Gulf War II Promises New Weapons, Technology

Scripps Howard News Service | January 6, 2003 | Lisa Hoffman

[Tailback]

Army times 9/16/02

Stryker falls short in first major field test

By Frank Tiboni
Staff Writer

FORT IRWIN, Calif. — The Stryker’s debut in a joint war game exposed flaws in the U.S. Army’s new armored personnel carrier, according to initial service observations. The biggest problem was difficulty loading the 107-inch-wide vehicle on a C-130 Hercules transport plane.

“Very little can be stowed in its proper place due to C-130 loading restrictions,” said “Stryker Findings,” an Aug. 6 document produced by observers from the Army’s Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC), the Alexandria, Va.-based organization that monitors the service’s weapon system acquisition and development. The authors of the 21-page document also found other faults with the $2 million Stryker’s performance in last month’s Millennium Challenge 2002 U.S. military
exercise, including:

• Its gun and grenade launcher — the remote weapon station — could not find and fire at the enemy while moving. This proved fatal during the war game, which pitted the new vehicles against infantry troops and Soviet-made armored personnel carriers. Thirteen of 14 Strykers were destroyed by small arms fire, grenades and guns mounted on enemy vehicles, during ambushes and other encounters on one of the exercise’s missions. On one of the simulated missions, the Strykers failed to kill a single enemy vehicle.

• A total of 13 tires on the 16 Strykers needed replacement during the 96-hour war game.

• The Stryker interior is so cramped that troops inside found it difficult to drink from their canteens.

[Britton J Wingfield]

To fit a Stryker aboard a C-130, soldiers removed ammunition from external racks and stowed it inside the cabin, the document said. Soldiers also had to disassemble and remove the remote weapon station, which includes an MK 19 40mm grenade launcher and a .50-caliber machine gun. “Many exterior parts must be removed prior to loading on the C-130,” the document said.

[Tailback]

I guess that LTC Michael K. Robel, USAR and the owners of StrategyPage.com are seditionists also.

http://www.strategypage.com/articles/ibctrevisited/

[Britton J Wingfield]

If you complain about MREs we'll send you to the gulag!

[Tailback]

Man, I guess you better tell the FBI about this author on Rense.com

Currently the Strike Force centerpiece is the LAVIII/IV 'Stryker' Infantry Fighting Vehicle. Unlike the B-52, it is a completely new vehicle. Also unlike the B-52, it does not meet the standards set by the Army Chief of Staff. The 21-24 ton armored car rides on eight air-filled rubber tires elevated high above the road, driven through a complicated and sensitive kluge of transmission drive shafts, steering and suspension. At $3 Million per LAV copy, The LAV does not even meet the requirements of effectiveness, maneuverability and transportability. It cannot fit into a C-130 without extensive temporary modifications that must be reversed upon delivery for combat. The rubber wheels are vulnerable to the simplest urban weapon: the Molotov Cocktail. Trapped in a narrow street it cannot turn in its own length to escape. Crossing swampy plains, its weight bogs it down, and it cannot swim so it is limited to bridge crossings. Restricted to highways and roads, the LAV cannot support operations away from a well- established infrastructure. Tracked vehicles were developed to take the place of wheeled ones operating in difficult and hazardous conditions, yet the Army is insisting on returning to wheels. The published reasons: speed, weight and flexibility are all spurious. No wheeled combat vehicle today can keep up with an M1A2 Tank operating with its governors off. No wheeled combat vehicle can turn 180 degrees within its own length as any tracked vehicle can. Tracked vehicles reduce ground pressure over the length of the vehicle unlike wheeled vehicles that have a very narrow tire print on which to place their weight. And the M113 is designed to swim, freeing it from being road and bridge bound. The Army has 17,000 M113A3s that already meet the requirements for the Strike Force vehicle. Known today as the 'Gavin,' the M113 weighs in at 10.5-13 tons, well below the 24-ton weight of the Stryker. The Gavin is the Army's equivalent of the rugged, dependable 'B-52.' Now in the A3 version, it has been re-tracked, up-engined, and modernized so it can go in any terrain: jungle, mountain, desert and urban. Most importantly, it can be loaded into a C-130 without any modifications, and offloaded at the danger point ready-to-fight. Ask why the Army insisting on buying a vehicle that doesn't meet its own standards. There has to be a reason other than operational necessity. We are fighting for the survival of world freedom; We are fighting for each other; Give us the tools to do the job.

http://www.rense.com/general26/gavin.htm

[Tailback]

LOL! Actually potato soup and 20 grams of bread are probably better than MRE's. Uh-Oh, I hope Rain-Man doesn't tell the FBI I said that! ROFLMAO

[rmlew]

I'm not ex-military or anything, however, I see a small problem.
The Stryker seems to be a light M2 or M3 Bradley. It will carry troops and fulfill the recon mission.
What heavy support will they have? We need a light tank to replace the Sheridan. Wasn't that the point of the M8?

The Stryker may be fine for urban combat, but how will it fare against a BMP-3 or a T-72?

[Rain-maker]

Guess you like hot water by pushing the wrong buttons. Utterly disgraceful...

 

[rmlew]

Why don't we just update the M8?

[Tailback]

Dude, give it a rest. You're making yourself look absolutely crazy.

[Tailback]

There was a Stryker version called the MGS (medium gun system) that used the 105mm cannon from the M60 tank. It suffered from recoil problem and even more weight and height problems and had to be sent back to the drawing board. That was supposed to fit the role of the M8. Why the Army doesn't just go to the company that designed the M8 and buy some I don't know.

[xsrdx]

What are you, some retired Officer working for the company making the Stryker?

No. And for the record, I would have preferred a tracked ICV. But to characterize Stryker as a "death trap" is disingenuous and serves no purpose other than to emotionalize the argument.

Stryker is not perfect, it was fielded on a massively compressed timeline, faster than any armored platform IN US HISTORY, and its going to have some issues.

If you study military acquisition history, DAMN FEW systems are introduced to flag waving positive receptions, from Garand to Abrams, most ground combat systems catch hell at their introduction.

Whether an AGS or 113 variant would do a better job is speculation - given the nature of the IBCT mission (its an infantry carrier - not a light tank, not a fighting vehicle) the system adds viable capability that did not exist prior to it's fielding.

[xsrdx]

The Stryker may be fine for urban combat, but how will it fare against a BMP-3 or a T-72?

Poorly, it's not meant to fight heads up against tanks or infantry fighting vehicles like BMPs.

The Stryker/IBCT concept is to enable a "medium" force capability, more lethal and survivable than "light" forces like airborne, air assault and light infantry divisions, but with more strategic mobility than heavy forces like Armored or Mech Infantry divisions.

The IBCT/Stryker is intended for use where the enemy is primarily dismounted, or equipped with only light armored transport.

Stryker/IBCT is an additional capability - it does not replace either light or heavy forces in the tactical arena.

[rmlew]

Considering that some Media Darling Gernerals and Rumsfeild's Whiz Kids plan light mobile divisions, this is a real issue. They want to replace some of our heavy forces with Strykers.

[xsrdx]

They want to replace some of our heavy forces with Strykers.

The Army already has, to some extent, because it's only authorized a fixed quantity of force structure. The DoD argument is that future wars won't require the quantity of heavy armor we have now.

Notice, however, that the Army divisions deployed to Iraq are primarily heavy divisions.

The challenge is to prevent the whiz kid mentality from declaring ground forces, especially tank and mech infantry units, all but obsolete.

[xsrdx]

The DoD argument is that future wars won't require the quantity of heavy armor we have now.

I forgot to add; that argument is short sighted, naive, and potentially suicidal - but there are many within the DoD that subscribe to it.