Posted on 02/28/2022 8:10:18 PM PST by Mariner
As the Ministry of Energy announced on January 15 , due to unscheduled repairs of one of the catalytic cracking units of LUKOIL-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez (NORSI), there was a decrease in the production of motor gasoline, and with the participation of oil companies, measures were developed to continue the uninterrupted supply of fuel to the domestic market during the repair period of the enterprise .
“The headquarters participants emphasized that the needs of the domestic market will be met by reducing export supplies and reorienting the existing resources of other market participants,” the ministry said.
https://www.interfax.ru/business/940314
Read 20NOV2023:
Oil refineries may switch to non-original parts due to a shortage of “original” spare parts.
https://freerepublic.com/focus/news/4042550/posts?page=5501#5501
The official TG channel of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Ukraine, General Zaluzhnyi, released a video, depicting the events around the two shot down Russian planes. You can see several bogeys. Two of them were fast losing speed and then suddenly vanished from the screen. The other planes left as fast as they can.
I marked the two crash sites on my map. The first happened close to the Ukrainian coast near Prymors’k, the other one on the way back to Russia. The second one could be the Il-22M11 trying desperately to reach Anapa.
One of crashed planes launched from the Kushchyovskaya air base in the Krasnodar region.
https://twitter.com/Tendar/status/1746856498683089159
If this is true, and an A-50 was shot down either by Ukrainians or Russian mistake, then there was a Russian AWACS (Signal intelligence - whatever they were doing) crew that went down consisting of maybe a colonel (or senior Lt. Col), a few Lt.Col., 3 - 4 Maj., and a 5-6 Capt. together with pilot and co-pilot. that makes 12 - 14 officers.
Highly trained and skilled people. Years of training.
Huge loss in itself.
And demoralizing because the A-50 community might be a tight group of 100-200 officers - suddenly 14 are killed.
https://twitter.com/Cyberdefensecom/status/1746864739127300233
Tragic news: as a result of an attack on our planes over the Sea of Azov, 14 people were killed. This figure was confirmed to us by three sources in the Aerospace Forces.
There were 14 people on board the downed A-50 - crew members and operators. They all died. Four people on board the Il-22 were wounded as a result of the enemy strike. All of them, fortunately, are alive, but two are in serious condition.
Happy memory to those who died. Eternal flight, brothers, as our pilots say.
https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/3445
Russian fighter bomber:
In today’s “333” we will try to answer the question about the attack on three of our aircraft in the Sea of Azov. The question is quite logical. We will answer. Anyway, we’ll try. According to my information, the Ukrainians had nothing to do with the loss of the RLDNiU A-50 aircraft.
And I really hope that this time the commission for the analysis of the disaster will not fuck the pilots for weather reports, and will not require signatures in the logs for checking the logs; it should not fuck the pilots at all, but the direct culprits of the tragedy.
11 (according to other sources 12) military pilots died.
In the [invasion of Ukraine], unfortunately, the worst and most dangerous enemy for the Aerospace Forces has become our air defense.
It always hits you in the back. It is impossible to protect against it or somehow provide for it or take it into account. But something needs to be done about this. “No one is to blame” and “this is a coincidence” will not work here.
https://t.me/fighter_bomber/15407
333 = code for Fire!
Rumors about Putin's death have once again spread in the Kremlin. The probable culprit has already been found.
Four of our sources in the Presidential Administration immediately noted the intensification of behind-the-scenes conversations about the imminent death of Vladimir Vladimirovich. “In the smoking rooms they talk about the president's terrible illness and that he didn't even take communion at Christmas recently because he doesn't want to die and is offended by God,” one of the interlocutors told us. Another reported that, “according to knowledgeable people, Vladimir Vladimirovich will die before the summer.” Of course, there is no evidence of this, but the rumor is spreading very actively.
This is not the first time rumors about the president's death have been spread. We wrote that similar rumors were already circulating at the end of November. And in October, the dubious Telegram channel “General SVR” spread the fake news that Putin was supposedly already dead .
Something else is interesting in this situation. Our sources in the FSB and FSO claim that Dmitry Medvedev may be involved in spreading gossip about the imminent death of Vladimir Vladimirovich. It turns out that Dmitry Anatolyevich was recently convicted of financing and in every possible way protecting the “mad professor” Valery Solovy and the General SVR channel. There is a suspicion that it was he who could come up with a lie about Putin's death and publish it for a decent amount of money.
“Medvedev seems to be tired of the role of a clown who scolds the West and threatens NATO with a nuclear club. He believes that he is still young enough and promising and can return to the presidency. He cannot go directly against Vladimir Vladimirovich, but he is quite capable of doing such nasty things on the sly. Moreover, everyone knows what a wild imagination Medvedev has,” says our FSB interlocutor.
Now Medvedev’s involvement in spreading rumors about the president's death is being verified. If his guilt is proven, Putin will receive a corresponding report from the security forces.
Russia and Iran are preparing to sign a Grand Interstate Treaty to further develop Russian-Iranian military-technological cooperation.[47] Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Defense and Iranian Armed Forces Logistics Minister Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Ashtiani reportedly discussed bilateral military and military-technical cooperation during a phone call on January 15, and both sides are reportedly preparing to sign the Grand Interstate Treaty within an unspecified timeframe.[48] Both sides emphasized their commitment to the fundamental principles of Russian-Iranian relations – including unconditional respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity – which will be confirmed in the upcoming Grand Interstate Treaty. Shoigu noted that Moscow and Tehran are consistently increasing their cooperation in the interest of building a “truly equal multipolar world.” Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov similarly spoke with Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian about the progress of the new interstate agreement and a number of bilateral cooperation topics involving trade, economy, transport, and logistics during a phone call on January 15.[49] Lavrov and Abdollahian reiterated that Russia and Iran are preparing to codify different fundamental principles of Russian-Iranian relations in the new Grand Interstate Treaty.[50] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Deputy Chief Major General Vadym Skibitskyi stated in an interview published on January 15 that Iran wants to increase military-technical cooperation with Russia and hopes to acquire Su-34 fighter aircraft, training aircraft, and radar stations.[51]
full report: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-15-2024
Russian President Vladimir Putin notably amplified a longstanding Kremlin effort to set information conditions for future escalations against the Baltic countries, likely as part of his wider effort to weaken NATO. Putin claimed on January 16 that Latvia and other Baltic states are “throwing [ethnic] Russian people” out of their countries and that this situation “directly affects [Russia's] security.”[10] Previous changes to Latvia's immigration law stipulated that Russian citizens’ permanent residence permits would become invalid in September 2023 and that Russian citizens would need to follow the general procedure for obtaining EU permanent residence status in Latvia, including passing a Latvian language exam, by November 30, 2023.[11] The Latvian Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs stated in December 2023 that Latvia would deport about 1,200 Russian citizens who failed to apply for a new residence permit by the deadline.[12] Putin has long employed an expansive definition of Russia's sovereignty and trivialized the sovereignty of former Soviet republics, and Russia has long claimed that it has the right to protect its “compatriots abroad,” including ethnic Russians and Russian speakers beyond Russia's borders.[13] ISW has not observed any indication that a Russian attack against the Baltics is imminent or likely, but Putin may be setting information conditions for future aggressive Russian actions abroad under the pretext of protecting its “compatriots.” Putin recently threatened Finland in mid-December 2023 and reiterated a world view illustrating that he continues to pursue demanded changes to the NATO alliance that would amount to dismantling it.[14]
Putin subsequently tied alleged security threats to Russia in Eastern Europe to NATO's “Open Door Policy,” a core principle of the alliance enshrined in its charter that allows it the discretion to admit new members. Putin claimed that NATO “open[ed] the doors to Ukraine and Georgia” in 2008 – referring to the Bucharest Declaration in which NATO promised Ukraine and Georgia paths to membership but took no concrete steps towards opening such paths – and claimed that this declaration went against Ukraine's 1991 Declaration of Independence that stated that Ukraine is a neutral state.[15] Putin did not mention that the Russian Federation committed “to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine,” which included Crimea and occupied Donbas, in 1994 in exchange for Ukraine's return of the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons on its territory to Russia.[16] Sovereignty includes the right of self-determination. Putin claimed that NATO's 2008 declaration “completely changed the situation in Eastern Europe” and affected Russia's security. ISW previously assessed that Putin did not invade Ukraine in 2022 to defend Russia against a threat from NATO but rather to weaken and ultimately destroy NATO – a goal he still pursues.[17] The Kremlin and Kremlin-affiliated actors have recently promoted information operations and conducted hybrid warfare tactics aimed at destabilizing NATO and may now be setting information conditions for possible future aggressive Russian actions against NATO countries and their neighbors.[18]
full report: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-16-2024
Why are they suddenly talking about moving the capital from Moscow again? Is it true that this is impossible?
Unexpectedly, a lot of talk arose around the transfer of the capital of the Russian Federation from Moscow. In particular, historian Afanasy Nikolaev handed over an open letter to Vladimir Putin with a proposal to consider the possibility of moving the capital to Irkutsk. Dmitry Peskov has already responded to the idea, calling it unrealizable in the current conditions.
There are several points about this. Firstly, in his letter the historian rightly noted that moving the capital to Irkutsk would ensure security for the country's leadership. Now the danger for Siberia is much less than for Moscow. However, there is another question here. Elites want to live in comfortable conditions. Putin, for example, really likes Sochi, but now he rarely goes there. Sending all ministers and tens of thousands of officials to Irkutsk in one fell swoop is, of course, a large-scale idea, but it will most likely lead to collapse rather than provide any bonuses. At the same time, Irkutsk is significantly closer to our main partner - China.
Secondly, it is worth noting that the idea of moving the capital is not new. In November last year, due to the difficult situation at the fronts, documents even began to be taken out of Moscow. Then Kazan, Yaroslavl and Yekaterinburg were named among the candidates for the status of the new/temporary capital . We also wrote that not far from Yekaterinburg , a new bunker for the president was urgently built.
Thirdly, is Peskov right when he says that moving the capital is now impossible? Any tasks depend on conditions. Now, fortunately, Moscow is not being bombed and there are no enemy troops on the approaches to it. Moreover, such a scenario looks frankly unlikely. But if conditions change, the issue of moving the capital can be resolved as soon as possible. Sources in the Kremlin apparatus told us about this. As expected, many people are against the transfer, including Sergei Sobyanin.
https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/3452
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Irkutsk
A workshop producing drones for the army exploded in the Rostov region.
An explosion at the Avangard plant in Shakhty, Rostov region, occurred in a workshop where FPV drones were produced. Thank God, there were no fatalities, but three people were seriously injured.
According to our sources in the government of the Rostov region, a private company that collaborated with the Ministry of Defense, two months ago rented one of the workshops of the Avangard plant to produce drones for the front. “They made FPV drones and sold them to armies, as far as I know, at fairly low prices. According to the preliminary version, someone blew up the workshop. A terrible event, it's good that there were no dead,” our source said.
According to an interlocutor at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, possible losses are “several hundred ready-made or almost ready-made drones.” He also said that there are two versions of the crime.
The first is the actions of saboteurs. The second is that the workshop was undermined by unscrupulous competitors. They were unhappy with the low prices at which the affected company supplied drones to our Armed Forces. An investigation has been launched.
Note that this is not the first attack on the production of FPV drones in our country. In November, a workshop for the production of kamikaze drones burned down in the Krasnodar Territory . At first, saboteurs were suspected of that fire, but, according to the investigation, the workshop was most likely set on fire by unscrupulous competitors of businessmen who produced drones for the army. Evidence is currently being collected against the suspects in this crime.
UPD. According to the latest data, 12 people were injured as a result of the explosion in Shakhty, three in serious condition.
https://t.me/kremlin_secrets/3453
They are loyal to their wallet, as if they only have a short time to live.
Significant protests erupted in Baymak, Bashkortostan Republic, following a Russian court's guilty verdict for a prominent Bashkort activist, prompting a swift Russian government response as well as backlash from the Russian ultranationalist community. Bashkortostan's Baymaksky Court found prominent Bashkort activist Fail Alsynov guilty on January 11 of inciting ethnic hatred and sentenced him to four years in prison, which the court announced publicly on January 17 following a closed-door trial.[35] Alsynov allegedly gave a speech on April 28, 2023, that insulted ethnic groups from the Caucasus.[36] Hundreds of Alsynov’s supporters had gathered at the courthouse ahead of his January 17 verdict announcement, and protests involving hundreds to thousands of supporters lasted for hours following the verdict. Some Russian opposition sources reported that 2,000-5,000 people protested in support of Alsynov and that responding Russian authorities detained anywhere from five to several dozen protestors.[37] The reported scale of the Baymak protest appears comparable to if not larger than that of the antisemitic riots in Dagestan in October 2023.[38] Footage shows Russian riot police using tear gas and stun grenades to dispel the protestors, two of whom Russian police beat with batons and 20-40 of whom sought medical attention following the protests.[39] Russian law enforcement reportedly detained around 20-40 protestors, and Alsynov’s supporters negotiated with Russian law enforcement to cease protests for the day in exchange for the release of the detained protestors.[40] The protests have dispersed as of this publication, though it is unclear whether activists are planning for further protests on subsequent days. Hundreds to thousands of activists gathered outside the Baymaksky Court in the days leading up to the public announcement of Alsynov’s sentence, suggesting that the size of the protests on January 17 was not necessarily spontaneous.[41]
Russian authorities appear to be better equipped to handle the Bashkortostan protests than the October 2023 Dagestan protests. The Russian Investigative Committee announced on January 17 that it is opening a criminal investigation into the protest for the organization of and participation in “mass riots” and for the use of violence against authorities.[42] Multiple Telegram channels that the Bashkort activists reportedly used to coordinate and spread news of the protest became temporarily unavailable on January 17, a possible Russian government censorship attempt to limit the protest from growing or spreading.[43] The Russian ultranationalist community latched onto the Bashkortostan protest in anger despite the swift government response. Some criticized Alsynov’s supporters as “extremists” and “wolves in sheep's clothing” who only aim to separate Bashkortostan from Russia.[44] Others amplified footage of military personnel in Bashkortostan's “Minigali Shaimuratov” Battalion disavowing the protesters and Alsynov as “traitors,” “extremists,” and “separatists.”[45] The Russian government and Bashkort military personnel's swift response suggest that the Russian government may intensify efforts to ensure that non-ethnic Russian communities support the war in Ukraine. Russian sources’ characterization of the protesters as “separatists” organized by outside forces suggests that Russian ultranationalists will continue to label any notable unrest from non-ethnic Russians as a hybrid warfare attack against Russia.[46]
full report: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-17-2024
Is this the beginning of the end?
Recent widespread GPS disruptions across Poland and the Baltic region are prompting speculation about the potential operation of Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems in the region. Polish outlet Radio Zet cited data from the GPSJAM GPS interference tracking site on January 16 that showed unprecedentedly high levels of GPS jamming across northern and eastern Poland, including across Warsaw and as far south as Łódź.[14] GPSJAM data also shows similarly high levels of GPS jamming across the southern Baltic Sea and northwestern and central Poland between December 25-27, 2023, and on January 10, 2024.[15] Polish media outlets suggested that the December 2023 outages may have been caused either by unspecified NATO military exercises in the Baltic region or could be linked to recent Russian EW tests in the Kaliningrad region.[16] Swedish Military Intelligence and Security Service (MUST) opened a case into the disturbances on January 12 in light of Russian Baltic Fleet EW exercises.[17] Swedish Lieutenant Colonel Joakim Paasikivi stated on January 6 that he believes that recent GPS interference levels are a result of “Russian influence activities or so-called hybrid warfare,” and noted that Russia has previously interfered with GPS signals in northern Europe to protect Russian activities in Murmansk Oblast or disrupt NATO exercises.[18] Russian media reported that elements of the Russian Baltic Fleet have been training with the Borisoglebsk-2 EW system in Kaliningrad Oblast since mid-December 2023, which some sources linked to the disturbances.[19] ISW cannot independently verify the cause of the GPS jamming levels at this time, but the suggestion that Russian EW capabilities in Kaliningrad Oblast could so significantly impact Poland and the Baltic region is notable.
Russia and the Central African Republic (CAR) are in negotiations regarding Russian military basing in CAR. Russian Ambassador to CAR Alexander Bikantov stated that Russia's and CAR’s defense ministries are discussing the creation of a Russian military base in CAR and are currently selecting the base's location.[45] Russian outlet RBK reported that the Russian Embassy in CAR stated that Russian and Central African officials have not yet finalized the size of the potential Russian contingent in CAR or the date of its arrival.[46] Kremlin-backed outlet Africa Initiative reported on January 16 that CAR Presidential Advisor Fidel Ngouandika stated that CAR wants Russia to build a military base in the country and that CAR’s government has “already provided a site in Beringo, 80km from Bangui, where there is an international airport.”[47] The site in Beringo reportedly can accommodate up to 10,000 personnel.[48] The Kremlin continues efforts to expand Russia‘s influence in Africa through the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) controlled Africa Corps and is likely attempting to expand the Africa Corps’ operations in Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, and CAR.[49] The Russian military's apparent ability to negotiate deploying expeditionary forces to the CAR indicates that Russia has offset some of the acute manpower shortages that the Russian military experienced in 2022 and 2023. The Russian military hastily redeployed forces from Russia's (small) foreign bases in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan Armenia, and Syria, to Russia in 2022, likely in response to acute personnel shortages from Russia's invasion of Ukraine.[50]
full report: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-18-2024
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