Posted on 05/22/2004 5:41:40 PM PDT by b4its2late
Point taken. I too trust his motives, though I understand they are not in league with my own.
exactly!!
Flowers don't come from the barrel of a gun. I don't depend on the media to know that. You must be a chickenhawk.
Michael Moore conspirazoids are on board, ignore them.
Thanks for the info, unfortunately the NeoCons on the board (some of them don't even know that's their bent towards that ideology) have decided to hell with the facts, civility and fair discussion, smearing ALL that don't blindly follow their mindset as lefty commies (a trick from the liberal's playbook).
Even though I don't agree with Gen. Zinny on many points, I thought giving the man credit where credits due was in order before attacking his words on 60 minutes.
God Bless...
So there lefty poet, are you going to share your affiliation with the majority anti-war "kamp" or just grovel around avoiding the question?
Here's a better one: defeatist.
The Quislings on Ice trolls are skating on thin ice yet again this morning.
You're mistaken.
General Zinni had two tours in Vietnam, the second tour had him medi-evac out in 1970. A Bronze star w/ Valor device plus a gold star in lieu of 2 award, Purple heart, Navy Commendation Medal w/ Combat V device ...
Would you like to try and flip flop your way out of claiming to be in the majority "kamp" that opposed the way?
Keep on paddelin.....
Upstream and beyond.
GW in 2004
Man, have you should have gotten vaccinated for rabies. All that drool and foam on your keyboard is gonna take it's toll ya troll!
Yawn.
I agree Walt, would have been more prudent (where have I heard that b4??) to put pressure on Iran, North Korea and Saudi Arabia to clean-up there whack-job country before invaded a regime we already had under our thumb.
I'm afraid unless Bush comes up with some serious WMD in Iraq and/or Osama Bin Runin, the whole Iraq fiasco will turn into a nightmare under Kerry.
God help our troops!
God's looking out for our troops. Bush is President and Zinni and Clark are retired.
I don't know a lot about General Zinni, but I'm in agreement with you in giving the Man, the Soldier, the General, the VietNam Survivor credit where credit is due, and addressing any of his intellectual drawbacks with more than cheap shots.
Let me put it this way, who would I rather have protecting me, him or his current band of detractors? The General wins immediately, and without the slightest doubt.
Yep, tell that to the survivors of the Cole.
By Richard Miniter
Part one of an exclusive four-part series of excerpts. Clinton administration counter-terrorism czar Richard Clarke attended a meeting with Secretary of Defense William Cohen, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Attorney General Janet Reno, and others. Several others were in the room, including Leon Fuerth, Gore's national security advisor; Jim Steinberg, the deputy National Security Advisor; and Michael Sheehan, the State Department's coordinator for counterterrorism. An American warship had been attacked without warning in a "friendly" harbor — and, at the time, no one knew if the ship's pumps could keep it afloat for the night. Now they had to decide what to do about it.
Mr. Clarke had no doubts about whom to punish. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had compiled thick binders of bin Laden and Taliban targets in Afghanistan, complete with satellite photographs and GPS bomb coordinates — the Pentagon's "target decks." The detailed plan was "to level" every bin Laden training camp and compound in Afghanistan as well as key Taliban buildings in Kabul and Kandahar. "Let's blow them up," Clarke said. . . . Around the table, Clarke heard only objections — not a mandate for action.
This is how Clarke remembers the meeting, which has never before been described in the press. . . . Attorney General Janet Reno insisted that they had no clear idea who had actually carried out the attack. The "Justice [Department] also noted, as always, that any use of force had to be consistent with international law, i.e. not retaliation but self protection from future attack," Clarke told the author. Reno could not be reached for comment.
Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet joined Reno in insisting on an investigation before launching a retaliatory strike. Tenet "did not want a months-long investigation," CIA spokesman Bill Harlow said. "He simply believed that before the United States attacked, it ought to know for sure who was behind the Cole bombing." While Tenet noted that the CIA had not reached a conclusion about what terror group was behind the surprise attack on the USS Cole, "he said personally he thought that it would turn out to be al Qaeda," Clarke recalls.
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was also against a counterstrike — but for diplomatic reasons. "We're desperately trying to halt the fighting that has broken out between Israel and the Palestinians," Albright said. Clarke recalls her saying, "Bombing Muslims wouldn't be helpful at this time." Some two weeks earlier, Ariel Sharon had visited the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, which touched off a wave of violence known as the "second Intifada" and threatened to completely destroy the Clinton Administration's hopes for Middle East peace settlement.
Mr. Clarke remembers other objections from the State Department. "State noted that we had been bombing Iraq and Serbia and were getting the reputation internationally as a mad bomber nation that could only address its problems that way." "It would be irresponsible," a spokeswoman for Albright told the author, for the Secretary of State, as America's chief diplomat, not to consider the diplomatic impact of a missile strike that might try but would quite likely fail to kill bin Laden.
Albright urged continued diplomatic efforts to persuade the Taliban to turn over bin Laden. Those efforts had been going on for more than two years and had gone nowhere. It was unlikely that the Taliban would ever voluntarily turn over its strongest internal ally. . . .
Secretary of Defense Cohen also did not favor a retaliatory strike, according to Mr. Clarke. The attack "was not sufficient provocation," Clarke remembers Cohen saying, or words to that effect. Cohen thought that any military strike needed a "clear and compelling justification," Clarke recalls. (Cohen, despite repeated phone calls over more than one week, failed to respond to interview requests.) Cohen also noted that General Anthony Zinni, then head of CENTCOM, was concerned that a major bombing campaign would cause domestic unrest in Pakistan (where bin Laden enjoyed strong support among extremists) and hurt the U.S. military's relationship with that nation.
Mr. Cohen's views were perfectly in accord with those of the top uniformed officers and Clinton's political appointees at the Pentagon, Sheehan told the author. "It was the entire Pentagon," he added. The chief lesson that the Defense Department seemed to draw from the assault on the USS Cole was the need for better security for its ships, what was invariably called "force protection." Listening to Cohen and later talking to top military officers, Sheehan, a former member of Special Forces before joining the State Department, told the author that he was "stunned" and "taken aback" by their views. "This phenomenon I cannot explain," he said. Why didn't they want to go hit back at those who had just murdered American servicemen without warning or provocation?
The issue was hotly debated. Some of the principals were concerned that bin Laden might somehow survive the cruise-missile attack and appear in another triumphant press conference. Clarke countered by saying that they could say that they were only targeting terrorist infrastructure. If they got bin Laden, they could take that as a bonus. Others worried about target information. At the time, Clarke said that he had very reliable and specific information about bin Laden's location. And so on. Each objection was countered and answered with a yet another objection.
In the end, for a variety of reasons, the principals were against Mr. Clarke's retaliation plan by a margin of seven to one against. Mr. Clarke was the sole one in favor. Bin Laden would get away — again.
___________
"Cohen also noted that General Anthony Zinni, then head of CENTCOM, was concerned that a major bombing campaign would cause domestic unrest in Pakistan (where bin Laden enjoyed strong support among extremists) and hurt the U.S. military's relationship with that nation."
Zinni didn't want to attack those who had murdered the Cole sailors...but had no problem setting the Cole up for attack.
"We needed the fuel," Adm. Vern Clark, chief of U.S. naval operations, said on "CNN Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer."
"There is risk everywhere throughout the Middle East," Clark said after offering condolences to the victims' families.
Retired U.S. Marine Gen. Anthony Zinni agreed that the decision to refuel ships in Yemen, a practice that began under his tenure, was based primarily on the need for additional refueling facilities between the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf.
Zinni denied that the policy was simply a "bone to the Yemenis" to improve relations with the United States.
But Clark did mention that the policy was "was an attempt to reach out and establish better relations with Yemen."
No good options
"There weren't very many good options down there," Zinni told CNN. "I think there's a misconception that we went there accepting greater risk than other places for the sake of engagement. That wasn't the case."
Responding to a U.S. Department of State review in 1999 that described Yemen as a "safe haven for terrorist groups," Clark said: "Since the policy was begun almost two years ago, 25 ships have conducted refueling operations in that port.
"The threat assessment had not changed one iota with regard to Aden. That's the bottom line," Clark said.
_____________ The policy was established by Zinni, despite a 1999 review describing Yemen as a safe haven for terrorist groups.
"We needed the fuel," Adm. Vern Clark, chief of U.S. naval operations, said on "CNN Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer."
"There is risk everywhere throughout the Middle East," Clark said after offering condolences to the victims' families.
Retired U.S. Marine Gen. Anthony Zinni agreed that the decision to refuel ships in Yemen, a practice that began under his tenure, was based primarily on the need for additional refueling facilities between the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf.
Zinni denied that the policy was simply a "bone to the Yemenis" to improve relations with the United States.
But Clark did mention that the policy was "was an attempt to reach out and establish better relations with Yemen."
No good options
"There weren't very many good options down there," Zinni told CNN. "I think there's a misconception that we went there accepting greater risk than other places for the sake of engagement. That wasn't the case."
Responding to a U.S. Department of State review in 1999 that described Yemen as a "safe haven for terrorist groups," Clark said: "Since the policy was begun almost two years ago, 25 ships have conducted refueling operations in that port.
"The threat assessment had not changed one iota with regard to Aden. That's the bottom line," Clark said.
_____________
The policy was established by Zinni, despite a 1999 review describing Yemen as a safe haven for terrorist groups.
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