Posted on 09/21/2004 9:05:21 PM PDT by DoctorZIn
Many of the websites, known as blogs or weblogs, have also posted news items from the banned publications on their websites. The protest was started by blogger Hossein Derakhshan, a student at Toronto university in Canada. He told the BBC that although he felt the action was symbolic, he wanted to show Iranian authorities "that they would not be able to censor the internet in the same way as they have managed to control other media". He said he was delighted with the response. The hardline Iranian press has published a personal attack on him, he said, "which is proof that the authorities must be worried by the bloggers' protest". Iranian web Earlier this month, three reformist websites - Emrooz, Rooydad and Baamdad - re-appeared in a stripped-down form after having been blocked by the authorities. One of them moved the content of its site onto a blog as a means of getting around the block. It is thought that the number of Iranians keeping blogs is now between 10,000 and 15,000. However, some recent reports have now suggested that Iranian authorities are considering the creation of a national intranet - an internet service just for Iran - which would be separate from the world wide web. This would potentially mean that users would not be able to access anything the authorities do not want them to see. But Mr Derakhshan said he and his fellow bloggers are working on a strategy to get around the intranet, using email subscription services. |
Tue Sep 21, 7:23 PM ET
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By Carol Giacomo, Diplomatic Correspondent
NEW YORK (Reuters) - Europe warned on Tuesday that it would not tolerate an Iran with nuclear weapons after the Islamic republic defied the United Nations (news - web sites) by announcing it had begun converting a large amount of raw uranium to prepare it for enrichment, a process that can be used to develop atomic bombs.
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European Union (news - web sites) foreign policy chief Javier Solana said, however, the EU remained committed to offering energy and other cooperation if Tehran abandoned its nuclear ambitions.
Solana spoke to Reuters after a meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi on the fringes of the U.N. General Assembly that was "frank ... tough and friendly."
Solana sidestepped a question about whether he felt the Iranian nuclear controversy was still open to negotiation.
"I think we have to keep on doing the utmost in talking and dialogue ... If we fail in that direction, we may have to resort to other mechanisms (such as taking the issue to the U.N. Security Council but) we prefer not to have to," he said.
Iran's announcement on Tuesday came just three days after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.N.'s nuclear watchdog, adopted a resolution calling on Iran to suspend all activities related to uranium enrichment.
Iran had promised Britain, France and Germany last October it would freeze all activities related to uranium enrichment.
But Tehran angered the EU's "big three" by reneging on that commitment.
The United States and some other nations believe Tehran intends to use fissile material for weapons. Iran denies that and says its nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes.
The IAEA, which has been probing Iran's nuclear program for two years, has found many previously concealed activities that could be used in weapons production, but no "smoking gun."
Washington believes the resolution passed by the IAEA on Saturday opened the door to tough action by the IAEA board when it meets again in November -- namely, a referral of Iran's case to the U.N. Security Council and possibly economic sanctions.
Solana, in a telephone interview, said he told Kharrazi "in a very clear manner that they had to comply with the (IAEA) report ... and that we will not tolerate that Iran will have nuclear weapons, potentially nuclear weapons."
He described the meeting as "tough and friendly at the same time because we want to maintain a friendly attitude" with Iran.
The IAEA set a fixed period -- the November meeting -- "to clarify the position of Iran (and) we have to use this period to get everybody convinced .. They have to convince us and generate trust that what they are saying is the truth," Solana said.
He said he told Kharrazi "if you don't want to go in the direction of having the capability of nuclear weapons, we can start talking about so many things. The possibilities of dialogue and cooperation between the EU and other countries with Iran are very many," he said.
He declined to say if he thought the United States, which has not had diplomatic relations with Tehran since the 1979 Iranian revolution, should engage in dialogue.
President Bush (news - web sites) has refused to negotiate with Iran on the nuclear issue, but Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry (news - web sites) has said he would be willing to talk with Tehran about some kind of a deal.
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POLICYWATCH
Number 899 | September 16, 2004 |
THE IAEA AND IRAN: THE PERILS OF INACTION
By Michael Eisenstadt
Deep divisions among the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), currently meeting in Vienna, continue to hamper U.S. efforts on two key fronts: pressing Iran to suspend work on its nuclear program, and referring allegations of Iranian violations of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to the UN Security Council. With the current meeting unlikely to produce tangible steps to halt Iran's nuclear program, it is important to understand the potential consequences of Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability.
Political Dynamics -- Iran and Beyond
Iranian possession of nuclear weapons could have significant political consequences. It might dim prospects for political change in Iran by discouraging supporters of reform and bolstering outspoken hardline supporters of the nuclear program. It might cause some of Iran's neighbors to accommodate the Islamic Republic on various issues, while influencing others to seek an independent deterrent capability or to deepen security cooperation with the United States -- though Iranian nuclear weapons could constrain U.S. military freedom of action in the Persian Gulf as well. Such a development would also likely embolden forces opposed to Arab-Israeli peace (such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hizballah), further complicating efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. And, as Iran eventually extends the range of its missile force to enable it to strike targets outside the Middle East, the states of the European Union will have to factor the country's nuclear potential into their policymaking toward Tehran.
Stoking Proliferation?
North Korea's unchecked development of a small nuclear stockpile has long prompted fears that South Korea and Japan might develop nuclear weapons themselves; recent revelations regarding South Korean enrichment experiments carried our four years ago have vindicated these concerns. Iran's nuclear program -- whether or not it results in a declared nuclear weapons capability -- has likewise raised concerns that it could spur a new round of proliferation in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia might try to purchase a nuclear weapon from North Korea or Pakistan, while some of the smaller Gulf states might leverage their petrochemical industries to produce modest chemical weapon stockpiles for deterrence. Israel would probably continue its successful policy of nuclear ambiguity, though it may find ways to bolster its deterrent posture by further reducing the thin veneer of ambiguity regarding its nuclear status. This could cause Egypt and Syria to explore their nuclear options (although there is reason for concern that Syria is already doing so). Finally, Iran's activities could eventually cause post-Saddam Iraq to consider its nuclear options, if and when a degree of stability returns to that country.
Fostering Stability or Instability?
There are two schools of thought regarding how nuclear weapons affect the behavior of states. One argues that the acquisition of nuclear weapons induces greater prudence and caution among possessor states, and adduces U.S. and Soviet behavior during the Cold War as proof (though post-Cold War revelations regarding the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and false warnings of nuclear attacks during the Cold War have diminished the appeal of this model). The other argues that the acquisition of nuclear weapons (or, more generally, weapons of mass destruction) can lead to an increased propensity for risk-taking. Thus, Iraq's maturing chemical and biological weapons programs may have emboldened Saddam Hussein to pursue a more aggressive regional policy in 1989-1990 and to invade Kuwait. Similarly, the confidence that Pakistan's leadership drew from its May 1998 nuclear weapons test may have emboldened it to attempt to seize a portion of Kashmir from India, due to its mistaken belief that India would be deterred from responding militarily. This attempt resulted in the Kargil Crisis of May-July 1999.
It is impossible to know how nuclear weapons might affect Iranian policy, though several of the regime's past actions give reason for pause: witness Tehran's employment of gunboat diplomacy in 2001 vis-a-vis Azerbaijan (to halt its exploration for oil in contested portions of the Caspian Sea); its abandonment of an October 2003 agreement with Britain, France, and Germany that temporarily froze key elements of its nuclear program; its humiliating treatment of British servicemen recently detained in the Shatt al-Arab waterway; its threats to annihilate Israel should the latter bomb sites associated with the Iranian nuclear program; and its rebuff of an IAEA request to visit a suspected nuclear site at a military industrial facility at Parchin. Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons might further embolden its increasingly self-confident hardline leadership to bully its neighbors, stiff-arm Europe, threaten Israel, and more aggressively work to undermine U.S. interests in the region.
Military Risk-Taking?
Iranian decisionmakers may believe that the possession of nuclear weapons could provide Tehran with greater latitude to pursue more aggressive policies against its neighbors, the United States, or Israel. Although Iran is unlikely to conduct conventional military operations against any of its neighbors (its conventional military forces are weak, and there are few scenarios in which a conventional military move would make sense), it might increase support for terrorist groups that target U.S. or Israeli interests, or resume efforts to export the revolution to places where there are large Shiite communities.
Implications of Instability in Iran?
Instability and unrest in a nuclear Iran could have dire consequences. Were antiregime violence to escalate to the point that it threatened the survival of the Islamic Republic (unlikely in the near term, but a possibility in the future should popular demands for political change continue to be ignored by conservative hardliners), diehard supporters of the old order might lash out at perceived external enemies of the doomed regime with all means at their disposal, including nuclear weapons. The apocalyptic possibility of nuclear terrorism by an Islamic Republic in its death throes, though unlikely in the near term, cannot be dismissed as a source of concern.
Potential for Nuclear Terrorism?
The fact that Iran or its agents have not yet used chemical or biological agents in terrorist attacks may indicate the existence of a normative threshold, or it may indicate that, having achieved important successes by conventional terrorism (e.g., the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks bombing, which led to the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Lebanon), Tehran perceives no need to incur the risk that the use of weapons of mass destruction would entail. Nevertheless, Iran is likely to seek, when acting against more powerful adversaries, the ability to covertly deliver such weapons by nontraditional means (i.e., terrorists, boats, or remotely piloted aircraft). Because such methods offer the possibility of deniability, they are likely to become important adjuncts to more traditional delivery means such as missiles. In situations in which deniability is a critical consideration, they are likely to be the delivery means of choice. The possibility of deniable, covert delivery of nuclear weapons by Iran could pose a major challenge for deterrence -- particularly if the country's leadership believed that the nation's vital interests or the regime's survival was at stake.
Conclusion
Any assessment of the implications of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons is necessarily speculative, and it is unlikely that all of the aforementioned possible outcomes will come to pass. But there can be no doubt that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by an Iran that supports terrorism, seeks hegemony in the Gulf, works to undermine American efforts to achieve Arab-Israeli peace and other critical U.S. interests in the region, and continues to call for the destruction of another UN member-state (Israel), will be a source of instability in a region of strategic importance to the international community.
Michael Eisenstadt is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute.
HonestReporting has repeatedly denounced media outlets' categorical refusal to call terrorists 'terrorists' in news reports (see our special report on this topic).
As Islamic terror continues to spread worldwide, one major news outlet decided that enough is enough - it's time to call terrorism by its name. CanWest, owners of Canada's largest newspaper chain, recently implemented a new editorial policy to use the 'T-word' in reports on brutal terrorist acts and groups.
So when CanWest's National Post published a Reuters report on Sept. 14, they exercised their right to change this Reuters line that whitewashes Palestinian terror:
... the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, which has been involved in a four-year-old revolt against Israeli occupation in Gaza and the West Bank. (Jeffrey Heller, 9/13 'Sharon Faces Netanyahu Challenge')
to this, more accurate line:
... the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, a terrorist group that has been involved in a four-year-old campaign of violence against Israel.
Reuters didn't like the adjustment, and took the unusual step of officially informing CanWest that if it intended to continue this practice, CanWest should remove Reuters' name from the byline. Why? The New York Times reported (emphasis added):
"Our editorial policy is that we don't use emotive words when labeling someone," said David A. Schlesinger, Reuters' global managing editor. "Any paper can change copy and do whatever they want. But if a paper wants to change our copy that way, we would be more comfortable if they remove the byline."
Mr. Schlesinger said he was concerned that changes like those made at CanWest could lead to "confusion" about what Reuters is reporting and possibly endanger its reporters in volatile areas or situations.
"My goal is to protect our reporters and protect our editorial integrity," he said.
Schlesinger (right) with Reuters' news exec Stephen Jukes, who instructed editors not to call 9/11 'terror,' since 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter.' |
This is a stunning admission ― Reuters' top international editor openly acknowledges that one of the main reasons his agency refuses to call terrorists 'terrorists' has nothing to do with editorial pursuit of objectivity, but rather is a response to intimidation from thugs and their supporters.
In every other news arena, western journalists pride themselves on bravely 'telling it as is,' regardless of their subjects' (potentially hostile) reactions. So why do editors at Reuters ― and, presumably, other news outlets; bend over backwards to appease Islamic terrorists, using 'safe' language that deliberately minimizes their inhuman acts?
Scott Anderson, editor-in-chief of CanWest Publications, said that Reuters' policy 'undermine[s] journalistic principles,' and raised the key question: 'If you're couching language to protect people, are you telling the truth?'
An editorial in the Ottawa Citizen, one of CanWest's newspapers, spells out the issue in black and white:
Terrorism is a technical term. It describes a modus operandi, a tactic. We side with security professionals who define terrorism as the deliberate targeting of civilians in pursuit of a political goal. Those who bombed the nightclub in Bali were terrorists. Suicide bombers who strap explosives to their bodies and blow up people eating in a pizza parlour are terrorists. The men and women who took a school full of hostages in Beslan, Russia, and shot some of the children in the back as they tried to flee to safety were terrorists. We as journalists do not violate our impartiality by describing them as such.Ironically, it is supposedly neutral terms like 'militant' that betray a bias, insofar as they have a sanitizing effect. Activists for various political causes can be 'militant,' but they don't take children hostage.
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The CanWest/Reuters affair is remarkably similar to CNN's Iraqi cover-up from last year, when CNN's top news executive admitted that CNN's knowledge of murder, torture, and planned assassinations in Saddam's Iraq was suppressed in order to maintain CNN's Baghdad bureau. We asked back then:
Now that this senior CNN executive has come clean, it leaves us wondering: In what other regions ruled by terrorist dictators do the media toe the party line so as to remain in good stead?
We now have our answer in the Palestinian region. Reuters admits to regulating their language to appease the terrorists; and that's an open admission of pro-Palestinian bias.
ACTION ITEMS:
(1) Send comments to Reuters: editor@reuters.com
(2) If your local paper uses Reuters wire stories for coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, bring Reuters' admission of non-objectivity to the attention of your local editor. (3) Write a short letter to your local newspaper, citing Reuters' declaration that the goal of their soft language is to protect reporters, and recognizing the implication: Reuters is not providing unadulterated, independent coverage of stories like the Israeli-Arab conflict.
Thank you for your ongoing involvement in the battle against media bias.
Baghdad, Iraq, Sep. 22 (UPI) -- Iraqi Defense Minister Hazem Shaalan says Iran has reduced its interference in Iraq's domestic affairs and ended support of Shiite radical cleric Moqtada Sadr.
The London-based Saudi daily al-Hayat quoted Shaalan as saying Wednesday that Iran had restricted its interference in Iraq after a recent visit by Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh to Tehran.
"In fact, border infiltrations have receded and interference is restrained in Iraqi state institutions," Shaalan said.
Shaalan, who had described Iran as Iraq's number one enemy, stressed that "security will not be consolidated before we succeed in controlling the border with all neighboring countries."
He said Iran had also withdrawn its support of Moqtada Sadr, who waged a rebellion against U.S. forces in central Iraq, notably in the holy city of Najaf.
Iran: Curbs on foreign investment
Iran's conservative-held parliament has approved the first reading of a bill that will place tough controls on foreign investment.
Embattled reformist President Muhammad Khatami has said the move will deal a major blow to the economy.
"This law is without precedent in the history of the Islamic republic," a visibly angry Khatami told reporters after a cabinet meeting. "It will paralyse the work of the government."
A majority of deputies gave preliminary approval to the bill, which obliges the government to seek the approval of MPs for major deals signed with foreign companies.
"This will discourage foreigners from investing in Iran. This will cost the country billions of dollars," Khatami complained.
"This law signifies that the voice of a government led by a president representing the people has no value and that the government cannot deal with the international community," the president fumed.
Another blow
The vote is yet another setback for Khatami and his reformist-dominated cabinet, already politically isolated after the ouster of reformists from parliament in February's elections.
Hardliners and conservatives took control of the Iranian parliament, or Majlis, after most reformists and moderates loyal to the government were barred from standing in the polls.
Parliament is now scheduled to examine the bill article by article and Khatami said he hoped it would "change the nature of the text" in the process.
In its current form the bill is retroactive and would apply to any contracts signed from the beginning of the current Iranian year on 20 March, and in which a foreign company has more than a 49% stake.
Contracts
It also singles out contracts related to airport services and telecommunications.
This is a direct reference to an airport building and operating contract signed with Tepe-Akfen-Vie (TAV) - an Austrian-Turkish consortium - and a deal with Turkey's Turkcell to provide Iran with more mobile phone lines.
In May, Iran's hardline Revolutionary Guards shut down Tehran's new airport arguing that the contract with TAV endangered the Islamic republic's security because the operators also had business dealings with Israel.
We do not expect much from the international community in general - the US in particular. We just expect them not to legitimize or help this terrorist regime. We expect a rigid sanction against the IRI, not of the type that we have been witnessing during the years that a sanction was supposed to be enforced, and not of the type that would exclude Halliburton, GE and more than two-hundred American companies. A genuine and real sanction.
We expect the U.S. to reduce its diplomatic relations with the Islamic Regime to the lowest possible level. This regime is not the representative of the Iranian people, and we challenge those who think otherwise by an internationally monitored referendum. If the US government and politicians want to be on the side of the brave Iranians who have not given up hopes in spite of confronting a brutal regime and all its western supporters, they should just give them moral support by declaring that they do not recognize the Islamic Regime as their representatives, and that they would refrain from establishing friendly relations with their abusers.
That is all we believe most Iranians expect from the U.S. and other countries. Just do not help this terrorist regime, and the Iranians themselves will topple the Islamic Regime through disobedience and non-violent action.
Those who listen will earn the love and votes of the Iranians.
Mohammad Parvin is an adjunct professor at the California State University and director of the Mission for Establishment of Human Rights in Iran (MEHR) - http://mehr.org
The new Iranian Academic Year started, today, and millions of school and university students commenced a year placed under increased repressive measures. Militiamen and Bassij paramilitary members were seen posted in front of many schools and universities by questionning, often very brutaly, whom ever seemed "suspect" or not observing the "Islamic moral code".
Several students have been reported as having been beaten up or arrested for their first day of Academic year.
Bust despite all the official desperate tries to intimidate, reports from many academy districts in the Capital and cities, such as Esfahan or Hamadan, are stating about the astonishing refusal of especially school students to chant the regime's anthem and instead to chant the banned Iranian National Anthem "Oh, Iran...!"
Scenes, such as, students turning their backs during the official opening ceremonies of several schools have been reported as well as sporadic slogans against the regime and its leaders.
Fresh political graffitis, such as "Sal e Azadi" (the Year of Freedom), were already noticeable on the first day of classes and hand written and typed tracts calling for solidarity of all students against the regime were seen circulating.
Most first day's discussions were political despite the massive monitoring of the students by members of Herrasat (Intelligence) and Bassij mercenaries deployed in what is supposed to be a place of exchange of thoughts and learning.
Most universities won't become fully operationnal till end of the month and it's doubteful that in the current situation this Academic Year will go till its end.
Damage control: Workers try to finish a nuclear reactor in Bushehr, Iran. The US and UN must prevent similar scenarios elsewhere. | |
WASHINGTON: This weekend, the UN's nuclear watchdog agency called on Tehran to freeze its efforts to produce nuclear fuel, since this would enable Iran to come within days of having a nuclear arsenal. On one side, the US and its allies want Iran to restrain its declared nuclear activities. On the other, Iran and its supporters insist that they have the right to pursue them all. Although it's unclear who will win, what's not is that the dispute is forcing all sides back to square one. At stake is the future of international nuclear controls, as well as any hopes of keeping the Middle East from following Iran's nuclear example.
Unfortunately, these risks are not yet well appreciated. When it comes to Iran's nuclear ambition, everyone, both hawks and doves, Europeans and Americans, is in some form of denial. They all still believe that there is some way to keep Iran from coming within a few weeks of having a nuclear bomb. Iran, however, is no more than 12 to 36 months from acquiring nuclear arms, possesses technology and material to produce them, and seems dead set on securing an option to do so. US officials insist that Iran has begun testing non-nuclear weapons components. Preventing Iran from building the bomb, therefore, can no longer be assured.
Still, most experts don't perceive this urgency. President Bush's detractors believe Iran's nuclear misbehavior is little more than a misunderstanding. By simply dealing directly with Tehran, they insist, the US can resolve the troubling nuclear ambitions. Washington, they argue, should offer a reliable supply of fresh reactor fuel in exchange for Iran's pledge to refrain from making its own (and thereby coming within days of making a bomb). Never mind that the US has tried and failed over the last two decades to settle an array of matters with Tehran, or that Iran's defiance of a year-old nuclear enrichment freeze agreement has humiliated Britain, France, and Germany. A new US president, according to Bush's opposition, can reverse these trends.
White House officials, meanwhile, insist that Iran, having repeatedly violated the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), should be hauled before the United Nations Security Council to make sure it doesn't get the bomb. After two years of failed International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) attempts to get Iran to come clean, UN action is long overdue. What are the chances that the UN can keep Iran from getting the bomb? Judging from the Security Council's inability to ensure Saddam's compliance with international weapons inspections, hardly as much as one would hope.
This, then, gives rise to the hawkish solution: bombing (with or without UN approval). Israeli or US attack of Iran's nuclear plants, this group insists, is the only hope. Striking Iran's known nuclear plants would at least delay its program a few years, but at what cost? Certainly, any lasting results would require a much larger follow-up "game plan" to overthrow the current regime - an endeavor still underway in Afghanistan and Iraq.
If there is no sure way to prevent Iran from getting within a screw driver's turn from having nuclear arms, what should the international community do? The answer: Tackle the most worrisome preventable problems. This would clearly exclude getting Iran to keep its nuclear materials and capabilities out of the hands of terrorists. This scenario is not only unlikely (Tehran's power-controlling Mullahs are unlikely to allow it), but clearly beyond the scope of international powers.
What, then, deserves greater attention? The one thing that's even worse than a nuclear-ready Iran and that can still be thwarted: an entire Middle East cast in Iran's nuclear mold. Earlier in 2004, senior Saudi officials announced their interest in acquiring or "leasing" nuclear weapons from China or Pakistan (a legal move under the NPT, so long as the weapons remain under Chinese or Pakistani "control"). Egypt, having revealed plans to develop a large nuclear desalinization plant, also recently received sensitive nuclear technology from Libya. Syria, meanwhile, is believed to be experimenting with uranium enrichment centrifuges. And Algeria is in the midst of upgrading its second large research reactor facility, which is still, curiously, ringed with air defense units.
If these states continue to pursue their nuclear dreams (spurred by Iran's example), could Iraq, with its considerable number of nuclear scientists and engineers, be expected to stand idly by? And what of Turkey, whose private sector was recently revealed to have been part of Pakistani proliferator Dr. A. Q. Khan's network? Will nuclear agitation to its south and its repeated rejection from the European Union cause Turkey to reconsider its non-nuclear status? What would happen if, under the pressure of increasing anti-US sentiment in Turkey, the US withdrew its forces, along with the tactical nuclear weapons it has based there?
What can be done to stem these developments?
First, the international community must challenge Iran's claim that its nuclear activities are peaceful and protected under the NPT. No nation that sits on so much oil and gas as Iran does has a legitimate, "peaceful" need to generate nuclear electricity. Consider: Had Iran openly solicited proposals to provide electrical generating capacity, all of the non-nuclear bids would have come in at a fraction of the cost of building nuclear power reactors and fuel production plants. These points need to be hammered home in the lead-up to the NPT review conference next May. Certainly, if the NPT is to prevent nuclear proliferation, it cannot allow nations the right to pursue dangerous, uneconomical nuclear activities that bring them within days of having an arsenal.
Second, the US and its allies should build on France's recent proposals that the UN Security Council adopt country-neutral rules for dealing with NPT violators. These rules should stipulate that countries that reject inspections and withdraw from the NPT (something Iran has threatened to do) without first addressing their previous violations must surrender and dismantle their nuclear capabilities (especially large research and power reactors and bulk handling facilities) to come back into compliance. They also would stipulate that nations not found to be in full compliance should no longer receive nuclear assistance from any other country (e.g., Russia to Iran to complete the reactor at Bushehr, which has been the "peaceful" justification for Iran's most dangerous nuclear activities) until the IAEA Board of Governors unanimously issues a clean bill of health.
Surely, if France can support such rules, so can Europe, the US, and its allies. If these nations unite, Russia, moreover, will likely follow, particularly if it receives a reward. (Here, one might start with the cost-free nuclear cooperative agreement Moscow has been seeking for so many years from the US.)
Finally, the US and its allies need to pace themselves. In the end, the only sure path to nonproliferation is more moderate self-rule and increased arms restraint backed by US and allied military resolve and economic cooperation. Iran's current rulers, for sure, will have to go. Until then, though, bombing or bribing Tehran should be put aside in favor of tightening up and enforcing the rules to keep others from following Iran's example.
Henry Sokolski is executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Washington, DC, and is editor with Patrick Clawson of "Checking Iran's Nuclear Ambitions" (US Army War College, 2004).
9/14/2004 | Clip No. 267 |
Iranian Political Analyst Proposes Sinking a Ship in the Straits of Hormuz |
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The following are excerpts from an interview with Iranian political analyst Abo al-Fazl Zohreh-Vand: Abu Al-Fazl: Iran is in a position where a nuclear attack against it is impossible. If it were to be attacked, the whole international atmosphere would be distorted. Everyone always talks about the oil in the Caucasus and central Asia. These are negligible quantities. Today, more than 70% of the oil comes from the Persian Gulf. If something happens to the Hormuz Straits if only one ship were to sink there the oil [supply] would stop and then you'd see what happen's to the world economy. Why should a bomb fall? Suppose some ship falls Suppose some tanker sinks in the Hormuz Straits As you know, there are two narrow waterways in the Hormuz Straits. One lane is used coming and the other is used going. Outside these corridors no ship can move. The water's depth permits passage only through these two lanes. If some tanker were to sink in one of these lanes, it will be impossible to export oil.
DoctorZin Note: To view this video click on the MemriTV logo above. |
I am just wonderning if there is a country any country that dosen't even recognise the current governmet in that country at all any at all?
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