Posted on 01/13/2005 10:05:10 AM PST by alessandrofiaschi
No one doubts that Congress has that power and that it is constitutional for them to use it. What this case dealt with is the fact that, under the guidelines, courts were required to base their sentences on a long list of facts that were not found by the jury. For example, in a drug case, the guidelines say that the sentence depends on the quantity of drugs the defendant "possessed or intended to possess," but the jury only decides if the defendant is guilty of possession; the judge then decides the amount. This was held (correctly, IMHO) to be a violation of the right to trial by jury.
Um, hate to burst your bubble, but Scalia joined the opinion of the Court that was authored by Stevens; specifically, that the Sixth Amendment applies to sentencing guidelines. Scalia dissented in part only because of the appellate review standard set forth in the opinion.
Thanks for the ping!
Funny... more or less, but that's also my opinion! Thanks.
The formulas are a pain in the rear for jurors, I was a juror in a federal criminal trial and had to answer five additional questions after the finding of guilty on the count(s). The instructions were vague and the questions badly phrased, but they were mandated by law.
Thanks. I agree that the disparity between those two cases is nothing short of obscene.
Scalia is correct that the appellate review provisions will wreak havoc, but that havoc is a byproduct of Congress scoring political points at the expense of judicial discretion. I have never been comfortable with mandated sentences. IMHO Congress would better exercise its authority by careful review of judicial appointments. If the candidate cannot be trusted to exercize a reasonable weighting of the specifics of each case, the candidate does not belong on the bench.
Life is not always fair, but that is no excuse for setting rules which guarantee unjust sentences with no consideration of mitigating factors allowed, a process which institutionalizes gross injustice. If we are to appoint persons as judges, we should allow them the latitude to actually "judge" all the factors admissable in individual cases.
I find the holding that thousands of individuals should serve sentences far beyond the merits of their particular circumstance merely for the convenience of the judiciary system to be a travesty inconsistent with the alleged concern for the rights of the people our country is supposed to stand for.
The way I read this opinion is that Scalia(Thomas/Stevens) want a JURY to determine the FACTS (drug amount, culpability as mastermind of conspiracy, etc.) that will blow the defendant away, not JUDGES.
The problem is Ginsberg who switched sides on the remedy, and made the guidelines advisory.
The easy (and constitutional) solution was to place the facts in front of a jury, and keep the guidelines mandatory.
Supreme Court Rules Judges Are Not Bound by Sentencing Rules
FGS
Perhaps we are not as far apart on this as it might seem. I agree juries determine the facts of a case, but once the jury has weighed the evidence, it has traditionally then been the task of the judge to take that verdict and actually impose a specific sentence in light of such mitigating factors as are present. One well known exception is in death penalty cases, where the jury first renders the verdict, then considers separately the issue of yea or nay on the punishment phase of the matter. Judges have great latitude to amend a jury's award in a civil case. Even without the "mandatory minimums", judges are limited to the range of punishment set out in statutory law. Why does a legislative body bother to set into black letter law this range of possible punishment if that body is then going to strip judges of the right to work within the limits set forth by said legislative branch?
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