Posted on 11/30/2004 6:21:11 PM PST by betty boop
M-PI: ""Since I can't scientifically prove it, is it RATIONAL for me to believe that others beside myself have minds [and aren't just preprogrammed robots]?" ~
StJacques: "It is the premise of your question that is flawed. You can scientifically prove that others besides yourself have minds. Take a very large number of people (sample), test them for rational behavior (observation), and you can conclude through this inductive, i.e. "scientific," method, that others have minds (conclusion)." ~
Really???? You had better let Alvin Plantinga know. No one else has ever been able to come up with the "scientific proof" until you came along. LOL
Alvin Plantinga: "Although the arguments for God's existence fail, the grounds offered for our belief in other minds are also inadequate. The inability to establish belief in other minds is similar to the inadequacy of the teleological argument for God's existence. Yet despite the weakness of the grounds one can offer, we believe in other minds and we hold that such a belief is rational. ". . . if my belief in other minds is rational, so is my belief in God" ~ (p.271) God and Other Minds: A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God By Alvin Plantinga
*
In his early book, God and Other Minds (1967), Plantinga first fired the epistemological shot heard ‘round the philosophy-of-religion world. There he argued that the attempt to prove the existence of other minds suffers from similar difficulties as the attempt to prove God’s existence by arguing from analogy to an intelligent designer. Both attempts bank on problematic arguments from analogy. The impossibility of proving that other minds exist by means of analogy from our direct experience of our own minds, he argued, should not cast doubt on the rationality of our belief in other minds, but rather on the foundationalist theories that permit us to hold only beliefs that we can support by rational inferences. In fact, he argued, if it is rational to believe in other minds immediately, without being able to prove their existence, then it is no less rational to likewise believe in God.
In his now famous 1983 inaugural address as John A. O’Brien Professor of Philosophy at Notre Dame, Plantinga called Christian philosophers to independence from the agenda set by the secular academy, advising that they have as much right to start from Christian assumptions as secular thinkers to start from naturalistic ones. Since that time, in keeping with his own advice, Plantinga has continued to define and refine his own standards of rationality in terms of “warrant” and the “proper function” of cognitive faculties."
The above was excerpted from the item below:
The Analytic Theist: An Alvin Plantinga Reader. Edited by James F. Sennett. Eerdmans. 367 pages. $30.00. [This review by Philip Blosser was first published under the title of “God Among the Philosophers” in New Oxford Review 66, No. 9 (October 1999), 39-42. Reproduced with permission.] http://www.lrc.edu/rel/blosser/Plantinga.htm
In the spring of 1980, Time magazine reported: “In a quiet revolution in thought and arguments that hardly anyone could have foreseen only two decades ago, God is making a comeback. Most intriguingly, this is happening not among theologians or ordinary believers . . . but in the crisp, intellectual circles of academic philosophers, where the consensus had long banished the Almighty from fruitful discourse.”
That earlier consensusaccording to which theism was held to be intellectually untenable, and “God talk” neither verifiable nor falsifiable and, hence, meaninglesshad long put Christian philosophers on the defensive. Few Christian philosophers were to be found in the decades preceding the 1970s, and even fewer willing to publicly identify themselves as such.
But all this has changed. The Society of Christian Philosophers, which Plantinga helped to found in 1978 has over 1100 members today and has become what one observer called “the largest single interest group among American philosophers.” Christian philosophers enjoy an unprecedented credibility today in the secular academy. Plantinga himself, an evangelical Calvinist, has served as President of the American Philosophical Association, and was invited to give the prestigious Gifford Lectures in Scotland in 1987.
How did all this come about? First, the earlier philosophical consensus has disintegrated. The logical empiricists’ principles of rational justification were shown to be incapable of meeting the demands of their own criteria. Further, by around 1980, most philosophers were admitting that the whole Enlightenment project of making pure reason the only infallible guide to faith and practice (as envisioned by Kant) was a failure. This pulled the rug out from under the earlier attacks on theism by discrediting their presuppositions.
Second, among those pointing out the failure of the Enlightenment project and attacking some of its most pervasive and entrenched orthodoxies were Christian philosophers. Among these, probably none has been as close to the heart of contemporary philosophical conversations as Plantinga, whom Time called “America’s leading orthodox Protestant philosopher of God.”
Largely as a result of Plantinga’s influence, the Christian philosophers’ earlier beleaguered posture, resulting from their perpetually unsuccessful attempts at trying to meet the skeptic’s insatiable demand for “sufficiently credible” empirical evidence and rational verification for their beliefs, has become a thing of the past. In its place have come confident assertions of the theist’s “epistemic rights” in taking belief in God, including a wide range of beliefs about the existence and nature of God, as “properly basic,” and, as such, as a foundational “deliverance of reason.”
The heart of this bold new initiative among Christian philosophers, sometimes referred to as “Reformed epistemology” because of its loosely Calvinistic historical associations, is a dual challenge to the evidentialist and foundationalist assumptions underlying the Enlightenment’s rejection of theism. In its most generic sense, evidentialism holds that a belief is rational only if it is based on sufficiently compelling evidence or rational justification, and foundationalism holds that some of our beliefs (non-basic beliefs) rest on other beliefs (basic beliefs). For example, my (non-basic) belief that there must be a fire somewhere is based on my inference from my (basic) belief that I am perceiving smoke, while my belief that I am perceiving smoke is immediate (basic) and not inferred from any other belief.
Thus, evidentialism, as a theory about what beliefs we are entitled to have and the degree of confidence we may be permitted to have in them, is viewed by Reformed epistemology as an adversary of theism when it is linked to a form of foundationalism, which, in addition to distinguishing basic from non-basic beliefs, relegates religious beliefs to “non-basic” status. On this view, only those beliefs are properly basic which are (1) self-evident, (2) evident to the senses, or (3) incorrigible. Since theistic belief does not meet these criteria and is not inferable from beliefs that do, it is viewed as rationally unjustifiable.
These assumptions have set the agenda for the modern debate about the rationality of religious belief since the 17th century, with defenders of theism repeatedly trying to meet these criteria. Plantinga’s approach is best understood as a completely different strategy for responding to this challenge. Instead of agreeing to play according to the rules set by the opposition, Plantinga disputes the rules, claiming that they indefensibly restrict the beliefs that qualify as properly basic, and that belief in God can sometimes be perfectly rational even without being based on an inference or argument.
At this point, Plantinga’s strategy banks on an emerging consensus about the failures of modern epistemology. For several centuries, philosophers have been trying to prove the rationality of a number of common sense beliefs, such as our belief that the world is more than five minutes old, our belief in an external world, and our belief in other minds than our own. Since none of these beliefs is self-evident or incorrigible, it was thought necessary to show how such common sense beliefs could be rationally inferred from other properly basic beliefs. The spectacle of so many brilliant philosophers struggling to prove what virtually nobody ever doubted, and then utterly failing in their attempts, could not fail to break the spell of solemnity surrounding the epistemological canons of evidentialism and foundationalism. The consensus that has emerged is that the mistake was not in the attempts at rational justification, but in the assumption that they were ever necessary.
In his early book, God and Other Minds (1967), Plantinga first fired the epistemological shot heard ‘round the philosophy-of-religion world. There he argued that the attempt to prove the existence of other minds suffers from similar difficulties as the attempt to prove God’s existence by arguing from analogy to an intelligent designer. Both attempts bank on problematic arguments from analogy. The impossibility of proving that other minds exist by means of analogy from our direct experience of our own minds, he argued, should not cast doubt on the rationality of our belief in other minds, but rather on the foundationalist theories that permit us to hold only beliefs that we can support by rational inferences. In fact, he argued, if it is rational to believe in other minds immediately, without being able to prove their existence, then it is no less rational to likewise believe in God.
In his now famous 1983 inaugural address as John A. O’Brien Professor of Philosophy at Notre Dame, Plantinga called Christian philosophers to independence from the agenda set by the secular academy, advising that they have as much right to start from Christian assumptions as secular thinkers to start from naturalistic ones. Since that time, in keeping with his own advice, Plantinga has continued to define and refine his own standards of rationality in terms of “warrant” and the “proper function” of cognitive faculties.
Some of Plantinga’s contentions are controversial even among his allies. His claim that a person is rationally entitled to believe in God even if he can offer no argument for his belief, or infer his belief from other beliefs he holds, does not seem problematic in itself. Aquinas would agree. But neither Aquinas nor many Catholic philosophers would agree with his claim that belief in God is not merely a foundational belief, but a foundational knowledge; or with his frequent suggestion that since theistic belief is properly basic, natural theology is useless; or with his view that the rational “warrant” for beliefs lies in the “proper function” of an individual’s cognitive faculties, a criterion not only involuntary but external and inaccessible to the consciousness of the believer.
Further, even Reformed philosophers have wondered what, exactly, is Reformed about Reformed epistemology, although some affinities may exist between the theory’s individualistic, externalist, and nonvoluntarist emphases and Calvin’s predestinarian individualism, his notion that theistic belief is a natural disposition (sensus divinitatis) implanted in us by God but corrupted by the noetic effects of sin.
Plantinga clearly remains an outstanding ally and resource for Christian philosophers in the academy today. The Analytic Theist offers an excellent introductory anthology of his writings, with a large cross-section of representative material, as well as some lesser-known but invaluable essays.
Subjects range from natural theology, the ontological argument, free will and divine foreknowledge, to religious pluralism and exclusivism, Christian philosophy at the end of the 20th century, and an amusing expose of “historical-critical” biblical scholarship gone to seed (“Sheehan’s Shenanigans: How Theology Becomes Tomfoolery”).
The selections were clearly made with a scholarly audience in mind. Moreover, as the adjective in the book’s title denotes, Plantinga is an “analytic” philosopher, intensely focused on close analysis of logical arguments.
Some selections will prove quite challenging. Yet, one certainly need not be a philosopher (or even an “analytic” philosopher) to benefit from the book.
The editor generally steered clear of using Plantinga’s most technical pieces, and a few of the essays included were written for broader audiences. The book would make an ideal text for an intermediate level course in philosophy of religion.
Philip Blosser
Lenoir-Rhyne College
D Edmund Joaquin: "No, you are taking it on faith that they do. It's a need to buy into a rational world that will cause you to do so, but ultimately one has to accept the perceived or desired, reality based on faith" Yes it IS rational.
The POINT IS, that contrary to the protestations of atheists / macro-evolutionists / junk science ---- it IS rational for sane people to "take certain things on faith". See my post #881.
If we have faith that riding the space shuttle will be safe, we're getting less rational by degrees
There is the lack of an absolute certainty that throws the wrench in, isn't there?
And this lack of absolute certainty about God is what the unbeliever wrestles with, and even the believer at times. But yes, I agree with your argument that the sane person can take things on faith
Now if this is true, that Christ is not risen, the gospel is false, the Word of God is false and God is a liar. The prophets lied, over centuries. Moses is a liar, for He said that a greater prophet than he was coming. John the Baptist had to be a liar. Zacharias, the father of John and a high priest that entered into the Holy of holies, had to be a liar. The angel Gabriel had to be a liar.
All of the witnesses to the resurrection and all of the disciples are liars. Untold numbers, even eyewitnesses, willingly suffered terrible deaths for a lie. The Roman guards had to go tell the authorities that they fell asleep on their posts, and the body was stolen on their watch, knowing full well that they would die for their lapse. Paul, the former Saul, who first willingly killed Christians, suddenly gave up his whole life as a Pharisee and began to perpetrate a lie, losing everything, and eventually his life. All of the Jewish converts to Christianity, gave up everything as well, for a lie. All of the martyrs throughout history, have died, are dying and will die, for a lie.
All of the facts surrounding the event just don't add up. Taking all of them into consideration, it is more rational to believe that Christ rose from the dead, than to not believe.
Great. So in light of that reality, would you say that this the sort of FAITH that an informed, rational, sane person would embrace?:
"In spite of the fact that most mutations are harmful and 2/3 of all mutations are recessive, we evolved because natural selection chose helpful mutations by eliminating those which are harmful. We know and believe that natural selection can eliminate recessive mutations, and we know that the proof for our belief is out there, we just haven't found it yet." ~ Dr. Blind Faith, PhD - Whatsamatter U.
But the point is Stalin wanted to starve the Kulaks.
I didn't properly credit the good doctor. Here is the correction: ~ Dr. Blind Faith, PhD - Cognitive Dissonance Instructor at Whatsamatter U.
Stalin's wanting to starve the Kulaks doesn't explain why he screwed up the whole system.
On the other hand, Lysenko did outlive Stalin by 23 years. (Lysenko died in 1976.)
I thought this was a given. I believe what you are saying is that selection doesn't operate unless there is replication. That is also an assumption shared by most biologists.
But there are other consequenses of pre-biotic chemistry. No preditors, no consumers.
I have no trouble agreeing that we don't know how or where first life arose, but it seems clear that once life exists, chemical evolution takes a back seat.
I do believe it is up to biochemists to demonstrate a plausible route to chemical evolution. The lack of such a route is why there is no theory of biogenesis.
I don't believe we will ever know the exact path to first life, even if we can demonstrate a plausible natural path.
There are several reasons why most, biologists believe in abiogenesis. One is historical and cultural. It was thought for years that organic compounds could not be synthesized, but eventually they were. It was thought for years that complex organics like amino acids could no arise undirected, but they did. It is reasonable to attempt further steps anong this line.
Another reason is that science has no choice. Science isn't in the business of proving things can't be reduced to natural causes. Just the reverse. Lack of success proves nothing.
I note that you have centered somewhat on the definition (or description) given with regard to "specified complexity". In my view not all definitions of complexity are equal. That particular one strikes me as vague.
If I were to choose, I'd select Kolmogorov for the least description and functional complexity for the least time. But all of them are helpful and give insight to the question at hand.
With regard to the biogenesis/abiogenesis question and specified complexity, the mathematician seems to be focusing on a need for an algorithm at inception - a source for information. I did not take his as a purely bio/chemical question.
In biology and I would imagine all sciences that deal with a historical record and incomplete information (archeology, anthropology, etc.) - the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.
In mathematics and in physics, however, the absence of evidence is evidence of absence.
When the two disciplines look at the same question - e.g. abiogenesis - the one is not concerned about an absence of information and to the other, such absence would be dispositive.
Let me offer my theory of why (or I should say how) Stalin screwed up the system. He believed that a "second reality" could be made effective in the natural world. He refused to recognize that the world is the way it is, that it has a nature that perdures, and that there is also such a thing as human nature. Implicitly, one gathers he did understand something about "real" human nature; which is why he destroyed the Kulaks. They demonstrated very natural human characteristics of which Stalin disapproved: the desire to be self-sustaining, to own property, etc.; such things are "antisocial qualities" to a communist. Thus they were wiped out.
In the end, Stalin's abstract second reality utterly dissolved, though not in his lifetime. In the long run, I imagine this is what happens with all constructions of second reality. You can't cut across the grain of nature forever without "nature evening the score." The lesson of China in this self-same regard is still in the future; I expect China will implode, too, just as USSR did. It's simply a matter of time.
As they say, "time is the mother of Truth." Thanks, Doc, for correcting the record on the fate of Lysenko.
China will not implode in the same way as the Soviet Union. China has developed a market economy. It will probably suffer a great recession, similar to Japan's, and for the same reason.
The other vestiges of totalitarianism will probably fade over time without a revolution.
Im interested in why information is required for chemical evolution. It strikes me that chemical evolution has been observed to take place. Obviously, a number of key observations have not been made (or the question would be settled).
But there is a difference, it is mindless to deny it. The classic betty boop example makes it clear - drop a live albatross, a dead albatross and a 12 lb cannonball off the Leaning Tower of Pisa and observe what happens.
We have three scientific definitions of that difference on the table: Shannon-Weaver, Irvin Bauer, George Javor. There are of course many other ways to approach the question in theology and philosophy - but we are trying to keep the subject within the reach of science.
Shannon-Weaver and Bauer are mathematical. Bauer and Javor are descriptive. Javor is biochemistry.
In the specified complexity excerpt you are addressing, it is noted that Manfred Eigen recognized that life cannot emerge without information. Even so, his understanding of "information" is not correct in that he does not look at the Shannon-Weaver definition (Shannon's theory is the base of the field, information theory). Eigen sees information as the value or meaning of the message, specified complexity, a common mistake. IOW, even if the message were informed and complexity, if there is no communication it is simply a dead message - like DNA, which has the same information content in a dead albatross as it does in a live albatross.
At bottom, there is a difference in nature, in the here-and-now, at this level of sight and mind, between life and non-life/death. Without understanding that difference, there can be no theory of life arising from non-life. The chemical evolution (to life) cannot be addressed without some understanding of what life "is".
I'm mostly lurking, but I couldn't ignore the discussion of the Kulaks, whose destruction was not a case of unintended consequences, but rather was priority #one for the Soviets.
I agree, in a weird way, that Stalin's regime was anti-Darwin, since the selection of the millions he destroyed was, to the degree it wasn't completely random, skewed toward the most productive, and less conformist, members of the population at large. As a consequence, his regime was a case of, not survival of the fittest in the sense of being superior, but rather survival of the ones best able to blend into the background. A few more generations and Russians would be concrete-grey right out of the womb.
But I'm not sure this is what was meant, in which case I would wonder how many Stalinists were bible-thumping creationists.
You're welcome! You might like this one, too:
http://www.leaderu.com/truth/3truth02.html
900?
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