Some Fort Detrick Labs Closed

WJZ ^ | Jul 20, 2004 10:25 am

[Shermy]

If I recall the current 9/11 report correctly it "exonerated" Saudi Arabia. But then mentioned that charities connected with the Saudi Arabian govt. may have been involved.

So Saudi was not "exonerated" and certainly the Saudi govt. would have never acted without intermediates. It sounded like a cover up to me, with a deflective exoneration to deter most inquirers from looking further.

[John Faust]

Have any Saudi officials or princes or even any of the ex-Iran-contra figures made any noteworthy comments on the anthrax case?

Wasn't Colin Powell on the periphery of Iran-Contra? His UN speech emphasized what Iraq could do with a vial of anthrax. Some took that to be a veiled reference to the 2001 letters.

There is Armitage too. Called "my white son" by Powell. Has he said anything about the anthrax case?

[Khan Noonian Singh]

On a related topic, here is a choice rarity.

Have you ever wondered what points an experienced special ops strategist would make about the anthrax letters?

Here are some comments by the late Theodore G. Shackley, CIA covert operations specialist, counterinsurgency expert and low-intensity warfare strategist extraordinaire. They're from Still the Target, a book he wrote in the aftermath of 09-11-01, about how people can protect themselves against the risk of terrorism.

To tie this to the discussion, Shackley was very close to some of the Iran-Contra principals - Thomas Clines et cetera - and there are rumourly suspicions that Shackley had still some unrevealed rôle in Iran-contra.

In an early chapter of the book, Shackley analyses Pres Bush's actions against terrorism. He is positive about Bush's high-level strategy.

Here is a short passage. It's what Ted Shackley says about President Bush's handling of the problem of maintaining popular support for a long drawn-out war. This is the only place I found in the book where he mentions the anthrax letters.

---

Excerpt from Still the Target, by Theodore G. Shackley
With Khan's commentary after the excerpt

Sustaining Popular Support

President Bush and his administration, mindful of the lessons of Vietnam, decided early in the war to sustain popular support for their protracted war strategy. As a result, the President and his cabinet appeared regularly at scheduled events -- at news conferences, TV talk shows, visits to airports, federal agencies, and the Ground Zero sites in New York and Washington, in order to keep the nation informed on what was being done to fight the war.

The popular response to these efforts was overwhelmingly supportive. Sadly, however, a small anti-war movement developed, primarily under the guise of anti-globalization. The debate that this produced had to proceed, unpleasant though it may have been, for this is democracy at work.

A more significant blemish on the Bush performance chart developed from the anthrax issue. The handling of this matter can, at best, be described as inept. No one in government was prepared for what happened. The experts did not envision "someone" sending expertly processed anthrax spores through the mail. Nor did the scientific gurus anticipate that the spores would pop out of letters during post office processing and infect postal workers.

What is now clear is that the following five lessons have been learned from the nation's anthrax experience to date:

1. Medical scientists thought they knew anthrax. But they now say they overestimated the death rate for those infected and had no idea how many spores a person must inhale to develop the disease.
2. Procedures for communicating about unfolding events proved inadequate for reassurance of a frightened public.
3. Federal, state and local governments were unprepared for the close collaboration required in an investigation combining the medical and the criminal.
4. Laboratories were unexpectedly swamped with samples that had to be tested for anthrax spores.
5. In the special case of anthrax, there was a misunderstanding of the difference between the goals of terrorism and the goals of warfare. In short, warfare seeks to conquer territories and capture cities. The terrorist wants to hurt a few people and scare a lot of people in order to make a point.

The FBI, as of January 30, 2002, was taking the position that a single person is most likely responsible for the anthrax mailings that killed five people. This person has laboratory experience and probably has or has had legitimate access to dangerous germs. This conclusion is based on the fact that the perpetrator selected the highly virulent Ames strain of anthrax to use in the mailings. The FBI summarizes its position by saying, "The killer has the technical knowledge and/or expertise to produce a highly refined and deadly product."

---

Khan's Annotated Commentary on this passage by Theodore G. Shackley

In the commentary below, <<TGS>> is shorthand for << Theodore G. Shackley >>.

* TGS says, "The handling of this matter can, at best, be described as inept."

<< At best... inept >>? That means that it's probably worse than << inept >>. But what is worse than inept? Utterly confuzed? Downright negligent? Maybe even criminally responsible? What?

 
** TGS says, "The experts did not envision "someone" sending expertly processed anthrax spores through the mail."

Two remarques:

- Why did TGS put the word "someone" in scare quotes? The quotes look out of place. What do they mean? Is TGS with subtlety hinting that he has an idea who the someone is, that it's not really a mysterious "someone"?

- Nota bene - TGS acknowleges that the spores were << expertly processed >>. He does not mince words over that.

 
*** From TGS's lesson 5, one can infer that he views the anthrax mailings as part of some organised, purposeful terrorist action, not just something done by a single deranged person of pathology.

**** As a set-off or contrast, TGS states the FBI's view << that a single person is most likely responsible for the anthrax mailings....... >> Throughout this paragraph, he with care delineates the FBI's public position as distinct, and, I infer, different, from his own.

***** Why does TGS not mention the anthrax mailings in his chapter on biological and chemical weapons? If the mailings were important enough to mention in the early chapter where he sets the theme and the context, why does he completely ignore them when he discusses in detail the subject of terrorists' use of biological weapons?

****** Why does TGS choose to bring up the anthrax mailings only in the context of how to sustain public support for the war? It's the sole mention of the mailings. Why is the section on how to sustain public support for the war the particular spot in the book where TGS discusses the mailings?

[Allan]

Well
this is an interesting surprise.
I was not aware that the elder TGS wrote a book after 09-11-01.
If I am not mistaken
he died within a year after the event.

[Mitchell]

I searched and found a reference and brief description from the publisher, American Literary Press (Noble House). Co-author (or ghostwriter?) Finney is apparently another ex-CIA agent.

---

Still The Target: Coping with Terror and Crime
by Theodore G. Shackley with Richard A Finney
ISBN 1-56167-786-8,  160 pages, $18.95 US, $23.95 CAN

The world is quite different from what it was prior to September 11th and the threat of a future terrorist attack is real.  Fear, surprise, and havoc are the terrorists' main weapons.  Still The Target is a counter-weapon.  The first line of defense is a heightened awareness and this book offers practical strategies that corporations, governments, and private individuals can put into play to protect themselves from acts of terrorism.  The vivid case studies, the research findings, and the authors' past CIA experience are woven together to bring into focus the evil patterns of thinking that lie behind the violence of hi-jackings, kidnappings, and assassinations. Still The Target will provide readers with the most current information available today.

---

[Mitchell]

There is Armitage too. Called "my white son" by Powell. Has he said anything about the anthrax case?

Armitage testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Jan. 30, 2003. Here's how his testimony started:

Testimony of Richard L. Armitage
Deputy Secretary of State
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
30 January 2003

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee.

In October 2001, a single letter containing one teaspoon of anthrax threw this body into chaos. The offices next door were closed down for three months. Hundreds of your staff were subjected to emergency medical treatment. And two postal service employees died -- the building they worked in is still not open for business.

According to the United Nations Special Commission [UNSCOM], which carried out inspections in Iraq for the better part of a decade, Iraq possesses some 25,000 liters of anthrax. That is, for the record, more than 5 million teaspoons of anthrax. And we have no idea where any of it is. Saddam Hussein has never accounted for one grain of it.

This is a matter of terrible urgency. I welcome the opportunity to discuss with you and this Committee the latest developments in the inspection process and what those developments mean for our commitment, as a country and as part of the world community, to see that Iraq is disarmed fully, finally and right now of all weapons of mass destruction and terror....

You can read his entire speech at http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20030131a3.html.

[Allan]

Iraq possesses some 25,000 liters of anthrax.

Regarding which
I have been waiting
in vain
many months now
for an official report
on the status of this missing anthrax.

Surely
a most striking case
of a dog that didn't bark.

[John Faust]

"I was not aware that the elder TGS wrote a book after 09-11-01."

The "elder" TGS? Did Shackley have a son also in intelligence work?

[Mitchell]

The status is: Missing in January 2003, and still missing today.

[Khan Noonian Singh]

<< The "elder" TGS? Did Shackley have a son also in intelligence work? >>

His obituary http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A48202-2002Dec12 says that he was survived by his wife, his daughter and two grandsons. No son. I nevver heard of his daughter or grandsons doing intelligence work.

If Ted Shackley is << the elder TGS >>, then who is << the younger TGS >>?

Also in the obit, FYI... The date of Shackley's death was 9 December 2002.

[apokatastasis]

The existence of the 25,000 liters of anthrax is entirely conjectural. It is in fact the amount of anthrax that could have been grown, using growth media which Iraq is known to have ordered.

[apokatastasis]

The other TGS is banned freeper "The Great Satan", who now runs a blog on the topic of "Iraq, 9/11, and Anthrax". There's no connection to Shackley.

[Mitchell]

The existence of the 25,000 liters of anthrax is entirely conjectural.

The exact amount is conjectural. But, from UNSCOM's final reports, according to your link:

Iraq admitted to the weaponization of thousands of liters of anthrax, botulinim [sic] toxin, and aflatoxin for use with Scud warheads, aerial bombs and aircraft.

Now, it's true that this includes not just anthrax, but also botulinum toxin and aflatoxin, and it says "thousands of liters" instead of "25,000 liters" specifically.

So we still have a "dog that didn't bark". Where are the thousands of liters of anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin that Iraq admitted to having? Or, if the admission was a bluff on the part of Saddam or his scientists, where is the evidence of that?

[Allan]

There's no connection to Shackley.

Of course not.
It would be totally absurd to suggest such a thing.

[Khan Noonian Singh]

<< The other TGS is banned freeper "The Great Satan", who now runs a blog on the topic of "Iraq, 9/11, and Anthrax". There's no connection to Shackley. >>

That's funny. I don't know about that freeper, but many yrs ago I heard from several people how Ted Shackley expressed wry amusement at his initials being the same as those of Iran's << The Great Satan >> monicker.

Shackley was undubitably cognisant of the coincidence. He was unflaggingly busy during the 70s, the time when the Iranians were loudly vocal with chants and screeds about << The Great Satan >> , as they hatefully called the US. Being in the intelligence biz, and having the initials TGS, it didn't glide by him unnoticed.

[Mitchell]

It would be totally absurd to suggest such a thing.

Ahh, the Theater of the Absurd.

Always entertaining.

As I recall, Godot even made an appearance, so to speak, on an earlier anthrax thread.

[John Faust]

Ahh, the Theater of the Absurd.
Always entertaining.

Do not dismiss the Absurd as if it were mere entertainment.

The Absurd gives birth to Meaning, like Ashes bring forth the Phoenix.

[apokatastasis]

It turns out Shackley ran some sort of front company called TGS International.

I went to school at a "TGS" myself... Maybe I should get a new hobby that doesn't involve the perils of paranoid synthesis.

[Mitchell]

the perils of paranoid synthesis

Truly a delightful phrase. You have captured the core of tin-foil.

However, when looking at covert activities, one can't apply normal standards of paranoia. After all, covert activities are frequently bizarre, and false clues are usually planted with them.

Moreover, there is a tendency to go toward the extreme. This is partly because that fits the psychology of the participants, and partly because it helps hide the operation. How does it hide the operation? If the true story is sufficiently bizarre, reasonable people will usually reject suspicions as paranoia, relegating any such theory to the realm of crackpots. Ridicule by association is a powerful tool of disinformation.

How paranoid would one have to be to have taken seriously, in advance, the 9/11 plot, or Iran-Contra, or attempted assassination by exploding cigar, or any number of other similar incidents?

Some theories, on the other hand, are nonsense, of course.

I submit that there is no general way to distinguish, in advance, paranoid tin-foil from the bits and pieces of an actual covert operation.

And, although we don't know who was responsible for the anthrax letters, it is apparent that those mailings were a covert operation.

[I should add that I do not know whether the particular line of investigation being suggested on this thread has any merit.]

[apokatastasis]

I recently read The Hidden Hand: Middle East Fear of Conspiracy by Daniel Pipes, which argues that conspiracy theory ("conspiracism") is a central feature of Middle Eastern political culture. He also says that one of the things promoting this situation is "the plethora of actual conspiracies"! He also wrote another book, just called Conspiracy, which argues for a connection between conspiracism in power and totalitarianism - in his opinion the two most conspiracist recent societies were Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Both ideologies were conspiracist (the Jews conspiring against the Aryans, the bosses conspiring against the workers); both governments had their origin in the seizure of power by a counter-conspiracy; and both societies were genuinely conspiracy-ridden, because of their conspiracist political cultures. I have this notion of my own that the world has experienced four (and maybe now five) great outbursts of this symbiosis between conspiracism and counter-conspiracy in the past century: 1920s Russia, 1940s Germany, 1960s China, 1980s Iran, and, just maybe, 2000s USA. One might hope that this latest iteration is a little gentler in its outcome, being based more on DIY Internet theorizing than on demagogic mass media.

In any case, whether or not DU-style conspiracy theory deserves a place in the historical Hall of Fame, I think it is very likely that al Qaeda fits the pattern identified by Pipes - it's a real-life counter-conspiracy motivated by an erroneous conspiracy theory, in this case the "conspiracy against Islam", a concept which first became state ideology in Khomeini's Iran.

I'd also like to see someone write a study of conspiracist thinking in the world's intelligence services. Once again, it's a situation where "if you're not paranoid, you're crazy", and the challenge is to develop a rational paranoia...