Posted on 08/23/2005 10:51:56 AM PDT by Peach
"although something about one of the Florida bases was mentioned last night on the National Geographic special on 9/11."
That would be McDill AFB in Tampa. The transcript of what was said about the identification of Atta and al-Shehhi is posted on another thread.
I know that Able Danger has upset the Atta timetable ... now for some corroborating evidence backing up the Czechs' placing Atta in Prague meeting the Iraqis...
"Space Needle bombing attempt -->1999, BinLaden connected."
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Hmmm, wonder if this is what they're trying to keep quiet. Also Disneyland was a known target of ObL at that time, according to this:
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/2/20/160738.shtml
"Former CIA officials told United Press International that Southern California's Disneyland and Seattle's Space Needle were targets of foiled 1999 millennium bombing attacks financed and advised by Saudi millionaire terrorist Osama bin Laden."
I just searched the entire 911 report (on-line version - pdf version) and there is no mention of "able danger".
there was no index produced by the commission. just a list of names, with no page numbers....
InFact: 9/11 Commission Report Index
Here's some info about intelligence sharing.
Section on: Legal Constraints on the FBI and "the Wall"
The FBI had different tools for law enforcement and intelligence. For criminal matters, it could apply for and use traditional criminal warrants. For intelligence matters involving international terrorism, however, the rules were different. For many years the attorney general could authorize surveillance of foreign powers and agents of foreign powers without any court review, but in 1978 Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. This law regulated intelligence collection directed at foreign powers and agents of foreign powers in the United States.
In addition to requiring court review of proposed surveillance (and later, physical searches), the 1978 act was interpreted by the courts to require that a search be approved only if its "primary purpose" was to obtain foreign intelligence information. In other words, the authorities of the FISA law could not be used to circumvent traditional criminal warrant requirements. The Justice Department interpreted these rulings as saying that criminal prosecutors could be briefed on FISA information but could not direct or control its collection.
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, Justice prosecutors had informal ar rangements for obtaining information gathered in the FISA process, the understanding being that they would not improperly exploit that process for their criminal cases. Whether the FBI shared with prosecutors information pertinent to possible criminal investigations was left solely to the judgment of the FBI.31,P. But the prosecution of Aldrich Ames for espionage in 1994 revived concerns about the prosecutors' role in intelligence investigations.The Department of Justice's Office of Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR) is responsible for reviewing and presenting all FISA applications to the FISA Court. It worried that because of the numerous prior consultations between FBI agents and prosecutors, the judge might rule that the FISA warrants had been misused. If that had happened,Ames might have escaped conviction. Richard Scruggs, the acting head of OIPR, complained to Attorney General Janet Reno about the lack of information-sharing controls. On his own, he began imposing information- sharing procedures for FISA material.
The Office of Intelligence Policy and Review became the gatekeeper for the flow of FISA information to criminal prosecutors.
Section on: Counterterrorism Evolves
In July 1995, Attorney General Reno issued formal procedures aimed at managing information sharing between Justice Department prosecutors and the FBI.They were developed in a working group led by the Justice Department's Executive Office of National Security, overseen by Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick.
These procedures--while requiring the sharing of intelligence information with prosecutors--regulated the manner in which such information could be shared from the intelligence side of the house to the criminal side.
These procedures were almost immediately misunderstood and misapplied.(((NOTICE: they put the blame ON EVERYONE ELSE)). As a result, there was far less information sharing and coordination between the FBI and the Criminal Division in practice than was allowed under the department's procedures. Over time the procedures came to be referred to as "the wall."
The term "the wall" is misleading, however, because several factors led to a series of barriers to information sharing that developed.
The Office of Intelligence Policy and Review became the sole gatekeeper for passing information to the Criminal Division. Though Attorney General Reno's procedures did not include such a provision, the Office assumed the role anyway, arguing that its position reflected the concerns of Judge Royce Lamberth, then chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.The Office threatened that if it could not regulate the flow of information to criminal prosecutors, it would no longer present the FBI's warrant requests to the FISA Court.The information flow withered.
The 1995 procedures dealt only with sharing between agents and criminal prosecutors, not between two kinds of FBI agents, those working on intelligence matters and those working on criminal matters. But pressure from the Office of Intelligence Policy Review, FBI leadership, and the FISA Court built barriers between agents--even agents serving on the same squads. FBI Deputy Director Bryant reinforced the Office's caution by informing agents that too much information sharing could be a career stopper.
Agents in the field began to believe--incorrectly--that no FISA information could be shared with agents working on criminal investigations.
This perception evolved into the still more exaggerated belief that the FBI could not share any intelligence information with criminal investigators, even if no FISA procedures had been used. Thus, relevant information from the National Security Agency and the CIA often failed to make its way to criminal investigators. Separate reviews in 1999, 2000, and 2001 concluded independently that information sharing was not occurring, and that the intent of the 1995 procedures was ignored routinely.
We will describe some of the unfortunate consequences of these accumulated institutional beliefs and practices in chapter 8.,P> There were other legal limitations. Both prosecutors and FBI agents argued that they were barred by court rules from sharing grand jury information, even though the prohibition applied only to that small fraction that had been pre- sented to a grand jury, and even that prohibition had exceptions.
But as interpreted by FBI field offices, this prohibition could conceivably apply to much of the information unearthed in an investigation.There were also restrictions, arising from executive order, on the commingling of domestic information with foreign intelligence. Finally the NSA began putting caveats on its Bin Ladinrelated reports that required prior approval before sharing their contents with criminal investigators and prosecutors.
These developments further blocked the arteries of information sharing.
Thank you, Starwise.
Thank you, bob.
SHAFFER ON WITH DONNIE DEUTSCH NOW -- CNBC
And there's novocain and then RINOKean, one used for suppressing pain and the other used to suppress painful truth.
Thanks for the heads up. Watching now.
In May of 2002, Rep Weldon was talking about AD and mentions the chart. He gives details about AD without naming it. The important person to watch IMHO is General Charles Holland. He is now a 4 star general. Does he back his men, or remain quiet?
(Source Congressional Record: May 21, 2002 (House) Page H2820-H2834) :
In fact, Mr. Speaker, there is another interesting development that occurred. After the Army showed the capability of the LIWAC model at Ft. Belvoir, other services began to take interest. Special forces command down in Florida contacted the Army and said, hey, we hear you are doing some neat things. We want to build a mini version of what you are doing down at our headquarters.
I did not find out about this until October of 2001, after the attack on the trade center.
A year before, special forces command developed their own mini version of a data processing or collaborative center with very limited capabilities. But what they did, Mr. Speaker, they did a profile of al Qaeda 1 year before 9-11.
Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, here is the chart, the unclassified chart of what special forces command had 1 year before 9- 11. Interesting. The entire al Qaeda network is identified in a graphic chart with all the linkages to all the terrorist groups around the world.
In fact, Mr. Speaker, I was told by the folks who developed the capability for special forces command that this chart and the briefing that was supposed to be given to General Shelton, Chairman of our Joint Chiefs, had a recommendation to take out 5 cells of bin Laden's network. Mr. Speaker, this was 1 year before 9-11.
This was not during President Bush's administration. This occurred in the fall of the remaining term of President Bill Clinton.
The key question I have been trying to get at is why was this 3-hour briefing, which I also got, I got General Holland to bring his briefers up from Florida with special forces, I went in the Pentagon, went in the tank, and they gave me the briefing, as much as they could give me, because part of it is being used for our operational plan, why was that 3-hour briefing with the recommendations to take out 5 cells of bin Laden's network condensed down to a 1-hour brief when it was given to General Hugh Shelton in January of 2001? And why were the recommendations to take out 5 cells not followed up on? That is the question we should get answered, Mr. Speaker.
Because 1 year before 9-11, the capability that special forces built actually identified to us the network of al Qaeda. And they went beyond that and gave us recommendations where we could take out cells to eliminate their capability. So for those pundits out there sitting in their armchairs criticizing President Bush, they have it all wrong.
THEY CAN'T TEST HOW GOOD THIS PROGRAM IS, BECAUSE IT NO LONGER EXISTS.
WHAT????!!!!!!!!
I turned it on too late and missed that.
Please explain again.
Bernie Kerik up next.
PING TO MY POST #374 - Lt. Shaffer was just on with Donnie Deutsch on CNBC -- says he expects we'll be hearing more over the next 3-4 weeks, especially if there are hearings. They want accountability on who shut this program down and why because it was SO good and so efficient at linking patterns of people, affiliations, etc..
Kerik believes Ben Venista. Thinks if the Commission had info on Atta being watched a year before, they'd have explored that. Thinks there's something fishy about the info from Shaffer coming out now.
I think I give up.
He says the program was so incredibly good that it revealed some links between foreign governments and high government officials in OUR GOVT.
Do you think he meant terrorist links between foreign goverment officials and some of our government officials?
I will have to check in later...lightening in the area again.
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