Posted on 03/03/2008 10:37:49 AM PST by Rebeleye
What part of 'it has been settled by judicial decision in this Court that this [-----> Northwest <-----] Ordinance is not in force,' do you fail to comprehend? The Court, in two decisions agreed that the Northwest Ordinance, and it's provisions was not incorporated by the Constitution, nor incorporable by the delegates at the Philadelphia convention, nor extendable by Congress after ratification. That Supreme Court ruling dismisses any lower court ruling otherwise. That ruling being made, the court found that 'Graham finally succeeded in obtaining a decree in the Louisville chancery Court for $3,000 damages, to be paid before a day named, or the boat, her furniture, tackle &c., to be sold if forthcoming, and if not forthcoming, the court to make the necessary order against the obligors {Jacob Strader, James Gorman, and John Armstrong], in said forthcoming bond, which decree was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. To reverse the decree of affirmance this writ of error was sued out.'
The court rejected their suit for 'want of jurisdiction'. Strader, Gorman and Armstrong owed Dr. Graham $3,000 for his loss.
Slavery could not be prohibited in the territories/states on the basis of the Northwest Ordinance, affirming the terms of the original cession by Virginia. Simple.
In none of those cases was the terms of the original cession upheld. Just because the court says the Northwest Ordinance wasn't in force doesn't automatically mean that the Cession is. From Strader:
In the case above mentioned, Permoli claimed the protection of the clause in one of the six articles which provides for the freedom of religion, alleging that it had been violated by the First Municipality. And he brought the question before this Court upon the ground that it had jurisdiction under the Ordinance. But the Court held that the Ordinance ceased to be in force when Louisiana became a state, and dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction.(...)And in the states since formed in the territory, these provisions, so far as they have been preserved, own their validity and authority to the Constitution of the United States and the constitutions and laws of the respective states, and not to the authority of the Ordinance of the old Confederation. As we have already said, it ceased to be in force upon the adoption of the Constitution, and cannot now be the source of jurisdiction of any description in this Court.
What Jarrot says is that the Ordinance and the state constitution trump the cession. What Strader and Permoli both say is that the Ordinance has been superceded by the US Constitution and by the various statehoods ("the Court held that the Ordinance ceased to be in force when Louisiana became a state."). Also from Strader:
Every state has an undoubted right to determine the status, or domestic and social condition of the persons domiciled within its territory except insofar as the powers of the states in this respect are restrained, or duties and obligations imposed upon them, by the Constitution of the United States.You'd have us believe that the state had no power to ban slavery within its borders because of the terms of the cession, and that's plainly false. Seriously, do you believe that all of the states formed out of Virginia cession were prevented from outlawing slavery?
What Jarrot held was that the cession must yield to the Northwest Ordinance and Constitution ['held that those rights could not be thus protected, but must yield to the ordinance and Constitution.'] A HIGHER court held otherwise.
What Strader and Permoli both say is that the Ordinance has been superceded by the US Constitution and by the various statehoods
What the cases say is that the Northwest Ordinance violated the terms of the cession, was not extendable to other territories. Regarding the supremacy of the federal and state constitutions, I noted that in 1110.
You'd have us believe that the state had no power to ban slavery within its borders because of the terms of the cession
Pure lies. In 1004 I wrote, 'Each state had the power to ban the practice within it's own borders.'
1. either the LEFTIST/sanctimonious/SELF-righteous/SELF-serving/arrogant ELITISTS out of the north & "LEFT coast" get out of:
a. our homes
b.
our schools,
c.our churches,
d.our public/private institutions &
e. learn to leave the southland & southerners ALONE and/OR
2. the southland "gets a belly full" & once more LEAVES the union.
imVho, the southland will NOT long continue to remain "unequally yoked" to the LEFTIST/hate-FILLED north.
free dixie,sw
No it didn't. No matter how much you insist otherwise, you can't show where any case says that the Virginia Cession mattered for squat, having been superceded by everything that came after--the Ordinance, the US Constitution, and the various state constitutions. You said, "Slavery could not be prohibited in the territories/states on the basis of the Northwest Ordinance, affirming the terms of the original cession by Virginia," but that's not at all what the court said. The court said that, whatever the Northwest Ordinance said, it had no standing once the areas in question became states. They aren't saying that the Ordinance is invalid because it violates the terms of the Cession, but because it violates the equal-standing clause of the US Constitution.
Regarding the supremacy of the federal and state constitutions, I noted that in 1110.
And yet, in regards to the line from Jarrot: "those rights could not be thus protected, but must yield to the ordinance and Constitution," you tell us that "a HIGHER court found otherwise."
What Strader says is that the issue was decided in Permoli. What Permoli says is that the court has no jurisdiction over the particular question because the terms of the Ordinance are no longer in force because Louisiana is now a state.
Ya think? Justice Taney wrote, 'But it has been settled by judicial decision in this Court that this Ordinance is not in force. ... The six articles, said to be perpetual as a compact, are not made a part of the new Constitution. They certainly are not superior and paramount to the Constitution, and cannot confer power and jurisdiction upon this Court. The whole judicial authority of the courts of the United States is derived from the Constitution itself and the laws made under it.' Reiterating the validity of the Ordinance, Taney stated, '[a]s we have already said, it ceased to be in force upon the adoption of the Constitution.'
you tell us that "a HIGHER court found otherwise."
It did. The Illinois court held that cession 'must yield to the [Northwest] ordinance and [federal] Constitution.' The Supreme court held otherwise, the Ordinance without authority since adoption. Regarding the federal Constitution, Justice McKinley addressed that issue in Pollad v. Hagan, writing 'the United States never held any municipal sovereignty, jurisdiction, or right of soil in and to the territory of which Alabama or any of the new States were formed, except for temporary purposes and to execute the trusts created by the acts of the Virginia and Georgia legislatures, and the deeds of cession executed by them to the United States ... '[W]e must come to the conclusion that it was the intention of the parties to invest the United States with the eminent domain of the country ceded, both national and municipal, for the purposes of temporary government, and to hold it in trust for the performance of the stipulations and conditions expressed in the deeds of cession and the legislative acts connected with them. '
the regulations of Congress, under the old Confederation or the present Constitution, for the government of a particular territory could have no force beyond its limits. It certainly could not restrict the power of the states within their respective territories, nor in any manner interfere with their laws and institutions, nor give this Court any control over them. T he Ordinance in question, if still in force, could have no more operation than the laws of Ohio in the State of Kentucky, and could not influence the decision upon the rights of the master or the slaves in that state, nor give this Court jurisdiction upon the subject.The Illinois court held that cession 'must yield to the [Northwest] ordinance and [federal] Constitution.'
Wrong. The Illinois Supreme Court is speaking of the Illinois state constitution. From Judicial Decision Making and the End of Slavery in Illinois:
While the plaintiff in Jarrot v. Jarrot was a post-1787 French slave, that is, was born after 1787, and indeed, perhaps after the 1818 Constitution, and accordingly, there was no reason to go beyond the question of whether a post-Ordinance French slave was free, in asserting that "sovereignty" dictated that the Ordinance overrode the reservations of the Virginia cession, the Scates opinion suggested that there was no basis upon which to distinguish the pre-1787 French slave and keep that individual in servitude. In beginning his discussion of the issues, Scates had defined the issue as "whether the descendants of the slaves of the old French settlers of the Illinois country, born since the adoption of the ordinance and before the constitution, or since the constitution, can be held in slavery in this State." But as he described the powers of sover-eignty and the failure of the argument based on the Virginia cession, he left little room for the survival of any slavery in Illinois, French or otherwise, in the face of the prohibition in the Ordinance combined with the 1818 Constitution that barred any slavery "hereafter ... introduced."The Supreme court held otherwise, the Ordinance without authority since adoption.Having surveyed the cases and recognized the broad scope of the slavery ban of the Ordinance, Scates came back to the theme of the presumption of freedom. He could not doubt, he said, the Plaintiff's right to enjoy the promise of the state Constitution and to be "equally free and independent with other citizens."Indeed, he went on, "all philanthropists unite in deprecating the evils of slavery, and it affords me sincere pleasure, when my duty under the constitution and law requires me to break the fetters of the slave, and declare the captive free."He went on to reject arguments that legislation in Illinois had confirmed "these negroes" to be slaves and that the Ordinance or Constitution should be interpreted on that basis. On the one hand, mere legislation could not override the Ordinance and further, he said, he would "never feel warranted" in a doubtful case of construction to construe the law so as to "deprive a human being of his liberty, or deny him the rights of humanity."
I think you're missing some words in that sentence, but what Pollard says is that the Cession terms ceased to be in effect upon statehood
When Alabama was admitted into the union, on an equal footing with the original States, she succeeded to all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain which Georgia possessed at the date of the cession, except so far as this right was diminished by the public lands remaining in the possession and under the control of the United States, for the temporary purposes provided for in the deed of cession and the legislative acts connected with it. Nothing remained to the United States, according to the terms of the agreement, but the public lands. And, if an express stipulation had been inserted in the agreement, granting the municipal right of sovereignty and eminent domain to the United States, such stipulation would have been void and inoperative, because the United States have no constitutional capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eminent domain, within the limits of a State or elsewhere, except in the cases in which it is expressly granted.In short, once land becomes a state, the terms of the cessions become null and void, except for the lands still held by the federal government.(...)
We will now inquire into the nature and extent of the right of the United States to these lands, and whether that right can in any manner affect or control the decision of the case before us. This right originated in voluntary surrenders, made by several of the old States, of their waste and unappropriated lands, to the United States, under a resolution of the old Congress, of the 6th of September, 1780, recommending such surrender and cession, to aid in paying the public debt, incurred by the war of the Revolution. The object of all the parties to these contracts of cession, was to convert the land into money for the payment of the debt, and to erect new States over the territory thus ceded; and as soon as these purposes could be accomplished, the power of the United States over these lands, as property, was to cease.
ctr
From Strader:
It is undoubtedly true that most of the material provisions and principles of these six articles, not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, have been the established law within this territory ever since the Ordinance was passed, and hence the Ordinance itself is sometimes spoken of as still in force. But these provisions owed their legal validity and force, after the [Federal] Constitution was adopted and while the territorial government continued, to the [Federal] Act of Congress of August 7, 1789, which adopted and continued the Ordinance of 1787 and carried its provisions into execution, with some modifications, which were necessary to adapt its form of government to the new [federal] Constitution. And in the states since formed in the territory, these provisions, so far as they have been preserved, own their validity and authority to the Constitution of the United States and the constitutions and laws of the respective states [the federal constitution predates the constitution of the 34 subsequent states], and not to the authority of the Ordinance of the old Confederation. As we have already said, it ceased to be in force upon the adoption of the [federal] Constitution, and cannot now be the source of jurisdiction of any description in this Court.It's a very simple concept.
The Illinois Supreme Court is speaking of the Illinois state constitution.
My bad. Jarrot was decided 6-3, yet it was also Justice Scates that upheld the right of soujourn in Willard v. People. Scates relies on the Ordinance as the source of power (until adoption of the state constitution), yet the US Supreme Court disagreed - see above.
In short, once land becomes a state, the terms of the cessions become null and void, except for the lands still held by the federal government.
As I said previously, any state could end slavery.
None of which says that the terms of the Virginia cession are still in force. According to what I read, the Ordinance and statehood trump the cession and the Constitution and statehood trump the Ordinance.
Scates relies on the Ordinance as the source of power (until adoption of the state constitution), yet the US Supreme Court disagreed - see above.
Which doesn't overturn the decision, as you claimed, but only differs in its reasoning to reach the same conclusion. Scates uses the Ordinance and statehood to reach a conclusion, Taney uses statehood alone to reach the same conclusion. Either way, Jarrot stands.
Then you can't read.
Scates uses the Ordinance and statehood to reach a conclusion, Taney uses statehood alone to reach the same conclusion.
US Supreme Court decisions overrule lower court decisions.
Using a different set of criteria to reach the same conclusion does not constitute overturning a decision. Jarrot says that they've used the Ordinance and the state constitution. Permoli and Strader say statehood (and therefore state constitutions) are enough. In every case the result is the same--it's the state's business. If Scates had written the exact same thing, only leaving out the reference to the Ordinance in reaching his conclusion, the decision would have been the same.
When Alabama was admitted into the union, on an equal footing with the original States, she succeeded to all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain which Georgia possessed at the date of the cession, except so far as this right was diminished by the public lands remaining in the possession and under the control of the United States, for the temporary purposes provided for in the deed of cession and the legislative acts connected with it. Nothing remained to the United States, according to the terms of the agreement, but the public lands. And, if an express stipulation had been inserted in the agreement, granting the municipal right of sovereignty and eminent domain to the United States, such stipulation would have been void and inoperative, because the United States have no constitutional capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eminent domain, within the limits of a State or elsewhere, except in the cases in which it is expressly granted.
>Considering that Leonard Pitts is a socialist, that would make the Nazis part of his heritage.<
Just for the sake of argument, Israel is a socialist socity today.
Aha, you do understand written text. Be proud.
After the war many former slaves returned to work for their former owners ......... so in my mind slavery couldn’t have been that evil. There evidently was some owners who didn’t abuse their slaves.
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