Posted on 11/13/2004 11:12:00 AM PST by LouAvul
SOURCE: Harry V. Jaffa, New Birth of Freedom, p. 363
It is an axiomatic premise of all written law, as explained by Aristotle, that if circumstances arise in which the letter of the law negates the intention of the lawgiver, then the intention must be preferred to the letter.
Harry should jump into his wayback machine and more to ancient Greece. The law is what it says, not what someone (presumably Jaffa) thinks the lawgiver intended it to say.
SOURCE: Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, pp. 19-20.
In reality, however, if one accepts the principle that the object of judicial interpretation is to determine the intent of the legislature, being bound by genuine but unexpressed legislative intent rather than the law is only the theoretical threat. The practical threat is that, under the guise or even the self-delusion of pursuing unexpressed legislative intents, common-law judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires, extending their lawmaking proclivities from the common law to the statutory field. When you are told to decide, not on the basis of what the legislature said, but on the basis of what it meant, and are assured that there is no necessary connection between the two, your best shot at figuring out what the legislature meant is to ask yourself what a wise and intelligent person should have meant; and that will surely bring you to the conclusion that the law means what you think it ought to mean -- which is precisely how judges decide things under the common law. As Dean Landis of Harvard Law School (a believer in the search for legislative intent) put it in a 1930 article:[T]he gravest sins are perpetrated in the name of the intent of the legislature. Judges are rarely willing to admit their role as actual lawgivers, and such admissions as are wrung from their unwilling lips lie in the field of common and not statute law. To condone in these instances the practice of talking in terms of the intent of the legislature, as if the legislature had attributed a particular meaning to certain words, when it is apparent that the intent is that of the judge, is to condone atavistic practices too reminiscent of the medicine man.[Scalia's italics]
[lg] That didn't bother you when the subject was Texas vs. White and Salmon P. Chase was sitting up there writing opinions about the legality of matters in which he himself had been a principal actor, to-wit, the United States's conquest of the South.
Another example, of course, is Justice Benjamin R. Curtis sitting on the bench listening to the argument on behalf of Dred Scott by his brother, George T. Curtis.
And capitan_kerryfugio has, as yet, been unwilling or unable to produce any source for this assertion that the aged Chief Justice and the young Merryman were either "neighbors" or "friends."
[cr] Chief Justice William Rehnquist, All the Laws But One, pg 35, quoting the New York Times of 29 May 1861.
SOURCE: William H. Rehnquist, All the Laws But One, pp. 34-5.
One may readily observe that, in quoting the New York Times of May 29, 1861 and several other newspapers, Rehnquist EXPLICITLY states that, NORTHERN OPINION, as might have been expected, was critical of Taney's decision.
EXPLICITLY, Rehnquist was demonstrating NORTHERN OPINION at the time.
Moreover, by May 29, 1861, the Taney opinion being reported upon by newspapers had obviously already been issued.
Northern opinion, as might have been expected, was critical of Taney's decision. The Washington Evening Star opined in its issue of May 29:
The action of Chief Justice Taney in this case is probably in accordance with the strict letter of the law.... Nevertheless, it exhibits a determination on his part palpably to ignore the existing state of the country, which signally justified the action of General Cadwalader with respect to Merriman [sic] -- an individual whose conduct has proved him to be eminently dangerous to the cause of the maintenance of the Union.... Under these circumstances, there can be no doubt that public opinion will justify the refusal of General Cadwalader, in times like these, to deny to a man notoriously striving to overthrow the Constitution, Union and Government of the United States, the advantage of the writ of habeas corpus.The New York Times in its issue of the same day said:
In the case of John Merriman [sic], the interposition of Chief Justice Taney can only be regarded as at once officious and improper.... Judge Taney presents the ungracious spectacle of a judicial and the military authority of the United States at variance, the soldier eager to punish, and the jurist to exculpate a traitor. The antithesis might have been very easily avoided; and an impression that the zeal of the Justice might have been less fervent, had not the prisoner been a citizen of his own State, a neighbor, and a personal friend, would not have countenanced.The Baltimore Daily Republican was more sympathetic, in its May 28 issue, giving this report of the proceedings which had taken place that morning:
Shortly before the hour named, the doors of the courtroom were thrown open, when the crowd, which by this time had increased to several hundred, rushed in pell mell, until the room had become densely packed to such an extent as to render it exceedingly uncomfortable. Every nook and corner was occupied, and a general scrambling for positions progressed for some time, large numbers being unable to effect an entrance into the roomThe decision of the venerable Chief Justice was received by those assembled, many of whom were members of the bar, with heartfelt exclamations of approbation, such as "Thank God for such a man," "God grant that he may live many years to protect us," and many similar remarks.
When your comments are supported by lies, there is no substance.
What transpired was that you were revealed as a desperated, pathetic little man and a liar.
And of course we always have this:
"By 1984, I was prohibited from participating in partisan political campaigns, by the Hatch Act."
-- cr #1804 06/02/2004"I worked in Reagan's campaigns in 1976, 1980, and 1984."
-- cr #412 10/24/2004
The official records PROVE that the privilege of the writ had NOT been suspended by ANYONE when Taney issued his opinion. Authorization, signed by E.D. Townsend, Assistant-Adjutant General was not sent to General Cadwalader until a letter was issued on May 28, 1861. The military had no lawful authority to suspend the privilege of the writ, and Assistant-Adjutant General Townsend had no authority is sign such a letter even if General Scott did have such authority. The UNLAWFUL authorization to suspend the privilege of the writ was issued AFTER Taney acted.
Assuming arguendo that the order of Lincoln was valid and authorized General Scott to suspend habeas corpus, it was restricted to General Scott personally, or "the officer in command at the point where resistance occurs."
As the official record documents quoted below demonstrate, General Keim directed Colonel Yohe to effect the arrest and Colonel Yohe directed Captain Heckman to make the arrest. General Keim was in Pennsylvania and could not be authorized to suspend habeas corpus in Maryland.
General Cadwalader was ordered to appear in court at 11 a.m., May 27, 1861.
In his message to Lt. Col. E.D. Townsend, General Cadwalader explicitly states that he had asked for specific charges and specifications and the names of witnesses and had not yet received it. He then adverts to his response to the writ to be filed that morning at 11 a.m., documenting that it was filed without knowing specific charges and specifications nor the identity of witnesses, two of which would be Constitutionally required for a charge of treason.
In his return to the writ, General Cadwalader had his aide-de-camp tell the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court that "He [General Cadwalader] has further inform you that he is duly authorized by the President of the United States in such cases to suspend the writ of habeas corpus for the public safety."
Note that there is no clear statement that anybody actually had suspended the writ. Through an aide, General Cadwalader only asserted second-hand, without documentation, that he had been authorized to do so.
The following day, on May 28, 1861, Lt. Col. Townsend sends a message to General Cadwalader stating, "The general-in-chief directs me to say under authority conferred upon him by the President of the United States and fully transferred to you that you will hold in secure confinement all persons implicated in treasonable practices unless you should become satisfied that the arrest in any particular case was made without sufficient evidence of guilt."
On August 20, 1861, HQ Division of the Potomac issued this: "When there is good reason to suppose that persons are giving aid and comfort to the enemy they should be arrested even when there is a want of positive proof of their guilt."
It appears clear that habeas had not been suspended by anyone prior to Taney's issuance of the writ. The record also indicates that habeas had not been suspended when General Cadwalader refused to appear in court in response to the writ. It appears that General Cadwalader was stalling for time as, by his own admission, he neither knew the specific charges or specifications, nor the names of any legally required witnesses.
It appears that General Cadwalader defied the lawfully issued writ on May 27th, and there is no record of anybody suspending the writ prior to May 28th.
Even then, the supposed authorization consists of a letter from Lt. Col. E.D. Townsend saying that the general-in-chief directed him to tell General Cadwalader that he had been authorized to suspend the writ. Even assuming arguendo that General Scott had the power to delegate authorization to suspend habeas it is highly doubtful that it could be lawfully delegated in such manner. The letter should have been signed and issued by General Scott personally.
It is certain that President Lincoln did not personally suspend habeas regarding Merryman. Congress has never authorized any President to delegate the authority to suspend habeas to any military officer. And, of course, Congress has never authorized any military officer to further delegate the authority to suspend habeas down the chain of command.
http://www.ehistory.com/uscw/library/or/107/0337.cfm
Page 337 Chapter LXIII. CORRESPONDENCE, ETC. - UNION.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, April 27, 1861.
The undersigned, General-in-Chief, of the Army, has received from the President of the United States the following communication:
COMMANDING GENERAL ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES:
You are engaged in repressing an insurrection against the laws of the United States. If at any point on or in the vicinity of the military line which is now used between the city of Philadelphia, via Perryville, Annapolis City, and Annapolis Junction, you find resistance which renders it necessary to suspend the writ of habeas corpus for the public safety, you personally, or through the officer in command at the point where resistance occurs, are authorized to suspend that writ.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
In accordance with the foregoing warrant, the undersigned devolves on Major-General Patterson, commanding the Department of Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland; Brigadier-General Butler, commanding the Department of Annapolis, and Colonel Mansfield, commanding the Washington Department, a like authority, each within the limits of his command to execute in all proper cases the instructions of the President.
WINFIELD SCOTT.
THE MARYLAND ARRESTS -- OFFICIAL RECORD
OFFICIAL RECORDS: Series 2, vol 1, Part 1 (Prisoners of War)
Page 574 PRISONERS OF WAR, ETC.
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ANNAPOLIS,
Baltimore, May 27, 1861.
Lieutenant Colonel E. D. TOWNSEND,
Asst. Adjt. General, Hdqrs. of the Army, Washington, D. C.
COLONEL: On the 25th instant Mr. John Merryman was arrested near Cockeysville to the northward of the city of Baltimore, by the order of Colonel Yohe acting under instructions from Major General William H. Keim. I inclose a copy of the instructions given by Colonel Yohe to Captain Heckman under which the arrest was made and also a copy of the written statement made by Adjt. James Miltimore and Lieutenant William H. Abel of the circumstances attending the arrest which was made on their arrival at Fort McHenry with the prisoner. You are aware that neither Colonel Yohe nor General Keim are within the limits of the department under my command. I donot know the address of Colonel Yohe. General Keim is I think in the neighborhood of Harrisburg.
I directed the officers named who brought the prisoner here to have more specific charges and specifications furnished against the accused with the names of witnesses by which it was expected to prove them and the nature of their testimony, which hen it was my intention to forward to you for the instruction of the general-in-chief.
I regret to say that I have not as yet been furnished with this information. I was yesterday evening served with a writ of habeas corpus issued by the Honorable Roger B. Taney, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, commanding me to be and appear at the U. S. court-room in the city of Baltimore on Monday (this day), the 27th day of May, 1861, at 11 o'clock in the morning, and that I have with me the body of John Merryman of Baltimore County now in my custody, and that I certify and make known the day and cause of the capture and detention of the said John Merryman and that I do submit to and receive whatsoever the said court shall determine upon concerning me in this behalf.
I have the honor to inclose herewith a copy of said writ together with a copy of my reply thereto which will be handed to the court at 11 o'clock this day, the hour named in said writ.
Requesting to be furnished with further instructions as to the course I am to pursue in this case,
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, yours,
GEO. CADWALADER,
Brevet Major-General, Commanding.
======================
Page 575 THE MARYLAND ARRESTS.
[Inclosure Numbers 1.]
HEADQUARTERS,
May 21, 1861.
Captain HECKMAN, Company D.
SIR: I have been directed by Major-General Keim to seize the arms of the company near you and arrest the captain if in arms against the Government. You will be cautious in your movements and be well satisfied that the captain or any of them are spreading secession sentiments and using their infleunce in favor of the Southern Confederacy. By all means get the arms. Do not make it known until you are ready and be sure that you accompalish your purpose. If you think you need any assistance you can call upon Company E, at Cockeysville. If you arrest the captain take him to General Cadwalader's department. Do not be precipitate. Act cooly and deliberately but determinedly.
Yours, &c.,
SAM'L YOHE,
Colonel First Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers.
[Inclosure Numbers 2.]
This is certify that Mr. John Merryman was arrested by orders of Colonel Yoheas first lieutenant of a secession company who have in their possession arms belonging to the United States Gopvernment for the purpose of using the same against the Government. The prisoner acknowledged being lieutenant of said company in the presence of Adjutant Miltimore, of First Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteers, and Lieutenant Abel, Company D, First Regiment. It can also be proven that the prisoner has been drilling with his company and has uttered and advanced secession doctrines. The prisoner was arrested on the morning of May 25 at his residence about two miles from Cockeysville.
JAMES MILTIMORE, Adjutant,
WILLIAM H. ABEL, Lieutenant,
First Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers.
[Inclosure Numbers 3.]
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
District of Maryland, to wit:
To GEORGE CADWALADER, GREETING:
You are hereby commanded to be and appear before the Honorable Roger B. Taney, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, at the U. S. court room in the Masonic Hal in the city of Baltimore on Monday, the 27th day of May, 1861, at 11 o'clock in the morning, and that you have with you the body of John Merryman, of Baltimore County, and now in your custody, and that you certify and make known the dayand cause of the capture and detention of the said John Merryman, and that you then and there do submit to and receive whatsoaccording to law, and have you then and there this writ.
Witness, the Honorable R. B. Taney, Chief Justice of our Supreme Court, the first Monday in December, in the year of our Lord 1861.
[SEAL.]
THOS. SPICER,
Circuit Clerk.
============================
Page 576 PRISONERS OF WAR, ETC.
Inclosure Numbers 4.]
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ANNAPOLIS,
Fort McHenry, May 26, 1861.
Honorable ROGER B. TANEY,
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,
Baltimore, Md.
SIR: The undersigned to whom the annexed writ of this date signed by Thomas Spicer, clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States, is directed most respectfully states that the arrest of Mr. John Merryman in the said writ named was not made with his knowledge or by his order or direction but was made by Colonel Samuel Yohe acting under the orders of Major General William H. Keim, both of said officers being in the military service of the United States but not within the limits of his command. The prisoner was brought to this post on the 25th instant by Adjt. James Miltimore and Lieutenant William H. Abel by order of Colonel Yohe, and is charged with various acts of treason and with being publicly associated with and holding a commission as lieutenant in a company having in their possession arms belonging to the United States and avowing his purpose of armed hostility against the Government. He is also informed that it can be clarly established that the prisoner has made open and unreserved declarations of his association with this organized force; as being in avowed hostility to the Goverment and in readiness to co-operate with those engaged in the present rebellion against the Government of the United States.
He has further inform you that he is duly authorized by the President of the United States in such cases to suspend the writ of habeas corpus for the public safety. This is a high and delicate trust and it has been enjoined upon him that it should be executed with judgment and discretion but he is neverthelesss also instructed that in times of civil strife errors if any should be on the side of safety to the country. He most respectfully submits for your consideration that those who should co-operate in the present trying and painful position in which our country is placed should not by reason of any unnecessary want of confidence in each other increase our embarrassments. He therefore respectfully requests that you will postpone further action upon this case until he can receive instructions from the President of the United States when you shall hear further from him.
I have the honor to be, with high respect, your obedient servant,
GEO. CADWALADER,
Brevet Major-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, May 28, 1861.
Bvt. Major General G. CADWALADER, U. S. Army,
Commanding Department of Annapolis, Baltimore, Md.
GENERAL: Your letter of the 27th instant with inclosures reporting the arrest of John Merryman and the issue by Chief Justice Taney of a writ of habeas corpus in his case has been received.
The general-in-chief directs me to say under authority conferred upon him by the President of the United States and fully transferred to you that you will hold in secure confinement all persons implicated in treasonable practices unless you should become satisfied that the arrest in any particular case was made without sufficient evidence of guilt.
Page 577 THE MARYLAND ARRESTS.
In returns to writs of habeas corpus by whomsoever issued you will most respectfully decline for the time to produce the prisoners but will say that when the present unhappy difficulties are at an end you will duly respond to the writs in question.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
It is a fact that the privilege of the writ was suspended by Military officers at THEIR discretion, as unlawfully authorized by Lincoln.
It is a fact that Congress NEVER APPROVED those acts.
A grant of indemnity from criminal prosecution recognizes that the act was criminal.
No different then Jackson had done.
Hmmm. You'd better check Jackson's history with respect to habeas corpus again. From a US Department of Justice web site:
A very interesting case occurred during the tenure of United States Attorney John Dick in 1815. Just after the Battle of New Orleans during the War of 1812, United States Attorney Dick indicted Major General Andrew Jackson on charges of obstruction of justice. Jackson also was charged with contempt of court. According to the indictment, Jackson had "...disrespectfully wrested from the clerk an original order of the honorable the judge of this court, for the issuing of a writ of habeas corpus in the case of a certain Louis Louallier, then imprisoned by the said Major General Andrew Jackson." Jackson incurred the charges of obstruction when he imprisoned the judge who had charged him with contempt. When the future President of the United States appeared in court, he refused to answer the interrogatories and promptly received a fine of $1,000 which he paid and then left the court. Leaving the courthouse, Jackson stopped and spoke to a large crowd that had gathered:
"I have during the invasion (of New Orleans) exerted every one of my faculties for the defense and preservation of the Constitution and the laws. On this day I have been called upon to submit to their operations, under circumstances which many persons might have thought sufficient to justify resistance. Considering obedience to the laws, even when we think them unjustly applied, is the first duty of the citizen, and I do not hesitate to comply with the sentence you have heard pronounced; and I entreat you to remember the example I have given you of respectful submission to the administration of justice." (As quoted in Proceedings of the Louisiana Bar Association, 1898-1899, p. 120.)
Would that Lincoln had had that much respect for the law.
Moreover my remarks were regarding Jackson's view on the separation of powers, which he held that the Executive branch did not have to submit to the Judical branch in every case.
What a load of crap.
CAPITAN was caught LYING yet again and typically tried to WEASEL his way out.
All will note he gives no example of any alleged slander, although allegedly easy to prove, in his mind only.
I did NOT back out of the (absurd) wager, I UPPED THE ANTE and capitan backed out.
One must consider the prospect of an anonymous person on FR known only by a handle as a "neutral" third party, arbitrating the credibility of a proven liar such as capitan.
Among others, we have ALREADY exposed one Brigade member as a Neo-Nazi crackpot, and another, ahem, has, so to speak, exposed himself.
capitan cannot offer any valid defense of the lies he posted because they are lies and there is no defense.
ALL can simply compare the evidence provided and decide for him or her self. We do not need a "neutral" third party arbitrator provided by capitan.
Is that similar to the states not having to comply with the Federal government in every case? Separation of powers, don't you know, ala the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions.
http://class.lls.edu/~manheimk/cl1/jackson.htm
It is maintained by the advocates of the bank that its constitutionality in all its features ought to be considered as settled by precedent and by the decision of the Supreme Court. To this conclusion I can not assent. Mere precedent is a dangerous source of authority, and should not be regarded as deciding questions of constitutional power except where the acquiescence of the people and the States can be considered as well settled. So far from this being the case on this subject, an argument against the bank might be based on precedent. One Congress, in 1791, decided in favor. Prior to the present Congress, therefore, the precedents drawn from that source were equal. If we resort to the States, the expression of legislative, judicial, and executive opinions against the bank have been probably to those in its favor as 4 to 1. There is nothing in precedent, therefore which, if its authority were admitted, ought to weigh in favor of the act before me.
If the opinion of the Supreme Court covered the whole ground of this act, it ought not to control the coordinate authorities of this Government. The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution. Each public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood by others. It is as much the duty of the House of Representatives, of the Senate, and of the President to decide upon the constitutionality of any bill or resolution which may be presented to them for passage or approval as it is of the supreme judges when it may be brought before them for judicial decision. The opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the judges, and on that point the President is independent of both. The authority of the Supreme Court must not, therefore, be permitted to control the Congress or the Executive when acting in their legislative capacities, but to have only such influences the force of their reasoning may deserve.
As for separation of powers, we call that Federalism
If Congress had disapproved he would have been impeached.
I think you are again beating a dead horse.
I suspect that on separation of powers in general we agree. However, consider though what Lincoln and his administration were doing. From the Congressional Globe, July 16, 1861, page 150 and 151, Representative Burnett of Kentucky speaking:
I state, as a member of this House, that the President has violated the Constitution of the United States by his proclamations of the 19th and 27th of April last, declaring a blockade of southern ports. It is one of the incidents of the war-making power to declare a blockade. It is an act of war, and Congress alone has the power to declare war. ...
Men are now arrested in Maryland, and they have been in other portions of the country, upon warrants issued by the Secretary of State alone, and confined in the jail of the District of Columbia. They have not been able to be reached by a writ of habeas corpus; and after they have been kept there for weeks, they have been dismissed without a statement of the charge against them.
The President has also violated that clause of the Constitution which says that no money shall be drawn from the Treasury of the United States, except in consequence of appropriations by law. He has taken appropriations made by Congress for one purpose and applied them to another, in violation of law ...
Article one, section nine, clause five [sic, actually clause six], of the Constitution, declares that no preference shall be given to the ports of one State, over those of another; yet the President of the United States, of his own motion, and without authority of law, shuts up ports still claimed to be within the Union, according to the theory of the Republican party and of the President himself.
As this proclamation was made by the President with full knowledge that the Congress of the United States had, at its last session, expressly refused to pass a bill conferring upon him the power to blockade southern ports and collect the revenue outside of the ports. This blockade has been extended to our interior commerce and trade; and today, sir, the ports of loyal States are closed. My own State furnishes a striking example. Her ports are to-day closed; and her principle railroad virtually under the control and management of the Federal Government. The Constitution confers upon Congress alone the "power to regulate commerce among the several States. " ...
By his proclamation of the 3rd of May, calling into the service of the United States forty-two thousand volunteers for three and five years, by his increase of the regular Army twenty two thousand seven hundred and fourteen men, and adding to the Navy eighteen thousand seamen, he not only violated the plain letter of the Constitution in article one, eighth section, and twelfth clause [actually 12th and 13th clauses], but usurped the powers of the legislative department of this Government.
From Senator Breckenridge the same day:
It is proposed, sir, to approve and make valid the act of the President in enlisting men for three and five years. I ask you by what authority of the Constitution or law has he done this act? The power is not conferred in the Constitution; it has not been granted by law. It is therefore an unconstitutional and illegal act of executive power.
Lincoln could have convened Congress and allowed them to have their constitutional say in what was going on. But no, he waited until July 4. By contrast, Jefferson Davis convened his Congress in less than two weeks once Lincoln called up 75,000 troops.
Question: The power of declaring war resides, according to the Constitution, in Congress. Yet Lincoln essentially declared war by ordering the blockade of Southern ports. How did the Supreme Court react to that? Did that start us on the road to the "imperial presidency," which Congress finally tried to stop with the War Powers Resolution in the post-Vietnam era?
Farber: Lincoln's actions were actually fairly easy to justify under the Constitution. When the Constitution was being framed, the drafters deliberately gave Congress the power to declare war (rather than to "make" war). They wanted the president to be able to act on his own if the country was attacked. In Lincoln's case, a third of the country was in hostile hands, and a U.S. fort had been attacked and taken by hostile troops. Rather than acting like an imperial president, he then turned to Congress for approval. Ironically, his actions came closer to complying with the standards of the War Powers Resolution, over a century before it was passed, than most presidents have done in the modern era.
http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/237931in.html
The very last act of the Senate on March 28, 1861, was to check with the President to see whether he had anything to tell them before they adjorned.
Mr. Powell, from the committee appointed to wait on the President of the United States and notify him that unless he has some further communication to make, the Senate is ready to adjourn, reported that the committee had waited on the President, and been informed by him that he had no further communication to make to the Senate.
On March 29, Lincoln ordered Welles and Cameron to prepare the relief expedition to Sumter. He waited for the Senate to adjorn before he took an action bound to end in a shooting war.
From the Cincinnati Enquirer as reported in the Memphis Daily Appeal of March 27, 1981:
The New York and all Eastern Republicans are getting clamorous for an extra session. They now admit that, critical and extraordinary as the condition of the country is, the President is without power to to take any effectual step toward its relief. He can effect no fixed and decisive policy toward the seceding States, because no laws give him authority to carry it into effect.
He cannot enforce the laws, because no power has been put at his command for that purpose. He cannot close the ports which refuse to pay Federal duties, nor has he the authority to enforce payment except through the local authorities. These, moreover, are the least of the difficulties which embarrass the action of the Government. This loan is called for, but there is no prospect of revenue to render it safe. The seceded States invite imports under the tariff of 1857, at least ten per cent. lower than that which the Federal Government has just adopted. As a matter of course, foreign trade will seek southern ports, because it will be driven there by the Morrill tariff. It has been stated that Secretary Chase has been heard to say that the tariff bill must be repealed.
No exception, capitan. No demonstration was ever made that the writ had been properly suspended. Your continued assertion otherwise amounts to nothing more than the affirmation of a consequent.
Farber, a fully credentialled legal scholar provides the rationale.
And Farber, as usual, employs a sloppy and fallacious argument that, not unlike your own, consists of the affirmation of his own consequent.
Argh. 1981 = 1861
Given your demonstrated ignorance on other matters from this thread, one can never be sure.
Based on the quality and quantity of recognition I think it is safe to say that neither had any real recognition for the first three years of their existence.
Since when did St. Eustasius and Saxe Coburg Gotha cease to be real places? I also invite you to take your case up with the U.S. government on the former, as to this day it officially identifies the reception at St. Eustasius as the first international recognition of the United States.
I did not present myself as an authoritative credentialed attorney, thus your ad verecundiam appeal would not apply. I did, however, observe a substantial logical flaw in the arguments of both you and Farber, to which neither of you have produced a sufficient response.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.