No, it doesn't.
But I've linked to it before.
I agree about Pilot In Control.
But my question stems from the "Contributing Factor" side of the Accident Investigation upcoming Report.
And since I finally got my phone/internet service back up, I've heard and watched the NTSB woman say that the 777 had a 17 mikle straight in approach.
Just received this from a friend. I have no attribution, but it does provide, if true, insight into Korean pilots and their ability to take training.
Low-down on Korean pilots
After I retired from UAL as a Standards Captain on the –400, I got a job as a simulator instructor working for Alteon (a Boeing subsidiary) at Asiana. When I first got there, I was shocked and surprised by the lack of basic piloting skills shown by most of the pilots. It is not a normal situation with normal progression from new hire, right seat, left seat taking a decade or two. One big difference is that ex-Military pilots are given super-seniority and progress to the left seat much faster. Compared to the US, they also upgrade fairly rapidly because of the phenomenal growth by all Asian air carriers. By the way, after about six months at Asiana, I was moved over to KAL and found them to be identical. The only difference was the color of the uniforms and airplanes. I worked in Korea for 5 long years and although I found most of the people to be very pleasant, it’s a minefield of a work environment ... for them and for us expats.
One of the first things I learned was that the pilots kept a web-site and reported on every training session. I don’t think this was officially sanctioned by the company, but after one or two simulator periods, a database was building on me (and everyone else) that told them exactly how I ran the sessions, what to expect on checks, and what to look out for. For example; I used to open an aft cargo door at 100 knots to get them to initiate an RTO and I would brief them on it during the briefing. This was on the B-737 NG and many of the captains were coming off the 777 or B744 and they were used to the Master Caution System being inhibited at 80 kts. Well, for the first few days after I started that, EVERYONE rejected the takeoff. Then, all of a sudden they all “got it” and continued the takeoff (in accordance with their manuals). The word had gotten out. I figured it was an overall PLUS for the training program.
We expat instructors were forced upon them after the amount of fatal accidents (most of the them totally avoidable) over a decade began to be noticed by the outside world. They were basically given an ultimatum by the FAA, Transport Canada, and the EU to totally rebuild and rethink their training program or face being banned from the skies all over the world. They hired Boeing and Airbus to staff the training centers. KAL has one center and Asiana has another. When I was there (2003-2008) we had about 60 expats conducting training KAL and about 40 at Asiana. Most instructors were from the USA, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand with a few stuffed in from Europe and Asia. Boeing also operated training centers in Singapore and China so they did hire some instructors from there.
This solution has only been partially successful but still faces ingrained resistance from the Koreans. I lost track of the number of highly qualified instructors I worked with who were fired because they tried to enforce “normal” standards of performance. By normal standards, I would include being able to master basic tasks like successfully shoot a visual approach with 10 kt crosswind and the weather CAVOK. I am not kidding when I tell you that requiring them to shoot a visual approach struck fear in their hearts ... with good reason. Like this Asiana crew, it didn’t’ compute that you needed to be a 1000’ AGL at 3 miles and your sink rate should be 600-800 Ft/Min. But, after 5 years, they finally nailed me. I still had to sign my name to their training and sometimes if I just couldn’t pass someone on a check, I had no choice but to fail them. I usually busted about 3-5 crews a year and the resistance against me built. I finally failed an extremely incompetent crew and it turned out he was the a high-ranking captain who was the Chief Line Check pilot on the fleet I was teaching on. I found out on my next monthly trip home that KAL was not going to renew my Visa. The crew I failed was given another check and continued a fly while talking about how unfair Captain Brown was.
Any of you Boeing glass-cockpit guys will know what I mean when I describe these events. I gave them a VOR approach with an 15 mile arc from the IAF. By the way, KAL dictated the profiles for all sessions and we just administered them. He requested two turns in holding at the IAF to get set up for the approach. When he finally got his nerve up, he requested “Radar Vectors” to final. He could have just said he was ready for the approach and I would have cleared him to the IAF and then “Cleared for the approach” and he could have selected “Exit Hold” and been on his way. He was already in LNAV/VNAV PATH. So, I gave him vectors to final with a 30 degree intercept. Of course, he failed to “Extend the FAF” and he couldn’t understand why it would not intercept the LNAV magenta line when he punched LNAV and VNAV. He made three approaches and missed approaches before he figured out that his active waypoint was “Hold at XYZ.” Every time he punched LNAV, it would try to go back to the IAF ... just like it was supposed to do. Since it was a check, I was not allowed (by their own rules) to offer him any help. That was just one of about half dozen major errors I documented in his UNSAT paperwork. He also failed to put in ANY aileron on takeoff with a 30-knot direct crosswind (again, the weather was dictated by KAL).
This Asiana SFO accident makes me sick and while I am surprised there are not more, I expect that there will be many more of the same type accidents in the future unless some drastic steps are taken. They are already required to hire a certain percentage of expats to try to ingrain more flying expertise in them, but more likely, they will eventually be fired too. One of the best trainees I ever had was a Korean/American (he grew up and went to school in the USA) who flew C-141’s in the USAF. When he got out, he moved back to Korea and got hired by KAL. I met him when I gave him some training and a check on the B-737 and of course, he breezed through the training. I give him annual PCs for a few years and he was always a good pilot. Then, he got involved with trying to start a pilots union and when they tired to enforce some sort of duty rigs on international flights, he was fired after being arrested and JAILED!
The Koreans are very very bright and smart so I was puzzled by their inability to fly an airplane well. They would show up on Day 1 of training (an hour before the scheduled briefing time, in a 3-piece suit, and shined shoes) with the entire contents of the FCOM and Flight Manual totally memorized. But, putting that information to actual use was many times impossible. Crosswind landings are also an unsolvable puzzle for most of them. I never did figure it out completely, but I think I did uncover a few clues. Here is my best guess. First off, their educational system emphasizes ROTE memorization from the first day of school as little kids. As you know, that is the lowest form of learning and they act like robots. They are also taught to NEVER challenge authority and in spite of the flight training heavily emphasizing CRM/CLR, it still exists either on the surface or very subtly. You just can’t change 3000 years of culture.
The other thing that I think plays an important role is the fact that there is virtually NO civil aircraft flying in Korea. It’s actually illegal to own a Cessna-152 and just go learn to fly. Ultra-lights and Powered Hang Gliders are Ok. I guess they don’t trust the people to not start WW III by flying 35 miles north of Inchon into North Korea. But, they don’t get the kids who grew up flying (and thinking for themselves) and hanging around airports. They do recruit some kids from college and send then to the US or Australia and get them their tickets. Generally, I had better experience with them than with the ex-Military pilots. This was a surprise to me as I spent years as a Naval Aviator flying fighters after getting my private in light airplanes. I would get experienced F-4, F-5, F-15, and F-16 pilots who were actually terrible pilots if they had to hand fly the airplane. What a shock!
Finally, I’ll get off my box and talk about the total flight hours they claim. I do accept that there are a few talented and free-thinking pilots that I met and trained in Korea. Some are still in contact and I consider them friends. They were a joy! But, they were few and far between and certainly not the norm.
Actually, this is a worldwide problem involving automation and the auto-flight concept. Take one of these new first officers that got his ratings in the US or Australia and came to KAL or Asiana with 225 flight hours. After takeoff, in accordance with their SOP, he calls for the autopilot to be engaged at 250’ after takeoff. How much actual flight time is that? Hardly one minute. Then he might fly for hours on the autopilot and finally disengage it (MAYBE?) below 800’ after the gear was down, flaps extended and on airspeed (autothrottle) . Then he might bring it in to land. Again, how much real “flight time” or real experience did he get. Minutes! Of course, on the 777 or 747, it’s the same only they get more inflated logbooks.
So, when I hear that a 10,000 hour Korean captain was vectored in for a 17-mile final and cleared for a visual approach in CAVOK weather, it raises the hair on the back of my neck.
Tom
I believe every word of what your friend said.
Oh man, this brings back so many memories from the R.O.K.
First, let me state that I've got 5 tours in South Korea, some of them were 14 months long (DEROS is a month, not a date; i.e. in before the 5th, out after the 25th).
"You just can’t change 3000 years of culture."
They told us in Korea, that Korean teachers in grade-school and college, told their students
that since they were young and energetic, they only needed half the sleep that adults needed.
Adults sleep 8 hours (they drew the number ''8" on the chalk board), and learning students need to apply themselves learning by studying.
(They then took an eraser and erased the left half of the number "8" and left the number"3".) This is how much sleep good students should be getting if they study properly.
And they meant it.
A friend of mine went to Kunsan AB in the early 80s and then the Koreans were flying F-86s.
He was working local when, in clear weather a Korean F-86 pilot on a PAR Approach, flew into "Big Coyote" a hill west of the approach end of RWY36 for no reason.
When they asked the PAR Controller what happened, he reported hearing "snoring" on the frequency, and said he tried to raise the pilot when the pilot started veering off course.
He got no response.
They played back the controller tapes, and verified the "snoring" on the frequency.
The pilot fell asleep while flying the PAR Approach, flews into the small mountain/large hill and killed himself, and totally destroyed the F-86.
The Korean Wing Commander wanted the PAR Controller in jail, but the tapes saved him.
In Korea, someone had to answer for the lost aircraft, so the pilot being dead, the South Korean Commander found the aircraft "crew-chief" responsible, and sentenced him to death by firing squad.
The Korean Commander ordered all ROK military stationed at Kunsan AB to attend the execution on the ramp, west of the large old F-86 hanger, north of the 06/24 TWY and north of the Control Tower.
They took the crew-chief out to the west side of the ramp, blind folded him, stuck a cigarette in his mouth, marched a firing squad out east of him, and read the sentence, and shot him dead.
When I was at Kunsan AB in the late 80s, we had a Korean flight of 4 F-5s depart going to the Koonie Range west of Osan AB.
It was a Saturday and not much was going on, and they were scheduled for refueling and were to return in 2 hours.
When they returned to Kunsan, there were only 3 F-5s that landed.
I asked them three times,
"Where is Number Four of the Flight?" and I got no response at first, but on the third time, one of them keyed up the mic and gave three seconds of dead air, and then unkeyed.
We called the ROK Command post, and asked them, but they wouldn't say anything. They just hung up on us.
I thought no more of it, thinking that number 4 might have diverted.
Two weeks later, on a Sunday Swing shift, an USAF Captain came up and asked my crew some questions about the flight.
We told him what had happened, went down and retrieved the tape and played it for him.
He made a copy, and then told us that Number 4 had crashed into Koonie Range without saying a word about any problems.
Your friend commented:
"By normal standards, I would include being able to master basic tasks like successfully shoot a visual approach with 10 kt crosswind and the weather CAVOK.
I am not kidding when I tell you that requiring them to shoot a visual approach struck fear in their hearts ... with good reason.
Like this Asiana crew, it didn’t’ compute that you needed to be a 1000’ AGL at 3 miles and your sink rate should be 600-800 Ft/Min."
The Kim-Hae Massacre Later that year at Kunsan, we had a new SOF (Supervisor Of Flying) come up and the weather was W0X0F.
It as so foggy from sea fog, you couldn't see the parallel taxiway at the base of the control tower, less than 100 feet away.
After about 15 minutes, we got a hole in the sea fog blowing from south to north, and the new SOF started calling the ROK alternates.
They all reported 1,000 ft ceiling and 3 miles visibility. The SOF looked at me and said he was going to launch the fleet.
As watch sup at the time, I told him,
"Don't do it. It's mail-order weather.
Launch one F-16 for a weather ship, and have him check the weather, and report back to you.
The SOF looked at me in disgust, picked up the phone and called the 8th TAC Fighter Wing Command Post and said, "Launch the fleet!"
In 10 minutes ground control had 4 flights of 4 F-16s requesting clearance and calling for taxi.
In 5 minutes the parallel taxiway was full of F-16s taxiing to RWY 36, and the second squadron was calling for their clearance.
The fog showed up again as the second squadron started taxiing.
With the south hammerhead full of F-16s, and the parallel taxiway full, the SOF waited another 10 minutes, checking with Kunsan weather station, and another break in the sea-fog showed up and rolled north.
One more call from the SOF to the ROK alternates who all reported 1,000 and 3, and he said launch 'em.
I again told him, "Don't do it. It's mail-order weather!"
Again the SOF said "Launch 'em now!"
So we launched 8 flights of 4 F-16s each.
As the last flight got airborne, the sea-fog rolled in again, and again we were W0X0F, and couldn't see shit.
The departing F-16s said the tops were at 4,800 feet, and were solid as far as he could see.
The SOF sent the first flight of 4 to Osan AB, and to Suwon AB.
He sent the second flight of 4 to Tae-Gue.
He sent the third flight to Pusan, and the fourth flight to Kim-Hae.
All flights reported in a few minutes later, that they flew down to decision height and didn't see the approach lights.
The phone rang at the base of the tower, and I answered.
The Wing Commander wanted in and up into the cab, and I let him in.
When the Col got up the stairs, he looked at me and said.
"(My last name), you know he's(the SOF) new. Didn't you tell him?"
Yes sir, I did. I told him twice, and he didn't want to hear it!
The Col. ask me
"Well now I've got 32 fighter airborne and no place to put 'em, so what do you recommend?"
Call Osan or Kadena and get a refueling tanker airborne, and get the fighters as high as you can in holding.
If nothing else, recover here in W0X0F with the PAR controller.
We got a tanker airborne, and we waited another 30 minutes, and then we got lucky.
Kim-Hae started reporting more that 1,000 and 3.
He started landing at Kim-Hae and got 20 of them down, when one had to take a BAK-12 cable at the approach end.
Our own weather was improving and we recovered the rest of the F-16s at Kunsan.
The point being, you can't trust Korean weather stations to tell you when their base is below minimums.
Needless to say, I never saw that Captain again in the tower, and I spent another 8 months at Kunsan after that.
Hot Brakes
Another time at Osan AB, we had some ROK F-5s divert from Kunsan into Osan, but we had one of our own F-16s in the de-armimg hammerhead with HOT BRAKES.
We tried several times to get the Korean F-5 pilots to exit the runway at threequarter field, telling them HOT BRAKES IN THE DE-ARM AREA.
The didn't get it.
Anything out of the ordinary, AND I MEAN ANYTHING, and they're like a deer frozen in the headlights.
Koreans just don't do alternate plans.
They never plan for screw-ups.
I could give more examples of the Koreans' inability to analyze situations and change their plans on the fly ... but this is enough.