Posted on 02/12/2017 4:26:47 PM PST by janetjanet998
Edited on 02/12/2017 9:33:58 PM PST by Admin Moderator. [history]
Coverup.
Possibly. Or actual security concerns, though I would think that there are some obvious weaknesses that a bad guy with explosives could exploit at this or many other dams.
I vote “cover up” until shown otherwise.
Fascinating stuff. The turbine work alone is amazing. 95+% efficiency is very good for a vertical system.
Coverup. Total. Absolute. No other explanation.
I know these people like cornbread. In another life, I cover local government for my own newsblog. I do my own “citizen reporting.” I know how they act.
If it were a security concern, they would have instituted the blackout back in February. Now, when the fault reports start coming in, its a big secret.
I don’t buy it for a minute, and no other reporter (there are still a few out there) will believe it either.
They will be very careful where they let the media venture, including Juan Browne, the local guy with a press pass (who has done a good job so far). They will show them only what reports the “approved” story.
The problem with covering up is that the rumor mill will make up the truth if they can’t find it. And it may, or may not be fact-based. There are already a lot of videos out there that depict varying assessments of what’s happening, or what can/will happen.
With no factual anchor, the truth becomes a casualty.
Installation Procedures:
1.Drill hole at proper diameter and depth.
2.Make depth 2 longer than the bolt.
3.Insert appropriate Minova resin cartridge.
4.Insert Double Lok Bolt and Bearing Plate to within 1/16 to 1/8 of roof line.
5.Rotate bolt using drill pre-set to proper Bearing Plate should be tight against roof.
https://www.minovaglobal.com/applications/double-lok-rock-bolts
As far as re-drilling, if we get a “bad hole” we usually wind up splitting the distance to the next bolt and doubling up the quantity. In a down location I would think that they would be acceptable at some small angle if the hole starts off axis. Most likely the rig hit a piece of rebar and had to tilt some to keep the location intact per the engineered layout.
Something smells fishy about this.
They never learn. Ever.
Letters to the editor:
http://www.eastbaytimes.com/2017/03/31/talk-back-letter-writers-are-shaken-by-oroville-dam-failures/
Good to see the people speaking out. Yes, if PG&E had done this, they would be nailed to the cross. But since it’s government, NOBODY is accountable.
I would guess that hiding the facts was a legal move, not a security move. To show the truth would condemn their activities (or inactivity) the last several years.
Well a few get it! Good find.
Thanks JanetJanet998 for this info.
I was wondering when this was going to come up. I ran across a functional "security" weakness in these many weeks of schematic investigations. But back in the 1960's we weren't faced with crazy ideological murderous people. Therefore, design architecture wasn't factored in to counter recent worldly tactics. I truly believe the BOC has discovered this "tactic" weakness too.
I'm not going to reveal this item, but I can state that I believe this "tactical" item is being used as a reason not to inform the public of what the BOC has found on the main spillway. Why? (1) they can easily reason that the public [and press] would become outraged, angry, then fearful (2) the precise details of BOC MS findings could be considered extreme negligence, or worse in the public eye & recriminations to DWR, and thus to the governing oversight of Dept of Safety of Dams, and thus the state of CA would be intense. Remember, DWR did not report the "river valve" accident. Actual specifics only came out when investigation reports and fines were assessed two years later.
So essentially, the "security weakness", is being used as a shield against items (1)(2). [I was wondering why the original BOC report had particular wording on the original report on some items of the original chute design. I was mildly surprised that so much information was revealed - but this was good - as it was peeling back the veneer on heavily filtered DWR responses to the media & public.] DWR took plenty of heat from experts being interviewed by the newspapers where the experts were making comments about the spillway "breaking in half" years ago (i.e. poor design).
They now have all of the 3D generated Ground Penetrating Radar processed results. They now have the original construction evidence of "wash" erodible material layer between the emplacement rock and the concrete slabs. They now have the info on water in the chute embankment areas. They now know the "uncaptured" flaw design of the bell coupling offset drain pipe. They now know the extent of the "voiding" underneath the slabs. They now know the extreme thinning points in the slabs, the non-lower rebar design in the slabs, the extreme cracking from the thinning of the drain design, the poor rock seams below the slab, the anchor bar emplacement to counter the forces, and with the BOC expert who is renowned for "calculating" probability or risk of slab failure - he knows the reality. This "reality" is what they are shielding and do not want to make public.
Follow-up: The “security weakness” is real. (1) They should enhance security access routes to the dam (military grade security to stop kinetic vehicular breach attempts). (2) they should consider backup power only operation for MS (layer of redundancy).
I think I understand what you mean. And if it is what I’m thinking, it’s not the only place that it could happen. But the results would be pretty significant at this location.
As far as the spillway gates, if it’s like the dams (well, some of our dams) in the TVA system, they have on-site diesel generators specifically for the purpose of allowing starting the plant in a total blackout situation. I’m not sure about gate operation under those conditions, but many of our dams have a crane-rack type of mechanism that is moved from gate to gate to open or close the individual gates. A semi-manual operation, but it still requires power. I honestly don’t know if they are set up to operate with the diesel as the only power source or not, but I suspect that that can be done.
If I think of it, I’ll ask one of the hydro operators on Monday. They would know.
Here’s a quick video of the Chickamauga Dam near Chattanooga, TN, with some of the spill gates opened. This is about 10 miles from my house, and I have been deep inside of it. Incidentally, there’s a bit of water seepage inside, but it’s apparently considered “normal” and according to old timers, has been like that as long as they remember.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q0Rn7G8CRUg
:) like keep yourself safe
If I recall, they can be pinned at several opening levels. I don't have a hydro background, so I'm going from memory here.
BTW, the highway over the dam is Tennessee route 153, a pretty busy thoroughfare.
You probably knew of one of my friends here in Louisiana.
C. B. Forgotston, Jr. Memorialized Yesterday in Hammond
I'm not downplaying the actual security "scenario", just highlighting the politics at play.
= = Article clip:
"DWR requested the consultants report be kept confidential, said FERC spokeswoman Celeste Miller."
= = end clip.
= = Reason cited for "confidential status": (emphasis mine)
FERCs website says a document can be made confidential if it gives strategic information related to the production, generation, transmission, or distribution of energy or could be useful to a person planning an attack on critical infrastructure.
= = end clip.
**Memo - likely bulleted mini-report with more detailed results & commentary just like the March 17 memo (that gave great heartburn to DWR)
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