Posted on 09/25/2001 4:56:53 PM PDT by Fred
Well...I don't think a 747 or a 757/767 could actually penetrate the 'can'. However, the trick isn't to penetrate, but to shock and dislodge the reactor core and damage the steam containment system when the auto-leluge system kicks in.
Some frequently asked questions about nuclear power plant security:Q: Are nuclear plants likely targets for terrorist attacks? A: The likelihood of a terrorist act against a nuclear facility is low, because plants are equipped for, and prepared to defend against, most types of attacks. They are structurally fortified to withstand the impact of natural forces like hurricanes and tornadoes and airborne objects up to a very substantial force. Reactors at nuclear power plants are enclosed in containment buildings made of steel and reinforced concrete up to four feet thick. Containments at nuclear power plants along the glide paths into airports are designed to withstand airliner accidents. Each nuclear plant has a well-armed security force trained to defend against armed assaults and acts of sabotage, and has a multiple barrier, defense-in-depth design to ensure against a potential release of radioactivity in case of an accident or act of sabotage. Given all that has been done to “harden” plants against attack or sabotage, the FBI historically has rated the chances of their being targeted by terrorists as low. Even so, the nuclear industry is taking steps to strengthen security programs against terrorist threats. The industry—under NRC oversight—is seeking to further enhance the effectiveness and comprehensiveness of the evaluations of our security program, including “force-on-force” exercises. Q: What has the industry’s response been to the terrorists attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on Sept. 11? A: All U.S. nuclear plants went on the highest level of alert status immediately after the events of September 11, even before a security advisory was issued by federal authorities, and will maintain a heightened level of vigilance as long as circumstances dictate. Those measures include: adding additional security personnel and erecting physical barriers where needed; increasing patrols of grounds and perimeters; and restricting access by the general public. Current security measures are highly effective in deterring sabotage and safeguarding the public, but industry representatives are working with local, state and federal officials to explore additional ways that nuclear plant security can be enhanced in light of the New York and Washington events. Q: What is the responsibility of the industry regarding the safety and security of nuclear plants? A: Companies that operate nuclear power plants must demonstrate the ability to defend against assaults by a well-trained paramilitary force, armed with automatic weapons and explosives, intent on forcing its way into a plant to commit radiological sabotage, with the aid of an “insider.” High-tech surveillance and communications systems are in place to identify potential intruders and speed the response to possible threats. In addition, internal security programs reduce the sabotage threat from an “insider” by conducting background checks of plant personnel, tightly controlling access to certain areas of the facility, and maintaining “fitness-for-duty” standards to deter drug and alcohol problems and detect erratic behavior. All U.S. nuclear power plants meet the security requirements of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Regular mock drills and “force-on-force” exercises help hone the response of plant security forces to a wide range of threat scenarios. On the limited number of occasions when such exercises have shown potential weaknesses in plant security, companies have implemented additional protective measures. Although the industry and government have acknowledged that armed frontal assaults on nuclear power plants are unlikely, preparing for even unlikely events is in keeping with the defense-in-depth strategy for protecting public health and safety. Q: What kind of damage could occur if an aircraft strikes a nuclear power plant? A: While nuclear plants cannot be guaranteed to be impervious to every imaginable threat, commercial nuclear reactors are designed and constructed with that extremely remote possibility in mind. Design requirements with respect to aircraft impacts are tailored to each individual facility, but all nuclear reactor containment buildings are like bunkers, built of thick, steel-reinforced concrete. Inside the containment building, the reactor is encased in a steel pressure vessel up a foot thick. This defense-in-depth safety strategy minimizes the risk of penetration from outside forces, and helps prevent the release of radioactivity in the event of an accident.
Also see:
Plant Security: Physical Barriers, Armed Guards, Personnel Procedures
Credibility = zero!
What a crock!
Terrorists will not attack nuclear power reactors because they are too hard to get at, and will not have the desired effect (no big explosions, no big loss of life, etc)
You could float right into Turkey Point on Biscayne Bay with a group of terrorists and take the plant over without having to worry about any land based defenses, who would stop them the Marine Patrol?
So where IS this data?? I note you don't provide a link to any?? There isn't any back in the "source" (NCI.ORG).
I don't, but neither is anything else guaranteed to be absolutely safe from a well organized military attack of sufficient force. We can spend ourselves blind securing everything - and still not do the job. It is a matter of priorities.
Elsewhere you posted look at the data.
So you are either in league with these opportunistic fear-mongering NGO's or you have succombed to their sirene song of sweet "give a bunch of unemployable attornies a handout to raise hell in Washington."
One thing is for sure - they don't have the data. They don't even have a clue of the data. Real vulnerabilities or lack thereof from real red-teaming [delta-force] against nuclear facilities is very sensitive classified information.
NPR?? You mean "National Socialist Radio"? The wholly-owned subsidiary of the left?
"So suppose, just to clarify our policy commitments, it's good data. Wouldn't this be a priority?"
The deal is that it is quite unlikely to be good data. The power reactor guys KNOW (and have known for years) that they are likely targets. So I am absolutely certain that steps have already been taken to enhance security. They may need more, they may not--I suspect we are unlikely to know, as they (like the military, and wisely) are not going to publicize ALL (or even most) of the precautions in place simply with a view to taking the potential terrorists by surprise.
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