the members of Jama'at al-Jihad, the group that carried out Anwar Sadat's 1981 assassination, were an army colonel on active duty and a reserve lieutenant colonel.[67] Other members were drawn from a broad swath of Egyptian society, including state security forces and military intelligence. In December 1986, a ring of four military officers and 29 Islamists affiliated with the same group was arrested and charged with waging jihad against the Mubarak regime.[68] By the end of the decade, the government's purge had resulted in the detention of some 10,000 Islamists suspected of infiltration.
That the regime has grown wary should not come as a surprise. In prosecuting its own "war on terror" against radical Islamists in the 1980s and 1990s, the state began implementing policies to counteract the threat. Yet rarely has the military entered into this calculus. Fearing its exposure to fundamentalist ideologies, the government has rarely summoned the armed forces into action.[69] Instead, counterterrorism operations have often been delegated to state security services, but even they have not been immune from this phenomenon. Thus, the regime has left no stone unturned in stemming the tide of infiltration. In addition to restricting the military's rules of engagement, it has begun constructing a host of military cities in remote locations, such as Mubarak Military City in the Nile Delta region, to ward off Islamist influence.
The regime's precautionary steps have often been supplemented by stern counterterrorism measures--measures which not only broke the Islamist insurgency's back in the 1990s but have also allowed relative quiet to prevail since. While the threat posed by al-Jihad and al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya has not evaporated--even with the latter's renunciation of violence--the radical Islamist leadership in Egypt remains fractured and marginalized. Mubarak's cooption of the movement's mainstream and less militant elements, coupled with the recent release of 950 al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya members in April 2006,[70] has further moderated their ranks.
Despite episodic violence, Mubarak's balancing act has thus far allowed him to secure the allegiance of the military--the regime's most significant pillar of strength--while thwarting the Islamists' attempt at regime change. Still, the latter's quest for power in Egypt lies within the realm of possibility, given Mubarak's border policies at Rafah and his failure to appoint a vice president and surefire successor.
CONCLUSION
As the Egyptian armed forces continue to upgrade the quantity and quality of their military platforms to unparalleled heights--levels rivaling those of Israel--they have positioned themselves to be a major player on the Middle Eastern block. The path charted by Egypt during the coming years, though, will go a long way toward determining the significance of its meteoric rise from an archaic, Soviet-styled military to a Western-armed, twenty-first century juggernaut.
While justifiably concerned about the neighborhood in which they operate, the Egyptian military's unrelenting buildup appears to have already met its stated objectives of deterrence. The continued integration of Western weaponry into Egypt's armored corps, air force, and naval fleet has thus raised the question: To what end? Egyptian defense officials will riposte that a strong military is essential for enhancing regional security, protecting strategic maritime routes, and strengthening U.S.-Egyptian coordination.
Though the Egyptian armed forces do serve these and other interests, one cannot neglect the fact that rearmament is also geared toward changing the military status quo vis-a-vis Israel. Of course, this is not to suggest that Egypt is on the warpath, moving toward a confrontation with Israel tomorrow or the day after. Full-blown hostilities, reminiscent of past Arab-Israeli wars, that would reap wholesale death and destruction are not, one would think, in Cairo's best interests. Yet in an explosive region such as this, policymaking is not often equated with best interests.
Viewed in the context of Egypt's regional ambitions, limited rapprochement with Israel, and potential succession crisis--with all its implications for the peace treaty and an Islamist resurgence--the military's buildup resembles a powder keg forming on Israel's doorstep. Three decades of peace notwithstanding, the Egyptian-Israeli front remains a tinderbox, one in which a cold peace may just become a cold war.
*Jeffrey Azarva is a research assistant at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, DC.
NOTES
[1] David Honig, "A Mighty Arsenal: Egypt's Military Buildup: 1979-1999," Policy Watch, No. 447,(The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 21, 2000).
[2] United States Government Accountability Office, Report to the U.S. House Committee on International Relations, "State and DoD Need to Assess How the Foreign Military Financing Program for Egypt Achieves U.S. Foreign Policy and Security Goals," April 2006, GAO-06-437.
[3] Hillel Frisch, "Arab Armies: Religious, Economic, and Structural Dimensions," Mideast Security and Policy Studies, No. 54 (June 2003), p. 95.
[4] Owen L. Sirs, Nasser and the Missile Age in the Middle East (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 98.
[5] Robert Satloff, Testimony before the U.S. House Committee on International Relations, April 10, 1997.
[6] Richard F. Grimmett, "Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1997-2004," Congressional Research Service (RL33051), August 29, 2005, p. 28.
[7] Ibid, p. 28.
[8] Yezid Sayigh, Arab Military Industry: Capability, Performance, and Impact (London: Brassey's, 1992), p. 63.
[9] Though granted a license by the Pentagon to produce the M1A1 model in 1988, the Egyptian government first began assembling the Abrams tank after the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The first assembly contract lasted from 1991 until 1998 and resulted in the production of 555 combat tanks.
[10] Arieh O'Sullivan, "Egypt--The New Enemy?" The Jerusalem Post, August 25, 1999.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Yiftah S. Shapir (ed.), "The Middle East Military Balance," The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, February 20, 2006.
[13] Amnon Barzilai, "Should We Be Up in Arms Over Egypt's Buildup?" Ha'aretz, January 18, 2005.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Honig, "A Mighty Arsenal: Egypt's Military Buildup: 1979-1999."
[16] Shlomo Brom and Yiftah S. Shapir, The Middle East Strategic Balance: The Egyptian Armed Forces (Sussex Academic Press, The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, 2004), p. 97.
[17] Ibid, p. 98.
[18] Honig, "A Mighty Arsenal."
[19] Federation of American Scientists, "Harpoon Missile Sale to Egypt Launches Debate," Arms Sales Monitor, No. 47 (January 2002), p. 3.
[20] Wade Boese, "U.S. Announces New Arms Sales to Middle East Worth Billions," Arms Control Today, March 1999.
[21] Frisch, "Arab Armies," p.100.
[22] Boese, "U.S. Announces New Arms Sales to Middle East Worth Billions."
[23] Frisch, "Arab Armies," p. 100.
[24] "Report: Israel trying to block US sale of missile system to Jordan," Agence France Presse, August 1, 2004.
[25] Frisch, "Arab Armies," p. 101.
[26] Clyde R. Mark, "Egypt-United States Relations," Congressional Research Service (IB93087), August 20, 2003, p. 9.
[27] David A. Silverstein, "Keeping an Eye on the Allies," Backgrounder Update, No. 154 (The Heritage Foundation, February 4, 1991).
[28] Remarks by U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Francis J. Ricciardone at Abu Suwaye Air Base, June 21, 2006.
[29] See http://www.perini.com/pmsi/federal_defense_body.htm.
[30] Michael Coulter, "Review of U.S. Policy and Assistance Programs to Egypt," Testimony to the U.S. House Committee on International Relations, May 17, 2006.
[31] Yossef Bodanksy and Vaughn S. Forrest, "Approaching the New Cycle of Arab-Israeli Fighting," Task Force on Terrorism & Unconventional Warfare, U.S. House of Representatives, December 10, 1996.
[32] Frisch, "Arab Armies," p. 102-03.
[33] Satloff, Testimony before the U.S. House Committee on International Relations.
[34] Frisch, "Arab Armies," p. 103.
[35] Uzi Mahnaimi, "Egypt Threatens Show of Armed Force to Aid Arafat," Sunday Times (London), August 12, 2001.
[36] See http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/egypt/army.htm.
[37] Stephen A. Cook, "Egypt--Still America's Partner?" Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 2, (June 2000).
[38] Reuven Pedatzurr, "A New Threat Pops Up--Egypt," Ha'aretz, October 22, 2003.
[39] Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Mubarak the Pharaoh," The Wall Street Journal, July 15, 2004.
[40] Mubarak Interview with al-Arabiya Satellite Channel, Egypt State Information Service, April 9, 2006; see http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Politics/Presidency/President/Interview/
[41] See Egypt's constitution in English: http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Politics/Constitution/Text/040703000000000001.htm.
[42] Gamal Essam El-Din, "Reintroducing Gamal Mubarak," al-Ahram Weekly, March 30-April 5, 2006.
[43] Michael Slackman and Mona el-Naggar, "Mubarak's Son Proposes Nuclear Program," New York Times, September 20, 2006.
[44] El Pais (Madrid), March 28, 2000.
[45] Anton LaGuardia, "Mubarak's Heir Apparent Hails 'Cairo Spring'" The Daily Telegraph, June 14, 2005.
[46] "The Future of Egypt," The Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 10, No. 2 (June 2006).
[47] Frisch, "Arab Armies," p. 96.
[48] Daniel Sobelman, "Gamal Mubarak, President of Egypt?" Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Spring 2001).
[49] Hossam Hamalawy, "Powerful Egyptian Spy Chief No Longer Behind the Scenes," Los Angeles Times, February 8, 2005.
[50] Yuval Steinitz, "The Growing Threat to Israel's Qualitative Military Edge," Jerusalem Issue Brief, Vol. 3, No. 10 (Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, December 11, 2003).
[51] Oded Granot, "An Israeli View: The Egyptian Initiative for a Unilateral Ceasefire," http://www.bitterlemons.org, No. 6, February 10, 2003.
[52] Eli Kazhdan and David Keyes, "The Inevitable Disintegration of the Hudna," Jerusalem Issue Brief, Vol. 3, No. 5 (August 26, 2003).
[53] Molly Moore, "In Jerusalem, A Scene 'Like a Horror Movie,'" The Washington Post, August 20, 2003.
[54] Mark Lavie, "Israel: Peace Plan in Deep Freeze Until Palestinians Crack Down on Militants," Associated Press, August 11, 2003.
[55] Michael Herzog, "A New Reality on the Egypt-Gaza Border (Part II): Analysis of the New Israel-Egypt Agreement," Peace Watch, No. 520 (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 21, 2005).
[56] During the 18-month-long negotiations, Sulayman and Tantawi sought to package the agreement as the first phase in the deployment of thousands of Egyptian troops to the Israel-Egypt border. Israel rejected this proposal, citing Annex I, Article II in the1979 treaty. This annex, which delineated four security zones in the Sinai, prohibits Egypt from stationing any armed personnel, except civil police, in the zone closest to the Israeli border.
[57] Brooke Neuman, "A New Reality on the Egypt-Gaza Border (Part I): Analysis of the New Israel-Egypt Agreement," Peace Watch, No. 518 (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 19, 2005).
[58] Doron Almog, "Tunnel-Vision in Gaza," Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Summer 2004).
[59] Hillel Frisch, "Eye of the Sphinx: Egypt's Military Doctrine," The Journal of International Security Affairs, No. 2 (Winter 2002), p. 13.
[60] Ibid, p. 13.
[61] "Shin Bet Chief Accuses Egypt of Allowing Weapons Smuggling into Gaza Strip," Ha'aretz, September 27, 2006.
[62] "Sinai: Egyptian Policeman Try to Smuggle Arms to Gaza," http://www.ynetnews.com, September 30, 2006.
[63] Yitzhak Benhorin, "Dichter Urges U.S. Pressure on Cairo over Gaza Arms Smuggling," http://www.ynetnews.com, October 19, 2006.
[64] Almog, "Tunnel-Vision in Gaza."
[65] Aaron Klein, "Palestinians Plotting Egypt Attack?" http://www.ynetnews.com, September 13, 2006.
[66] Daniel Williams, "Cairo Links Sinai Attacks to Palestinians: Gaza Extremists Said to Train Egyptians," Washington Post, May 24, 2006.
[67] John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 146.
[68] Ibid, p. 98.
[69] Jonathan Spyer, "Failure and Longevity: The Dominant Political Order in the Middle East," MERIA, Vol. 10, No. 2 (June 2006).
[70] Challiss McDonough, "Egypt Frees 950 Gamaa Islamiya Prisoners," Voice of America News, April 12, 2006.
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Tribal Leaders Cooperating with U.S. and Iraqi Security Forces Reducing Terrorist-staged Violence (back)
March 16, 2007
by Gerry J. Gilmore
WASHINGTON, - Tribal leaders are cooperating with U.S. and Iraqi security forces to reduce terrorist-staged violence in Diyala province, senior U.S. and Iraqi military officials said today.
U.S. and Iraqi officials have urged prominent sheikhs in Diyala province 'to work with their people to become part of the security process and part of the political process (to) drive a wedge (between) the terrorists and any auxiliary support or direct support that they may receive from the people,' Army Col. David W. Sutherland, commander of the 1st Cavalry Division's 3rd Brigade Combat Team, said from his headquarters in Baqubah during a teleconference with reporters.
Baqubah is the capital city of Diyala and is located about 125 miles northeast of Baghdad .
The sheikhs were attentive during recent discussions, said Maj. Gen. Shakir Halail Husain, commander of the 5th Iraqi Army Division, and Sutherland's partner.
'We explained to them that the coalition forces and the Iraqi security forces are working to serve them, and the government of Diyala is working to provide food and fuel for them,' the Iraqi general commented through an interpreter at the news conference.
Those talks are paying off. Citizens in Muqdadiyah, Baqubah and Balad Ruz have provided tips that have resulted in the arrest of several terrorists, the Iraqi general said.
'Yesterday, we arrested 17 of them,' he said, 'and we killed six terrorists in the same area.'
Sectarian violence in Diyala province, as measured by the number of murders and kidnappings, has decreased 70 percent in the period between July 2006 and February, Sutherland noted. However, attacks on U.S. and Iraqi security forces in the province have gone up, the colonel said.
This situation indicates 'the terrorists are trying to disrupt the operations by coalition forces working with the Iraqi security forces,' Sutherland said.
Meanwhile, al Qaeda in Iraq has changed its name to the Islamic State of Iraq in order to posture as an Iraqi resistance group, the colonel said. However, 'this is the same foreign-led group dedicated to death and destruction,' he pointed out.
Sutherland said his five-battalion force was recently reinforced by the 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, which is equipped with Stryker vehicles. American soldiers in Diyala province work alongside Iraqi 5th Division-troops and 10,000 Iraqi police, he said.
And, recent U.S.-Iraqi anti-terrorist operations conducted in Balad Ruz, Katoon and Muqdadyidah have been successful, the Iraqi general noted.
'We have scored big success in these areas,' he said. 'We have improved security in Diyala province.'
Source: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=32490
Algeria-Maghreb: Terrorist Threat Likely To Grow (back)
March 14, 2007
EVENT: A suicide bomber was killed on March 11 at an internet cafe in Casablanca , Morocco , when explosives he was carrying exploded prematurely.
SIGNIFICANCE: Coming on the third anniversary of the 2004 Madrid train bombings carried by predominantly North African militants, the incident highlights the Islamic militant threat in the Western Mediterranean .
ANALYSIS: The formation on January 24 of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), formerly the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GPSC), seems to indicate a growing effort to gather North African militants under a single umbrella movement (see TUNISIA: Militant clashes highlight stability concerns - February 7, 2007).
The move followed the statement last September by GSPC 'emir' Abu Musab Abd al-Wadud, who pledged loyalty to Osama bin Laden, saying the al-Qaida leader 'can use us to strike whomever and wherever he wishes and he will find nothing but obedience from us'. Transnational focus. The re-branding of the GSPC appears to be aimed at exploiting the al-Qaida brand to draw greater numbers of recruits to Algeria from abroad.
The movement has suffered declining appeal among war-weary Algerians for over a decade (see ALGERIA : Bouteflika succession now dominates debate - November 29, 2006). It appears now to be focused on: development of a jihadist training ground for recruits from the Maghreb; and the role of springboard for operations in a wide number of countries as well as Algeria .
There are several indications of an increasingly transnational approach: Group name. The re-naming of GSPC as AQIM brings the Algerian-led group into line with the other major jihadist affiliates of al-Qaida. For instance, Iraqi jihadists cemented their pact with the al-Qaida leadership by renaming themselves Al-Qaida in the Land of the Two Rivers (see IRAQ : Jihadist training ground recalls Afghanistan - August 26, 2005). Elements of the loosely-controlled GSPC began adopting similar nomenclature in December 2004 when a cell adopted the name Al-Qaida in the Land of the Berbers and later in April 2005 when another adopted Al-Qaida in Algeria (see ALGERIA : Insurgents align with al-Qaida - February 4, 2004). Rhetoric.
In contrast to the fiercely independent and nationalistic tone of Algeria 's Islamists in the past, Algeria 's senior militants have been including more transnational themes in their rhetoric in recent years. In September 2005, al-Wadud spoke of 'the global war between the people of Islam and the people of the cross' and later urged North Africans to rid themselves of 'the disease of national sensitivity'. Al-Wadud noted in September that 'the United States of America can only be defeated by the Islamic United States'.
Rebuilding local support.
Alongside efforts to boost transnational recruitment, AQIM is actively seeking to improve its image in Algeria and re-build its domestic following. The first step has been to increase its propaganda output, releasing an ever-increasing stream of videos and internet communiques this year, including videos and an online journal, both unusually long.
These publications have three key themes:
Denying atrocities.
Algerian al-Qaida affiliates repeatedly have denied the involvement of their cells in government-reported massacres of civilians and urban mass casualty bombings, and even disavowed regional cells for undertaking some criminal acts. Al-Wadud has claimed that night bombings of police stations were timed specifically to reduce the risk to 'innocent Muslims'. AQIM's effort to publicise a new discriminate style of warfare is a calculated effort to win hearts and minds.
Highlighting corruption.
Al-Wadud has also sought to tap into Algerian public opinion to a greater extent than previous GSPC emirs. Whereas his predecessors relished or at least accepted the growing isolation of their movement, he has criticised the government using issues of the day such as the Khalifa Bank scandal trial (see ALGERIA : Reform needed to break oil and gas dependence - March 13, 2006). The movement's online journal has published lucid analyses of corruption that include charts comparing salaries and noting a large income disparity favouring government officials. In January, al-Wadud called for a 'people's revolution'.
Nationalism.
Al-Wadud has also gained good mileage from the traditional antipathy of Algerians to allegations of foreign, and particularly French, influence on the country and local culture. AQIM has regularly accused the government of giving Algeria's hydrocarbons wealth to foreign interests, tapping into a deep vein of resource nationalism to justify bomb attacks on foreign oil industry workers in December and March that killed one Russian and injured nine other expatriates (see MIDDLE EAST: Resource nationalism to push up oil price - November 27, 2006).
Maghreb network?
AQIM has also developed a training programme that, against a background of internecine bickering and criminal activity by local cells, nevertheless is fairly sophisticated:
Basic training. There is some evidence that mobile training teams operate in the pan-Sahel region, developing the basic skills of fighters while they are hosted by the smuggling networks associated with militant emirs in southern Algeria and beyond. These cells undertake some recruitment in Mauritania , Mali and elsewhere the pan-Sahel region. However, they do not appear to have extensive contact with the minor jihadist movements in Chad and Nigeria , and have had very little involvement with highly-autonomous Libyan, Egyptian, Sudanese, or Somali militants. Claims of an overall umbrella movement of North African militants are thus overstated. Domestic operations. Some militants are placed with cells operating in northern coastal provinces such as Boumerdes, Tizi Ouzou and Bouira.
These cells are demonstrating increased sophistication with radio-controlled truck bombs, al-Qaida's hallmark multiple simultaneous attacks, and the first targeting of expatriates in the country for a decade. The resumption of large-scale government search and destroy operations will slow but not prevent such attacks. International operations. Some militants with international interests are then streamed to operations in the Mediterranean and beyond, and may eventually present a major risk to their countries of origin: Morocco is the key target in North Africa itself, with Tunisia also at risk.
In the first week of January, the Moroccan government announced the dismantling of an alleged 62-person terrorist cell. Spain and particularly its African enclaves, Ceuta and Melilla , have been the subject of repeated plots. Italy appears to be a logistical base for the movement of fundraisers and attack cells to northern Europe, where France is the avowed main target of AQIM. However, the United Kingdom and Germany have also witnessed fundraising and support cells mutate into attack cells.
Algerian cells are also well connected to a network of recruiters and people-movers that send volunteers to further their training in Iraq , with militants often travelling via Italy and Syria . Some of those sent to Iraq are known to have returned already with operational experience to pass on. Outlook. Some features of AQIM suggest that an increased terrorist threat will develop in Algeria , including the most pronounced 'blowback' of tactics and expertise from Iraq in any country to date. Suicide operations likely will emerge alongside increased targeting of foreign oil workers.
Al-Wadud is laying out sophisticated parallel efforts to train increasing numbers of foreign fighters and re-build the movement's domestic support base. Although links to groups throughout the pan-Sahel and trans-Saharan corridors are rudimentary, these uncontrolled spaces will only slowly be tamed by initiatives such as the US Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Plan and meanwhile will provide strategic depth, transport lines and a training environment for militants (see PROSPECTS 2006: US focus on Islam risks Sahel security - December 20, 2005).
CONCLUSION: There is likely to be a steady increase in the terrorist threat facing North Africa and southern Europe, including further attacks on tourists and oil workers in Morocco and Algeria . However, fears of a broader threat from an overall umbrella movement in the pan-Sahel and trans-Saharan Africa are less justified.
Source: http://www.oxan.com/display.aspx?ItemID=DB132978
Aussie Attack Planner Revealed (back)
March 16, 2007
by Natalie O'Brien and Emma-Kate Symons
A SHADOWY Pakistani terrorist with links to jihadi cells around the world has been revealed as the alleged mastermind of a deadly plot to launch a terrorist attack on Australian soil. Sajid Mir, the man dubbed 'The Phantom' in the French trial of terror suspect Willie Brigitte, has been identified as the terror operative who allegedly sent Brigitte on a mission to Sydney to plan an attack on either the Lucas Heights nuclear reactor in Sydney's south or the national electricity grid. Mir, who is understood to have controlled and trained numerous Australian terror suspects, was the organiser and financial backer of the Brigitte mission.
It has also been revealed that Mir was the controller for Sydney architect Faheem Khalid Lodhi, who was sentenced to 20 years' jail last year for his part in the terrorist plot. Terror expert Rohan Gunaratna said Mir was a 'very significant figure' who acted as the handler and controller for foreign operatives in the Pakistani terror group Lashkar-e-Toiba. Dr Gunaratna, author of Inside al-Qai'da, told The Australian yesterday that Mir's organisation, LET, now posed 'as much of a threat' to Australia as Osama bin Laden's al-Qa'ida.
The verdict in Brigitte's trial on terror charges was due to be handed down in Paris last night. Mir was charged in absentia with the same crime as Brigitte. Intelligence agencies have established that Mir had links to now-dismantled LET and al-Qa'ida terrorist cells in the US and Britain . But little is known of his whereabouts, and despite suspicions that he remains at large somewhere in Pakistan , there is no evidence confirming whether he is dead or alive. 'He's a bit like a phantom - we don't know anything about what he looks like, we don't know where he is, but he's haunting this court,' said French prosecutor Vanessa Perree.
French prosecutors allege Mir was the linchpin of LET's rapidly growing network of international terrorist groups. He was described as the 'chief of external relations' for LET. They said he played a 'determining role' in the organisation, and through phone and email from the Pakistan camp, had tried to plan a series of terrorist missions abroad, including the so-called 'French connection project' involving Brigitte in Australia .
A key leader, Mir lured foreign jihadis to Pakistan for military training and lessons in bomb-making, including Brigitte, who arrived from France just after the September 11, 2001, attacks. Brigitte and his fellow foreign recruits, from the US, Britain, Chechnya and Australia, were a minority among the 3000 undertaking Koranic studies in the LET camp in the Pakistani city of Faisalabad. The goal was to equip them ideologically for violent international jihad missions. LET was founded in Pakistan and is made up of mostly Pakistani Punjabis with a smattering of Afghans, Arabs, Bangladeshis, Southeast Asians and the occasional Western or Indian Muslim recruit. Although it was a Pakistan-based group with a specific focus on Kashmir , Dr Gunaratna said it had close links to al-Qa'ida and was ideologically close to the concept of global jihad. He said LET was increasingly establishing a significant presence in Australia , Europe and the US .
From September 2001 until his arrest in Australia in October 2003, Brigitte was allegedly under Mir's spell. He took orders to beware of being arrested, and pledged not to reveal secrets of the camp upon his return to France - apparently under the threat of death. From his Pakistani base, Mir was accused of planning Brigitte's Australian mission, allegedly to carry out bomb attacks on key Australian targets, such as the Lucas Heights nuclear reactor in Sydney 's south. According to mobile phone records seized by French police, Brigitte was in constant phone contact with Mir from his base in Paris in the lead-up to his trip to Sydney in May 2003. It was Mir who allegedly instructed him to meet the Australian leader of LET, Faheem Khalid Lodhi, upon his arrival. 'I had the feeling that if I disobeyed Mir it would be like disobeying God,' Brigitte told French prosecutors.
Mir had also planned for Brigitte, who arrived in Australia and married ex-army officer and Muslim convert Melanie Brown, to house a Chechen bomb expert and terror-training camp commander known as Abu Salah. But Salah never arrived. Brigitte was allegedly only one of Mir's many recruits, who were sent to far-flung parts of the globe to wage war on the infidels and lovers of Americans and Jews.
There were suggestions in the prosecution case that Mir had strong connections to the Pakistani military and intelligence, because of the freedom with which the LET camp he directed was able to operate. During the Brigitte trial it was revealed that Mir had sent an email to another LET leader, which was intercepted by investigators, asking menacingly, 'How is our French connection project going?' - a reference to Brigitte's alleged mission in Australia . Even after Brigitte's arrest in Sydney in 2003 and deportation to France , Mir was tracking the welfare and whereabouts of his zealous convert to Islam. The Paris court heard Lodhi and Mir were in email contact regarding Brigitte's fate following his arrest.
Dr Gunaratna warned that LET was posing an increasing threat to Australia as it evolved and came to resemble al-Qa'ida. He said it was slowly becoming an international terror group and the jihadis were focused on Australia . 'In their mind, Australia is as significant a target as Europe and the United States ,' Dr Gunaratna said. 'Jihadists are thinking about Australia in the same way as the US and Britain , particularly now because of their involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan . He said Australia faced a terror threat comparable to Europe .
Source: http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/ 0,20867,21390637-601,00.html
Homeland Security Secretary Quizzed about Muslim Radicalism (back)
March 15, 2007
by Peter Fedynsky
Does the United States face a threat of homegrown radical Islamic terrorism? That is a question put to U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff at a Senate committee hearing on Wednesday. VOA's Peter Fedynsky has details.
Members of the Senate Homeland Security Committee expressed concern that some American Muslims could be radicalized under foreign influence to commit acts of terror in the United States . Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff told the committee the principle way of spreading such influence is through the Internet.
'I don't think it's necessary to send radical recruiters into the United States , and I think there's a risk to doing that,' Chertoff said. 'But I have no question about the fact that [Osama] bin Laden, [Ayman al-] Zawahiri and others like them quite consciously use the media, including the Internet, as a recruiting tool.'
Chertoff and members of the committee were quick to point out that the ideology of violent extremism cannot be equated with the entire Muslim faith.
'We know that the vast majority of Muslims in this country, like the vast majority of Jews and Christians, are not violent, are not adherents to an extreme ideology and are full participants in the United States,' Chertoff said. 'So we have to make sure we don't ever make that improper connection or equation of this ideology in any religion.'
Secretary Chertoff said his department has regular meetings with Muslim communities across America to promote civic engagement and to discuss issues of mutual concern.
Committee member Claire McCaskill said the United States should similarly engage Muslims abroad. The Missouri Democrat expressed concern that America , as she put it, may be 'deporting democracy' through excessively stringent security requirements on those who want to visit this country.
'Because the young people who come here to learn in terms of college education go back home at the highest levels of their government, at the highest levels of the world of medicine or engineering, and they bring back what they saw of this wonderful experiment called democracy in America,' McCaskill said.
Secretary Chertoff agreed. He said the government has made adjustments to the visa process. But he noted that a small minority can do a lot of damage, and that is why the visa process takes longer for everyone.
Source: http://www.voanews.com/english/2007-03-15-voa48.cfm
Homeland Security Team To Focus on American Terrorists (back)
March 15, 2007
by Mimi Hall
WASHINGTON — The Homeland Security Department said Wednesday it has created a unit to combat the threat posed by 'homegrown terrorists' — citizens or legal residents who plot attacks from inside the nation's borders.
'This phenomenon presents a real and serious challenge to our nation,' Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff told a Senate panel.
Chertoff emphasized that violent extremists 'represent a small, fringe element within the American Muslim community' and that members of that community have been 'outspoken in their opposition to terrorist violence.' He noted that the last major attack by homegrown terrorists was the Oklahoma City bombing of 1995.
Homeland's Chief Intelligence Officer Charles Allen's new unit will address all forms of extremist activity but will focus mainly on the threat from radicalized Muslims. The group has met with officials in 18 cities from Albany , N.Y. , to Sacramento to get a handle on the problem. Allen said members have found that:
• Radicalization is a growing problem in prisons and at universities. Impressionable students are particularly susceptible to charismatic leaders aiming to 'instill a brand of extreme ideology.'
• There are groups in the USA that serve as 'gateways' for radicalization.
• Extremists 'manipulate social situations to create perceptions of victimization' and then provoke police or political responses that can be used as propaganda.
Senate Homeland Security Committee Chairman Joe Lieberman, I- Conn. , said Europe has a bigger problem with homegrown terrorists. The London and Madrid train bombings were carried out by citizens or longtime residents.
Sen. Susan Collins, R-Maine, the top Republican on the committee, said the government's efforts to secure the nation's borders and screen airline passengers help keep out foreign terrorists but don't protect against the rise of terrorist cells.
Chertoff said some Muslim groups are working with his office to combat radicalization. Jenn Kauffman of the Arab American Institute said her group looks forward to working with Homeland Security.
Salam Al-Marayati, executive director of the Muslim Public Affairs Council, said the USA does not have the extremism seen in Muslim communities elsewhere.
'It's the Muslim community's role to eliminate violent extremism, which is what it is doing,' he said.
url not listed......
Boyle Gets National Job On Terrorism (back)
March 16, 2007
By Tracy Gordon Fox
Former public safety Commissioner Leonard C. Boyle has been named director of the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center , the second person to hold the position since it was created in response to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. Boyle, who dealt with state, local and federal authorities during his two years with the Connecticut State Police, will put that experience to use in his new position. The screening center ensures that state, local and federal agencies share information on terrorists by keeping a thorough and accurate list of them, and dispersing them to a variety of agencies responsible for public safety.
In naming Boyle, FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III noted that Boyle had served as commissioner of Connecticut 's largest law enforcement agency and that before that he had a 17-year term as an award-winning prosecutor with the U.S. attorney's office in Connecticut , where he was a supervisor of 30 federal prosecutors. 'We have brought Len onboard to oversee and direct operations of the Terrorist Screening Center . He brings to the position a wealth of experience and will continue moving the TSC forward to promote national security and the protection of civil liberties,' Mueller said in a written statement.
'I am very privileged to be given this opportunity by Director Mueller. I am looking forward to working with the dedicated professionals at the Terrorist Screening Center to carry out this important mission,' Boyle said Thursday. The center maintains the U.S. government's consolidated terrorist watch list, which includes names and other identifying information for all known or suspected terrorists. It also supports agencies that screen for terrorists, providing a 24-hour call center for federal agents and local police. The center makes terrorist identities available through the National Crime Information Center , used by 870,000 state and local officers nationwide, according to the FBI's website. It 'serves as the single point of accountability for ensuring the merging and appropriate sharing of terrorist information by maintaining a thorough, accurate, and current secure list of terrorist identities information,' the website says.
Boyle, a former East Hartford police officer, served as state police commissioner during one of the most tumultuous times in the department's history. At the state police union's request, he initiated an outside investigation into the state police internal affairs unit, which brought about sweeping change in how the department investigates its own. He was well liked by the state police union and managers, and could have stayed on as commissioner, but told Gov. M. Jodi Rell that he wanted to leave the post. Rell replaced him with assistant U.S. Attorney John Danaher III, whose confirmation hearing is scheduled for Tuesday. 'He was a true gentleman here,' said Lt. J. Paul Vance, state police spokesman. 'He did a great job here and I'm sure he'll continue to do that for the federal government.'
Source: http://www.courant.com/news/local/hc-ctlenboyle0315. artmar16,0,6438836.story?coll=hc-headlines-local
Gandhi's Way Isn't the American Way -- Collective Suicide Is No Foreign Policy. (back)
March 15, 2007,
by Fred Thompson
I feel bad for Nancy Pelosi, AND her neighbors. Anti-war activists from the group Code Pink have been giving her the same treatment the president gets at his Crawford, Texas , ranch. Camping on her San Francisco lawn, they’re demanding she cut off funds to the troops in Iraq . Besides coolers and mattresses, protesters have brought along a giant paper mache statue of Mahatma Gandhi, who is pretty much the symbol of the anti-war movement. Code Pink was founded on his birthday, and when Saddam Hussein was being given a last chance to open Iraq to U.N. weapons inspectors, posters appeared around America asking 'What would Gandhi do?' And that’s a pretty good question.
At what point is it okay to fight dictators like Saddam or the al Qaeda terrorists who want to take his place? It turns out that the answer, according to Gandhi, is NEVER. During World War II, Gandhi penned an open letter to the British people, urging them to surrender to the Nazis. Later, when the extent of the holocaust was known, he criticized Jews who had tried to escape or fight for their lives as they did in Warsaw and Treblinka. 'The Jews should have offered themselves to the butcher’s knife,' he said. 'They should have thrown themselves into the sea from cliffs.' 'Collective suicide,' he told his biographer, 'would have been heroism.'
The so-called peace movement certainly has the right to make Gandhi’s way their way, but their efforts to make collective suicide American foreign policy just won’t cut it in this country. When American’s think of heroism, we think of the young American soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan , risking their lives to prevent another Adolph Hitler or Saddam Hussein. Gandhi probably wouldn't approve, but I can live with that.
Source: http://article.nationalreview.com/?q= MTM1NTg1YjFh MGE5MzZjZDUz NzNhNzdkMjE2YmEyNTY=
Britain Asks UN To Send Investigators into Zimbabwe (back)
March 16, 2007
by Basildon Peta, Andy McSmith and Anne Penketh
Britain will try high risk diplomacy by demanding that the Human Rights Council of the United Nations sends a team of investigators into Zimbabwe to gather evidence on the ground about the brutality of Robert Mugabe's regime.
The decision, agreed yesterday by Tony Blair and the Foreign Secretary, Margaret Beckett, is a sign of Whitehall 's confidence that patience with Mugabe across Africa, and particularly in South Africa , is wearing thin. Mr Mugabe has responded to every British criticism of his government by reminding his followers of Britain 's past as Africa's colonial master - a line which British ministers frankly admit has resonated with other black Africa leaders. The same note of defiance was struck again yesterday as Mr Mugabe told Western nations to 'go hang' after the barrage of criticism that followed the heavy beatings of opposition leaders this week.
Mr Mugabe made his remarks as regional African leaders, apparently impatient with Mr Mugabe's intransigence, deployed the Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete to try and encourage internal dialogue to resolve the long-running economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe . Mr Kikwete made an unscheduled visit to Zimbabwe on behalf of regional leaders who are worried about the ever deteriorating situation in the country. 'I came to brief the President on my visit to Europe and discussions that always come up on the situation in Zimbabwe . There are so many issues we discussed and we agreed on the way forward on a number of issues,' was all Mr Kikwete would say. He then left Mr Mugabe to dominate the press conference with his anti-Western tirades. 'It's the West as usual... when they criticise the government trying to prevent violence and punish the perpetrators of that violence, we take the position that they can go hang,' Mr Mugabe said yesterday.
His statement was made as Zimbabwe police said three officers were badly hurt late on Tuesday when suspected opposition supporters petrol bombed a police station in a Harare suburb, leaving their house in flames. They said the opposition Movement for Democratic Change party's 'orgy of violence was spreading' in the country. 'We believe that the attacks are assuming a militia-type of form,' a police spokesman, Wayne Bvudzijena, said as state television showed the badly burnt officers in hospital. The MDC strongly denied the accusations and said that they were part of efforts by the Mugabe regime to portray itself as the victim. Speaking in London , Mrs Beckett said yesterday: 'I am sorry to say that in many parts of Africa , Mugabe is viewed as a kind of hero of the revolution, and if it comes to a choice between the hero of the revolution and the colonial oppressor, they know whose side to be on.'
The Human Rights Council, which is currently meeting in Geneva , will be asked to put together a team of investigators to visit Zimbabwe , although it is recognised that there is a strong chance that they will be refused entry. The council will also be asked to pass a resolution condemning this week's attack on the opposition party, and Britain will ask the EU to add the names of perpetrators of the violence to the lengthening list of senior Zimbabweans banned from Europe .
Source: http://news.independent.co.uk/world/politics/article2362783.ece
New US Threat of Action over Darfur Seen as Serious (back)
March 15, 2007
After months of false starts and empty threats, the United States finally looks poised to take firm action against Sudan to halt the atrocities in Darfur .
Experts and human rights activists who have long been critical of US inactivity on Darfur said improved US-China cooperation in dealing with global crises coupled with growing impatience over Sudan's defiance may have created the diplomatic critical mass needed for the crackdown on Khartoum.
The State Department signaled its readiness to act Wednesday by announcing that it would seek a new UN Security Council resolution aimed at forcing the Sudanese government to honor past promises to allow a UN-led peacekeeping force into Darfur .
'It is simply the case that the Sudanese government needs to recognize that the international community can't stand idly by while people suffer,' Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said.
'We are indeed looking at other options, including options that might require further UN action,' she said.
President George W. Bush's special envoy for Darfur, Andrew Natsios, meanwhile told several human rights groups in a conference call Wednesday that the administration was preparing its own 'Plan B' package of economic sanctions against Sudan , according to a participant in the call.
The announcements came after Sudanese President Omar al-Beshir wrote to UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon last week backing away from a deal reached in November to let a 20,000-strong, UN-led peacekeeping force into Darfur .
The letter was just the latest step in a four-year campaign by Beshir to prevent international intervention in Darfur, where more than 200,000 people have died and at least two million been left homeless in a civil war in which government-backed militia have been blamed for most of the violence.
The violence has continued unabated despite numerous US appeals, including direct entreties from Bush and Rice to Beshir, and repeated US warnings that Khartoum will face serious consequences for its defiance.
But Bush has failed to put his words into action, despite having vowed early in his presidency never to sit idly by while another Rwanda-style genocide occurred.
Many analysts attributed the lack of US follow-through to Bush's preoccupation with Iraq and 'axis of evil' foes Iran and North Korea .
'Our position in the world is obviously complicated by what's gone on in Iraq, making it that much more difficult to mobilize coalitions, no matter how sincere and how substantial our case is against Sudan over Darfur,' said Jonathan Morgenstein of the US Institute of Peace.
US ardor for action was also cooled by hostility from China , a veto-wielding member of the UN Security Council which buys most of Sudan 's oil and historically opposes international meddling in internal conflicts that could encourage similar moves over Tibet , Morgenstein said.
But with little prospect for any successful outcomes in Iraq , Bush and Rice have been turning their diplomatic attention to other, potentially solvable, crises.
They have notably worked closely with China in using UN sanctions to lead North Korea into last month's historic nuclear disarmament agreement and as a weapon to challenge Iran 's nuclear program.
Alex Meixner of the Save Darfur coalition said there were new signs China might be ready for tougher action against Sudan after its ambassador to the UN described Beshir's latest backtracking on Darfur 'disappointing.'
He noted that the November agreement Beshir has reneged on came at a meeting involving the United Nations, European Union , US , Russia , China and African states.
'He's now not only going back on his word to the US , but also to China , Russia and his African allies,' Meixner said.
One member of a organization involved in Darfur who has spoken privately with US officials recently said he had detected a new determination to act.
'The administration is seeing this as the right opportunity to launch into some of their 'Plan B' actions because there seems to be more of an appetite for it overseas,' he said, speaking on condition of anonymity.
Natsios was quoted as saying one of the unilateral sanctions Washington could impose is blocking any international transactions with Sudan in US dollars -- a step which has proved effective against North Korea and Iran and could badly hit Sudan 's oil dealings.
Source: http://www.sudan.net/news/posted/14277.html
Europe's Emerging Counter-Terrorism Elite: The ATLAS Network (back)
March 15, 2007
by Ludo Block
Special operation forces, or in police terminology special intervention teams, are an essential asset in any counter-terrorism operation. Their deployment can be needed during a terrorist incident or as a logical follow-up on gathered intelligence with the aim to arrest terrorists and prevent an attack. The need for well-trained intervention units in Europe was first demonstrated during the 1972 Olympics in Munich when Palestinian terrorists kidnapped members of the Israeli Olympic team and the subsequent action to rescue the hostages failed tragically. Following this incident, most European countries created their own counter-terrorism special intervention units that were embedded in either police or military structures. Examples of present-day special intervention units in Europe are the renowned British SAS, French GIGN and German GSG-9 and the lesser-known units like the Austrian COBRA, Danish AKS, Dutch DSI, Estonian K-Commando and Finnish Karhuryhmä. Although the character of global terrorism has changed—broadly speaking from bombings and hijackings to suicide attacks—the need for special interventions has not decreased. On the contrary, contemporary terrorists tend to have little risk-aversion, meaning that specialized intervention is needed more than ever. This can be illustrated by the incident in April 2004 when a Spanish police officer was killed and 11 wounded as the alleged ringleader of the Madrid bombings, Sarhane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet, blew himself up together with three accomplices when the police raided their apartment. There is also the instance in November 2004 when a terrorist suspect threw a hand grenade, wounding three Dutch police officers part of an intervention unit, illustrating the dangers that police face when engaging terrorists.
To reach a high level of professionalism, special intervention units place much emphasis on training and, when possible, the sharing of each other's experiences. Practical experience with counter-terrorism, however, often comes with high prices paid in terms of trial and error. Out of fear that they may lose their 'competitive advantage,' they are understandably cautious in sharing their special knowledge, expertise or skills. Cooperation between special intervention units is therefore largely based on informal contacts and, above all, on mutual trust. In 1996, the European Union first politically pushed an initiative for cooperation in this field when the EU Council decided to create a directory of specialized counter-terrorist competences, skills and expertise to facilitate cooperation on special interventions between member states. Although it was envisaged that member states would take turns maintaining the director, little was actually done until September 2001. After 9/11, the Council—in an extraordinary meeting following the terrorist attacks—ordered Europol to take responsibility for the directory. At the same Council meeting, the European Police Chiefs were instructed to organize and coordinate cooperation of the special intervention units. This led to the establishment of the 'ATLAS network,' an informal cooperation structure between special intervention units in the European Union. Its initial goal was to bring each special intervention unit to the highest possible level of professionalism through intense structural mutual cooperation [1].
The first meeting of the heads of the intervention units took place in October 2001, and the ATLAS network currently regroups more than 30 counter-terrorist special intervention units based in the police, gendarmerie and armed forces of the EU member states and the non-EU member Norway [2]. The little known network is, however, not formally institutionalized in any EU framework. Only in November 2005, based on a short European Commission press briefing, was there any public media coverage of the ATLAS network, revealing its name and existence [3]. In January 2006, the EU counter-terrorism coordinator in a public speech briefly mentioned the ATLAS network and its possible usage in case of hostage situations and other emergencies requiring cross-border assistance [4].
Meanwhile, cooperation between the units in the network has been enhanced on various terrains. European funds were freed for setting up an operative database to act as a library on completed operations and as support for acquisitions of common special equipment, as well as for setting up an expert group on equipment and technologies [5]. Europol was tasked with providing the units secure means of communication and in 2005 personnel from each unit in the ATLAS network was instructed in the use of Europol's secure communication platform, 'EurOPs' [6].
Joint counter-terrorism exercises as well as seminars, studies and the exchange of materials between the special intervention units in various formations have in the past six years been organized on a regular basis. Examples include a four-day international exercise in 2003 in Germany to increase competencies to handle assault and hostage taking from boats and a large-scale exercise in 2004 in the harbor of Rotterdam . Joint studies on improvement of operational procedures and techniques that have been conducted include a joint study in Spain of the effect of explosives on different types of doors to improve accessing techniques and a study and exercises in Italy of forced entry into high-speed trains [6].
According to a study of the Swedish National Defense College , the advantages of ATLAS cooperation for small countries like the Nordic states are many, ranging from joint exercises that offer possibilities to test special equipment to the possibility of exchanging experiences from demanding incidents face-to-face [7]. Meanwhile, access to alternate training situations is an asset of interest to all units in the network. The need for training cannot be emphasized enough as was sadly demonstrated recently when a French GIGN member was killed and two others seriously wounded during a seemingly routine arrest of a mentally ill person who was shooting at the police with a shotgun (Le Monde, January 20).
Although the current primary aim of the ATLAS network is mutual training to a common standard, it is foreseen that the cooperation could expand to an operational level. Plans for organizing assistance possibilities from neighboring countries have been considered from the inception of the network. Operational cooperation, however, is still somewhat of a sensitive issue. Governments are reluctant to give permission for deployment of 'foreign' police or military on their sovereign territory especially when this by definition entails the possible use of deadly force. Nevertheless, in the elaboration of the 2004 EU multi-annual strategic plan on police and judicial cooperation—the so-called Hague Program—development of a legal framework for operational cooperation in special interventions was explicitly included [8].
In October 2004, the European Police Chiefs attended the ATLAS exercise at the harbor of Rotterdam and discussed the question of the appropriate legislative framework if such an operation should ever take place in reality. The idea of a formal legal framework to regulate cooperation between special intervention units, however, did not receive a warm welcome from the units themselves. They preferred a less formal approach that allows the network to draw up its internal rules, procedures and organizational arrangements [9]. From a professional perspective, the preference of the units for informal cooperation with little public exposure is understandable. Nonetheless, in the current European political landscape it would be naïve to assume that operational assistance could be rendered on the same informal basis as combined training and exchange of experience. Furthermore, since no member state can pretend that it has the capacity to deal with all kinds of large-scale situations that require a special intervention, the possibility of a request for actual operational assistance from one of the EU member states is far from hypothetical.
A further discussion on a possible legal framework for special interventions in the European Union started in 2005 and issues discussed included the scope of cooperation (the definition of crisis, type of assistance to be rendered), civil and penal responsibility, the decision-making process (chain of command during operations), working procedures and financial issues [10]. As such discussions in the EU policy-making process usually take some time, the six largest European states agreed in March 2006 as an interim solution on developing joint support teams to offer operational assistance in case of serious terrorist attacks. These expert teams or liaison officers could provide on-site support to an attacked country upon its request [11].
In December 2006, Austria presented a concrete draft of a legal framework for cooperation between the special intervention units in crisis situations [12]. The envisaged framework lays down general rules and conditions to allow for special intervention units of one member state to provide assistance and/or actual operational deployment on the territory of another member state. The most essential issues covered by the proposed framework are those regarding the chain of command and civil and penal liability, while further organizational and operational details are left to the professionals involved.
Already, the ATLAS network fulfills an important role in European counter-terrorism capabilities by enhancing mutual trust and reaching common standards between the intervention units and by further professionalizing counter-terrorist intervention techniques. With the proposed legal framework, actual deployment of special intervention units from each European country across Europe becomes possible. This would further enhance the role of the ATLAS network, which is a much needed step in the development of a common European special intervention capacity.
Notes
1. Conclusions adopted by the JHA Council (12156/01), Brussels , September 20, 2001.
2. Combating Terrorism in Nordic Countries: A Comparative Study of the Military's Role, Swedish National Defense College , 2003.
3. European Broadcasting Service, November 29, 2005, item reference: I-049865en.
4. Presentation by Gijs de Vries, EU counter-terrorism coordinator, at a seminar of the Center for European Reform in Brussels , January 19, 2006.
5. Amendments submitted to the meeting of the European Parliament Committee on Budgets of 4, 5 and 6, October 2005.
6. AGIS project descriptions and evaluations 2003, 2004, 2005.
7. Combating Terrorism in Nordic Countries: A Comparative Study of the Military's Role.
8. Council and Commission Action Plan Implementing The Hague Program Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union, Brussels, June 10, 2005.
9. Conclusions on the 10th meeting of the Police Chiefs Task Force, October 11-12, 2004.
10. Discussion document on a normative framework for 'ATLAS' (8434/05), Brussels , April 25, 2005.
11. Conclusions of the meeting of the interior ministers of France , Germany , Italy , Poland , Spain and the United Kingdom , Heiligendamm, March 22-23, 2006.
12. Official Journal of the European Union, C321, December 29, 2006.
Source: http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php? articleid=2370280
Ban Concerned Over Arms Smuggling in Lebanon (back)
March 16, 2007
UNITED NATIONS: UN chief Ban Ki-moon, in a report seen here on Wednesday, has expressed concern about the 'reported activities of unauthorised armed elements' in Lebanon and has urged Israel to end its air incursions into Lebanese airspace. The report, a copy of which was obtained by AFP, reviews implementation of Security Council resolution 1731, which ended the 34-day war between Israel and Hesbollah guerrillas last August. 'I am concerned by the reported activities of unauthorised armed elements outside of UNIFIL (the UN Interim Force in Lebanon )’s areas of operations,' Ban said, insisting that successful implementation of 1701 requires 'the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon '. Referring to Israel ’s repeated concerns over arms smuggling into Lebanon from Syria , Ban noted that information provided by the Israeli military was 'substantial.' But, he said, 'its authentication would require independent military assessment.' He meanwhile called on Israel 'to review its policy of overflights through Lebanese airspace, which are a continuing violation of 1701, and most urgently to provide the United Nations with all information on cluster munitions' fired during last year’s conflict. afp
Source: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page= 2007\03\16\story_16-3-2007_pg4_2
Austrian Combat Aircrafts Lack Navigation System: GPS-License Ordered Too Late. (back)
March 16, 2007
Austria might have to beg for necessary software licenses the USA - No one in the Austrian ministry of defense seems to be responsible, now a single civil servant is tasked to fix it - When Austrian pilots start up their Euofighter Typhoon, they might get a blind-reply message from the GPS navigation system: military GPS navigation and MIDS-LVT for radio transmission with up to date encryption will not work without US-issued licenses. It would have been Austrias responsibility to obtain those licenses for such customer furnished equipment since usually it's issued only to NATO members - for non-members an exemption has to be made. Such an exemption was announced to Austria November 27th 2006, but it might take time since in the US some two dozen offices are dealing with, and facing the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan they might have other priorities. At the Austrian side Brigade General Jeloschek is tasked to obtain the licences - and beside he is tasked by DefSec Darabos to find a way cancelling the purchase of the jets.
Source: http://derstandard.at/?url=/?id=2806707
Boston: Islamic Group Sues Scholar for Lbeling Muslims (back)
March 15, 2007
by Matt Rand
Unable to shake off allegations of connections to Egyptian Muslim scholar Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Islamic Society of Boston (ISB) has done the Massachusetts equivalent of calling in the Marines: it has summoned the trial lawyers. Qaradawi, considered to be a supporter of suicide bombings, is being sued in a Boston court for libel against Muslims. And the Islamic Society of Boston has not only sued an 'Islamic cleric, a Christian political science professor and the Jewish daughter of Holocaust survivors,' says The David Project, a Jewish group that educates and trains students and the Jewish community about Israel that is a defendant in the lawsuit, along with The Boston Herald, Investigative Project head Steve Emerson and Fox 25 News. They have also twice subpoenaed the Anti-Defamation League, which declined comment.
Photocopies of Islamic Society of Boston IRS tax returns from 1998, 1999, and 2000 which list Qaradawi as a trustee are included as evidence in the statements of several of the defendants being sued for libel. At the same time, notarized 1993 documents from the City of Cambridge also list Qaradawi as a trustee. Lawyers on behalf of the Muslim Public Affairs Council in late February filed 'friends of the court' briefs for the Islamic Society of Boston, accusing the defendants of seeking to 'demonize and vilify' US Muslims. The American Jewish Congress was one step ahead, having filed a 'friend of the court' brief for the David Project and other defendants last October. At the same time Georgetown University scholar John Esposito filed his own affidavit which sought to distance the Islamic society of Boston from radical Islamic groups, saying that the defendants 'misleadingly attempt to suggest a link' between the ISB and Wahhabism. Suggesting he sought to set the record straight on the Islamic Society of Boston, Esposito goes on to say that he intends to correct the 'gross mis-characterizations' cited by the defendants '...as their apparent excuse for attacking the ISB [Islamic Society of Boston] and its leadership.' However, Emerson, who in his written statement to the court worried that Boston might be looking the other way when it came to Islamic extremists, was the subject of much of Esposito's negative comments. Emerson wrote in his affidavit that he was concerned that ' Boston public officials' were worried 'they may be subsidizing the significant expansion of a particularly extremist and minority sect of Islam.' The ISB, meanwhile, accused the David Project of being the 'hidden hand' behind another lawsuit Boston resident James Policastro brought against the ISB, alleging that the David Project used Policastro to 'keep the role of the David Project hidden from the public.'
Source: http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=117387909540 6&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull
Brigitte: 9 Years for Australia Terror Plot (back)
March 16, 2007
by James Button
A FRENCH court yesterday sentenced Willie Brigitte to nine years' jail for plotting to carry out terror attacks, the main one in Australia . Brigitte showed no emotion as Judge Jacqueline Rebeyrotte sentenced him to nine years, with a six-year minimum. But lawyer Harry Durimel described the sentence as 'white justice for black people'. Brigitte's other lawyer, Jean-Claude Durimel, said he had 10 days in which to decide whether to appeal.
Brigitte, who has already been in detention for nearly 3½ years, appeared in court in a white Nike top and loose fitting white trousers. After the verdict was delivered, a white hood was put over his head to prevent him being photographed as he was taken away by two security guards.
The charges against him relate chiefly to his activities during five months he spent in Australia in 2003. Investigators said he trained with terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan . He then moved to Australia , where he was being prepared for attacks on targets such as Sydney 's Lucas Heights nuclear reactor and the Pine Gap US spy base in central Australia . Investigators said Brigitte was working in co-operation with Faheem Khalid Lodhi, a Pakistani-born architect who was sentenced to 20 years in jail last year for planning to blow up Sydney 's power grid.
During his stay in Australia , Brigitte was involved with radicals from the Lakemba community and worked at a Sydney kebab shop. Living in the south-west suburbs of Sydney, Brigitte — who is from the French territory of Guadeloupe in the Caribbean — married an Australian Muslim convert and former army signaller, Melanie Brown — his third wife. He was arrested in October 2003 and deported to France , where he was charged with 'criminal association in relation to a terrorist enterprise'. Brigitte's defence said he went to Australia to escape the influence of his controller, Lashkar-e-Toiba commander Sajid Mir and Australian-based Lodhi. Mir, Brigitte's co-defendant in absentia, was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment on the same charges as Brigitte, with two-thirds of that to be the non-parole period. His whereabouts remain unknown.
Source: http://www.theage.com.au/news/world/brigitte-9- years-for-australia-terror-plot /2007/03/16/1173722666284.html
Catholic Church In Cologne Collects Money For A Mosque (back)
March 16, 2007
When the Rev. Franz Meurer stands at the altar this Sunday in his priestly vestments, he'll say to the congregation: 'Today's collection is for the construction of the big new mosque in Ehrenfeld.' Meurer, 55, is not expecting protests. Both the board of Cologne's St. Theodore Catholic Church and the parish council have unanimously approved the action. 'It's only natural that we're helping them,' he said of the Muslims living in a city that is one of the main centres of Catholicism in Germany. After the special collection was announced last Sunday, several parishioners asked if it was really necessary - considering, for instance, that four young Turks beat a family man into a coma on the Thursday before Ash Wednesday. 'I said, 'Hey, people, think about it, will you? We'll be supporting the sensible ones',' Meurer recalled. 'That's not so dumb.'
St. Theodore's parish council came up with the unusual idea. Its chairman reminded the group that their new church was completed five years ago, and that the Protestant parish in the neighbourhood had given a nice gift. 'Now we, in turn, should give someone a gift too,' Meurer said. 'That's how we hit upon the mosque; it's being designed by the same architect that did our church.' The mosque, at the headquarters of the Turkish-Islamic Union for the Institution of Religion (DITIB) in the Cologne district of Ehrenfeld, will be one of Germany's biggest. Plans call for two 55-metre-high minarets, a dome, and room for more than 3,000 worshippers. A right-wing populist party called ProCologne has been gathering signatures for a public petition against the structure. Ehrenfeld residents who want nothing to do with the petition have reservations about the size of the mosque, however. Meurer's parish is in the Cologne suburbs of Hoehenberg and Vingst, both of which have a high proportion of foreigners. At his initiative, 180 sponsors planted 41,000 daffodils now in bloom along the streets. Christian community work for Meurer means things like installing public dog loos because, as he said, 'once an area like this is neglected, it can go downhill very fast.'
At the community centre, young Muslim women in headscarves are photographed at no cost for job applications. Turkish children play in the yard. And Meurer organises multi-religious celebrations. Cardinal Joachim Meisner, archbishop of Cologne, set off a heated debate late last year when he directed Catholic school teachers in the region to stop participating in multi-religious events. 'All that matters to me about them is keeping peace in the area,' Meurer remarked. 'We don't pray together there. We get to know each other, which is possible only at get-togethers like that.' Weighing what the parish could buy for the mosque sparked a lively discussion about Islam, Meurer said. 'Our people were suggesting such things as a little kneeler, a bell, a picture and the like. But then I said, 'Friends, this isn't likely to lead anywhere. They pray to God one on one in their mosques. They haven't got liturgical objects like we do'.' About 350 euros (462 dollars) winds up in the collection bag on normal Sundays. This time, though, more than 1,000 euros has been collected in advance. DITIB officials said the amount of the gift was unimportant. 'It's simply a nice gesture by Mr Meurer,' said Rafet Ozturk, DITIB's coordinator for interreligious dialogue. 'We're pleased, of course. Even very pleased.'
Source: http://www.playfuls.com/news_10_19335-Catholic-Church-In- Cologne-Collects-Money-For-A-Mosque.html
Georgia Tech's Censorship 'Technique' (back)
March 16, 2007
by Orit T. Sklar
Last month, the editorial board of the Technique – the Georgia Tech student Newspaper – rejected an advertisement from the Terrorism Awareness Project entitled, “What Americans Need to Know about Jihad.” In the February 23rd edition, the Technique published a news article with the headline, “Islamic Awareness Week promotes understanding.”
The Technique has clearly chosen to promote one particular viewpoint and censor those views not in line with its own unbalanced agenda. The Technique seems to doubt the intellectual ability of Georgia Tech students to come to their own conclusions when given complete information. Worse, the paper believes its role is to review, filter and censor, in order to entrench a single narrow ideology as the only one worthy of expression on campus. I’m sure the Technique would describe itself as a marketplace of ideas. Too bad there’s only one item on the shelf at this marketplace. Buy it and like it.
Radical Islam has set every region of the world aflame in its quest to conquer and destroy modern civilization. But even at the very moment we are battling the jihadists in Iraq and Afghanistan, sympathizers inexplicably abound here at home. Covering up the identification and the intentions of our enemies is dangerous and can only lead to our demise. While bodies pile up in every corner of the globe, the Muslim community and opinion-makers on college campuses refuse to even consider the possibility that the Islamic community is, if not to blame for the slaughter, complicit in its silence. How much more killing needs to happen in the name of Islam before its stateside advocates demonstrate against terrorism, instead of against the free society that stands to crumble should that which they deny exists triumph? Typically, according to the Technique, Muslims are the victims:
In recent years, the deplorable activities of terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda and the Taliban have unfortunately led many people to have many misconceptions about Muslim people. Even the Islamic faith has become a victim of false accusations and beliefs as a result of the mistrust towards the Muslim community that has been precipitated by events like 9/11 and the 2005 London train bombings.
In response, Tech's Muslim Student Association (MSA) launched an Islamic Awareness Week last Tuesday, Feb. 13. This week was meant to add momentum to the organization's attempts to break down common misconceptions about Islam and Muslim people.
Islamo-fascist terrorists will remove anyone and anything that stands in the way of achieving their goals. The true victims in this situation are all of those people who wish to live in a free, democratic society.
The ad submitted by Terrorism Awareness Project simply calls attention to the oft-stated goal of jihadists – the establishment of a global Islamic state under Islamic law. The article chose to whitewash the truth about how Islamic terrorists themselves have advanced jihad through word and deed:
Jihad was another issue that was discussed and clarified during the week…'Jihad is directed towards purifying yourself and your inner values and not towards purifying the world by extraditing other religions,' Masud said. [Umair Masud President, Muslim Student Association]
Muslim countries have some of the worst ratings in the world in terms of women’s rights. (Many of the outspoken critics of radical Islam are women who have written books based on their experience as a woman in a Muslim country. Most of them need extra security, to protect them from those that seek to silence them.) And yet, the article addresses the hijab as if it was some kind of idealistic model for a woman’s life. Women might be able to choose whether or not to wear a hijab in free societies, but that is not possible in countries where Sharia law reigns supreme. I doubt that a woman such as Azar Nafisi, author of Reading Lolita in Tehran – who was forced to wear a hijab in Iran out of fear for being killed – would agree with Masud’s assessment that, “Muslim women wear the hijab to not only reflect their modesty and self pride but also to establish their identity in society.”
Accompanying the article was a picture of the mosque on 14th street with the caption, “Several Muslim students at Tech regularly visit the newly constructed mosque.” Ironically, this picture could have been used back in April 2006 when news broke that Syed Haris Ahmed, also known as the “Georgia Tech Terrorist,” was indicted on suspicion of giving material support of terrorism. The Technique places Islam and the mosque on an idealistic pedestal complete with praise and admiration. But replace the mosque with a synagogue or church, and it is highly likely that the Technique would jump at the opportunity to demonize Judaism or Christianity.
The exclusion of this vital but inconvenient information is representative of how the Institute and the Muslim community also chose to deal with the chilling news that one of “our own” was a terrorist: pretend it never happened.
The Technique’s biased coverage is not new. The Technique’s coverage since the September 11th declaration of war by radical Islam has been repulsive. The Technique claims to be “The South’s Liveliest College Newspaper.” But that can only be true if one considers a career in Soviet-style propaganda a worthy pursuit.
The Technique is receiving approximately $60,000 a year from Student Activity fees. It is time that the Technique is held accountable. The Technique is part of the problem at Georgia Tech. It is yet another area of the campus that has taken it upon itself to shut down debate, replacing honesty with censorship and partisanship. In effect, it has replaced a vital tool for disseminating information to the student body of about 17,000. The Technique is ultimately hindering Georgia Tech from truly becoming a marketplace of ideas by censoring its ideological adversaries. As long as a select few have the power to invent the “truth,” the entire Georgia Tech community will be done a great disservice.
Source: http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=27403
Shocking Book 'Welcome to Montrealistan' (back)
March 16, 2007
(Rough English Translation from French from CC and Babelfish) (Original French below)
Approximately thirty Islamists which Montreal regard as potential terrorists are under serious investigation by the police force, reveals the Montréalistan book, which will appear in bookstores next week. Regarded as a potential threat for the safety of the country, these radical montréalers are followed by teams, filmed by hidden cameras or listened to electronically 24 hours a day. This investigative report by Stanké, the journalist from the Newspaper of Montreal Fabrice de Pierrebourg informs Montréalers that they are wrong to believe that they are sheltered from terrorism. 'All the components of radical Islamism are present in Montreal, indicates the author. Considerable key characters of Islamic international terrorism are based or have lived in Montreal.'
Charismatic Ideologists and Militants, Recruiters of Suicide Bombers, and Terrorist Fund Raisers
Until now, the plots planned here were aimed at external targets - the town of Roubaix and the subway of Paris, in France, in the years 1990 while more recently, the airport of Los Angeles, in the United States, whose attack fell through in 1999 with the conviction of Montrealer Ahmed Ressam to 22 years in prison.
Enigmatic Fateh Kamel
The author of 'Welcome to Montréalistan' succeeded in meeting other disturbing people living in Montreal including Fateh Kamel, who was supposedly the handler for Ahmed Ressam a few years ago. Kamel played a 'central part in the wave of terrorist attacks' in France in the years 1990, according to the Canadian Service of information of safety. It was described as a 'framework for international terror [... ] whose boss is none other than Usama Bin Laden'. * He returned to Montreal after getting out of prison in France in 2005. This man condemned for terrorist activity earns his living driving taxis with Montrealers unaware.
Montreal, Land of Welcome
'Montreal is a harbour, a logistic base to plan, prepare and to finance terrorist attacks, states the journalist. There is the feeling that nobody wants to believe that there is evil here, that we want to believe that we are good people but it is not the case. An official report from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police states that 'For the year 2005, 12 terrorist plots were disrupted', repeats Mr. de Pierrebourg.
The probability that Canada will be the target of a terrorist attack 'increases daily', according to experts' quoted by the journalist. There are many security issues listed for the Pierre-Elliott-Trudeau airport as of last autumn.
Warning
Moreover, the Montréalistan investigation is meant to be taken as a serious warning about our lack of security. 'For a long time, the political and legal authorities here have not taken the radicals seriously', in part due to the Parisian origin, which marked the attacks where many died in Paris in the years 1980 and 1990. Another factor: Montreal attracts more French-speaking immigrants from North Africa (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia) than anywhere else in Canada.
Montreal: potential target
Ironically, the fact that Canada was never struck makes it a target with great media value. 'An attack here could be used to draw worldwide media attention, the author suggests. And Montreal is a large metropolis.' Five years after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the New York police force still has agent monitoring activity in Montreal, according to him. There is only one other such agent in Canada and that is in Toronto.
Canada's involvement in Afghanistan is mentioned increasingly in the radical islamist forums', according to the author. And Canada provides oil to the United States, thus opposing Al-Qaïda in Arabia. ·
Montréalistan, 360 pages, with the Stanké editions, will be on sale as from Wednesday. * Drawn from the book Jihad in Europe of Ali Laïdi and Ahmed Salam, éd. Threshold, 2002.
ORIGINAL FRENCH
Un livre choc de Fabrice de Pierrebourg Bienvenue à Montréalistan (Journal de Montréal) Une trentaine d'islamistes de Montréal considérés comme des terroristes potentiels sont «activement surveillés, filés ou écoutés» par la police, révèle le livre Montréalistan, qui paraît la semaine prochaine. Considérés comme une menace potentielle à la sécurité du pays, ces radicaux montréalais sont suivis par des équipes de filature, filmés par des caméras cachées ou mis sous écoute électronique 24 heures sur 24. Fort de son enquête de terrain, Montréalistan, publiée chez Stanké, le journaliste du Journal de Montréal Fabrice de Pierrebourg avertit les Montréalais qu'ils ont tort de se croire à l'abri du terrorisme. ::encart:: «Toutes les composantes de l'islamisme radical sont présentes à Montréal, indique l'auteur. Bon nombre de personnages clés du terrorisme international islamique sont basés ou ont vécu à Montréal.» Des idéologues charismatiques aux soldats exécutants, en pensant par des faussaires, des recruteurs de martyrs potentiels, des pourvoyeurs d'argent, etc. Jusqu'à maintenant, les complots planifiés ici ont visé des cibles extérieures. La ville de Roubaix et le métro de Paris, en France, dans les années 1990. Et plus récemment, l'aéroport de Los Angeles, aux États-Unis, dont l'attentat avorté en 1999 a valu une peine de 22 ans de prison au Montréalais Ahmed Ressam. L'énigmatique Fateh Kamel L'auteur a aussi réussi à rencontrer d'inquiétants personnages vivant à Montréal. Parmi eux: Fateh Kamel, patron présumé d'Ahmed Ressam il y a quelques années. Kamel a joué un «rôle central dans la vague d'attentats terroristes» en France dans les années 1990, selon le Service canadien de renseignement de sécurité. Il a été décrit comme un «cadre de l'internationale de la terreur [...] dont le boss n'est autre qu'Oussama Ben Laden».* De retour à Montréal depuis sa sortie de prison en France en 2005, l'homme condamné pour activité terroriste gagne sa vie au volant d'un taxi, sans être reconnu de ses clients montréalais. Montréal, terre d'accueil «Montréal est un havre, une base logistique pour planifier, préparer et financer des attaques terroristes, soutient le journaliste. On a le sentiment que personne ne nous veut du mal parce que nous, on se croit gentils.» Mais ce n'est pas le cas, comme en fait foi un rapport «très discret» de la Gendarmerie royale du Canada, dont il a obtenu copie. «Pour l'année 2005, ils disent avoir perturbé 12 complots terroristes», rapporte M. de Pierrebourg. La probabilité que le Canada soit la cible d'un attentat terroriste «augmente de jour en jour», selon les experts cités par le journaliste, qui a signé un reportage-choc sur les nombreux problèmes de sécurité à l'aéroport Pierre-Elliott-Trudeau, l'automne dernier. Avertissement D'ailleurs, l'enquête Montréalistan se veut un autre sérieux avertissement au niveau de la sécurité. «Longtemps, les autorités politiques et judiciaires d'ici n'ont pas pris les radicaux au sérieux», souligne le Parisien d'origine, marqué par les attentats qui ont fait des dizaines de morts à Paris dans les années 1980 et 1990. Un autre facteur: la langue française attire à Montréal plus d'immigrants francophones d'Afrique du Nord (Algérie, Maroc, Tunisie) que n'importe où au Canada. Montréal: cible potentielle Ironiquement, le fait que le Canada n'ait jamais été frappé en fait une cible d'une grande valeur médiatique. «Un attentat, c'est un show qui sert à attirer l'attention des médias du monde entier, rappelle l'auteur. Et Montréal est une grande métropole.» Cinq ans après les attentats du 11 septembre 2001, la police de New York a encore un agent de surveillance à Montréal, selon lui. Elle en aurait posté un seul autre au Canada : à Toronto. L'offensive du Canada en Afghanistan lui vaut d'être «de plus en plus cité dans les forums islamistes radicaux», selon l'auteur. Et le Canada fournit du pétrole aux États-Unis, contrariant ainsi Al-Qaïda en Arabie. · Montréalistan, 360 pages, aux éditions Stanké, sera en vente à partir de mercredi. * Tiré du livre Le Jihad en Europe d'Ali Laïdi et Ahmed Salam, éd. Seuil, 2002.
Source: http://www.canoe.com/infos/dossiers/archives/2007/03/ 20070316-102732.html
CAIR Revives Minnesota Branch (back)
March 15, 2007
by Richard Meryhew and Pamela Miller
A controversial national Islamic civil liberties organization has revived its Minnesota chapter after a series of highly publicized incidents involving Muslim taxi drivers, store clerks and airline passengers.
The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), which has 32 chapters in the United States and Canada, will open a St. Paul office this weekend, leaders said Thursday.
CAIR Minnesota's resurrection, months in the making, comes as the state's Muslim community is being scrutinized as never before.
This week, six imams (prayer leaders) who were removed from a US Airways flight in Minneapolis in November sued the airline and the Metropolitan Airports Commission (MAC).
They claim they were removed because of their race and religion.
In addition, some Muslim taxi drivers who refuse to ferry alcohol and dogs are awaiting a ruling on the issue from the MAC. And some Muslim store clerks have refused to scan pork products.
The incidents have triggered widespread anger against Muslims, despite pleas for tolerance. 'The Muslim community in Minnesota is very diverse,' stressed Zafar Siddiqui of the Islamic Resource Group. 'We have people ranging from indigenous Muslims to immigrants from East Africa, South Asia, the Middle East, the Far East and Europe,' and just as wide a spectrum of views on hot-button topics.
Since 9/11, CAIR has grown from a half-dozen chapters to more than two dozen nationwide, said Ibrahim Hooper, a CAIR spokesman in Washington, D.C.
CAIR Minnesota leaders said they decided to restart the chapter after hearing stories about Muslims being subjected to racial profiling.
Spokeswoman Valerie Shirley, a Muslim convert and University of Minnesota graduate student, said she and others have heard story after story about Muslims being 'harassed and pulled aside for searches' at airports.
'The community here needs somebody to stand up for them when their rights are being stomped on like that,' she said. 'So a group of us got together and decided to revive it.'
Their action comes at a time of increased national scrutiny of CAIR, which some have speculated is linked to terrorist organizations in the Middle East. CAIR representatives deny any link to terrorism.
'There's a veritable cottage industry of people who 24/7 are looking for things to defame and distort in the American Muslim community and its institutions,' Hooper said. 'Because CAIR is the most prominent organization, we're the nail that sticks up. And it's a tempting target for the hammer of bigots.'
CAIR's local history
The local CAIR chapter, which first organized in the mid-1990s, had been dormant for more than a year when it began reorganizing late last year, said Lori Saroya, an American-born Muslim who will be the chapter's chairwoman.
Organizers contacted the national office and talked with Hooper, who once lived in the Twin Cities and attended the University of Minnesota. Nihad Awad, executive director of CAIR's national office, also once lived in Minnesota, Hooper said.
For the most part, local chapters establish their own agendas and raise their own money, Hooper said. 'Everybody is pretty independent, but they are all trying to operate on the same page,' he said.
Ten board members have been elected, and on Saturday the new office will open in the Griggs-Midway building on University Avenue. The organization will survive on corporate and individual donations and financing from an annual fundraiser, Shirley said.
Early reaction
Reaction from other groups to the CAIR Minnesota revival was less than enthusiastic.
Steve Hunegs of the Jewish Community Relations Council said he hopes the local group will not push the same agenda as CAIR's national office.
'National CAIR has given a platform to the academics who accuse our pro-Israel community of subverting and distorting American foreign policy, which is simply not true,' he said. 'These accusations are an attempt to intimidate the pro-Israel community into not exercising its constitutional rights to lobby Congress and the executive branch.'
Omar Jamal, executive director of the Somali Justice Advocacy Center in St. Paul, said he was dismayed by the news.
'CAIR pushes issues from the Mideast under the guise that it's an umbrella organization for all Muslims,' he said. 'But it does nothing for Somali Muslims.'
Many Somali Muslims are new immigrants who do not have the advanced language skills and education of those here longer, 'so they are vulnerable to being influenced by CAIR and MAS [the Muslim American Society], which walk hand in hand,' Jamal said.
'You watch, they'll come in here and start fundraising and it'll all go toward pro-Middle East causes,' he said. 'The individuals involved here may be moderate and want to do good, but overall, the organization wants to push its own points of view.'
Shirley disagreed, saying CAIR has helped represent a variety of Muslims on a variety of issues.
'The agenda we are pushing is a world agenda -- and that's civil rights,' she said. 'And that crosses all boundaries.'
Source: http://www.startribune.com/462/story/1058473.html
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