Posted on 04/12/2005 7:20:07 AM PDT by kcvl
So what? Suppose they were Republicans too. So what? Does that mean they can't read a medical chart?
The court Dr was biased as well.
Oh really? Because he didn't agree with you? You guys are great. They're all biased because they don't hold your crazy views?
It is certainly true that there is no express warrant for suicide. However, neither is there any proscription, express or implied -- as you no doubt know. You folks (not you as yet) who call Terri's death "murder" and accuse Judge Greer of being a Nazi for merely fairly deciding a case carry the burden of establishing that enforcing Terri's wishes is not Biblically permissible. Obviously, that cannot be done.
What are you complaining about? The courts found him guilty, did they not? You seem disappointed that death does not rule, absolutely.
You did not answer my question. It was a death - that one is obvious but the mechanism by which she died is what we were referring to. If someone put a gun to her head and pulled the trigger would that be murder?
I would say that 3 out of the 5 had an agenda. Death is an agenda, life is an obligation.
I disagree. The videos show 2 of the 5 told the truth.
Yes - you are correct - the 2 Dr's told the truth, but because the court was biased they were ignored. The entire trial was a complete sham. Makes me sick. There should have been 10 Dr's from reputable hospitals across the country and it should have had to been unanimous. None of them should have been "chosen" by MS or Judge Greer. And so none of them should have been chosen by the Shindlers. The outcome would have been completely different.
I can agree with that : )
Of course, I am not sure that any system which gave effect to Terri's desire to die would meet with your approval. Nonetheless, our system is a hybrid of the adversary and the "neutral". So, in Terri's case, there were 2 experts selected by the Petitioners, 2 by the Respondents and 1 by the Court. That is rather typical of such proceedings.
My experience as a lawyer is that I am generally more satisfied with the party-selected experts because you know where they are coming from. Obviously, a party is not going to proffer an expert that doesn't support their theory of the case. The court generally will use the so-called 'neutral' expert to compare and contrast the theories of the party-experts.
I realize you don't like the result in this case, but the system is actually a pretty good one. It exposes all views and gives the trier of fact contrary expert views to help it (court or jury) weigh one against the other.
I personally would not want the whole group to be so-called "neutral" experts. They tend to be selected blindly and you can't be sure that they will really air both sides of the case fairly. So, don't throw the baby out with the wash water. Keep in mind this is just one case where you don't like the result, but don't give up on a very good system.
Not necessarily. It all depends on the circumstances. If it was an unlawful killing with malice aforethought, it is murder.
And if they couldn't agree, then she dies right? I didn't think so.
Look, if you want to make sure no one gets to exercise their right to die, make it 10,000 doctors and require unanimity and only one in a million (the odds of 10,000 doctors agreeing on anything) billionaires (because of the cost of 10,000 doctors)would get their right to die.
BTW, keep in mind that at most 'reputable hospitals' there is a range of opinion within the medical staff. I'll bet you don't want the registered libertarian from every staff, do you? See the problem. Selection of the 'neutrals' is the problem.
If you really want the neutral approach, and you don't want a judge to ameliorate the kookiness of physicians (I think that would be a big mistake), then use the striking procedure utilized in arbitrations. Let the court (or some other neutral source) select a list of five, let each side strike two and the remaining one is your decision-maker.
That's better than unanimity requirements (which don't work), but I don't think you'll be happy with the result. Our present system is much better. Your side will probably win the next case and you'll think they're very wise then.
"I realize you don't like the result in this case, but the system is actually a pretty good one. It exposes all views and gives the trier of fact contrary expert views to help it (court or jury) weigh one against the other."
Give me a break. A Judge can choose and pretty much knows which way his Court Appointed expert will go especially with this particular case. The system is flawed. Greer knew the outcome without even sending his Dr. Death in for his outrageous proclamation that Terri was not "human". What a monster Cranford is.
And you indicate that it was Terri's desire to die. How do you know that for a fact. That is an entire other aspect of this case that was a total sham. You would have to believe a person like MS, his brother and his brothers wife to come to that conclusion. Based on everything that MS has done now and in the past his credibility is extremely suspect. So again this court was a complete sham in many more ways than one. So I ask you would you be willing to bet your life that Terri wanted to die and that she was brain dead? Would you be willing to put your life on the line the same way you think it was perfectly reasonable to put Terris life on the line?
Yes. It's possible, but my experience is that judges usually work off a list (to avoid allegations of 'favoritism') and appoint the 'next in line' as the expert on any given case. The result is often unpredictable -- which is why I prefer the party-expert system.
Greer knew the outcome without even sending his Dr. Death in for his outrageous proclamation that Terri was not "human".
You obviously have no support for your allegation as to what Judge Greer "knew." That kind of recklessness doesn't aid your argument. Calm down.
I think there are incontrovertible direct and implied proscriptions against suicide in the Bible, derived from God's ownership over His creation, and included in the prohibition of murder. ("You shall not murder," has no direct object. It doesn't say, "You shall not murder someone else." It simply says, "You shall not murder.) A person's life is the property of God, and to destroy one's life is to wrongly assert dominion over what is God's.
Genesis 9:5,6
5"Surely I will require (D)your lifeblood; (E)from every beast I will require it. And from every man, from every man's brother I will require the life of man.
6"(F)Whoever sheds man's blood,
By man his blood shall be shed,
For (G)in the image of God
He made man.
1 Corinthians 6:19-21
19Do you not know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit, who is in you, whom you have received from God? You are not your own; 20you were bought at a price. Therefore honor God with your body.
1 Corinthians 3:16-18
16Don't you know that you yourselves are God's temple and that God's Spirit lives in you? 17If anyone destroys God's temple, God will destroy him; for God's temple is sacred, and you are that temple.
Consider some of the examples of suicide:
2 Samuel 17: 21-23
21It came about after they had departed that they came up out of the well and went and told King David; and they said to David, "(T)Arise and cross over the water quickly for thus Ahithophel has counseled against you."
22Then David and all the people who were with him arose and crossed the Jordan; and by dawn not even one remained who had not crossed the Jordan.
23Now when Ahithophel saw that his counsel was not followed, he saddled his donkey and arose and went to his home, to (U)his city, and (V)set his house in order, and (W)strangled himself; thus he died and was buried in the grave of his father.
1 Kings 16: 18,19
18When Zimri saw that the city was taken, he went into the citadel of the king's house and burned the king's house over him with fire, and (V)died,
19because of his sins which he sinned, doing evil in the sight of the LORD, (W)walking in the way of Jeroboam, and in his sin which he did, making Israel sin.
Of course, Judas:
5And he threw the pieces of silver into (A)the temple sanctuary and departed; and (B)he went away and hanged himself.
... 18(Now this man (A)acquired a field with (B)the price of his wickedness, and falling headlong, he burst open in the middle and all his intestines gushed out.An attempted suicide - Notice Paul's counsel:
27When (BB)the jailer awoke and saw the prison doors opened, he drew his sword and was about (BC)to kill himself, supposing that the prisoners had escaped.
28But Paul cried out with a loud voice, saying, "Do not harm yourself, for we are all here!"
29And he called for lights and rushed in, and trembling with fear he fell down before (BD)Paul and Silas,
30and after he brought them out, he said, "Sirs, (BE)what must I do to be saved?"
The following excerpt is taken from the United States Supreme Court ruling in the 1997 Washington v. Glucksberg (opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist).
We begin, as we do in all due process cases, by examining our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U. S., at 849-850; Cruzan, 497 U. S., at 269-279; Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion) (noting importance of "careful `respect for the teachings of history'"). In almost every State--indeed, in almost every western democracy--it is a crime to assist a suicide. [n.8] The States' assisted suicide bans are not innovations. Rather, they are longstanding expressions of the States' commitment to the protection and preservation of all human life. Cruzan, 497 U. S., at 280 ("[T]he States--indeed, all civilized nations--demonstrate their commitment to life by treating homicide as a serious crime. Moreover, the majority of States in this country have laws imposing criminal penalties on one who assists another to commit suicide"); see Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 373 (1989) ("[T]he primary and most reliable indication of [a national] consensus is . . . the pattern of enacted laws"). Indeed, opposition to and condemnation of suicide--and, therefore, of assisting suicide--are consistent and enduring themes of our philosophical, legal, and cultural heritages. See generally, Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone & Balch, Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 Duquesne L. Rev. 1, 17-56 (1985) (hereinafter Marzen); New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, When Death is Sought: Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Medical Context 77-82 (May 1994) (hereinafter New York Task Force).
More specifically, for over 700 years, the Anglo American common law tradition has punished or otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide. [n.9] Cruzan, 497 U. S., at 294-295 (Scalia, J., concurring). In the 13th century, Henry de Bracton, one of the first legal treatise writers, observed that "[j]ust as a man may commit felony by slaying another so may he do so by slaying himself." 2 Bracton on Laws and Customs of England 423 (f. 150) (G. Woodbine ed., S. Thorne transl., 1968). The real and personal property of one who killed himself to avoid conviction and punishment for a crime were forfeit to the king; however, thought Bracton, "if a man slays himself in weariness of life or because he is unwilling to endure further bodily pain . . . [only] his movable goods [were] confiscated." Id., at 423-424 (f. 150). Thus, "[t]he principle that suicide of a sane person, for whatever reason, was a punishable felony was . . . introduced into English common law." [n.10] Centuries later, Sir William Blackstone, whose Commentaries on the Laws of England not only provided a definitive summary of the common law but was also a primary legal authority for 18th and 19th century American lawyers, referred to suicide as "self murder" and "the pretended heroism, but real cowardice, of the Stoic philosophers, who destroyed themselves to avoid those ills which they had not the fortitude to endure . . . ." 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *189. Blackstone emphasized that "the law has . . . ranked [suicide] among the highest crimes," ibid, although, anticipating later developments, he conceded that the harsh and shameful punishments imposed for suicide "borde[r] a little upon severity." Id., at *190.
For the most part, the early American colonies adopted the common law approach. For example, the legislators of the Providence Plantations, which would later become Rhode Island, declared, in 1647, that "[s]elf murder is by all agreed to be the most unnatural, and it is by this present Assembly declared, to be that, wherein he that doth it, kills himself out of a premeditated hatred against his own life or other humor: . . .his goods and chattels are the king's custom, but not his debts nor lands; but in case he be an infant, a lunatic, mad or distracted man, he forfeits nothing." The Earliest Acts and Laws of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations 1647-1719, p. 19 (J. Cushing ed. 1977). Virginia also required ignominious burial for suicides, and their estates were forfeit to the crown. A. Scott, Criminal Law in Colonial Virginia 108, and n. 93, 198, and n. 15 (1930).
Over time, however, the American colonies abolished these harsh common law penalties. William Penn abandoned the criminal forfeiture sanction in Pennsylvania in 1701, and the other colonies (and later, the other States) eventually followed this example. Cruzan, 497 U. S., at 294 (Scalia, J., concurring). Zephaniah Swift, who would later become Chief Justice of Connecticut, wrote in 1796 that
"[t]here can be no act more contemptible, than to attempt to punish an offender for a crime, by exercising a mean act of revenge upon lifeless clay, that is insensible of the punishment. There can be no greater cruelty, than the inflicting [of] a punishment, as the forfeiture of goods, which must fall solely on the innocent offspring of the offender. . . . [Suicide] is so abhorrent to the feelings of mankind, and that strong love of life which is implanted in the human heart, that it cannot be so frequently committed, as to become dangerous to society. There can of course be no necessity of any punishment." 2 Z. Swift, A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut 304 (1796).
This statement makes it clear, however, that the movement away from the common law's harsh sanctions did not represent an acceptance of suicide; rather, as Chief Justice Swift observed, this change reflected the growing consensus that it was unfair to punish the suicide's family for his wrongdoing. Cruzan, supra, at
294 (Scalia, J., concurring). Nonetheless, although States moved away from Blackstone's treatment of suicide, courts continued to condemn it as a grave public wrong. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 93 U.S. 284, 286 (1876) (suicide is "an act of criminal self destruction"); Von Holden v. Chapman, 87 App. Div. 2d 66, 70-71, 450 N. Y. S. 2d 623, 626-627 (1982); Blackwood v. Jones, 111 Fla. 528, 532, 149 So. 600, 601 (1933) ("No sophistry is tolerated . . . which seek[s] to justify self destruction as commendable or even a matter of personal right").
That suicide remained a grievous, though nonfelonious, wrong is confirmed by the fact that colonial and early state legislatures and courts did not retreat from prohibiting assisting suicide. Swift, in his early 19th century treatise on the laws of Connecticut, stated that "[i]f one counsels another to commit suicide, and the other by reason of the advice kills himself, the advisor is guilty of murder as principal." 2 Z. Swift, A Digest of the Laws of the State of Connecticut 270 (1823). This was the wel l established common law view, see In re Joseph G., 3 4 Cal. 3d 429, 434-435, 667 P. 2d 1176, 1179 (1983); Commonwealth v. Mink, 123 Mass. 422, 428 (1877) ("`Now if the murder of one's self is felony, the accessory is equally guilty as if he had aided and abetted in the murder'") (quoting Chief Justice Parker's charge to the jury in Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 356 (1816)), as was the similar principle that the consent of a homicide victim is "wholly immaterial to the guilt of the person who cause[d] [his death]," 3 J. Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 16 (1883); see 1 F. Wharton, Criminal Law §§451-452 (9th ed. 1885); Martin v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 1009, 1018-1019, 37 S. E. 2d 43, 47 (1946) (" `The right to life and to personal security is not only sacred in the estimation of the common law, but it is inalienable' "). And the prohibitions against assisting suicide never contained exceptions for those who were near death. Rather, "[t]he life of those to whom life ha[d] become a burden--of those who [were] hopelessly diseased or fatally wounded--nay, even the lives of criminals condemned to death, [were] under the protection of law, equally as the lives of those who [were] in the full tide of life's enjoyment, and anxious to continue to live." Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146, 163 (1872); see Bowen, supra, at 360 (prisoner who persuaded another to commit suicide could be tried for murder, even though victim was scheduled shortly to be executed).
The earliest American statute explicitly to outlaw assisting suicide was enacted in New York in 1828, Act of Dec. 10, 1828, ch. 20, §4, 1828 N. Y. Laws 19 (codified at 2 N. Y. Rev. Stat. pt. 4, ch. 1, tit. 2, art. 1, §7, p. 661 (1829)), and many of the new States and Territories followed New York's example. Marzen 73-74. Between 1857 and 1865, a New York commission led by Dudley Field drafted a criminal code that prohibited "aiding" a suicide and, specifically, "furnish[ing] another person with any deadly weapon or poisonous drug, knowing that such person intends to use such weapon or drug in taking his own life." Id., at 76-77. By the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, it was a crime in most States to assist a suicide. See Cruzan, supra, at 294-295 (Scalia, J., concurring). The Field Penal Code was adopted in the Dakota Territory in 1877, in New York in 1881, and its language served as a model for several other western States' statutes in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Marzen 76-77, 205-206, 212-213. California, for example, codified its assisted suicide prohibition in 1874, using language similar to the Field Code's. [n.11] In this century, the Model Penal Code also prohibited "aiding" suicide, prompting many States to enact or revise their assisted suicide bans. [n.12] The Code's drafters observed that "the interests in the sanctity of life that are represented by the criminal homicide laws are threatened by one who expresses a willingness to participate in taking the life of another, even though the act may be accomplished with the consent, or at the request, of the suicide victim." American Law Institute, Model Penal Code §210.5, Comment 5, p. 100 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980).
Though deeply rooted, the States' assisted suicide bans have in recent years been reexamined and, generally, reaffirmed. Because of advances in medicine and technology, Americans today are increasingly likely to die in institutions, from chronic illnesses. President's Comm'n for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Deciding to Forego Life Sustaining Treatment 16-18 (1983). Public concern and democratic action are therefore sharply focused on how best to protect dignity and independence at the end of life, with the result that there have been many significant changes in state laws and in the attitudes these laws reflect. Many States, for example, now permit "living wills," surrogate health care decisionmaking, and the withdrawal or refusal of life sustaining medical treatment. See Vacco v. Quill, post, at 9-11; 79 F. 3d, at 818-820; People v. Kevorkian, 447 Mich. 436, 478-480, and nn. 53-56, 527 N. W. 2d 714, 731-732, and nn. 53-56 (1994). At the same time, however, voters and legislators continue for the most part to reaffirm their States' prohibitions on assisting suicide.
Cordially,
Let's think a little more carefully for a minute. The issue is not whether Terri was 'brain dead'. We know (and all the experts agreed) that her brain was basically gone and replaced by spinal fluid, but that her brain stem was still functioning (otherwise she wouldn't have been able to breathe).
The issue was what does this mean for her quality of life? The respondents' experts argued that brain cells can sometimes be trained to do things that they don't do in normal humans. Their argument was that some of the brain cells in the brain stem might be retrained, by means of certain experimental therapies, to handle very elemental speech and/or motor functions.
By the way, on your 'unanimity' point, even the two respondents' experts did not agree. Each had his own 'therapy' which he thought might work.
In short, the issue was not 'brain death', but whether or not (whatever the cause of her condition) Terri would or could 'recover.' Now "recovery" is a continuum not a point. Moreover, it is prospective and contingent so there can never be unanimity on anyone's part. Here is the Court of Appeal's summary of that evidence:
The evidence is overwhelming that Theresa is in a permanent or persistent vegetative state. It is important to understand that a persistent vegetative state is not simply a coma. [FN1] She is not asleep. She has cycles of apparent wakefulness and apparent sleep without any cognition or awareness. As she breathes, she often makes moaning sounds. Theresa has severe contractures of her hands, elbows, knees, and feet. {Par.] Over the span of this last decade, Theresa's brain has deteriorated because of the lack of oxygen it suffered at the time of the heart attack. By mid 1996, the CAT scans of her brain showed a severely abnormal structure. At this point, much of her cerebral cortex is simply gone and has been replaced by cerebral spinal fluid. [Par.] Medicine cannot cure this condition. Unless an act of God, a true miracle, were to recreate her brain, Theresa will always remain in an unconscious, reflexive state, totally dependent upon others to feed her and care for her most private needs. She could remain in this state for many years."
That was the evidence; everything else is speculation.
But what does this mean? Did Terri want to live like that? That was the key question.
And the court determined that she did not. We have absolutely no reason -- grounded in logic -- to think the court was wrong.
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