US officials consider return of inspectors

The Boston Globe is WAY behind the curve on this one. That's OK, because that puts them in the company of the rest of the world, including the UN. This topic was dealt with in-depth in a post I made last night. It was probably missed by most due to the late/early hour, so let me offer a shortened review of what is likely to happen with inspections. Bush has the UN beaten once again. How can they complain when the Coalition uses one of the UN’s own?

UN Chief Arms Inspector Hans Blix is retiring. "My contract expires at the end of June and I do not propose to stay beyond that” said Blix yesterday. What you may also not know is that as Blix and company were leaving Iraq, the US was quietly assembling its own team of former UN inspectors to lead a new effort to search for illegal weapons.

The new US effort is likely to be headed by Charles Duelfer, who is now assembling inspection teams in Kuwait. He headed the UN inspection effort from 1998 to 2000, and before that, was deputy to former UN arms chiefs Rolf Ekeus and Richard Butler.

Will it be more “ignorance is Blix” with Charles Duelfer? Hardly. While the current UN Chief Inspector obviously preferred a “Hans off” mentality toward Iraq, Duelfer was never fooled by Saddam Hussein’s regime. He is also eminently qualified for this mission. He is currently a visiting resident scholar at the Center for Strategic & International Studies. He served as the deputy executive chairman of the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) from 1993 until its termination in 2000. The CSIS is an impressive organization with several alumni who have achieved particular distinction in their respective fields. A partial alphabetical list includes:

Albright, Madeleine

Allen, Richard

Allen, William

Barak, Ehud

Berman, Wayne

Cilluffo, Frank

Clark, William

Crowe, William

Feulner, Edwin

Haig, Alexander

Hunter, Robert

Lubin, Daniel

Mazarr, Michael

Pharr, Susan

Samuels, Michael

Sestanovich, Stephen

Taylor, William

Yochelson, John

Duelfer has had a good grasp of the political and military situation in Iraq and elsewhere. In August of 2002, he wrote that Iraq was offering to accept inspectors in some fashion as a tactic to derail international support for an American military build-up against the regime. He said, “The United Nations inspectors have been and will be caught between the conflicting goals of Baghdad, Washington and other Security Council members. Their ability to succeed is limited by Iraq's lack of co-operation and the council's inability to force compliance.” In other words, he saw the whole sham for what it was before it even unfolded over the past several months.

He added that “If America is serious, it should not center its argument on the inspection issue. Washington needs to make a broader case. It needs to show the threat is broad and growing. To say Iraqis should change their own government is disingenuous . Outside intervention is needed to create conditions in which Iraqis can change their government. The potential of Iraq will never be realized under this regime. A country that should be the engine of development in the Middle East will remain a contorted and dangerous mutant threatening the region and beyond. And the people will continue to suffer.” Not quite “Blix-ian”, is it?

Going back nearly 2 years to May of 2001, Duelfer said "The best that we can understand is that Iraq took a decision in 1991 that they would reveal part of their program and conceal part of it, presumably under the assumption that we would think we had found everything. And they began with the missiles and chemical weapons which were obvious [because] everybody knew that they had them, and they denied that they had an offensive biological program until 1995." He continues: "The concealment activity was directed, as best we understand it, from the most senior parts of the government, from the presidency and his immediate security services: the Special Republican Guard and the Special Security Organization. But Iraq was never able to fully convince us that they had stopped concealment and in fact we were convinced of the opposite, that they still retain weapons."

With the UN and Iraq deadlocked on disarmament for more than 12 years after sanctions were imposed over Baghdad's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, many analysts have wondered why Iraqi President Saddam Hussein never cooperated with UN arms inspectors to get the sanctions lifted. Compliance is one way Saddam could have simply freed himself to still rearm later. Duelfer said many arms inspectors believe the Iraqi regime attaches so much importance to its weapons of mass destruction that it is unable to give them up under any circumstances:

In congressional testimony last year, Duelfer said: “On September 18, 1995, I had a long, late night meeting with several senior Iraqi ministers and other officials. The meeting was arranged to discuss the Iraqi concepts and requirements for their WMD development and production programs. Previously, Baghdad had refused to engage in such a discussion. I remember the meeting quite well, not simply because there was an unusual amount of candor, but because I suddenly realized how unlikely it was that the government would ever comply fully with the UN demand to completely give up all WMD capabilities forever. Consequently, the UNSCOM inspectors had an ultimately hopeless task under the conditions it was permitted to operate.

Iraq revealed that evening how weapons of mass destruction were viewed from the position of the Presidency. (They even provided selected presidential documents.) Partial descriptions of the origin of WMD efforts were discussed. They also discussed how these programs had been used and their importance to the regime. In essence, the possession of WMD had saved the regime on two occasions. The first was in the war with Iran in the 1980’s when Iranian human wave infantry attacks were repelled with chemical munitions (UNSCOM learned that 101,000 were reported “consumed” during this period). The second instance where WMD preserved the regime was more surprising. I had asked about the decision by the Iraqi leadership not to employ WMD in the 1991 Gulf War. In a carefully worded response, the impression was conveyed that the President thought if Iraq used chemical or biological weapons against the coalition, retaliation would end his regime and probably him personally. He was successfully deterred. However, my interlocutors went on to describe how they had loaded BW and CW agent into various missile warheads and bombs before hostilities began in 1991. Moreover they dispersed these weapons and pre-delegated the authority to use them if the United States moved on Baghdad. The Iraqis stated that these actions apparently deterred the United States from going to Baghdad. Whether the Iraqi leadership believes this was the only reason the United States did not go to Baghdad in 1991 is unknown. However, clearly they are convinced that the possession of WMD contributed to keeping the Americans away and thus was vital to their survival.”

That information is both ironical and chilling. It is ironical that Iraq has been holding on to their WMD in the belief that it was the only deterrent to keep us from moving on the regime, when, in fact, is the very reason we are marching on Baghdad today. The chilling part is the description of the deployment of WMD during GWI and how we are already hearing similar stories this time.

For further proof that Iraq indeed does have WMD, let’s look at more recent history. Iraq admitted trying to deceive U.N. arms specialists during the early years of the inspection program, but claims the effort ended in 1995, when Saddam's son-in-law, Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel, defected to Jordan. The Iraqis actually blamed Kamel for trying to hide weapons of mass destruction banned by the Security Council. He returned to Iraq later in 1995 and was promptly killed by Hussein. Contrary to Baghdad's assertions that the cover-up of prohibited arms ceased with Kamel's defection, U.N. weapons inspectors believe it goes on. "The problem is that we have evidence that it continues to exist and continues to operate,"

In his testimony Duelfer stated:

“UNSCOM had long pressed Iraq to provide information and documents describing the requirements and operational concepts for the BW, CW, Ballistic Missile and nuclear programs. Iraq refused until shortly after Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law, Hussein Kamal defected to Jordan in August 1995. Hussein Kamal was the most senior regime official with control over these weapons programs. Baghdad was concerned about what Kamal would reveal and sought to limit the damage by a burst of controlled cooperation and admissions.”

In another clear admission that Iraq did indeed possess WMD Duelfer noted: “Finally, and most recently, the official newspaper of the Iraqi Bath party, Ath-Thawra wrote that “Acquiescing to Israel’s, but not Arab, possession of such weapons (WMD) is a case of double standards. But no matter how much those who pursue double standards try to obstruct the Arabs, they will not stop their efforts to achieve this goal, be they overt or covert, in future. Acquiring weapons of mass destruction is consistent with ‘the right to self-defense and the requirements of national security, irrespective of the nature of a ruling regime.’ In further testimony, horrific details of Iraq’s programs are given:

“The three biological agents Iraq states it produced for weapons were anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin. There were many other biological agents on which Iraq conducted research and development. These included clostridium perfringens (causes gangrene), ricin, wheat cover smut and some early work on viruses. Iraq had begun some early genetic engineering work as well. Iraq conducted experiments mixing lethal and non-lethal agents such as CS, commonly used as a riot control agent.

Iraq never made clear the purposes of many of these programs and experiments, extensive though they were. It seemed probable that military use was not the only purpose. In fact, the military seemed to have almost no interest or relationship to the program. It is difficult to understand why Iraq would produce and put into aerial bombs, aflatoxin. It has the effect of causing cancer over a period of several years. Experiments Iraq conducted in mixing aflatoxin with riot control agent appear particularly insidious as they would mask the exposure of individuals to this cancer causing agent.

The experiments with wheat smut are evidently aimed at developing economic weapons. It was clear that Iraq understood that depending on the method of dispersal, the origin of the agent could be concealed. In other words, they understood the potential for conducting an attack that would be near impossible to connect to Baghdad as the responsible actor.”

Gulf War Syndrome, anyone???

Duelfer clearly saw the situation for what it was. “Of course, the difference in the regime is everything. The present regime in Baghdad will not give up WMD even if inspectors go in again. The present regime will also remain quite willing to use them.”

Duelfer then offered a starting history lesson:

“We have been here before. After World War I, the Allied powers dictated strict disarmament and monitoring obligations to Germany in the Versailles Treaty of 1919. An international organization called the Inter-Allied Control Commission was created to implement those provisions. Inspectors were sent to Germany to verify compliance with weapons, manufacturing and manpower limitations. They endeavored to obtain accurate declarations from Germany of postwar inventories and supervise required destruction activities.

The German military and, in particular, the elite officer corps, dealt with the Control Commission. Masterminded by the clever and driven Gen. Hans Von Seeekt, the inspectors' efforts were frustrated through deception and concealment systems, to preserve prohibited weapons and production. The Germans conducted weapons development abroad and illegally sustained a trained officer and troop base to rapidly expand its army once Allied attention waned.

The German government argued that the inspectors were too demanding and acted as spies. They pleaded that the requirements to demobilize contributed to unemployment and caused the suffering of innocent civilians. They argued that the destruction of many weapons factories was unnecessarily severe, since they could produce civilian products. The German Army created "army peace commissions," nominally instructed to help the work of the Control Commission, but, in fact, set up to provide surveillance of the inspectors and warn of upcoming inspections. UNSCOM experienced all the above.

As Germany resisted disarmament inspections, disputes among the Allies grew over German compliance and the need for enforcement. German obstruction was countered forcefully--once with an Allied ultimatum, in May 1921, which threatened occupation of the Ruhr if Germany did not provide improved cooperation. Temporarily, Germany improved.

But disputes continued among the Allies, with France assuming the more forceful position. Paris argued that enforcement was necessary and even sought to occupy key cities unilaterally. Britain was more anxious for a political solution, to be free of the problem so it could focus on other issues.

Thus, Germany successfully divided the Allies. The senior British member of the Control Commission, Brig. Gen. John Morgan, wrote that the German officer corps wore the commission down, "'by a policy of continuous evasion of our demands until British ministers . . . would turn a deaf ear to all our reports, convinced that either Germany was disarmed or, if she was not, never could be."

Ultimately, with the accession of Germany to the League of Nations, the Allies agreed to withdraw the Control Commission at the end of 1926, its work only partially complete. The fig leaf at that time was the argument that with Germany now in the League of Nations, it was only appropriate that any monitoring be accomplished under League auspices and as part of the overall goal of general disarmament. No further inspections were conducted.”

France and the UK changed roles this time around. George Bush is obviously not willing to let Saddam unleash any more of his horror upon the world as Hitler did in WWII.

Along with being a keen historian, Duelfer proved to be a prophet last August with these comments:

“The regime will make the most of the potential for civilian deaths and damage at the hands of any American-led invasion. Europeans will find it hard to overcome this. The same mindset that put hostages at the locations of military targets in 1990-1991 will no doubt be busy collocating military and civilian facilities in ways between which no smart weapon can distinguish.

Baghdad knows the Europeans will also be amenable to U.N. negotiations, including over the return of weapons inspectors. This is a card best played closer to the outbreak of a real attack. As war becomes more evident, international efforts to avoid war will precipitate peace envoys and, at an appropriate moment, the regime may offer the concession of accepting weapons inspectors. This will deflect any momentum the United States may have generated for its cause. It will take months, if not a year or more, before Iraq will have to yield up weapons or face confrontations over inspectors' demands. With the passage of this much time, Washington will have lost its focus. Moreover, the weapons inspectors can be squeezed out later with the same tactics used in 1998. Their demands and objections can always be trivialized. Why do the inspectors need to get into a particular warehouse? Why do they need documents? These are not issues worth going to war.

Finally, if all of Iraq's diplomatic and economic tactics don't succeed in convincing the Europeans and others to restrain the United States from moving militarily, Baghdad can create other problems elsewhere to deflect Washington. This period, when Saddam is convinced an attack is imminent but before it can begin, is the most dangerous time. Terrorism, military attacks and assassinations are all tactics that this regime is capable of, has used before and may use again.

Saddam knows he made a blunder in 1991. He invaded Kuwait before he had a nuclear weapon. Had he waited a year, the outcome would have been entirely different. Saddam also knows there would be no talk now of invasion if he had a nuclear weapon in his possession. Rest assured, his plan is to deter or contain the United States, by threatening or buying off others, until he can attain nuclear capability.

But these are not reasons to hesitate. These are reasons to move ahead. So long as Saddam and his clique control Iraq, the problem will only get worse.”

Meet Charles Duelfer, your next WMD inspector in Iraq.

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