Posted on 04/23/2025 8:02:19 PM PDT by Macho MAGA Man
It's all right there in Trump v United States. Hopefully TrumpII is using the week to reframe this.
How about some charges for deep staters, corrupt FBI agents, and members of Congress on the take.
Aw, woodpooper, try to keep up.
22 other members of MS-13 were on the same flight as their comrade Garcia to CECOT.
They were removed under an Executive Order declaring MS-13 a Foreign Terrorist Organization [FTO].
Trump has won. Garcia is in CECOT under a lawful EO. Kilmar Abrego Garcia is once, always, forever a citizen of El Salvador, not the United States. He had no rights to be deprived of.
Terrorist Designations of International Cartels
Aw, woodpooper, try to keep up.22 other members of MS-13 were on the same flight as their comrade Garcia to CECOT.
They were removed under an Executive Order declaring MS-13 a Foreign Terrorist Organization [FTO].
Aw, StanAnFailToDeliver, try to keep up. They will all come back.
His name is Abrego. His mother's maiden name is Garcia.
Removal as a foreign terrorist required the full gamut of due process under Alien Terrorist Removal Procedures. Epic fail. Unconstitutional and unlawful.
https://law.justia.com/codes/us/title-8/chapter-12/subchapter-v/sec-1532/
2023 U.S. Code
Title 8 - Aliens and Nationality
Chapter 12 - Immigration and Nationality
Subchapter V - Alien Terrorist Removal ProceduresSec. 1532 - Establishment of removal court
(a) Designation of judges
The Chief Justice of the United States shall publicly designate 5 district court judges from 5 of the United States judicial circuits who shall constitute a court that shall have jurisdiction to conduct all removal proceedings. The Chief Justice may, in the Chief Justice's discretion, designate the same judges under this section as are designated pursuant to section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)).
(b) Terms
Each judge designated under subsection (a) shall serve for a term of 5 years and shall be eligible for redesignation, except that of the members first designated—
(1) 1 member shall serve for a term of 1 year;
(2) 1 member shall serve for a term of 2 years;
(3) 1 member shall serve for a term of 3 years; and
(4) 1 member shall serve for a term of 4 years. (c) Chief judge (1) Designation
The Chief Justice shall publicly designate one of the judges of the removal court to be the chief judge of the removal court.
(2) Responsibilities
The chief judge shall—
(A) promulgate rules to facilitate the functioning of the removal court; and
(B) assign the consideration of cases to the various judges on the removal court.
(d) Expeditious and confidential nature of proceedings
The provisions of section 103(c) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(c)) shall apply to removal proceedings in the same manner as they apply to proceedings under that Act [50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.].
(e) Establishment of panel of special attorneys
The removal court shall provide for the designation of a panel of attorneys each of whom—
(1) has a security clearance which affords the attorney access to classified information, and
(2) has agreed to represent permanent resident aliens with respect to classified information under section 1534(e)(3) of this title in accordance with (and subject to the penalties under) this subchapter.
https://law.justia.com/codes/us/title-8/chapter-12/subchapter-v/sec-1533/
2023 U.S. Code
Title 8 - Aliens and Nationality
Chapter 12 - Immigration and Nationality
Subchapter V - Alien Terrorist Removal ProceduresSec. 1533 - Removal court procedure
(a) Application (1) In general
In any case in which the Attorney General has classified information that an alien is an alien terrorist, the Attorney General may seek removal of the alien under this subchapter by filing an application with the removal court that contains—
(A) the identity of the attorney in the Department of Justice making the application;
(B) a certification by the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General that the application satisfies the criteria and requirements of this section;
(C) the identity of the alien for whom authorization for the removal proceeding is sought; and
(D) a statement of the facts and circumstances relied on by the Department of Justice to establish probable cause that—
(i) the alien is an alien terrorist;
(ii) the alien is physically present in the United States; and
(iii) with respect to such alien, removal under subchapter II would pose a risk to the national security of the United States.
[...]
https://law.justia.com/codes/us/title-8/chapter-12/subchapter-v/sec-1534/
2023 U.S. Code
Title 8 - Aliens and Nationality
Chapter 12 - Immigration and Nationality
Subchapter V - Alien Terrorist Removal ProceduresSec. 1534 - Removal hearing
(a) In general
(1) Expeditious hearing
In any case in which an application for an order is approved under section 1533(c)(2) of this title, a removal hearing shall be conducted under this section as expeditiously as practicable for the purpose of determining whether the alien to whom the order pertains should be removed from the United States on the grounds that the alien is an alien terrorist.
(2) Public hearing
The removal hearing shall be open to the public.
(b) Notice
An alien who is the subject of a removal hearing under this subchapter shall be given reasonable notice of—
(1) the nature of the charges against the alien, including a general account of the basis for the charges; and
(2) the time and place at which the hearing will be held.
(c) Rights in hearing
(1) Right of counsel
The alien shall have a right to be present at such hearing and to be represented by counsel. Any alien financially unable to obtain counsel shall be entitled to have counsel assigned to represent the alien. Such counsel shall be appointed by the judge pursuant to the plan for furnishing representation for any person financially unable to obtain adequate representation for the district in which the hearing is conducted, as provided for in section 3006A of title 18. All provisions of that section shall apply and, for purposes of determining the maximum amount of compensation, the matter shall be treated as if a felony was charged.
(2) Introduction of evidence
Subject to the limitations in subsection (e), the alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to introduce evidence on the alien's own behalf.
(3) Examination of witnesses
Subject to the limitations in subsection (e), the alien shall have a reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence against the alien and to cross-examine any witness.
(4) Record
A verbatim record of the proceedings and of all testimony and evidence offered or produced at such a hearing shall be kept.
(5) Removal decision based on evidence at hearing
The decision of the judge regarding removal shall be based only on that evidence introduced at the removal hearing.
(d) Subpoenas
(1) Request
At any time prior to the conclusion of the removal hearing, either the alien or the Department of Justice may request the judge to issue a subpoena for the presence of a named witness (which subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce books, papers, documents, or other objects designated therein) upon a satisfactory showing that the presence of the witness is necessary for the determination of any material matter. Such a request may be made ex parte except that the judge shall inform the Department of Justice of any request for a subpoena by the alien for a witness or material if compliance with such a subpoena would reveal classified evidence or the source of that evidence. The Department of Justice shall be given a reasonable opportunity to oppose the issuance of such a subpoena.
[...]
https://law.justia.com/codes/us/title-8/chapter-12/subchapter-v/sec-1537/
2023 U.S. Code
Title 8 - Aliens and Nationality
Chapter 12 - Immigration and Nationality
Subchapter V - Alien Terrorist Removal ProceduresSec. 1537 - Custody and release after removal hearing
(a) Release
(1) In general
Subject to paragraph (2), if the judge decides that an alien should not be removed, the alien shall be released from custody.
(2) Custody pending appeal
If the Attorney General takes an appeal from such decision, the alien shall remain in custody, subject to the provisions of section 3142 of title 18.
(b) Custody and removal
(1) Custody
If the judge decides that an alien shall be removed, the alien shall be detained pending the outcome of any appeal. After the conclusion of any judicial review thereof which affirms the removal order, the Attorney General shall retain the alien in custody and remove the alien to a country specified under paragraph (2).
(2) Removal
(A) In general
The removal of an alien shall be to any country which the alien shall designate if such designation does not, in the judgment of the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of State, impair the obligation of the United States under any treaty (including a treaty pertaining to extradition) or otherwise adversely affect the foreign policy of the United States.
(B) Alternate countries
If the alien refuses to designate a country to which the alien wishes to be removed or if the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of State, determines that removal of the alien to the country so designated would impair a treaty obligation or adversely affect United States foreign policy, the Attorney General shall cause the alien to be removed to any country willing to receive such alien.
(C) Continued detention
If no country is willing to receive such an alien, the Attorney General may, notwithstanding any other provision of law, retain the alien in custody. The Attorney General, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall make periodic efforts to reach agreement with other countries to accept such an alien and at least every 6 months shall provide to the attorney representing the alien at the removal hearing a written report on the Attorney General's efforts. Any alien in custody pursuant to this subparagraph shall be released from custody solely at the discretion of the Attorney General and subject to such conditions as the Attorney General shall deem appropriate.
(D) Fingerprinting
Before an alien is removed from the United States pursuant to this subsection, or pursuant to an order of removal because such alien is inadmissible under section 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title, the alien shall be photographed and fingerprinted, and shall be advised of the provisions of section 1326(b) of this title.
(c) Continued detention pending trial
(1) Delay in removal
The Attorney General may hold in abeyance the removal of an alien who has been ordered removed, pursuant to this subchapter, to allow the trial of such alien on any Federal or State criminal charge and the service of any sentence of confinement resulting from such a trial.
(2) Maintenance of custody
Pending the commencement of any service of a sentence of confinement by an alien described in paragraph (1), such an alien shall remain in the custody of the Attorney General, unless the Attorney General determines that temporary release of the alien to the custody of State authorities for confinement in a State facility is appropriate and would not endanger national security or public safety.
(3) Subsequent removal
Following the completion of a sentence of confinement by an alien described in paragraph (1), or following the completion of State criminal proceedings which do not result in a sentence of confinement of an alien released to the custody of State authorities pursuant to paragraph (2), such an alien shall be returned to the custody of the Attorney General who shall proceed to the removal of the alien under this subchapter.
(d) Application of certain provisions relating to escape of prisoners
For purposes of sections 751 and 752 of title 18, an alien in the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to this subchapter shall be subject to the penalties provided by those sections in relation to a person committed to the custody of the Attorney General by virtue of an arrest on a charge of a felony.
(e) Rights of aliens in custody
(1) Family and attorney visits
An alien in the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to this subchapter shall be given reasonable opportunity, as determined by the Attorney General, to communicate with and receive visits from members of the alien's family, and to contact, retain, and communicate with an attorney.
(2) Diplomatic contact
An alien in the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to this subchapter shall have the right to contact an appropriate diplomatic or consular official of the alien's country of citizenship or nationality or of any country providing representation services therefore. The Attorney General shall notify the appropriate embassy, mission, or consular office of the alien's detention.
Maybe his remains will come back someday, but he’s never leaving El Salvador Club Fed, and he is one fuck-up away from going back to CECOT.
Maybe his remains will come back someday, but he’s never leaving El Salvador Club Fed, and he is one fuck-up away from going back to CECOT.
As long as removal threatens irreversible removal in violation of existing court orders and mandatory due process, the government may not be doing many removals until 2029. It is purely a matter of time before the government gets its mind right, or they will be hamstrung for the rest of their time in the current administration. Abrego will return, even if it is a temporary return.
An inside look at the El Salvador prison where Kilmar Abrego Garcia was moved after supermax siteStory by David Noriega
April 28, 2025SANTA ANA, El Salvador — The sprawling penitentiary where Kilmar Abrego Garcia was last known to be held offers a sharp contrast to the supermax mega-prison to which he was first deported.
Rather than tattooed gang members in brightly lit, crowded cells, the inmates at the Centro Industrial prison in Santa Ana wear yellow t-shirts and move more or less freely. Some spend much of their time outdoors raising dairy cows and growing vegetables. Others work in factories making uniforms for the armed forces or desks for public schools.
The government calls these “trusted inmates”: They have exhibited good behavior and are in the final years of their sentences. And the prison categorically excludes anyone accused of belonging to a gang.
“We only house the common population,” said Samuel Diaz, the prison’s director and warden. “No gang members work here.”
NBC News obtained access Monday to the Centro Industrial in Santa Ana in a carefully choreographed tour. Officials did not provide access to Abrego Garcia, and they would not answer questions about his location, the conditions of his detention or any other aspects of his case. But they facilitated interviews with other inmates, who described the conditions in the prison as “perfect” and “excellent.”
The Trump administration has been ordered by the Supreme Court to “facilitate” the return of Abrego Garcia, a Maryland man who the Justice Department has acknowledged should not have been sent to a prison in his native El Salvador because of an immigration judge’s 2019 order barring such action.
For human rights advocates in El Salvador and the United States, the details of Abrego Garcia’s transfer — from the Terrorism Confinement Center, or CECOT, a supermax prison specifically designed for gang members, to a low-security prison from which gang members are excluded — contradicts a central claim made by both governments: That Abrego Garcia is a dangerous member of MS-13 and a terrorist. (His wife and attorney deny those allegations.)
It appears the lunatic judge watched Newsmax and discovered there was more to Garcia than she knew about. What an intelligent Judge might do is...GET ALL THE FACTS BEFORE MAKING JUDGMENTS...
NOW..she wants “DISCOVERY”...a little late, moron.
You babble in democrat, woodbeater. LOFL.
In the week since your MSM, er MSN post, Garcia has been verbally deposed by his puta as a chronic wife-beater; confirmed on video in flagrante delecto as the delivery man for human trafficking; while Democrats have been TOLD by their hip-hop Minority Leader to permanently stay the f^ck away from El Salvador and this pendejo mojado.
And just like that! garcia has disappeared from the news cycle, to languish in Club Fed Salvador until quietly transferred back to CECOT for violating Club Fed rules. Or perhaps moved to Rwanda lofl...
DUE PROCESS FOR ALL
https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep345206/
Shaughnessy v. U.S., ex rel Mezei, 345 U. S. 206, 212 (1953)
It is true that aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness-encompassed in due process of law. The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 100-101 (1903); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 49-50 (1950); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U. S. 590, 598 (1953).
https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep426067/
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976)
There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of these persons from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 48-51; Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 238; see Russian Fleet v. United States, 282 U. S. 481, 489. Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection. Wong Yang Sung, supra; Wong Wing, supra.
https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep457202/
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982)
Syllabus
The illegal aliens who are plaintiffs in these cases challenging the statute may claim the benefit of the Equal Protection Clause, which provides that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is a "person" in any ordinary sense of that term. This Court's prior cases recognizing that illegal aliens are "persons" protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,which Clauses do not include the phrase "within its jurisdiction," cannot be distinguished on the asserted ground that persons who have entered the country illegally are not "within the jurisdiction" of a State even if they are present within its boundaries and subject to its laws. Nor do the logic and history of the Fourteenth Amendment support such a construction.Instead, use of the phrase "within its jurisdiction" confirms the understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment's protection extends to anyone, citizen or stranger, who is subject to the laws of a State, and reaches into every corner of a State's territory. Pp. 210-216.
Opinion of the Court at 210:
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." (Emphasis added.) Appellants argue at the outset that undocumented aliens, because of their immigration status, are not "persons within the jurisdiction" of the State of Texas, and that they therefore have no right to the equal protection of Texas law. We reject this argument. Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is surely a "person" in any ordinary sense of that term. Aliens, even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as "persons" guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206, 212 (1953); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 238 (1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369 (1886). Indeed, we have clearly held that the Fifth Amendment protects aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful from invidious discrimination by the Federal Government. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67, 77 (1976).
At 211, footnote 10:
Although we have not previously focused on the intended meaning of this phrase, we have had occasion to examine the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States .... ." (Emphasis added.) Justice Gray, writing for the Court in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649 (1898), detailed at some length the history of the Citizenship Clause, and the predominantly geographic sense in which the term "jurisdiction" was used. He further noted that it was "impossible to construe the words 'subject to the jurisdiction thereof,' in the opening sentence [of the Fourteenth Amendment], as less comprehensive than the words 'within its jurisdiction,'in the concluding sentence of the same section; or to hold that persons 'within the jurisdiction' of one of the States of the Union are not 'subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."' Id., at 687. Justice Gray concluded that "[e]very citizen or subject of another country, while domiciled here, is within the allegiance and the protection, and consequently subject to the jurisdiction, of the United States." Id., at 693. As one early commentator noted, given the historical emphasis on geographic territoriality, bounded only, if at all, by principles of sovereignty and allegiance, no plausible distinction with respect to Fourteenth Amendment "jurisdiction" can be drawn between resident aliens whose entry into the United States was lawful, and resident aliens whose entry was unlawful. See C. Bouvé, Exclusion and Expulsion of Aliens in the United States 425-427 (1912).
At 211-212:
Appellants seek to distinguish our prior cases, emphasizing that the Equal Protection Clause directs a State to afford its protection to persons within its jurisdiction while the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments contain no such assertedly limiting phrase. In appellants' view, persons who have entered the United States illegally are not "within the jurisdiction" of a State even if they are present within a State's boundaries and subject to its laws. Neither our cases nor the logic of the Fourteenth Amendment supports that constricting construction of the phrase "within its jurisdiction." We have never suggested that the class of persons who might avail themselves of the equal protection guarantee is less than coextensive with that entitled to due process. To the contrary, we have recognized that both provisions were fashioned to protect an identical class of persons, and to reach every exercise of state authority."The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens. It says: 'Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' These provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." Yick Wo, supra, at 369 (emphasis added).
In concluding that "all persons within the territory of the United States," including aliens unlawfully present, may invoke the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to challenge actions of the Federal Government, we reasoned from the understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to afford its protection to all within the boundaries of a State. Wong Wing, supra, at 238. Our cases applying the Equal Protection Clause reflect the same territorial theme:
At 213:
There is simply no support for appellants' suggestion that "due process" is somehow of greater stature than "equal protection" and therefore available to a larger class of persons.To the contrary, each aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment reflects an elementary limitation on state power. To permit a State to employ the phrase "within its jurisdiction" in order to identify subclasses of persons whom it would define as beyond its jurisdiction, thereby relieving itself of the obligation to assure that its laws are designed and applied equally to those persons, would undermine the principal purpose for which the Equal Protection Clause was incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause was intended to work nothing less than the abolition of all castebased and invidious class-based legislation. That objective is fundamentally at odds with the power the State asserts here to classify persons subject to its laws as nonetheless excepted from its protection.
https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep118356/
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369 (1886)
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens. It says: "Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." These provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.
https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep163228/
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 238 (1896)
And in the case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369, it was said: "The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens. It says: 'Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.' These provisions are universal in their application to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." Applying this reasoning to the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, it must be concluded that all persons within the territory of the United States are entitled to the protection guaranteed by those amendments, and that even aliens shall not be held to answer for a capital or other infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep189086/
The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 100-101 (1903)
Now, it has been settled that the power to exclude or expel aliens belonged to the political department of the Government, and that the order of an executive officer, invested with the power to determine finally the facts upon which an alien's right to enter this country, or remain in it, depended, was "due process of law, and no other tribunal, unless expressly authorized by law to do so, was at liberty to reexamine the evidence on which he acted, or to controvert its sufficiency." Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 713; Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 13. S. 651, 659; Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S. 538, 547. But this court has never held, nor must we now be understood as holding, that administrative officers, when executing the provisions of a statute involving the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in "due process of law" as understood at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.One of these principles is that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without opportunity, at some time, to be heard, before such officers, in respect of the matters upon which that liberty depends-not necessarily an opportunity upon a regular, set occasion, and according to the forms of judicial procedure, but one that will secure the prompt, vigorous action contemplated by Congress, and at the same time be appropriate to the nature of the case upon which such officers are required to act. Therefore, it is not competent for the Secretary of the Treasury or any executive officer, at any time within the year limited by the statute, arbitrarily to cause an alien, who has entered the country, and has become subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its population, although alleged to be illegally here, to be taken into custody and deported without giving him all opportunity to be heard upon the questions involving his right to be and remain in the United States. No such arbitrary power can exist where the principles involved in due process of law are recognized.
https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep339033/
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 49-50 (1950)
But the difficulty with any argument premised on the proposition that the deportation statute does not require a hearing is that, without such hearing, there would be no constitutional authority for deportation. The constitutional requirement of procedural due process of law derives from the same source as Congress' power to legislate and, where applicable, permeates every valid enactment of that body. It was under compulsion of the Constitution that this Court long ago held that an antecedent deportation statute must provide a hearing at least for aliens who had not entered clandestinely and who had been here some time even if illegally. The Court said:"This is the reasonable construction of the acts of Congress here in question, and they need not be otherwise interpreted. In the case of all acts of Congress, such interpretation ought to be adopted as, without doing violence to the import of the words used. will bring them into harmony with the Constitution." The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U. S. 86, 101.We think that the limitation to hearings "required by statute" in § 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act exempts from that section's application only those hearings which administrative agencies may hold by regulation, rule, custom, or special dispensation; not those held by compulsion. We do not think the limiting words render the Administrative Procedure Act inapplicable to hearings, the requirement for which has been read into a statute by the Court in order to save the statute from invalidity. They exempt hearings of less than statutory authority, not those of more than statutory authority. We would hardly attribute to Congress a purpose to be less scrupulous about the fairness of a hearing necessitated by the Constitution than one granted by it as a matter of expediency.
Indeed, to so construe the Immigration Act might again bring it into constitutional jeopardy. When the Constitution requires a hearing, it requires a fair one, one before a tribunal which meets at least currently prevailing standards of impartiality. A deportation hearing involves issues basic to human liberty and happiness and, in the present upheavals in lands to which aliens may be returned, perhaps to life itself.
https://www.loc.gov/item/usrep344590/
Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U. S. 590, 597, 598 (1953).
Although it later may be established, as respondents contend, that petitioner can be expelled and deported, yet before his expulsion, he is entitled to notice of the nature of the charge and a hearing at least before an executive or administrative tribunal. Although Congress may prescribe conditions for his expulsion and deportation, not even Congress may expel him without allowing him a fair opportunity to be heard. For example, he is entitled to a fair chance to prove mistaken identity. At the present stage of the instant case, the issue is not one of exclusion, expulsion or deportation. It is one of legislative construction and of procedural due process.
Did it work the last time you trolled Free Republic, n00b? When did you flip out under your previous name(s)?
Classic nutrootery -- offer no context, while making it obvious you don't even grok what you posted.
Let me cut this short -- clearly I f'd you over in your previous Freeptard incarnation, and I'm about to do it again.
You enjoy what little time you have left here. Another trophy for the mantle...
Dont waste your time with woodpusher. I’ve dealt with him long enough to know by now that he suffers from severe mental illness and is very unhinged
Why the mods allow him to remain on this site we’ll never know.....
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