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Discovery Institute Files Public Records Request in OSU Evolution Academic Freedom Case
Discovery Institute ^ | 11 July 2005 | Staff

Posted on 07/11/2005 6:48:41 PM PDT by PatrickHenry

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To: Right Wing Professor; betty boop
Thank you for your reply!

Both Dennett and Pinker argue that they are not epiphenomenalist, in that the mind most certainly has effects on physical events (to say otherwise would be absurd; obviously, we can act on the universe). If the mind is the action of the brain, and the brain can cause physical effects, then the mind can have physical effects. Speed really does kill; and people shooting guns kill people.

Then both Dennett and Pinker are trying to eat their cake and have it too - if they claim they are not epiphenomenalist.

Let's try it again, here is their logic.

The brain causes things to happen: brain > things.

The mind is what the brain does: brain > mind.

Therefore the mind causes things to happen: mind > things.

Do you see the problem with that deduction? I believe it would be considered an undistributed middle, i.e. where two separate categories are said to be connected because they share a common property

The only way their logic can be repaired is by reformulating "the mind is what the brain does" to "the mind is the brain and the brain is the mind". But then they would have a ghost "of" or "in" the machine which Pinker expressly forbids.

I think you're stretching my analogy too far. The gun and the car aren't autonomous. A better analogy might be a computer, where the software runs processes that in turn feed back on the computer.

That doesn't work either because the software becomes the forbidden (by Pinker) ghost "in" or "of" the machine.

I certainly agree with you though that the answer is to be found in the autonomy to which I would add the information (successful communication).

IOW, I assert that it is the autonomous successful communication which causes things to happen. The brain is no more than a biological instrument, the equivalent of a car or a gun in the metaphors you've been using.

401 posted on 07/18/2005 9:56:28 AM PDT by Alamo-Girl
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To: Alamo-Girl
You're treating the mind as a separate enetity. It isn't.

A gun kills things.

Shooting is what a gun does.

Shooting kills things.

The only way their logic can be repaired is by reformulating "the mind is what the brain does" to "the mind is the brain and the brain is the mind". But then they would have a ghost "of" or "in" the machine which Pinker expressly forbids.

I solved the puzzle.

I was thinking

Thinking solved the puzzle.

Does this mean I am identical to thinking? No, it does not. it means that thinking was the mechanism by which I solved the puzzle. Likewise the mind is the mechanism by which the brain acts.

402 posted on 07/18/2005 11:51:52 AM PDT by Right Wing Professor
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To: Alamo-Girl

No. A computer program may be an "epiphenomenon" of the hardware, but it can turn itself off or even reprogram itself in response to external stimuli. The mind's dependence on the brain doesn't make it unable to cause events, at least no more than anything else can cause events.


403 posted on 07/18/2005 8:02:51 PM PDT by Doctor Stochastic (Vegetabilisch = chaotisch is der Charakter der Modernen. - Friedrich Schlegel)
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To: Right Wing Professor
Thank you for your reply!

It is not you or I who have separated the mind from the brain but rather Pinker himself when he hypothesized "the mind is what the brain does". IOW, he says the brain causes the mind.

If he had said "the mind and the brain are one" there would be no epiphenomenons. The downside to him would be that the mind would be the ghost in the machine.

It seems to me that your syllogism is also an undistributed middle. The only connection between thinking and puzzle is "I" - you've not made a distribution.

It would work better this way:

Puzzles are solved only by thinking

I solved the puzzle

Therefore, I was thinking

Even so, that speaks for the mind, but doesn't say anything about the brain.


404 posted on 07/18/2005 8:14:08 PM PDT by Alamo-Girl
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To: Doctor Stochastic
Thank you for your reply!

No. A computer program may be an "epiphenomenon" of the hardware, but it can turn itself off or even reprogram itself in response to external stimuli. The mind's dependence on the brain doesn't make it unable to cause events, at least no more than anything else can cause events.

A program is not an epiphenomenon precisely because it can cause things to happen.

The entire issue is causality. Is there any way in Pinker's hypothesis "the mind is what the brain does" that the mind can cause anything to happen?

405 posted on 07/18/2005 8:17:40 PM PDT by Alamo-Girl
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To: Alamo-Girl
Is there any way in Pinker's hypothesis "the mind is what the brain does" that the mind can cause anything to happen?

Why not? Is the mind less attached to the brain than a program is to its hardware?

406 posted on 07/18/2005 8:22:03 PM PDT by Doctor Stochastic (Vegetabilisch = chaotisch is der Charakter der Modernen. - Friedrich Schlegel)
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To: Doctor Stochastic; betty boop
Thank you for your reply!

Why not? Is the mind less attached to the brain than a program is to its hardware?

It doesn't matter what you and I think. The question is concerning Pinker's hypothesis: "the mind is what the brain does".

In his view the brain causes the mind. They are two different things in his hypothesis. The mind is left dangling as an epiphenomenon - an effect which doesn't cause anything. The brain is doing the work, moving the muscles, processing the sensory inputs, "doing" the mind, etc.

My preference would have been to define the mind as autonomous successful communication (information) and leave the mind/body question to the philosophers. As it is, he has set himself up to be knocked down by both philosophers and all the various investigators who have found "mind" where there is no brain.

Pinker chose to address duality head on declaring there is no ghost in the machine pulling the levels, that the mind is what the brain does. His hypothesis is "fair game" to be falsified from several directions.

407 posted on 07/18/2005 8:43:51 PM PDT by Alamo-Girl
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To: Alamo-Girl

You are seeing a problem where none exists. The claim "the mind is what the brain does" in no way precludes the mind from "causing" something to happen (at least as far as anything is causal.)


408 posted on 07/18/2005 9:06:46 PM PDT by Doctor Stochastic (Vegetabilisch = chaotisch is der Charakter der Modernen. - Friedrich Schlegel)
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To: PatrickHenry

A scientist who does not support the scientific method shouldn't be suprised when he faces ostracism by his peers.


409 posted on 07/18/2005 9:12:13 PM PDT by Zeroisanumber
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To: Doctor Stochastic
Thank you for your reply!

You are seeing a problem where none exists. The claim "the mind is what the brain does" in no way precludes the mind from "causing" something to happen (at least as far as anything is causal.)

It wouldn't to you or to me because we see the mind as actually existing and being able to cause things.

But Pinker presupposes "there isn't any immaterial soul or spook or spirit that magically pulls the levers of behavior."

Thus when he says "the mind is what the brain does" he is being quite literal. The mind is one thing, the brain another. The brain causes the mind. Nothing immaterial "pulls the levers of behavior". The brain's "doing" is the mind, i.e. an epiphenomenon.

410 posted on 07/18/2005 9:23:47 PM PDT by Alamo-Girl
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To: Alamo-Girl
It's not a syllogism at all. It's not a logical construction. Thinking is the process by which the puzzle is solved. I solve the puzzle. The two are not commensurate quantities.

It is not you or I who have separated the mind from the brain but rather Pinker himself when he hypothesized "the mind is what the brain does". IOW, he says the brain causes the mind.

I disagree. And I have read Pinker, and not merely in selective quotiations.

411 posted on 07/19/2005 8:00:13 AM PDT by Right Wing Professor
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To: Right Wing Professor
Thank you for your reply!

It's not a syllogism at all. It's not a logical construction. Thinking is the process by which the puzzle is solved. I solve the puzzle. The two are not commensurate quantities.

Indeed. Neither the "I" nor the puzzle are quantities much less commensurate quantities.

But concerning whether your assertion was a logical construction, that is certainly what it appeared to be on my reading of it at post 402.

I disagree. And I have read Pinker, and not merely in selective quotiations.

I find his debates and lectures to be just as revealing.

It appears that we must conclude our discussion as we often do, in the agreement that we disagree.

412 posted on 07/19/2005 9:01:00 AM PDT by Alamo-Girl
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