Posted on 03/21/2005 1:56:28 AM PST by Truth666
Soros.
Is the city of "Osh" near "Kosh"? Sorry, I couldn't resist.
In the B'Gosh region? ;-)
You think Soros is at the bottom of this?
It is pretty blatant. He asked (told) Akayev not to run for re-election a few weeks ago. The whole thing is classic Soros 101.
I wish Americans cared as much.
Some people say Soros. With these bases, I'd think China would rank as a nice suspect behind this.
Maybe if they had more vowels, they could settle this by discussion. Kgwz vrf mrknzwr Kyrgystan!
This is NOT the work of ordinary protestors. This was well thought out.
Nick Solly Megoran 3/29/00
During Kyrgyzstan’s post-election period, most attention has focussed on the demonstrations staged by supporters of two opposition leaders, Daniyar Usunov and Felix Kulov. Meanwhile, a potentially more explosive situation in southern Kyrgyzstan has gone virtually unnoticed by the international community, even though it raises the spectre of interethnic conflict among Kyrgyz and Uzbeks.
Ethnic tensions have been on the rise in the southern regions of Osh and Jalalabad for several months. The increased outflow of ethnic Russians following last summer’s Batken hostage crisis has had a destabilising impact on interethnic relations. Uzbeks have suddenly emerged as the second largest ethnic group in the country after the titular majority, a fact that has unsettled many Kyrgyz. The ethnic balance also has been influenced by the formation of a new Batken oblast, an act that has diluted the ethnic Kyrgyz majority in Osh oblast, where the bulk of the Uzbek population lives in and around the regional capital of Osh.
According to one western observer, demographics was a major factor in prompting gerrymandering in the Osh region in an effort to ensure Kyrgyz candidates dominated recent parliamentary elections. more
He seems to have a whole lot of people available to send to do an instant riot. I suspect they are the same ones who tear up the pavement in Genoa, then go to Seattle to do a bit of downtown vandalism and are at hand to stage a demonstration in Turkey.
Takes plenty of money to fly these New Age anarchists around the world.
No wonder the Czech Republic threw out Soros and his "universities"
interesting enough headline to read this later
Good for them! This is just the process of cleaning out all the Soviet appointed gangsters, like they did in the Ukraine and Georgia. The gangsters took over these countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union and ran these countries like protection rackets instead of democracies.
When you look at a lot of these recent demonstrations, all you see is unwashed young faces. These are the militant hippies of the new Left. Brown shirts in dread locks.
Yup, good improvement.
Soros was tossed from Russia, Indonesia and the Brits aren't to happy with him either.
The Saakashvili Stalin-like grip
Georgia's media under pressure a year after aiding 'rose revolution' HRIDC: Georgian-language “Georgian Times” under threat of being closed by the authorities; Note from a terrorist website no less.
Presentation of the «Chechen» Parliamentary Group (Georgia helps the terrorists) Georgian govt wants president's monthly salary set at $2,185 (Average Georgian, less then $50)
Last year, the president and Cabinet members drew their salaries from various international funds, including the Soros foundation. This year, they have been paid from state coffers.
Oh and here's another fine fellow that Lukasz went out of his way on a half dozen threads to defend. Typical really.
Death of a Terrorist
The Moscow Times ^ | Tuesday, March 15, 2005 | Robert Bruce Ware
Posted on 03/15/2005 11:27:49 AM PST by jb6
Whatever Chechen rebel leader Aslan Maskhadov may have been in 1995 or 1997, he was a terrorist on the day he died. As compared to a monster like Chechen commander Shamil Basayev, Maskhadov might have been described as a "moderate" up to 1998. In January 1997, he became the first and last legitimately elected president of Chechnya. However, his incapacity to cope with pressures endemic to Chechen society led to his drift toward radicalism beginning in the latter part of that year.
In 1999, he disbanded the Chechen parliament and abolished the same Chechen constitution that legitimized his presidency, replacing it with a legal code similar to that of Sudan. Under the ensuing sharia rule, there were public executions, amputations and punishments of offenses including adultery and homosexuality. Some of those punished were pregnant women and children. Later that year, Maskhadov did not repudiate Basayev's invasion of Dagestan, let alone assist the Dagestanis in resisting it. He then declined President Vladimir Putin's requests to extradite Basayev, to close his al-Qaida-connected training camps and to renounce terrorism -- essentially the same three requests that President George W. Bush made to the Taliban in autumn 2001.
In summer 2002, Maskhadov stated publicly that all Chechen fighters were directly under his control and warned of an upcoming campaign to wage war on Russian territory. That October, the leaders of the Dubrovka hostage atrocity clearly stated in three separate press interviews that they were acting under Maskhadov's direction. He failed to condemn the attack while it was in progress.
On June 22, 2004, bands of terrorists from Chechnya killed approximately 100 people in neighboring Ingushetia. About 60 of these fatalities were police officials. About 40 were civilians, some of whom were hacked to death. The terrorists took approximately 20 hostages. The raids had no military targets. A few weeks later, Maskhadov publicly claimed responsibility for the Ingushetia raids.
When Osama bin Laden killed police officials and civilians in the World Trade Center, there were no Western analysts who failed to call him a terrorist. When Timothy McVeigh killed law enforcement officials and civilians in an Oklahoma City blast in 1993, no Americans failed to label him a terrorist. Why do people insist that Maskhadov is anything but a terrorist after he claimed responsibility for the slaughter of police officials and civilians in Ingushetia? It is revealing that the people who claim most loudly to care about the suffering of Chechen civilians seem to care nothing at all about the suffering of Ingush civilians. The same might be said about Dagestanis, since Maskhadov claimed to control the terrorists that have killed more than 50 of Dagestan's politicians and law enforcement officers in the last three years. Why is it that Western journalists and observers seem to care about the suffering of only those North Caucasus people who are fighting the Russians?
It is true that Maskhadov was a symbol of all that was legitimate and worthy in Chechen aspirations for independence. Unfortunately, he was no more than a symbol. Perhaps because he was unworthy of his cause or because his cause itself was unworthy, he quickly proved unable to lead a semi-independent Chechnya and was himself led into radicalism.
Because of his symbolic appeal, Maskhadov retained the sympathy of as much as 30 percent of the Chechen population. Yet he was also widely blamed by Chechens for their problems. Had they been given the chance to do so, it is unlikely that more than 10 percent would have supported him in last year's presidential election. In any case, many Chechens had sworn vendettas against Maskhadov, so that he surely would have died soon after attempting to resume any sort of public life.
Thus, Maskhadov had no more than symbolic value to the Chechen resistance. He controlled no more than a few people around him, and some days he barely controlled his own bodyguards. He was not the moderate ballast to radicals like Basayev, as some have suggested. On the contrary, after 1997 Maskhadov devoted much of his energy to preserving the illusion that he maintained some sort of control over Basayev and other Islamists. Negotiations with Maskhadov would have had no effect upon Basayev or other radical leaders.
Hence, Maskhadov's death will have only three consequences for Basayev. First, without his political front man, Basayev will suffer further reductions in external funding, by which, however, he will be undeterred. Second, Basayev's own demise will become more present in his mind. Basayev does not fear death, but the narcissism of his personal mythology is a significant part of his psychology. Third, Basayev may proclaim that one of his upcoming atrocities is vengeance for the martyred Maskhadov, even though Basayev has spent the last eight years undermining him.
Because of his iconic status, Maskhadov's death was necessary for the stabilization of the North Caucasus, but it is far from sufficient. In all but his iconic status, Maskhadov will be quickly replaced, as Basayev would be. In order to begin stabilizing the North Caucasus, the Kremlin first must support human rights and genuine democratic procedures throughout the region, beginning with the upcoming Chechen parliamentary elections. Instead of consolidating corruption, the Kremlin, secondly, must strive to reduce it. Finally, Russian officials must stimulate dramatic and widespread economic development. Otherwise, poverty, unemployment, corruption and despair will continue to nourish radicalism, alienation and instability in the region. Westerners who claim to care about the peoples of the North Caucasus should put their money where their mouths are by offering tangible assistance to stimulate economic development in this region.
Robert Bruce Ware is an associate professor at Southern Illinois University Edwardsville who has published extensively on Dagestan and Chechnya. He contributed this comment to The Moscow Times.
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