Posted on 04/19/2025 9:59:09 AM PDT by Jubal Harshaw
Not really like being a permanent resident, now is it?
Not like being an illegal alien.
Just a thug with a creative attorney.
Just a legal alien who was never charged with any crime, here or elsewhere.
Note that the government believes that his original premise for the stay is no longer valid
His original premise for an imaginary what? There is no removal order in the record of the case. FWIW, they can raise that issue after they bring him back. In the meantime, they are not sending anyone out until they are given permission by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Thug not coming back.
Unlawfully removed alien coming back.
Guess that gives you that sadz.
Nope, not really. After they bring him back, and they surely will, they can go through the required process and remove him lawfully. As they got caught attempting to illegally remove more individuals in defiance of the standing order of the U.S. Supreme Court, it now looks like they are not removing anyone until they correct their screwup.
I guess it gives you the sadz that the administration cannot just get away with serial rape of the Constitution. Guess that like the administration, you prefer headlines to real, actual and effective removals, like getting something done.
Sorry Peckerwood. Your Macho Man won’t be coming back for you and Van Hollen to have a little party with.
As the sheriff once said, you ain’t from these here parts, are ya? You really don’t know the history except what ya read in the funny papers. I lived it.
Joe Swing cleaned up the Southwest that I grew up in back in ‘54. Spanish was almost never heard, and North of Guadalupe, almost never saw any campesinos. Was real normal ‘merica.
Doncha hate it?
Sorry Peckerwood. Your Macho Man won’t be coming back for you and Van Hollen to have a little party with.
Sorry Trumpeteer, you have amply demonstrated that you do not know what you are talking about. For today's lesson, you may learn about war, predatory invasion, and nation or government.
https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cod.243061/gov.uscourts.cod.243061.35.0_1.pdf
DBU and RMM v Trump, D. Colo. 25-cv-1163-CNS (22 Apr 2025) ORDER at 21-26
1. Proclamation “Satisfying” the ActAccording to Petitioners, the Proclamation exceeds the President’s “statutory authority in three critical respects.” ECF No. 2 at 11. First, there is no “invasion or predatory incursion.” Id. Second, any purported invasion is not perpetuated by a “foreign government or nation.” Id. And third, there is “no process to contest whether an individual falls within the Proclamation.” Id. Skepticism of the Proclamation’s contrary findings is required, Petitioners urge, to the point of satisfying their first TRO burden. Id.; see also M.G., 117 F.4th at 1238. The Court agrees.
a. Invasion or Predatory Incursion
Petitioners’ first argument, see ECF No. 2 at 12, proceeds from a straightforward premise. The President’s authority under the Proclamation is “vested” under the Act. The Act demands, as a “statutory requirement,” an “invasion or predatory incursion.” ECF No. 12; 50 U.S.C. § 21. And because the Act’s “text and history” use these terms “to refer to military actions indicative of an actual or impending war”—not “mass illegal migration” or “criminal activities”—the Act cannot sustain the Proclamation. ECF No. 2 at 12–13. The Court agrees with Petitioners.
The Court does not define these words—“invasion,” “predatory,” and “incursion”— against blank definitional or historic registers. Begin with language. See, e.g., Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) (“[T]he starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself.”). “The term ‘invasion’ was a legal term of art with a well-defined meaning at the Founding.” J.G.G. v. Trump, No. 25-5067, 2025 WL 914682, at *8 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 26, 2025) (Henderson, J., concurring); see also id. (defining “invasion as a “‘[h]ostile entrance upon the right or possessions of another; hostile encroachment,’ such as when ‘William the Conqueror invaded England’”) (quoting Samuel Johnson, Invasion, sense 1, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 1773)); (reciting second dictionary defining “invasion as a “‘hostile entrance into the possession of another; particularly the entrance of a hostile army into a country for the purpose of conquest or plunder, or the attack of a military force’”) (quoting Noah Webster, Invasion, sense 1, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).
The Court finds these at-the-Founding definitions persuasive in demonstrating what “invasion” does—and does not—mean as a matter of plain language. “Invasions” contemplate military action. J.G.G., 2025 WL 914682, at *9 (“The term ‘invasion’ was well known to the Fifth Congress and the American public circa 1798. The phrase echoes throughout the Constitution ratified by the people just nine years before. And in every instance, it is used in a military sense.”) (Henderson, J., concurring). And at a bare minimum, “invasion” means more than the Proclamation’s description of TdA’s “infiltrat[ion],” “irregular warfare,” and “hostile actions” against the United States— notwithstanding the Proclamation’s conclusory description of “the devastating effects of [TdA’s] invasion.” Invocation of the Alien Enemies Act Regarding the Invasion of the United States by Tren de Aragua, 90 Fed. Reg. 13,033 (Mar. 14, 2025). See also id. (finding “TdA is undertaking hostile actions and conducting irregular warfare”); id. (stating TdA members are “chargeable with actual hostility against the United States”).
Definitions of “predatory incursion” likewise reveal a mismatch between what the phrase means and what the Proclamation says. As with the analysis of earlier definitions of “invasion,” the Court again finds Judge Henderson’s research and analysis of Founding era definitions for “predatory” and “incursion”—which Petitioners cite, and to which they direct the Court—persuasive in its own analysis of Petitioners’ TRO motion. See ECF No. 2 at 12; J.G.G., 2025 WL 914682, at *10 (Henderson, J., concurring). Explained in Judge Henderson’s concurring statement to the D.C. Circuit’s per curiam order denying emergency stays prior to the Supreme Court’s ultimate intervention in Trump v. J. G. G., 2025 WL 1024097, at *1, the “predatory” nature of an “incursion” “includes a ‘[p]lundering,’ such as the ‘predatory war made by Scotland.’” 2025 WL 914682, at *10 (Henderson, J., concurring) (original alteration and emphasis) (citing Samuel Johnson, Predatory, sense 1, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 1773)).
Indeed, consistent with these definitions, the Supreme Court’s discussion of the “power to be exercised by the President such as that conferred by the Act” rests on the presumption the United States is in a “state of war.” Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 168–69 (quotations omitted)); id. at 170 n.13 (“[T]he life of [the] statute is defined by the existence of a war.”) (emphasis added); id. at 170 (“The political branch of the Government has not brought the war with Germany to an end.”) (emphasis added). A year earlier the Second Circuit’s analysis of the Act rested on the same premise. See U.S. ex rel. Kessler v. Watkins, 163 F.2d 140, 143 (2d Cir. 1947) (“It seems quite necessary to suppose that the President could not carry out prior to the official termination of the declared state of war, deportations which the Executive regarded as necessary for the safety of the country but which could not be carried out during active warfare because of the danger to the aliens themselves or the interference with the effective conduct of military operations.”) (emphasis added); Clark, 155 F.2d at 295 (“[T]he state of war has not been terminated by act of Congress or by Executive Proclamation.”).
Satisfied with what “invasion” and “predatory incursion” mean, the Court could stop. See Burlington N. R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987) (“[W]hen we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete.” (quotations omitted)). These words, fundamentally, demand military and wartime action. The Proclamation makes no finding that satisfies these definitional demands. Thus, to the extent the Proclamation relies on the Act’s “invasion” and “incursion” provisions to justify its removal powers, it does so improperly. See J.G.G., 2025 WL 914682, at *2 (“A central limit to this power is the Act’s conditional clause—that the United States be at war or under invasion or predatory incursion.”) (Henderson, J., concurring) (per curiam).
But assume these unambiguous words are ambiguous. Turn to history. See, e.g., United States v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n of Cal,, 345 U.S. 295, 315 (1953); United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297, 303 (1969). As doing so is not required, see, e.g., Burlington, 481 U.S. at 461, the Court does not pause here for long, except to say it finds Petitioners’ recitation of the Act’s historical context persuasive. See ECF No. 2 at 13; see also J.G.G., 2025 WL 914682, at *9 (explaining the Act’s historical background) (Henderson, J., concurring); id. at *16 (“As James Madison explained, the [Act] was passed based on Congress’s ‘power to declare war’ and was in accord with ‘the law of nations.’”) (quoting The Report of 1800) (Millett, J., concurring). The Act’s history further demonstrates that invasions require the “use [of] military force,” id. at *9 (Henderson, J., concurring), and any contrary efforts to cramp the Proclamation’s findings into that historical meaning fail.
b. “Foreign Nation or Government”
Petitioners contend, as with its failures to identify an “invasion” or “predatory incursion,” the Proclamation likewise fails to assert a “foreign nation or government” is “invading the United States.” ECF No. 2 at 14. The Court agrees with Petitioners. The Court discerns little reason to linger on this point, especially where, as Petitioners observe, the Proclamation finds TdA is “closely aligned with [and] infiltrated[] the Maduro regime.” Invocation of the Alien Enemies Act Regarding the Invasion of the United States by Tren de Aragua, 90 FR 13033. The Proclamation does not find TdA itself is a foreign nation, country, or government. At bottom, the Proclamation fails to adequately find or assert TdA is a “foreign nation or government,” § 21, sufficient to justify the Act’s invocation. Indeed, if TdA was such a “foreign nation or government,” id., there would be no need for it to “undertak[e] hostile actions . . . at the direction, clandestine or otherwise, of the Maduro regime in Venezuela,” Invocation of the Alien Enemies Act Regarding the Invasion of the United States by Tren de Aragua, 90 FR 13033 (emphasis added).
Hilarious
We need “definitions” from a Bull Dyke
You really belong over on DU or BlueSky or some other Leftard echo chamber
Buh Bye Peckerwood
We need “definitions” from a Bull Dyke
Only because you are dumber than a bull dyke or even a old cow.
Perhaps you can revel in the unanimous opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court:
The Government is directed not to remove any member of the putative class of detainees from the United States until further notice of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. §1651(a).
A.A.R.P. et al v. Trump et al, U.S. Supreme Court, 24A1007, 4/19/2025, ORDER
Everyone has an opinion!
And Little Jonny’s midnight outrage will not deter us.
https://freerepublic.com/focus/chat/4312242/posts?page=17#17
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