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This idiot didn't do a damn thing while he served under Clinton, and now he wants to pin all of the blame on Bush. If Tenet had a shred of dignity, he would have resigned in disgrace on September 12, 2001, but he stuck around a couple more years. He's lucky he is an American, because someone in his position in another country would probably have been executed.

The CIA is the enemy of the UNITED STATES.
They are the best tool Al-Qaeda has.

Bunk. Clinton had 8 years' warning.
Time for this puke to show his cards.

I imagine if Tenet wants to tackle Bush, then Porter Goss may have a few cards to play.

#1. Tenet no longer has his top lieutenants (!! Zarqawi types) in the CIA. Porter Goss fired them all.
#2. Porter Goss knows how to data mine the CIA.
#3. Loss of Pensions and criminal prosecution are possible to those involved in dispersions when they themselves are culpable.

As a famous president said, "Bring it on!"

Let him go there :)

The only mistake Bush made pre-911 was keeping a Clinton incompetent like Tenent around. Any book pointing the finger at Bush will automatically lack credibility if it claims 8 months of failing to act against Al Qaeda is somehow worse or more damaging than the 8 years Clinton did nothing against Al Qaeda, including letting Bin Laden get away up to a dozen times according to 2 books published in the last few years, including "Why America Slept" by liberal Gerald Posner.

This article also claims that Tenent may back up Richard Clarke's claims that Bush did nothing about Al Qaeda prior to 9-11. But Clarke's claims have already been proven to be a lie, or at the very least contradictory, to what he said while still serving as terrorism czar. If Tenent wants to back up those claims, then he'll only be diminishing his credibility and his claims will have to be seen as little more than an axe grinding vendetta and an attempt to sell a book, both of which motivated Dickey Clarke when he didn't get the Homeland Security position.

Take a look at this transcript of a 2002 media sit-down with Clarke where he totally contradicted what he claimed in his election year "tell all":

Transcript: Clarke Praises Bush Team in '02
Wednesday, March 24, 2004

WASHINGTON — The following transcript documents a background briefing in early August 2002 by President Bush's former counterterrorism coordinator Richard A. Clarke to a handful of reporters, including Fox News' Jim Angle. In the conversation, cleared by the White House on Wednesday for distribution, Clarke describes the handover of intelligence from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration and the latter's decision to revise the U.S. approach to Al Qaeda. Clarke was named special adviser to the president for cyberspace security in October 2001. He resigned from his post in January 2003.

RICHARD CLARKE: Actually, I've got about seven points, let me just go through them quickly. Um, the first point, I think the overall point is, there was no plan on Al Qaeda that was passed from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration.

Second point is that the Clinton administration had a strategy in place, effectively dating from 1998. And there were a number of issues on the table since 1998. And they remained on the table when that administration went out of office — issues like aiding the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, changing our Pakistan policy -- uh, changing our policy toward Uzbekistan. And in January 2001, the incoming Bush administration was briefed on the existing strategy. They were also briefed on these series of issues that had not been decided on in a couple of years.

And the third point is the Bush administration decided then, you know, in late January, to do two things. One, vigorously pursue the existing policy, including all of the lethal covert action findings, which we've now made public to some extent.

And the point is, while this big review was going on, there were still in effect, the lethal findings were still in effect. The second thing the administration decided to do is to initiate a process to look at those issues which had been on the table for a couple of years and get them decided.

So, point five, that process which was initiated in the first week in February, uh, decided in principle, uh in the spring to add to the existing Clinton strategy and to increase CIA resources, for example, for covert action, five-fold, to go after Al Qaeda.

The sixth point, the newly-appointed deputies — and you had to remember, the deputies didn't get into office until late March, early April. The deputies then tasked the development of the implementation details, uh, of these new decisions that they were endorsing, and sending out to the principals.

Over the course of the summer — last point — they developed implementation details, the principals met at the end of the summer, approved them in their first meeting, changed the strategy by authorizing the increase in funding five-fold, changing the policy on Pakistan, changing the policy on Uzbekistan, changing the policy on the Northern Alliance assistance.

And then changed the strategy from one of rollback with Al Qaeda over the course of five years, which it had been, to a new strategy that called for the rapid elimination of Al Qaeda. That is in fact the timeline.

QUESTION: When was that presented to the president?

CLARKE: Well, the president was briefed throughout this process.

QUESTION: But when was the final September 4 document? (interrupted) Was that presented to the president?

CLARKE: The document went to the president on September 10, I think.

QUESTION: What is your response to the suggestion in the [Aug. 12, 2002] Time [magazine] article that the Bush administration was unwilling to take on board the suggestions made in the Clinton administration because of animus against the — general animus against the foreign policy?

CLARKE: I think if there was a general animus that clouded their vision, they might not have kept the same guy dealing with terrorism issue. This is the one issue where the National Security Council leadership decided continuity was important and kept the same guy around, the same team in place. That doesn't sound like animus against uh the previous team to me.

JIM ANGLE: You're saying that the Bush administration did not stop anything that the Clinton administration was doing while it was making these decisions, and by the end of the summer had increased money for covert action five-fold. Is that correct?

CLARKE: All of that's correct.

ANGLE: OK.

QUESTION: Are you saying now that there was not only a plan per se, presented by the transition team, but that it was nothing proactive that they had suggested?

CLARKE: Well, what I'm saying is, there are two things presented. One, what the existing strategy had been. And two, a series of issues — like aiding the Northern Alliance, changing Pakistan policy, changing Uzbek policy — that they had been unable to come to um, any new conclusions, um, from '98 on.

QUESTION: Was all of that from '98 on or was some of it ...

CLARKE: All of those issues were on the table from '98 on.

ANGLE: When in '98 were those presented?

CLARKE: In October of '98.

QUESTION: In response to the Embassy bombing?

CLARKE: Right, which was in September.

QUESTION: Were all of those issues part of alleged plan that was late December and the Clinton team decided not to pursue because it was too close to ...

CLARKE: There was never a plan, Andrea. What there was was these two things: One, a description of the existing strategy, which included a description of the threat. And two, those things which had been looked at over the course of two years, and which were still on the table.

QUESTION: So there was nothing that developed, no documents or no new plan of any sort?

CLARKE: There was no new plan.

QUESTION: No new strategy — I mean, I don't want to get into a semantics ...

CLARKE: Plan, strategy — there was no, nothing new.

QUESTION: 'Til late December, developing ...

CLARKE: What happened at the end of December was that the Clinton administration NSC principals committee met and once again looked at the strategy, and once again looked at the issues that they had brought, decided in the past to add to the strategy. But they did not at that point make any recommendations.

QUESTIONS: Had those issues evolved at all from October of '98 'til December of 2000?

CLARKE: Had they evolved? Um, not appreciably.

ANGLE: What was the problem? Why was it so difficult for the Clinton administration to make decisions on those issues?

CLARKE: Because they were tough issues. You know, take, for example, aiding the Northern Alliance. Um, people in the Northern Alliance had a, sort of bad track record. There were questions about the government, there were questions about drug-running, there was questions about whether or not in fact they would use the additional aid to go after Al Qaeda or not. Uh, and how would you stage a major new push in Uzbekistan or somebody else or Pakistan to cooperate?

One of the big problems was that Pakistan at the time was aiding the other side, was aiding the Taliban. And so, this would put, if we started aiding the Northern Alliance against the Taliban, this would have put us directly in opposition to the Pakistani government. These are not easy decisions.

ANGLE: And none of that really changed until we were attacked and then it was ...

CLARKE: No, that's not true. In the spring, the Bush administration changed — began to change Pakistani policy, um, by a dialogue that said we would be willing to lift sanctions. So we began to offer carrots, which made it possible for the Pakistanis, I think, to begin to realize that they could go down another path, which was to join us and to break away from the Taliban. So that's really how it started.

QUESTION: Had the Clinton administration in any of its work on this issue, in any of the findings or anything else, prepared for a call for the use of ground forces, special operations forces in any way? What did the Bush administration do with that if they had?

CLARKE: There was never a plan in the Clinton administration to use ground forces. The military was asked at a couple of points in the Clinton administration to think about it. Um, and they always came back and said it was not a good idea. There was never a plan to do that.

(Break in briefing details as reporters and Clarke go back and forth on how to source quotes from this backgrounder.)

ANGLE: So, just to finish up if we could then, so what you're saying is that there was no — one, there was no plan; two, there was no delay; and that actually the first changes since October of '98 were made in the spring months just after the administration came into office?

CLARKE: You got it. That's right.

QUESTION: It was not put into an action plan until September 4, signed off by the principals?

CLARKE: That's right.

QUESTION: I want to add though, that NSPD — the actual work on it began in early April.

CLARKE: There was a lot of in the first three NSPDs that were being worked in parallel.

ANGLE: Now the five-fold increase for the money in covert operations against Al Qaeda — did that actually go into effect when it was decided or was that a decision that happened in the next budget year or something?

CLARKE: Well, it was gonna go into effect in October, which was the next budget year, so it was a month away.

QUESTION: That actually got into the intelligence budget?

CLARKE: Yes it did.

QUESTION: Just to clarify, did that come up in April or later?

CLARKE: No, it came up in April and it was approved in principle and then went through the summer. And you know, the other thing to bear in mind is the shift from the rollback strategy to the elimination strategy. When President Bush told us in March to stop swatting at flies and just solve this problem, then that was the strategic direction that changed the NSPD from one of rollback to one of elimination.

QUESTION: Well can you clarify something? I've been told that he gave that direction at the end of May. Is that not correct?

CLARKE: No, it was March.

QUESTION: The elimination of Al Qaeda, get back to ground troops — now we haven't completely done that even with a substantial number of ground troops in Afghanistan. Was there, was the Bush administration contemplating without the provocation of September 11th moving troops into Afghanistan prior to that to go after Al Qaeda?

CLARKE: I can not try to speculate on that point. I don't know what we would have done.

QUESTION: In your judgment, is it possible to eliminate Al Qaeda without putting troops on the ground?

CLARKE: Uh, yeah, I think it was. I think it was. If we'd had Pakistani, Uzbek and Northern Alliance assistance.

I say BRING IT ON Tenet. He was part and parcel of any supposed cover up and no matter what he says he was the Director of the CIA well before George Bush took office.

Let's get it all out on the table. Time to end this cover-up that extends back for many years. If we, as a free nation, are to choose our leaders we need the facts so we can make wise decisions. Bush has nothing to fear from the truth if his hands are clean.

If I were Tenet I would hardly sit still for being made the fall guy if I had done everything I felt I should have done. I think this is only part of the overall puzzle with "Able Danger" surfacing. Let it all hang out and be done with it.

Considering that Tenet is a grossly incompitent, overstuffed, self-important, pompous liar, I wouldn't be too concerned about anything he might have to say.

The way he and Sandy Berger connived to lay 9/11 at the Bush administration's doorstep is simply disgusting, and I still hold that he should have been shot for gross dereliction and treason. Berger and that other Clarke should have gotten the chair.

Jamie Gorelick (and is this really her name or a description of what she did in the Clinton Admin?) should be crushed by heavy stones on Pay per View. The proceeds could go the 9/11 victims.

Janet Reno should be made to look at her own reflection in the mirror for eternity as her punishment. Then when she manages to turn herself to stone, we could lock her in a church in Waco, Texas and set it alight.

Billyboy should be hung by his privates and everyone who lost a father, brother, son, mother, sister, aunt or uncle in New York on 9/11 should be allowed to play pinata with him, utilizing a board with rusty nails driven through it. The carcasse could be unceremoniously cremated and sold to the highest bidder as an additive to kitty litter.

>>close to affirming the account of Richard Clarke<<

Then its BS.

The Bush administration's had delayed adopting a strategy against al-Qaida"

You mean the strategy that The Most Ethical Administration In History could have adopted after the first WTC incident (in Feb 1993)?

Why wasn't Tenet fired after September 11th? Why was he given the Medal of Freedom after screwing up then and also with the WMD?

A logical conclusion to draw is that he knew things that would embarrass the administration and they were encouraging him to keep quiet. Why else would you give a medal to someone who presided over these monumental intelligence failures?

So that's why Bush gave this treacherous POS the Presidential Medal of Freedom not long after Tenet left the CIA in June of last year. Bush should have fired Tenet within a month of taking office back in 2001.

Tenet should be in jail. He was the one who did not substantiate the false information collected and given to him on WMD.

Excerpt from Washington Times Sept 2, 2005 Section: Inside the Ring: " The IG report recommends setting up a special accountability review board to determine whether Mr. Tenet should be held accountable for failures to resolve differences between the CIA and the National Security Agency, which conducts electronic eavesdropping, on conducting operations against Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda before the 2001 attacks, former intelligence officials said."

I wondered what THIS means???

Bush won't blame Tenet. It's just not his way.

Buy that man a canoe. I'll bet he'd want to use it so much he would leave a half-eaten meal on the table to dash out for a quick paddle.

When I was debriefed after years in the intel business I was told that if I ever disclosed anything that revealed how I did what I did I would go to jail.

Maybe it's time to measure Mr. Tenet for a set of leg irons and belly chains.

"According to a former clandestine services officer, the former CIA director turned down a publisher's $4.5 million book offer because he didn't want to embarrass the White House by rehashing the failure to prevent September 11 and the flawed intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.”

BS, he was the boob who said "its a slam dunk", when pressed for whether Iraq had WMD..