Posted on 09/13/2004 4:41:01 PM PDT by Luis Gonzalez
Let's examine your "logic".
She reports an interview with a young man who was tortured by the Russians, and out of one side of your mouth, you call that "hearsay" because she wasn't a witness to his torture. And out of the other side now, in spite of the fact that you KNOW that she was drugged, and never arrived at Beslan, you condemn her for not reporting on something that she never actually saw!
Man...you have a serious logic deficiency issue.
Those things came about as a result of the freedom Russians enjoyed up until now, those freedoms are being rolled back.
Once again, you lack logic.
If things got better the way they were, how can they continue to be good, when by all indications Putin is rolling back Russia to the times when things were worse?
What's the opposite of Free Trade?
Government controlled trade.
Of the two, which one is most likely to be the way communist governments conduct trade?
If you are against free trade, then you are a communist.
Pick you allies genius... would you prefer Islam or Russia ?
I think I will stick with backing the Russians.
Neither.
No Evil Empire, no Axis of Evil for me.
I know.......silly of me to think that a few might support their colleagues.
Newsflash: The Soviet Union died in 1991. The Russian people do NOT hate us.
The Cold War is OVER.
I don't think that everything is negative in Russia today and I'm sure there are many positive trends. It sounds like as long as you don't criticize the government or complain about corruption, you will be left alone.
Drama queen, histrionic, liberal, liar......
Good call.
Then why are the same people still in charge?
Flash...you're naive as all get out.
JUST ON FOX - France and Russia gave assistance to terrorists in Iraq after the war started
Fox News | Just out | Bill Gertz
Posted on 09/09/2004 1:42:11 PM EDT by AWestCoaster
Linda Vester interviewed Bill Gertz on his new book 'Treachery.'
Some of the findings:
French government looked other way while arms dealers provided weapons to terrorists BEFORE and AFTER the Iraq war started.
French passports were provided to certain Iraqis to help them out of the country.
Russia provided terrorists expertise to jam our GPS bombs. Pres. Bush called Putkin to tell him to knock it off or Russians in Iraq would be potential targets.
MOSCOW (CP) - The temperature is plunging rapidly in U.S.-Russian ties, as the two sides exchange Cold War-style accusations and spar over the shape of the global order after America wins its war in Iraq.
"I can't remember seeing such sharp anti-American moods since the 1960s," says Alexander Panarin, who chairs the department of comparative politics at Moscow State University. Recent opinion polls suggest more than 90 per cent of Russians oppose U.S. military action in Iraq. "Elections are coming up in Russia, and every politician has to take the public's views into account," says Panarin.
The United States alleged this week that its forces fighting against Saddam Hussein's regime are at risk from sophisticated Russian-made weapons and electronic jamming equipment recently supplied by Russian companies to Baghdad, in breach of UN sanctions.
The Kremlin hotly denied the charges, and retorted that the United States has resumed the Cold War practice of sending high-flying U-2 spy planes to snoop on Russia from the airspace of Georgia, a former Soviet republic that's allied with the U.S. anti-Saddam coalition.
Russia's Defence Ministry says three U-2 flights in the past month have skirted Russia's borders, on one occasion causing fighter planes to be scrambled.
"There is an impression in Moscow that the U.S. is punishing us for our political stand against the war in Iraq," says Alexander Pikayev, an expert with the Carnegie Endowment in Moscow.
"We haven't seen this kind of rhetoric since the Cold War."
Antagonisms have been building up for months as Russia joined France in threatening to veto any UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq.
In the week since the war began, Moscow's opposition has toughened. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov warned that Moscow will block any future Security Council move to grant post facto legitimacy to the U.S.-led coalition's assault or its postwar control in Baghdad.
"Iraq does not need democracy brought on the wings of the Tomahawk," Ivanov said, referring to the U.S. cruise missiles.
Some experts warn that tensions could spiral, especially if the U.S. cuts Moscow out of the anticipated postwar reconstruction of Iraq.
Russian oil companies have major business in the region, including a $20-billion US contract by the partly state-owned LukOil firm to develop Iraq's huge West Qurna oilfield, which could be nullified by a post-Saddam regime in Baghdad.
"If we are shut out of Iraq, Russia will be angry," says Yevgeny Bazhanov, director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Institute of Contemporary International Studies. "The reasons are not so much economic, as that Russia cannot accept the U.S. acting as though it runs the world."
For many in Moscow, there is deep uncertainty about the further intentions of the U.S.
"If the Americans break Iraq's resistance swiftly, will they target Iran next?" says Panarin. "Russia has reasons to fear the threat coming into our own region."
Bazhanov raises the same worry: "If the Americans intend to move on to new targets after Iraq, it will be very dangerous," he says.
"Sooner or later, the U.S. must realize that it cannot solve all the world's problems on its own. It needs to co-operate with the UN, with Russia and others."
But the specific charges being traded could accelerate suspicions on both sides.
The U.S. claims that a Moscow-based company, Aviakonversiya, sold Iraq at least six of its portable jamming units, which are capable of scrambling the GPS signals used by many U.S. precision-guided munitions to locate their targets.
Aviakonversiya's director, Oleg Antonov, says the laptop-sized, three-kilogram devices were originally developed by Soviet scientists as an aid for astronomers.
Antonov says the American allegations that GPS jammers were delivered to Iraq are "nonsense." But he adds that Iraq "might have constructed such devices itself or purchased them from a third country."
A U.S. military spokesman on Tuesday declared that Iraqi efforts to baffle American guided weapons had failed miserably, and that all six Iraqi GPS jamming units had been destroyed in the early days of the war.
Two other Russian companies are suspected of providing militarily significant numbers of wire-guided Kornet anti-tank missiles, and thousands of night-vision goggles to Iraq in recent months. Some experts say the goggles could neutralize the American advantage in night-fighting.
Russian experts say all three companies named in the U.S. complaint do brisk export business, with customers that include the United Arab Emirates, Syria, Jordan, Yemen and India.
"These American allegations are plausible," says Vitaly Shlyikov, a former Russian deputy defence minister who is now an independent security consultant.
It's long been known that much of the former Soviet arsenal found its way into the international arms market during the wild 1990s, he notes, but the U.S. charges concern fresh production of advanced Russian weaponry.
"The fact is that the Kremlin is unable to control the situation, and the general climate of anti-Americanism prevailing among the Russian elite may encourage some businesspeople to take risks," such as dealing with Saddam, Shlyikov says.
"Russia would like to repair its relations with the U.S., but not at the cost of submitting to all American decisions," says Sergei Kazyonnov, an analyst with the independent Institute of National Security and Strategic Research in Moscow.
"The ball is in America's court now. If they want to be friends again, we're ready. If they want to go back to being enemies, we're ready for that too."
Flash...you're naive as all get out
I'm sure you extensive travelling in Russia has given you this insight.... when were you there last ?
The handwritting is on the wall.
They not only refused to back us in Iraq, but they supplied Iraq with technology to fight us.
Perhaps, the reason you defend Putin so heartily has a lot to do with your extensive travels through Russia.
This looks like a thread for the archives.
For a Russian Empire with a Tsar ? Yes it is ... new Soviet Union ... nope.
Perhaps, the reason you defend Putin so heartily has a lot to do with your extensive travels through Russia.
I don't defend Putin, that he is making mistakes is agreed, but do not be an idiot and think that the russian people are our enemies.
By RICHARD F. STAAR (1)
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace
Stanford University
On paper, the powers and responsibilities of Russia's Security Council (SC) are vast, but in practice Boris Yel'tsin jealously guarded his authority over the security services. During his tenure, the various "organs" were within the president's sole purview, the sphere upon which no one else should encroach. Thus, the security ministries were not subordinate to the government, nor were they subject to judicial or legislative oversight.
Institutionally, the SC secretary could amass substantial unchecked power. Yel'tsin, however, never let this happen. He used the Security Council as political necessity dictated, but never allowed it to become a genuinely autonomous institution. Vladimir Putin seems to have adopted a different approach. He has placed close allies, first Sergei Ivanov, then Vladimir B. Rushailo, in the secretary position, and has sought to broaden the structure of the SC. It remains to be seen if Putin feels secure enough to allow the SC to develop as a substantive institution and pursue meaningful progress on the national security agenda.
The Ten Secretaries
In July 1991, Yel'tsin issued a decree establishing a commission that would recommend the structure and duties of a Security Council (Sovet Bezopasnosti), to be chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Yuri B. Skokov. The following April, this man was appointed as the first secretary of the new council, which received the task of formulating domestic, foreign, and defense policies, i.e., preparing presidential decisions of a national security nature.(2)
Depending on his relationship with the president, the Security Council secretary may become the second most important personage in Russia or just another functionary without access to the top of the pyramid.(3) Yel'tsin would use the Security Council to fulfill a particularly important task (e.g., start and end the Chechen war) but then shuffle the cadres before the council could become a challenger to his authority.
The original council had a staff limited to 80 individuals, among whom about 20 came from the military. Most of the others were drawn from the former CPSU Central Committee apparatus or the military-industrial complex, in both of which Skokov had previously worked as a trusted Communist Party apparatchik (rising to deputy prime minister of the Russian republic). During July 1992, another Yel'tsin decree assigned to the Security Council secretary the task of coordinating the work of executive organs as well as implementing presidential national security directives.(4) The increased responsibility, however, would not translate into increased status for Skokov. Having opposed Yel'tsin's plans to introduce presidential rule during an October 1992 SC discussion, Skokov was passed over for prime minister two months later. He was fired the following May, after refusing to countersign a presidential decree introducing a state of emergency and dissolving parliament. Skokov's attempt to usurp external policy-making from the foreign affairs ministry with his own foreign policy concept also failed. Yel'tsin apparently never intended for the Security Council, and especially its secretary, to become powerful in their own right. Yel'tsin made sure that this situation, where the SC secretary attempts to thwart presidential authority over "the organs," would never recur.
Skokov was succeeded by the commanding officer for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) armed forces, Air Marshal Yevgeni I. Shaposhnikov, who had served as Soviet defense minister after the failed August 1991 coup attempt. Two weeks after Yel'tsin had appointed Marshal Shaposhnikov as SC secretary, he personally selected Lt. General Valeri L. Manilov as deputy secretary. This man had always served as a deputy commanding officer for political affairs (politruk) in the armed forces, i.e., as watchdog over the political reliability of combat officers. Obviously, Shaposhnikov did not have the full confidence of Yel'tsin. Although he did expand the staff to 150 individuals,(5) Shaposhnikov's appointment never was approved by the Supreme Soviet, and his tenure lasted less than two months. The appointment of a career armed forces officer would have suggested that the SC might be concentrating on military affairs rather than national security in the broader meaning of that term. Marshal Shaposhnikov had envisaged the SC as the center for coordination of all national security policies. To implement this concept effectively, cooperation of the defense minister, Army Gen. Pavel S. Grachev, as well as the interior minister, Col. Gen. Viktor F. Yerin, would have been necessary. This he did not achieve. The Supreme Soviet's refusal to confirm his appointment forced Shaposhnikov to resign.
Under its first two secretaries, the SC had functioned on the basis of collegiality. This condition ended with the appointment of then First Deputy Premier Oleg I. Lobov as secretary. He immediately began to recruit mid-level officials from the State Economic Planning Commission (Gosplan), where he had worked, and, thus, concentrated on the economy, with total staff increasing to around 300. In contrast to his predecessors, Lobov had strong support from the military-industrial complex, hence, his emphasis on economic security. Meanwhile, dissolution of the parliament by force in October 1993 reaffirmed Yel'tsin's dominance over the Security Council, which became even more pronounced. Yel'tsin strengthened the SC's power by listing it in the constitution as an official government organ. That document only states that the president "forms and leads the Security Council of the Russian Federation." But almost immediately, Yel'tsin created a counterweight. On 6 January 1994, Yel'tsin appointed an assistant for national security affairs in the person of Yuri M. Baturin, who was given oversight for the power "organs" (defense, interior, security, intelligence). Two months later, Baturin also became chairman of the commission on senior military and general officer ranks.
On 25 November 1994, the Security Council gave Yel'tsin its unanimous support for the invasion of Chechnya. Less than two weeks later, some 55,000 Russian troops marched into that mini-state to disarm an estimated 3,000 armed Chechens. Yel'tsin insisted that the above vote take place before any discussion. It's clear from a variety of sources that Yel'tsin reached the decision before the meeting was held. However, through the formality of the SC, its members shared the responsibility for the president's decision.(6) Those who subsequently voiced reservations included Justice Minister Yuri K. Kalmykov, foreign intelligence chief Yevgeni M. Primakov, and Foreign Minister Andrei V. Kozyrev.(7)
Lobov's attempts to strengthen his own influence were affected adversely by the war in Chechnya. His last mistake involved personal support for the "party of war" during the 1996 presidential election campaign. Hence Lobov reverted to deputy premier. He was succeeded as SC secretary by Lieutenant General Aleksandr I. Lebed'. The former paratrooper, a popular and flamboyant figure, had come in third during the first round of the presidential election. An endorsement by Lebed' was needed to bolster Yel'tsin's chances against communist candidate Gennady Zyuganov in the run-off race. This support was rewarded with the SC secretary position.(8) In his new office, Lebed' carried out Yel'tsin's campaign promise: to end the war in Chechnya. Thereby Lebed' accepted the responsibility for the cease-fire signed at Khasavyurt, Dagestan, in August 1996 just as the SC had accepted the responsibility for the invasion.
To counter Lebed's growing popularity, President Yel'tsin established a Defense Council under Baturin. It functioned as a new control mechanism formalizing Baturin's authority over the power ministries. These moves undercut SC power. In October 1996, after only 133 days on the job, Lebed' was dismissed for insubordination to Yel'tsin, who did not want him as his successor.(9) When he learned that Yel'tsin would have heart surgery, Lebed' urged the president to transfer his executive powers to him before the operation. The general was fired by the president on national television.
The next SC secretary, Ivan P. Rybkin, had been the first speaker of the State Duma. His appointment sent a signal that the Security Council's purview would be demilitarized. Rybkin had served as an adviser to financial tycoon Boris A. Berezovsky. As the Chechnya problem continued to fester, the latter became SC deputy secretary. This allowed Berezovsky to secure his financial interests, e.g., transit of oil from the Caspian Sea across Chechnya. In this period, Baturin managed military reform while the Security Council began to emphasize domestic security over international affairs and commenced work on a new security policy concept. Then Rybkin signaled that the SC would undergo a demilitarization and perhaps become more open in its activities.
In March 1998, Rybkin(10) in turn was succeeded by Andrei A. Kokoshin as a move possibly to weaken Berezovsky's influence within the circle of advisers around Yel'tsin. At this point, the SC absorbed the Defense Council, where Kokoshin had replaced Baturin. The first deputy defense minister in 1992, Kokoshin became the sole defense intellectual to serve as SC secretary. Prior to that, he had been the principal military inspector and secretary of the Defense Council. Kokoshin brought his former staff with him, which capped the SC to some 200 persons. However, the SC no longer dealt with Chechnya and was charged with reforming the armed forces.
Kokoshin's successor, Col. General Bordyuzha, former director of the Federal Border Service, received a concurrent appointment as head of the presidential administration in the Kremlin. Yel'tsin began attending SC meetings less frequently and, hence, the prestige of this organization declined. Bordyuzha cut the number of SC staffers back to 175 individuals. Bordyuzha, seen as an ally of Primakov, was removed at roughly the same time as Primakov's other important ally, Prosecutor General Yuri I. Skuratov. Conflicts with Yel'tsin's older daughter, Tatyana Dyachenko (in charge of public relations for the Kremlin), led to both men's dismissals during the spring of 1999. In this period the influence of the SC had continued to decline.
Since his appointment as FSB director in the summer of 1998, Vladimir V. Putin had the ear of the "tsar."(11) After Putin was made SC secretary in March 1999, the body's prestige increased dramatically. Under the new secretary, the SC commenced intensive work on various national security concepts and doctrines. Putin is reputed to have told his former colleagues that the FSB (former KGB) now had a foothold in the Kremlin. After he had been named prime minister on 9 August 1999, he held both positions for three months, allowing him to amass more power over the security services than any previous prime minister.
The subsequent SC secretary, Sergei B. Ivanov,(12) had served as Putin's deputy in the FSB. Ivanov completed work on several doctrines and concepts begun under his predecessor. In November 2000, his rank as lieutenant general in the foreign intelligence service was revoked, anticipating that he would become the first "civilian" defense minister on 28 March 2001. Both Putin and Ivanov studied at Leningrad State University, entered the KGB, and served abroad; the former in East Germany and the latter in Sweden. From this point on, foreign policy was being formulated by the Security Council and then implemented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Oversight for military reform was again transferred to SC purview, obviously with more authority than Kokoshin ever had.
The days of the special services did not end, however. The current SC secretary is Vladimir B. Rushailo, a colonel general and career police officer, who had served as minister for internal affairs. It is possible that the SC will decline in importance under this man, another close associate of Putin who was instrumental in the presidential campaign. His entire career had been concentrated on the struggle against domestic crime. Such a background does not suggest a dynamic personality who would be capable of making recommendations on high-level national security policies to the president of Russia.(13)
Rushailo's appointment was completely unexpected. Given his background, emphasis is likely to be focused on the struggle against domestic crime and terrorism. Hence, international affairs will be concentrated in the hands of Putin, with advice from Defense Minister Ivanov rather than the foreign minister or the SC, which again has been saddled with responsibility for the war in Chechnya. It is worth noting that a majority of the SC secretaries has come from the armed forces, the KGB/FSB, and uniformed police-especially the most recent four individuals.
Under Putin, the SC underwent an important alteration. The seven super-administrative districts were established by decree on 13 May 2000. All seven presidential representatives are ex officio members of the Security Council. This also portends a decline in the influence of the Security Council from the most important policy-making body in the diplomatic and national defense areas to a resurrected political bureau of the former ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Mikhail S. Gorbachëv's last politburo(14) included eight regular members plus fifteen ex-officio CPSU leaders from the constituent republics. Only the former voted. The parallel is striking!
Modus Operandi
Formally established by presidential decree no. 547 on 3 June 1992, the Security Council's principal tasks were enumerated at that time. Preparation of presidential decisions takes place through the six inter-agency commissions. These are organized along functional lines. Initially, there had been 10 such commissions.
The secretary bears personal responsibility for all SC activities. He interacts with other governmental ministers and agencies, and his oral reports to the Russian president take place on a weekly basis. This routine allows him to influence all decisions of a national security nature, if he has the intellectual capacity to do so.
The following basic tasks, assigned to the SC, appear in federal legislation "On Security": (15)
assessing internal and external threats and their sources
preparing scientifically based prognoses about changes in domestic and foreign security considerations
developing and coordinating federal programs to safeguard Russian Federation (RF) security
analyzing and processing information concerning preservation of RF security
informing the SC about implementing its decisions
organizing scientific research on RF security
preparing SC decisions and proposals for presidential decrees about security
preparing analytical information materials for the president
The third consecutive secretary published an article about the above activities. According to Oleg Lobov, the SC had become the lead consultative-coordinating organ in the field of national security. Its main tasks included
implementation of presidential functions in domestic, foreign, and military security policies;
preservation of Russia's sovereignty;
support for sociopolitical stability in society; and
defense of citizens' rights and freedoms(16)
Recommendations are voted on and passed by simple majority among the five permanent SC members and the chairman (who certainly has veto power), the nineteen regular members having only a consultative voice but no vote. Meetings of the council, which at times may be of an extraordinary nature, take place at least once a month. They are chaired by President Putin. He has the decisive vote, as suggested above.
The basic working organs are the six inter-agency commissions. (See chart.) These may be of a temporary nature, established for a limited period of time. Chaired by senior professional staff members of the SC apparatus, they represent the working level of this organization.
The SC secretary is also a permanent member of the council, with responsibility for planning the work schedule and for preparation of projects and documentation required by other SC members on current and anticipated future issues. He is the basic coordinator as well as link between the SC and executive/legislative branches of the government.
During his weekly sessions with the president, the SC secretary reports on the most important problems that require personal intervention by the chief of state. The intention here is to alert the president in advance regarding the development of crisis situations as well as key problems in the national security field. The SC may also be at the receiving end of this process, e.g., when Boris Yel'tsin asked it to prepare a concept for the 1996 national budget.
It is apparent from the foregoing that the use to which the Security Council has been applied has varied, depending upon the incumbent secretary. The last three of these men had served in the KGB/FSB or the uniformed police. All of them shared the same Weltanschauung, namely an outlook that had been shaped throughout their earlier careers.
The National Security Concept
A general document with this title was intended to include economic, ecological, social, defense information, and other security assessments. Central would be the place and role of Russia in the contemporary world, including its national interests, parameters for guaranteeing security, and freedom to develop both society as well as individuals. Never before had such a task been undertaken.
Toward the end of December 1997, President Yel'tsin signed decree no. 1300, titled "National Security Concept of the Russian People,"(17) having been produced by a team under the fifth consecutive SC secretary, Ivan P. Rybkin.
Work on a new national security concept probably began when Putin served in the above capacity and was completed by his successor, Lt. General (in the foreign intelligence service) Sergei B. Ivanov. Approved by presidential decree on 10 January 2000,(18) it repeats the same two main global trends: (1) a unipolar world, supported by the United States; and (2) a multipolar world, espoused by Russia. The first is based allegedly on unilateral solutions and the use of military force, regardless of international law.
Specific threats to Russia are perceived as originating because of its weakened scientific research and development (R & D) capability, increased dependence on foreign technology, and deteriorating defense posture. Information warfare is being waged to expel Russia from its own internal and external information markets. NATO's use of force, outside of its area of responsibility and without UN permission, could lead to global destabilization. Foreign special services are increasing their activities against Russia. Reforms of the military and defense industry are being delayed, with equipment stocks at impermissibly low levels. Social problems also lead to a weakening of military security.
Threats to Russia's national security are listed as follows: (1) a weakened R & D; (2) scientific brain drain; (3) separatism; (4) international terrorism; (5) NATO expansion; (6) foreign special services; and (7) delays in reforming the armed forces and defense industry.
Tasks envisaged by the currently applicable national security concept include identifying the above threats and removing them, ensuring security of borders, improving the economy, overcoming science and technology dependence on foreign sources, strengthening the system of state power, et al.
The New Military Doctrine
The next major document produced by the Security Council was approved by presidential decree on 21 April 2000.(19) It begins with an assessment of the politico-military situation facing Russia, as follows:
decline in the threat of a large-scale, including nuclear, war;
strengthening of regional power centers, ethnic and regional extremism, and separatism;
spread of local wars and armed conflict; and
proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.
Next, the main threats to Russian military security were identified as follows:
territorial claims;
ignoring Russian interests;
armed conflict close to CIS borders;
expansion of foreign blocs and alliances;
stationing of troops close to CIS borders;
armed provocation versus Russian military located on foreign soil;
hostile information operations;
discrimination against Russian citizens in foreign countries; and
international terrorism.
To safeguard military security, the new doctrine proclaims that Russia will strengthen the CIS alliance; give preference to nonmilitary means when facing military threats; observe arms control treaties (the RF is ready for further reductions of nuclear weapons bilaterally with the United States); and promote expansion of confidence-building measures.
"The Russian Federation will not use nuclear weapons against any signatory to the Nonproliferation Treaty that does not possess such arms, except for an attack by such a state against the Russian Federation."
The new military doctrine has classified military operations into four basic categories:
large-scale (regional) war to protect Russia and its allies;
local wars to neutralize the aggressor;
internal armed conflicts to liquidate illegal armed formations; and
peacekeeping [Russian word is miro-tvorchestvo, or "peace-making," which implies the use of force]
The introduction to this document repeats the description of two contradictory international trends from the National Security Concept: (1) toward a "unipolar" world domi nated by the United States, and (2) toward a "multipolar" world based on rules of international law and favored by Russia.
The 1993 military doctrine had distinguished between dangers and threats, with the former representing a possibility of war and the latter suggesting an imminent outbreak of war. The 28 basic provisions to guarantee military security, both during peace as well as war, remain unchanged from the earlier version of the doctrine.
The conditions for use of nuclear weapons are the same as those specified above in the national security concept. First use is not ruled out.
In effect, those who prepared the latest version of the military doctrine refused to admit that Russia is no longer a superpower, nor can they shed the fear of nonexistent foreign threats. Only military power can ensure their security and allay a paranoid view of the world.
Information Security Doctrine
A third important document emanating from the SC is the Information Security Doctrine,(20) approved by Putin on 12 September 2000. Henceforth, the 26 pages of legislation provide the government with power to decide what is "socially significant" and required to "protect society from distorted and inaccurate information." The term "independent Russian press" does not appear in the text.
Divided into ten sections, the new doctrine states that "freedom of information is guaranteed and censorship prohibited." One threat to Russia's information security is the allegedly increasing dependence of public life on "foreign information structures." Who will decide what is significant and accurate? Obviously, the "properly qualified agencies" of government.(21)
Apart from instituting a tight system of control over the mass media, the new information security concept establishes censorship, which can result in blocking independent sources of information. The government's communications intelligence agency (FAPSI) will prevent the spread of disinformation throughout the seven super-administrative districts established by Putin's decree of 13 May 2000. All of these presidential representatives are ex officio members of the Security Council.
1. A senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Richard Staar is a student of Russian affairs. The author wishes to thank Molly Molloy, Slavic Reference Librarian at the Hoover Institution, for her research contributions to this article.
2. Aleksei Mukhin, Spetssluzhby Rossii i bol'shaya polityka (Moscow: Tsentr, 2000), pp. 71-79.
3. Carolina Vendit, "The Russian Security Council," European Security, vol. 10 (summer 2001), pp. 7882; London.
4. Yuri V. Skokov, "My povernuli reformu," Pravda, 27 July 1993, p. 1.
5. Yevgeni I Shaposhnikov, Vybor (Moscow: PIK, 1995), pp. 256-284.
6. Yevgeni Primakov, Vosem mesyatsev plus (Moscow: Mysl, 2001) p. 92, and Yuri Baturin, et. al., Epokha Yel'tsina (Moscow: Varginus, 2001) pp. 597-598.
7. Valeri Vyzhutovich, "Mezhdu SB i politburo...," Izvestiya, 16 February 1995, p. 4. All decisions were made "by consensus," according to SC deputy secretary V. L. Manilov, who had been interviewed for this article.
8. Richard F. Staar, "Security Council," in The New Military in Russia (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996), pp. 3742.
9. Unfortunately, Lebed' does not discuss these events in his book, Ideologiya zdravogo smysla (Moscow: Rus'-Fil'm, 1997), pp. 57.
10. Ivan P. Rybkin, K bezopasnosti-cherez soglasie i doverie (Moscow: Sofrino, 1997; 78 pp.).
11. Baturin, Yuri, op.cit., p. 782.
12. Valeri Aleksin, "Glavnoe ugrozy bezopasnosti Rossii-vnutrennie," Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, no. 12 (713 April 2000), pp. 1 and 3; interview with Ivanov.
13. Oleg I. Lobov, "Sovet Bezopasnosti Rossii i natsional'nye interesy strany," Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn', no. 10 (October 1995), pp. 1322, at p. 16.
14. Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Directory of Soviet Officials (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 1990), pp. 149151.
15. Cited by Valeri L. Manilov, Bezopasnost' v epokhu partnerstva (Moscow: Terra, 1999), pp. 162163.
16. Oleg Lobov, op. cit.
17. See Perspective, vol. 8, no. 3 (JanuaryFebruary 1998), pp. 48.
18. "Kontseptsiya natsional'noi bezopasnosti R.F.," http://www.scrf.gov.ru/Documents/Decree/2000/24-1.html (17 pp.).
19."Voennaya doktrina R.F.," http://www.scrf.gov.ru/Documents/Decree/2000/706-1.html (21 pp.).
20. "Doktrina informatsionnoi bezopasnosti R.F.," http://www.scrf.gov.ru/Documents/Decree/2000/09-09.html (26 pp.).
21. Svetlana Babaeva, "Opasnaya li informatsiya," Izvestiya, 13 September 2000, p. 3.
Luis,
Most of these people don't care about what is going on if things aren’t looking so bright, while a very small few here may even wish for the return of communism because they are silently like them. As for the rest, they want to shop, have fun, party, and see nothing but good times from now till they no longer are with us. Anything, and I mean anything that gets in the way of this view will be put down at all costs despite what the facts are. They will ignore those facts, not answer them, come back at you with tripe little comments like:
that there economy is doing so well despite that fact that political structures gives the freedom for this, which ironically is now being sovietized, but I guess I am being negative(another failure of an argument on their part since it does not prove whether something is factual or not) for pointing out reality; or another favorite of theirs is ‘where you there’ or ‘ever visited’, implying then you have no right to say anything even when the news accounts are as plain as day(but this argument falls to the ground as it has nothing to do with the facts as they are here, they have only a feel good mentality that justifies putting some one down for bring a little sobering reality back into their life). Then there was one about how favorable the people of Russia have of the U.S. but as you pointed out relations are not so good. The people have about a 9% favorable rating of us, not a surprise given all the propaganda feed to them over the last 5 years, not to mention life is still hard over there. Yes it is true that many Russians had a high rating of us during the cold war, so what? It didn’t stop the government that enslaved them from doing rotten things. It won’t stop this government from doing rotten things except this time will have the full backing of the people(that scares me), well at least until they realize they have been had which could take a while.
All of their arguments are false unless they are willing to argue the facts and show that the worst is not transpiring before our eyes. But as anyone with an open eye, forget and open mind at this point, can see the facts speak for themselves. The reality doesn’t get anymore blunt than this, well..... maybe with the exception of having all out war. Of course if we wake up in time we might avoid that, but with people like the ones you have been arguing with I have little hope as they seem to be the norm today. However that doesn’t mean anyone should stop trying to point out the truth, God only knows, we need it now more than ever.
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