CHINESE ESPIONAGE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
(from the Congressional Record, Proceedings of the U.S. House of Representatives) Monday, June 7, 1999
It was this government and this administration that failed the American people, and the American people need to see the factual information.
With that in mind, Mr. Speaker, the following two charts are now available on my web site nationally:
The first chart, Mr. Speaker, for the first time ever gives the complete linkage between those agencies and entities of the Peoples Liberation Army and the Central Military Commission of the PLA which are all indicated by the red boxes, and you cannot read them, our colleagues cannot read them, but you can get this off of our web site, and I have offered to give copies of this chart in a smaller form to
every Member of Congress regardless of party.
Curt Weldon is no stranger to charts:
The China Connection
Liberalized / Decontrolled Technologies To Peoples Republic of China
The two charts together reveal, among other things:
- A systematic, well planned effort by the Chinese military at the highest levels to target and acquire technology for military modernization.
- That the targeting effort and financing to acquire the technology and buy influence at the highest levels of US Government were planned and implemented by Chinese military Intelligence through the second department under the General Staff Department (GSD).
- That the Chinese military acquired many of the technologies over the past seven years, although many of them had been targeted for acquisition for more than a quarter century.
- That the Chinese military set up a series of front companies and cut-outs to mask its technology targeting efforts and to launder money to hide its origin. Chinese military intelligence even resorted to the use of companies and bank accounts of the infamous Macau and Hong Kong Chinese Triad for this purpose.
- That even after the US Government learned of the diversion of the W-88 nuclear warhead design in late 1995 into 1996, the Clinton Administration continued to liberalize export controls on such sensitive technologies as computers, encryption, machine tools, telecommunications, stealth technologies, space launch technologies, satellites, the array of hot section technologies to improve the performance and life of Jet engines, and high temperature furnaces essential for the production of components for missiles and nuclear weapons.
- Despite knowledge of the U.S. designs for nuclear warheads, for example, the Clinton Administration still undertook a serious effort to redefine supercomputers to allow for increased exports of high performance computers to China. Rationale was not based on strategic criteria. Instead, it was governed by economic considerations of a few companies whose executives had supported President Clinton in 1992 and again in 1996.
- A September 1993 letter from President Clinton to Silicon Graphics CEO Edward McCracken, for example, promised to liberalize export controls of computers, machine tools, and telecommunications technologies (attached).
- In another instance, one National Security Council official in March 1998 -- some two years after knowledge of the W-88 and other U.S. nuclear warhead design diversions -- had proposed blanket waivers for satellite sales to China in exchange for China joining the Missile Technology Regime.
- Despite knowledge of the U.S. designs for nuclear warheads, for example, the Clinton Administration still undertook a serious effort to redefine supercomputers to allow for increased exports of high performance computers to China. Rationale was not based on strategic criteria. Instead, it was governed by economic considerations of a few companies whose executives had supported President Clinton in 1992 and again in 1996.
- That the Clinton-Gore Administration certified China in January 1998 to receive nuclear technology for being in compliance with non-proliferation regimes, even though there was strong evidence that the Chinese government was continuing its proliferation activities with Iran, North Korea, Syria, Pakistan, and Libya. Such proliferation activities, which were contrary to U.S.-Chinese understandings, continue unabated to this day.
- That the cumulative impact of these targeted technologies now permit China to:
- Develop reliable Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles with insights into MIRVing that ICBM force.
- Miniaturize nuclear warheads.
- Implement a command and control structure for its growing ICBM force.
- Develop an integrated command, control, communications, computer and intelligence encrypted network to enable better military command and control over vast areas, even beyond China itself.
- Improve power projection for its surface fleets, submarines, and long-range cruise missiles capable of hitting not only Taiwan, but also Japan from mainland China.
- Produce more proficient fighter and bomber aircraft capable of greater distances and speeds.
- Develop reliable Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles with insights into MIRVing that ICBM force.
- That the administration as early as 1994 systematically dismantled its system of monitoring the influx of Chinese and other foreign nationals visiting U.S. high technology companies, including our nuclear weapons labs. As a result, there are many tens of thousands of Chinese in the United States and we don't know where they are or what they are doing.
- In fact, it wasn't until this year just prior to public revelations of alleged Chinese espionage in our nation's nuclear weapons labs that the Energy Department decided to seek export licenses from the Commerce Department for foreign national visits. Yet, the requirement had always been law. And where was the Commerce Department in not forcing the issue with the Energy Department?
- In fact, it wasn't until this year just prior to public revelations of alleged Chinese espionage in our nation's nuclear weapons labs that the Energy Department decided to seek export licenses from the Commerce Department for foreign national visits. Yet, the requirement had always been law. And where was the Commerce Department in not forcing the issue with the Energy Department?
- The notion that Chinese and other foreign nationals would be allowed access to information or to the facilities where U.S. nuclear weapons were developed is unconscionable. It is seriously doubtful that the Chinese labs would allow U.S. scientists into their nuclear weapons labs.
Cox Report Details Damage to U.S. National Security
By Congressman Curt WeldonThe COX REPORT: http://tinyurl.com/c3bl7
Above...overshadowed by the Monica Legacy of bill clinton.