''No matter how many times I tried, it didn't compute.
They just didn't see it."
Clark placed career ahead of nation in Kosovo
Tucson Citizen ^ | Friday, January 23, 2004 | GEORGE JATRAS
Friday, January 23, 2004
The Dan Christman and Chuck Larson guest column published on Jan. 8 - "Gen. Clark's stand vs. Milosevic praiseworthy" - was remarkable as much for what it didn't say as for the distortions in what it did say. In praising Clark's testimony against former Yugoslav dictator Slobodan Milosevic before the International Tribunal at The Hague, the authors failed to mention that Milosevic was not permitted to question Clark on what the general had written in his book, "Waging Modern War."
Also, the U.S. government demanded and received the right to edit videotapes and transcripts of the sessions before they were made public. Following his secret testimony at The Hague, Clark, in answer to an inquiry about what should happen to Saddam Hussein, hypocritically stated that it was important that Hussein's trial not be behind closed doors, so that the whole world could see justice done.
While the article had high praise in general terms for Clark's leadership of NATO forces in the Balkans, a critical look at his performance tells a different story. In "Waging Modern War" Clark writes about his fury upon learning that Russian peacekeepers had entered the airport at Pristina, Kosovo, before British or American forces. In an Aug. 3, 1999, article, "The guy who almost started World War III," The Guardian (UK) wrote: "No sooner are we told by Britain's top generals that the Russians played a crucial role in ending the West's war against Yugoslavia than we learn that if NATO's supreme commander, the American Gen. Wesley Clark, had had his way, British paratroopers would have stormed Pristina airport, threatening to unleash the most frightening crisis with Moscow since the end of the Cold War. 'I'm not going to start the third world war for you', Gen. Mike Jackson, commander of the international K-For peacekeeping force, is reported to have told Gen. Clark when he refused to accept an order to send assault troops to prevent Russian troops from taking over the airfield of Kosovo's provincial capital."
Gen. Clark's buddy in Kosovo was Hashim Thaci, the leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army which, according to the July 30, 2002, Belfast News Letter (N. Ireland), is engaged in sex slavery, prostitution, murder, kidnapping and drugs. The Daily Telegraph reported on Feb. 19, 2002, that "European drug squad officers say Albanian and Kosovo Albanian dealers are ruthlessly trying to seize control of the European heroin market ..." This is the same Hashim "The Snake" Thaci with whom Clark was photographed in a triumphal handshake after NATO forces occupied Kosovo.
As for his ability as a military leader, Gen. Clark failed on two counts: the Kosovo air campaign and his plan for a ground campaign. While the questionable effectiveness of the air campaign is not solely his responsibility, his coverup of the results ("Kosovo Cover Up," Newsweek, May 15, 2000) are testimony to his dedication to power and career.
As for a ground war, which Gen. Clark admits that he favored, he insists that he could have conducted a successful ground war in Kosovo by sending supporting Apache helicopters through the mountain passes between Albania and Kosovo, a plan which was described to me by an Apache pilot as "hare-brained" and "suicidal."
There is no doubt that a ground war with the might of 19 NATO nations behind it eventually would have succeeded, but at what cost and why? To feed Gen. Clark's ego and ambition.
Before accepting the judgment of Adm. Larson and Lt. Gen. Christman, one should also consider the comments of two retired four-star generals, Gen.Tommy Franks, who led the campaign to capture Baghdad, and Gen. Hugh Shelton, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
An article in the Jan. 12 New Yorker quoted statements they made shortly after Clark announced his candidacy. When asked if Clark would make a good president, Franks' short reply was, "Absolutely not." When asked the same question, Shelton replied that "... the reason he came out of [his NATO command in] Europe had to do with integrity and character issues ... Wes won't get my vote."
Such comments by retired four-star generals about another four-star are almost unprecedented. They should not be taken lightly.
If Gen. Clark had had his way in Kosovo, we might have gone to war with Russia, or at least resurrected vestiges of the Cold War, and we certainly would have had hundreds if not thousands of casualties in an ill-conceived ground war.
Clark's obsession with career and power is what we saw too often in senior leaders during the Vietnam War and hoped never to see again in those with positions of responsibility for the lives of our GIs and the security of our nation.
Col. George Jatras, USAF (Ret.), of Camp Hill, Pa., flew 230 F-4 combat missions in Vietnam, served for seven years with various NATO designated units, was the senior Air Force attaché to the Soviet Union ('79-'81) and the senior Air Force advisor to the Naval War College, where he also served as an instructor in the Strategy Department.
He knew that the Russians would try to take the Pristina airport and he ordered a British General to send some of his troops along with elite US Rangers to take the airport before the Russians got there. The British General however was RIGHTFULLY scared, as this INSANITY would lead to a confrontation with the Russians and possibly start WWIII, so naturally he refused to obey these idiotic orders. It is because of this incident General Clark resigned.