Posted on 07/06/2018 11:35:11 AM PDT by detective
Trump should call one of the Dem senators that is in danger, whichever one is least odious, and make a deal. Vote for my pick, and I won’t campaign against you. Vote against, and I will be in your state 5 times, including the day before the election. Orchestrate a meeting with the nominee, after which the Senator comes out and says she will vote for confirmation. That will silence Collins and Murkowski, and bring everyone in line. Nomination will sail through.
Another consideration for this nominee is that if they have trouble getting it through, Trump can campaign like hell in the fall on that issue, and if he gets more Republicans in the Senate, especially if he gets 55 or more, he can submit the same nominee again, or one of the others on his short list. Only danger is if the Senate is lost, and I don’t see that happening.
I would add a 3rd. Like many in government, most of our major media are committed to enable and promote homosexuality.
If Trump's willing to overlook that, so should Trump supporters.
past confirmation hearing testimony:
https://www.congress.gov/110/chrg/shrg48894/CHRG-110shrg48894.htm
[I don’t have the time to read it.]
Deep Stater who will further take away our freedom.
No way in hell should this be the pick.
I am referring to Kavanaugh.
Kethledge respects individual rights. He should be the one chosen.
Mr. Kethledge
....
First and foremost, Senator, I think the approach I would
take recognizes the fact that, in my opinion, the fact that
judges are unelected I think is really the defining
characteristic of Article III judges and the characteristic
that circumscribes their power.
We are a democracy. Nobody elects Article III judges.
I think that means that Article III judges don’t get to impose their policy views, their opinions on the people of this country because that is not democracy.
The folks in this body do, and it is the job of Article III
judges to enforce your will, not the will of the judges
themselves.
I feel very passionate about that, and I tell you that, to the extent of my ability, that is what I would do if I were a judge.
Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit (Michigan) Age: 49
Education: Boston College; University of California, Berkeley Law
Clerkships: Arthur Spiegel (Southern District of Ohio); Nathaniel Jones (6th Circuit)
Amul Thapar was Trumps second judicial nominee following the appointment of Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court. Last May, the Senate confirmed Thapar to the 6th Circuit on party lines, by a vote of 52-44 (four Democrats abstained from voting).
Before ascending to the appeals court, he spent nearly a decade as a trial judge on the Eastern District of Kentucky. President George W. Bush nominated Thapar to that judgeship in May 2007, and he was confirmed by a voice vote in December 2007, making him the first South Asian-American federal judge and one of the youngest in the entire federal judiciary. He also volunteered to hear immigration cases during a judicial emergency in the Southern District of Texas.
Before joining the federal court, he served as an assistant U.S. attorney in the District of Columbia and in the Southern District of Ohio and later as the U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of Kentucky. He also worked in private practice in Washington, D.C., and Cincinnati, Ohio, and served as general counsel for Equalfooting.com, a business-to-business online marketplace.
In a recent Michigan Law Review article, Thapar and attorney Benjamin Beaton reviewed former 7th Circuit Judge Richard Posners new book in which Posner recommends abandoning a formalist approach in which judges rely on historical meaning, established interpretive tools, and precedent in favor of a more consequentialist, more overtly outcome-driven approach.
Thapar offers a robust defense of textualism, arguing that Posners approach would prove unworkable and unpredictable and would turn judges into policymakers, thereby violating separation of powers. He concluded the article:
Because judges are human, formalism is in a sense aspirational. As Justice Scalia admitted, the main danger in judicial interpretation of the Constitutionor, for that matter, in judicial interpretation of any lawis that the judges will mistake their own predilections for the law. Avoiding this error is the hardest part of being a conscientious judge; perhaps no conscientious judge ever succeeds entirely. But this is no basis for rejecting a formal approach to interpreting legal texts; it only heightens the need to incorporate limits, rather than license, into the judicial system. That textualism will sometimes fail to constrain judges is no reason to surrender to other interpretive approaches that, by their very design, impose fewer and less effective constraints.
Although he has only been an appeals court judge for little over a year, he wrote 36 appeals court opinions when he sat on the 6th and 11th circuits by designation, and hes written 10 published opinions since his confirmation last year. As a district court judge, Thapar published 631 ordersonly 11 of which were reversed on appeal.
Thapar appears to be a committed textualist. In Freeland v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (2011), Thapar remanded a diversity case back to state court because it was exactly one penny short of the jurisdictional minimum of the federal courts. While admitting that this result was painfully inefficient, he said that [t]he words [amount] in controversy have to mean something and that the statutes text left no other choice.
In Duncan v. Muzyn (2018), a case dealing with how much notice the Tennessee Valley Authoritys pension board must give members before voting to approve an amendment to the plan, the board argued that it should be granted deference because its rules are ambiguous. In declining to defer to the boards interpretation, Thapar wrote:
Simply calling something ambiguous does not make it so. Indeed, determining the point at which ambiguousness constitutes an ambiguity is no easy task. Contract language is not ambiguous merely because the parties interpret it differently Rather, where, as here, one interpretation far better accounts for the language at issue, the language is not ambiguous. In terms of the First Amendment, Thapar joined the majority opinion (along with Kethledge) in Bormuth v. Jackson holding that a county boards practice of opening public meetings with a prayer by a county commissioner did not violate the Establishment Clause.
And in one of his more controversial decisions on the district court, Thapar ruled in Winter v. Wolnitzek (2016) that a number of Kentuckys judicial conduct rules prohibiting judges from making campaign contributions to others, campaigning as a member of a political organization, and making speeches for or against political organizations were unconstitutional.
Thapar explained:
There is simply no difference between saying that one supports an organization by using words and saying that one supports an organization by donating money. Put more plainly, if a candidate can speak the words I support the Democratic Party, then he must likewise be allowed to put his money where his mouth is. The 6th Circuit praised Thapars thorough and thoughtful opinion, while overruling the portion of his opinion regarding campaign contributions.
Although he spent much of his career as a federal prosecutor, as a district court judge, Thapar has on occasion ruled in favor of criminal defendants. For example, in U.S. v. Sydnor (2017), Thapar excluded inculpatory statements made by the accused that were obtained before he was given his Miranda warnings, and in U.S. v. Lee (2012), Thapar suppressed evidence that was obtained after the police tracked the defendant using a GPS tracking device without first obtaining a warrant.
And as an appellate judge, he wrote an opinion in United States v. Perkins (2018), affirming the trial judges motion to suppress evidence police obtained in a drug investigation based on an anticipatory warrant where the triggering event never happened. He wrote that the governments interpretation (which made the triggering event irrelevant to the warrant) lacks common sense, runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment, and is not simply a hypertechnicality the court should overlook.
Of the judges Trump has appointed so far, Thapar has the most extensive record of judicial service, covering a range of issues from the criminal justice system to the First Amendment. He also has close ties to Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., and rumor has it Trump interviewed Thapar for the Supreme Court seat that ultimately went to Gorsuch.
>https://www.heritage.org/courts/commentary/meet-the-6-stellar-judges-leading-the-pack-trumps-supreme-court-short-list
Thanks.
Trump appointing a judge that sides with illegal immigration would be like Obama appointing a judge that would rule against the individual mandate being constitutional.
“Hes committed to diversity in clerk hiring: out of his 48 clerks, 25 are women and 13 are diverse astounding numbers by the standards of feeder judges, who tend to be white males hiring other white males.”
“The fact that Judge Kavanaugh has managed to send 39 out of these 48 clerks to SCOTUS is a testament to the fact that theres no tradeoff between diversity and excellence. You just need to work harder at it as Judge Kavanaugh does, traveling to law schools on his own dime to mentor diverse students, meet with minority law student groups, and give them advice on applying for clerkships.”
“As a Sixth Circuit judge, Kethledge hasnt handled as many hot-button issues as Kavanaugh on the D.C. Circuit”
Raymond Kethledge
Raymond Kethledge is being considered to fill the vacancy on the Supreme Court left by Justice Anthony Kennedy’s resignation. Judge Kethledge currently sits on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Judge Kethledge is not pro-life. He joined a decision that favorably cited a precedent censoring a pro-life advertisement, and held against allowing a Christian advertisement too. Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Suburban Mobility Auth. for Reg’l Transp., 698 F.3d 885 (6th Cir. 2012).
Judge Kethledge is not pro-Second Amendment either. He refused to join a concurring opinion by conservative Judge Danny Boggs that sought to strengthen the Second Amendment by establishing a “strict scrutiny” standard of review for laws that infringe on it. Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 702 (6th Cir. 2016) (Boggs, J., concurring). In February Justice Clarence Thomas complained about judges failing to use strict scrutiny, as Kethledge failed to do in 2016.
Judge Kethledge ruled 2-1 against Immigration Services to allow an illegal alien, who had illegally overstayed his visa by 10 years, to challenge the denial of a new employment visa application. Patel v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 732 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2013) (Kethledge holding that an illegal alien who had overstayed his prior visa by 10 years nevertheless has legal standing to challenge the denial of a petition for a new employment visa by a new prospective employer). That was too much for even a Clinton-appointed judge, who dissented.
Kethledge would be more liberal than Justice Anthony Kennedy on the Supreme Court.
“Thapar, the son of Indian immigrants who came to America legally, is the product of public schools in Toledo, Ohio.”
“His dad was a heating and air conditioning guy in Toledo.”
“Thapar spends his free time teaching and lecturing. He teaches at the University of Virginia Law School on the judicial philosophies of Scalia and Thomas and speaks frequently on originalism and textualism at Yale, Harvard, Columbia, and other leading law schools.”
The post to which I was responding only objected to an outcome.
"The Bush administration was in favor of illegal immigrants. Kethledge was a Bush appointee."
It's overly broad to say the administration was in favor of illegal immigrants. Regardless, being a Bush appointee (of which there are many) does not mean that a person agrees with every position of the Bush administration. It's not a meaningful objection.
"Kethledge agreed with Jimmy Carter-appointee and notoriously left-leaning Judge Gilbert Merritt that his conviction was not an aggravated felony mandating deportation."
OK, some substance. So, was he wrong? If so, how? Perhaps following the law the right answer is that it wasn't an "aggravated felony". If the law as written led to that result then that's what we're supposed to want. Someone that follows the law. If it didn't and he was wrong, then you have a meaningful objection. But the only way to show that is to explain what was wrong about it.
Here's the decision: 'https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17769770680674522297&q=Nguyen+v.+Holder+6th&hl=en&as_sdt=2003&as_vis=1'
Quoting: "This appeal raises the issue of whether the unauthorized use of an automobile constitutes a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C."
On its face, it doesn't seem unreasonable to answer that question as "NO". The decision was 3-0.
Four things: Will the nominee allow the states to take away the peoples’ Second Amendment rights?
and all the nominees will have reporters watching their homes to see if any of them have D.C. plane reservations...
Mr. Kethledge said “We are a democracy”? I hope not! That alone should disqualify him. We are a REPUBLIC.
Being a Bush appointee (41 or 43, it makes little difference) is strike 1.
Being soft on immigration is strike 2.
I say let’s avoid a strike-out by appointing someone who will be an Originalist, and who will by dint of that drive the Left even further over the edge of sanity: Thomas Hardiman. Hardiman is VERY pro-2nd Amendment, which by necessity means that he relies upon the TEXT of the Constitution to decide cases...and that’s what we want, an Originalist. That he’s very pro-2nd Amendment is even more reason to appoint him and
NOT Kethledge. NOT Kethledge. NOT Kethledge.
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