Computer Voting Is Open to Easy Fraud, Experts Say

New York Times ^ | 7/24/03 | John Schwartz

[nickcarraway]

What a surprise?

[smith288]

Well, if we ran it on Linux instead....

HEHE

[adam_az]

"This isn't the code for a vending machine," he said. "This is the code that protects our democracy."

"This isn't the code for a vending machine," he said. "This is the code that protects our democracy."

"This isn't the code for a vending machine," he said. "This is the code that protects our democracy."

"This isn't the code for a vending machine," he said. "This is the code that protects our democracy."

BINGO this can not be said enough times!

[adam_az]

The flaws are architectural, not just programming errors.

There is simply no way to do this with sufficient audit trail, given the stakes!

The risk far outweighs the benefit.

[w1andsodidwe]

"This isn't the code for a vending machine," he said. "This is the code that protects our democracy." >/i>

I would rather say "This is the code that protects our republic."

[Libertina]

Gee, ya think? At first I was happy to see that the liberals were finally getting the message, but I believe this is more likely setting up a foundatin to say that Bush really DIDN'T WIN (again) in 04. They won't be happy until they achieve civil war. IMHO

[OldFriend]

Of course, this is why the left proposes internet voting. Look how well motor voter registration and mail in voting worked.

[y2k_free_radical]

And GA. went statewide with electronic voting last year

[mabelkitty]

Riight.

And we can get several THOUSAND PROGRAMMERS TO GO ALONG WITH THIS.

I am so over conspiracies. I really am.

[mabelkitty]

So? West Virginia didn't, and boy-howdy what an upset that was!

[steve in DC]

What is the difference between voting on line and voting over the phone?

[TheOtherOne]

And we can get several THOUSAND PROGRAMMERS TO GO ALONG WITH THIS.

Huh?

[Carry_Okie]

Here's a pertinent piece I wrote in December 2002.

Ballot Transparency to Eliminate Fraudulent Counts

Voters have read and seen all sorts of assurances that the new touch-screen balloting systems are fool proof, tamper proof, and nothing to worry about. Many, including those who are familiar with the technology, are not at all reassured.

The concerns are on two levels. First, from the perspective of those not familiar with the technology, it is a device whose inner workings and inherent security they cannot possibly understand. If they can't understand it, how can they be assured that it is honest? Second, those who DO understand signal processing, software, and communications technology know that is far too easy to defraud the system in a way that would be irreversible and undetected. Either way, touch-screens are a loser.

Now, as users of ATMs, cell phones, the Internet, and other electronic media, it might at first seem a little strange that so many people have such concerns. Upon further consideration however, the key distinctions between voting and a service handling mere money become obvious:

• Customers have a choice of banking vendors. Citizens don’t have a choice of governments.
• There is a major difference between mere financial assets at risk, and a risk to individual liberty.

Governments are monopolies. One can go down the street to another bank and take the offending bank to court. An evil government can land you in prison (or worse) because they ARE the court. The stakes associated with voter fraud are far higher than with an ATM and so is the temptation to defraud the system.

Necessary and Sufficient

So, given that we are still smarting over hanging chads, what are the alternatives? Let’s begin to answer that question by looking at the requirements.

1. The system has to be simple and familiar to the voter.
2. There must be NO SOFTWARE involved, because it is too easy to change.
3. The system must be capable of completely manual operation.
4. The count must be capable of being validated by all parties involved and each count must be separate and distinct.
5. There must be no possibility to count a ballot twice or "lose" counts along the way.

Electronic sensors and interlocks are permissible as long as they can be duplicated manually.

Here is my proposal for a system that meets these requirements:

At the Polling Place

1. Ballot boxes are preprinted, serialized and tracked by a physical chain-of-custody document.
2. The box must be destroyed to be opened.
3. The box is locked under a ballot receiving machine.
4. The ballot receiving machine at the polling place reads the box number and records it on the ballot in Scantron form on the back side (fill in the dots). Note that one could do the same manually under observation.
5. The voter completes the standard optical ballot and delivers it to the receiving machine.
6. The machine prints the box number on the back of every ballot it accepts with a Scantron dot pattern. This too can be both read and performed manually. Then a dry film coating (basically an adhesive or heat activated tape) is applied to the ballot on the way into the sealed ballot box.
7. The coating is transparent but reveals a "watermark" when exposed to UV light. The ballot is now tamperproof.
8. The receiving machine totals the number of ballots in every box. The total is read manually and a receipt is delivered to each political party and candidate detailing the box numbers, precincts, and tally of ballots in every uniquely identified box.
9. Representatives of all Parties check the box tallies before the boxes leave the polling place.
10. If they agree on its accuracy, they record the ballot tally on the box using Scantron dots, initial it, and put a similar dry film over the number.

Note that the Scantron pattern is the perfect bridge between human and machine. It is readable by people for manual counting but does not require an optical character reading machine that needs cameras or software.

Both parties thus know the EXACT number of ballots cast in every precinct and in every box. Every box is signed. All parties can thus run check sums at the processing centers and verify the chain-of-custody.

At the Ballot Counting Center

1. The total of the ballots on the box is read by the counting machine. It would be very similar to the existing optical reader and might only require very minor modifications.
2. The counting machine reads the box code for precinct and ballot count or accepts that data input from a keypad read off the box by at least two witnesses with keys. The machine will not count the ballots without the UV visible watermark on the ballot over the votes AND matching precinct codes on the box and the ballot.
3. The machine halts and will not display the vote totals if the number of ballots recorded on the box and the number it counts do not match.
4. The ballots leave the counting machine get a NEW ballot box. Counted ballots are stamped again with output box number, recoated, and then deposited into the new sealed ballot box.
5. The new coating was applied in case of a recount, thus each ballot thus maintains a recount history.

[mabelkitty]

These machines are tested before they are sold to a municipality. They are then tested again. They are tested each and every year. Specs are test run even before the code is written.

Tell me again how the Holocaust never happened, because the amount of subterfuge required to pull it off is about the same.

[sgtbono2002]

I'm not a computer geek, but I do know hackers can gather up several hundred computers tie them all together and crash web sites, and you dont even know they used your computer. Do you really think they couldnt hack a voting site?

[Publius6961]

D'OH!

[mabelkitty]

It's isn't that I don't believe the act is possible - I don't believe for one minute that anybody, especially hackers!, could keep their mouths shut regarding any such conspiracy.

Human nature. No way.

[Pontiac]

Nice to know we have these in Lake County.

[Reeses]

Small time hackers aren't a worry however someone well funded like the Chinese government could spend $300 million to come up with a clever hack. The Chinese will be voting for Democrats. Hmmm, I wonder why.