Posted on 09/24/2003 11:25:56 PM PDT by betty boop
Very Aristotelian. That's how I see it also. I think BB has a different view.
Uh, second thought ... the concepts aren't actually part of the thing. They're in our mind, and we generate the concepts as we consider the characteristics of the thing. Or so it seems to me.
You're making too much of it. Tell me what a concept is. Do it without describing or naming the attributes of a concept.
Tell me what any particular concept is. Do it without describing or naming its attributes.
Of course you can't, because that is what anything is.
For example:
What is the concept "dog?" If I say, the concept "dog" is the concept that identifies four legged animals of the canine genus, (assuming it is correct) what I have just written are the attributes of the concept dog, namely, "an identification," restricted to "four legged animals," and "canines."
Hank
Well, this is a philosophy thread. We're supposed to use lots of big words to beat stuff to death.
Anyway, I said the concept [of dog] is in our minds, because if we all vanished, there wouldn't be any concepts. There would still be dogs, with all of their attributes, but no concept of "doginess."
Physically, only entities exist. Qualities, realitionships, and events are only qualities of entities, relationships between entities, and the action of entities.
Qualities (which in its broadest sense includes characteristics and attributes) do not have independent existence, and only exist as qualities of entities.
(So-called qualities of qualities are always conceptual abstractions and only exist epistemologically, not ontologically.)
Percepts have real, but not physical existence. The qualities of percepts exist only as qualities of percepts and have no independent ontological existence.
Concepts and conceptual qualities have no ontological existence at all. They only exist epistemologically.
Hank
So we should get a medal or something.
Anyway, I said the concept [of dog] is in our minds, because if we all vanished, there wouldn't be any concepts. There would still be dogs, with all of their attributes, but no concept of "doginess."
That's true, and there would be nothing to describe.
Hank
The thought always precedes and produces the act. Well, almost always ... ;-}
Not to get too nit-picky, but that definition would exclude people who, for whatever reason, are unconscious, people who are embryos, the severely and profoundly retarded -- not to mention, democrats.
Interesting point. Very interesting point. I'm not too worried about the "unconscious" issue, as I think there's no dispute that a sleeping, or drugged, or knocked-in-the-head man is still a man. But embryos, the retarded, and ultimately the brain-dead represent a field for discussion. (But I don't intend to shanghai the thread and convert it into an abortion or mercy-killing debate.)
As PatrickHenry (post #503) pointed out earlier, "Well, this is a philosophy thread. We're supposed to use lots of big words to beat stuff to death."
So I'd say you're right on target.
I posted the definition as an example of how the nature of a thing is whatever its qualities are, not as an example of a good definition. It actually is a good one, however. It does not exclude any of your examples, because "rational" does not mean "at this very moment behaving rationally," but, under all normal circumstances, the entity in question did, does, or will exhibit this quality, or would exhibit it, if some extrremity or abnormality did not prevent it.
(I am not sure, even with this explanation, Democrats qualify as human.)
(Have I successfully weaseled out this?)
(But I don't intend to shanghai the thread and convert it into an abortion or mercy-killing debate.)
Sure, sure, and I'm not going to say, "that's exactly what you intend."
Just kidding!
Hank
You want to talk about rocks and trees; and then of attributes, qualities, and characteristics; as if all these things denoted equal objective entities existing in the same ontological and epistemological space/time frame. And yet the first two and the second three denote entirely different orders or categories of existents in reality. And so, it seems to me, they may not rationally be equated for the sake of prosecuting an argument.
Sometimes I am not sure you and bb speak the same language as the rest of us.
What in the world does, "and yet the first two and the second three denote entirely different orders or categories of existents in reality," have to do with anything. Are saying rocks have no qualities or that trees have no attributes or that saying they do is some kind of epistemological mistake? How does saying, "if I want to describe what a tree is, I must say what its attributes are," possibly denote [trees and their attributes] are equal objective entities existing in the same ontological and epistemological space/time frame. Can we never, in the same sentence name something and its qualities without implying they have the same ontological and epistemological status?
I started this by saying, a thing is what it is. When "what a thing is," has been described, that is its nature. (What else would a thing's nature be?)
If I want to tell someone what this object I am holding is, I can only do so by describing it, by stating what its nature is, by enumerating its qualities and characteristics, which in this case is a, "red rubber ball." What is it's nature? Well, it is red, it is elastic, and it has a shape, which is spherical. Those characteristics are what a red rubber ball is. They are its nature, the kind of existent it is, a "red elastic spherical entity." If it were green, it could still be a rubber ball, but it couldn't be a red one. If it weren't elatic, it could still be a red ball, but it couldn't be rubber one. If it were a cube, it could still be a red rubber entity, but it could not be a ball.
Those qualities, red, elastic, and spherical, have no independent existence and only exist as qualities of the red rubber ball.
There is no free "redness" or "elasticity" or "sphericalness" running around free in nature. One cannot create a red rubber ball by gathering together some redness, some elasticity, and some sphericalness and plunking them together.
The nature of a thing is whatever it is, and it is whatever all its qaulities and characteristics are. Nothing exists without qualities, and no qualities exist except as qualities of existents. (If something had no qualities at all, it would not exist.) Everything that exists must be different in some way from everything else that exists, which means, everything must have at least one quality that is different form the qualities of every other existing thing. (Two things may have identical qualities in every way, and still exist, if their positional quality is different. Relative qualities are very important to existence.)
The notion that entities, or existents, of any kind, can be, in any way, separate from their qualities, or that qualities, of any kind, can exist, in any way, independent of existents is a huge ontological and epistemological mistake.
Hank
I have a tendency to look at most things geometrically - and to me this is plaid.
In the example, I envision rockness and treeness as lines of existence in one direction. And in lines which run perpendicular, forming right angles, are the attributes, qualities and characteristics.
Thus redness is an existence as is rockness, but in the opposing direction. A particular "rock" is some intersection of right angles of the plaid in multiple dimension.
I cannot say that betty boop sees it the same way that I do, but that’s my concept of physicality.
I'm sure that's true. But at the extremes there would probably be general agreement. For example, those rare cases where a baby is born with no cerebrum.
We, of course, are more civilzed. For retarded people who live on welfare, most females are required to take birth control pills in order to qualify for housing. I leave it to you to decide the morality of this. It is definitely utilitarian.
I know a slippery slope when I see one. I agree, this is a tricky area. Still, the genuine extremes aren't all that difficult. But they can't (or shouldn't) be used as stepping stones to the less extreme cases. Easy to say; tough to do. In the middle of the extremes are some of the most difficult topics in ethics. I don't pretend to have any universal answers.
Truth is not determined by how widely a concept is accepted. When first discovered, most truths are accepted by very few people, and no truth probably enjoys universal acceptance.
This is true for correct definitions as well.
Hank
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