Posted on 08/20/2004 5:43:21 AM PDT by TexConfederate1861
...that evidently was not even written by a lawyer
Still, when the colonies asserted self-rule they claimed all within their jurisdiction.
But you are right about property rights being settled by the demands of the founding fathers being satisfied by the British in the Paris Peace Treaty. Speaking of the property which concerned them, Article 7 is germane.
Article 7: There shall be a firm and perpetual peace between his Brittanic Majesty and the said states, and between the subjects of the one and the citizens of the other, wherefore all hostilities both by sea and land shall from henceforth cease. All prisoners on both sides shall be set at liberty, and his Brittanic Majesty shall with all convenient speed, and without causing any destruction, or carrying away any Negroes or other property of the American inhabitants, withdraw all his armies, garrisons, and fleets from the said United States, and from every post, place, and harbor within the same; leaving in all fortifications, the American artilery that may be therein; and shall also order and cause all archives, records, deeds, and papers belonging to any of the said states, or their citizens, which in the course of the war may have fallen into the hands of his officers, to be forthwith restored and delivered to the proper states and persons to whom they belong.
The Founders, The Framers, The Fathers and The Daddies sure had a way with words to let you know what mattered and what they were thinking.
From Bollman (as in the actual court ruling in Bollman, not some lawyer's argument and not the dissent as certain persons around here are inclined to dishonestly pass off as the ruling):
To enable the court to decide on such question, the power to determine it must be given by written law. The inquiry therefore on this motion will be, whether by any statute, compatible with the constitution of the United States, the power to award a writ of habeas corpus, in such a case as that of Erick Bollman and Samuel Swartwout, has been given to this court.In other words, the court has the power to issue writs of habeas corpus under section 14 of the Judicial Act of 1789, as enacted by congress to fulfill the obligation of Article I, Section 9's habeas corpus clause. Since the court's power is constitutionally granted from Congress, only Congress may take it away and Congress had not done so. THEREFORE, pursuant to Section 14 of the Judicial Act of 1789, Bollman's writ must be granted.The 14th section of the judicial act (Laws U. S. vol. 1. p. 58.) has been considered as containing a substantive grant of this power...
...It may be worthy of remark, that this act was passed by the first congress of the United States, sitting under a constitution which had declared "that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus should not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety might require it."
Acting under the immediate influence of this injunction, they must have felt, with peculiar force, the obligation of providing efficient means by which this great constitutional privilege should receive life and activity; for if the means be not in existence, the privilege itself would be lost, although no law for its suspension should be enacted. Under the impression of this obligation, they give, to all the courts, the power of awarding writs of habeas corpus...
...If the act of congress gives this court the power to award a writ of habeas corpus in the present case, it remains to inquire whether that act be compatible with the constitution.
In the mandamus case, (ante, vol. 1. p. 175. Marbury v. Madison,) it was decided that this court would not exercise original jurisdiction except so far as that jurisdiction was given by the constitution. But so far as that case has distinguished between original and appellate jurisdiction, that which the court is now asked to exercise is clearly appellate...
...The decision that the individual shall be imprisoned must always precede the application for a writ of habeas corpus, and this writ must always be for the purpose of revising that decision, and therefore appellate in its nature.
But this point also is decided in Hamilton's case and in Burford's case.
If at any time the public safety should require the suspension of the powers vested by this act in the courts of the United States, it is for the legislature to say so.
That question depends on political considerations, on which the legislature is to decide. Until the legislative will be expressed, this court can only see its duty, and must obey the laws. The motion, therefore, must be granted."
For some reason, this simple term, "therefore," has always been a source of great difficulty for capitan. Why this is so remains a mystery.
there·fore ( P ) Pronunciation Key (thârfôr, -fr) adv. For that reason or cause; consequently or hence.
Nonsense, for purposes of this conversation, you, Non-Sequitur, at your #1874 averred "Even if the Texas secession were legal...." We are arguing your assertion in your #1874 which was offered specifically based on the assumption that Texas secession was legal.
[Non-Seq #1874] Even if the Texas secession were legal, Constitutionally only Congress can dispose of federal property.
I very rarely, if ever, quote McPherson, as I do not own anything by McPherson. If I have quoted him, it is more likely a quote embedded in another quote, or from another source.
I have read a couple of his books, but that is about it. He's not on my list of regular references. Can you cite the McPherson quotations I reportedly made?
"But your technique, as much as your content was what was under review. Please try to read my posts for comprehension and keep up with us, will you? Your technique consists mostly of hairsplitting, conniving at wordplay, and sand in the eyes, served up with a generous dose of patronization and general abuse ad hominem, which is a favored Marxist and Clintonite brawling move."
You, of all people, should know, "when in Rome, do as the Romans do." Keep in mind, I give those who post to me a commensurate level of respect.
"Glad to hear you supported McClintock -- how about a link? Not that I don't trust you or anything."
Do your own homework. All my posts, save two, may be reviewed online. (One was a off-color joke and the other was the acronym "GFY.")
"Done. You lied."
Not refutation. Just laziness on your part.
"I post criticisms of your defective arguments and your appeal to Marxist authorities who are using American history to grind their red axes. I call you out on that. You reject my every post unless it's a cite-and-quote of authorities you approve of -- you're just like Wlat in that regard."
You keep bringing up "marxist authorities" with no specificity beyond an extremely weak link to McPherson. Since you "called me out" on that, you have the obligation to prove it. I am quite confident that you will either run and hide, or fail in the attempt.
"Furthermore, your own howler of a post about ethnic cleansing of the South ..."
I already refuted a similar charge by another one of your cabal. Why not cite the post you refer to and explain the odd rationale behind your interpretation?
"Like I just said. You mistake fixity for integrity -- obviously, since you disclose elsewhere that you have trouble with the concept of integrity."
Quite to the contrary. The shallowness of your arguments and replies, this being a good example, shows you are long on accusation and short on any proof. But that is the stock-in-trade of you guys.
"You just accused me of intellectual dishonesty."
I confess, I am not entirely sure about the "intellecutal" part. But the post I am replying to is dripping with dishonesty.
"And the posts I asked the Mods to pull, were precisely those in which you practiced to deceive us, and were discovered by nolu chan and 4ConservativeJustices. I didn't ask them to perform a public cleansing of their forum by performing damnatio memoriae on all your posts."
None of those posts were deceptive. In the ones that that you and your comrades squealed about most, you failed to address the underlying issues, but instead complained about the citation of the reference.
"Your assignment of "Lincoln-hater" is unsupported and vicious."
The derogatory and hateful language used by your group with reference to Lincoln is proof enough. If you believe that have been included, unfairly, by association, then I retract that assignation to you.
A footnote to Hamdi gives a more complete version of the opening statement of the eminent Mr. Taney in Gruber.. </sarcasm>
Mr. Taney opened the case to the jury, on the part of the Rev. Mr. Gruber.The statement, he said, made by the District Attorney, had informed the jury, of the interesting principles involved in the trial then pending before them. It was, indeed, an important case, in which the community, as well as the accused, had a deep interest. The prosecution, said Mr. Taney, is without precedent in the judicial proceedings of Maryland, and as the jury are the judges of the law, as well as the fact; it becomes my duty, not only to state the evidence we are about to offer, but to shew you the grounds on which we mean to rest the defence.
I need not, continued Mr. Taney, tell you, that [33] by the liberal and happy institutions of this state, the rights of conscience and the freedom of speech, are fully protected. No man can be prosecuted for preaching the articles of his religious creed; unless, indeed, his doctrine is immoral, and calculated to disturb the peace and order of society. And on subjects of national policy may, at all times, be freely and fully discussed in the pulpit, or elsewhere, without limitation or restraint. Therefore, the Reverend gentleman, whose cause I am now advocating, cannot be liable to prosecution in any form of proceeding, for the sermon mentioned by the District Attorney, unless his doctrines were immoral, and calculated to disturb the peace and order of society. The sermon, in itself, could in no other way be an offence against the laws. If his doctrines were not immoral, if the principles he maintained were not contrary to the peace and good order of society, he had an undoubted right to preach them, and to clothe them in such language, and to enforce them by such facts and arguments, as to him seemed proper. It would be nothing to the purpose, to say, that he offended or that he alarmed some, or all of his hearers. Their feelings, or their fears, would not alter the character of his doctrine, or take from him a right secured to him by the constitution and laws of the state.
But, in this case, he is not accused of preaching immoral, or dangerous doctrine. It is not the charge contained in the indictment. The preaching of such a sermon, is not laid as the offence. He is accused of [34] an attempt to excite insubordination and insurrection among our slaves: and the intention of the preacher is the essence of the crime. On this indictment, no matter what doctrines he preached; no matter what language he used; yet his doctrines, or his language could not amount to the crime now charged against him. They would be evidence, I admit, to shew his intention; but they would be nothing more than evidence, and could not constitute the offence itself.
(Mr. Taney then read, and explained to the jury, the different counts contained in the indictment.) You will perceive, continued Mr. Taney, by the explanation I have given you, that the intent of the accused, is the great object of your enquiry. The charge is a grave and serious one. It is necessary, in order to support the prosecution, that the wicked intention, charged in the indictment, should be made out by proof. The guilty design is the crime imputed to him. You must be satisfied, before you can say he is guilty, that such was his intent; such the object he wished to accomplish; and that such were the purposes for which his sermon was preached. For it is upon this sermon alone that this prosecution is founded.
It is true, said Mr. Taney, that the words used by him, are evidence of his intentions. But they are not conclusive evidence: nor are they the only evidence, from which the intent is to be gathered. His language is a circumstance, from which you may infer [35] his design. It is nothing more. And there are a variety of other circumstances, equally entitled to weight, and equally proper for the consideration of the jury. For, when it is alledged, on the part of the prosecution, that a clergyman of a Christian society, while professing to be engaged in the high and solemn duties of religion, was, in truth, seeking to produce insubordination and insurrection among the slaves, and a detached part of his sermon, is relied upon as the proof of his guilt; the party accused, has a right to refer you, in proof of his innocence, to the general scope and object of his sermon: to the other topics introduced and discussed: to the occasion on which it was preached: to the character of the congregation to whom it was addressed: to the opinions known to be held by the society to which he belongs: and above all, to the history of his own life, which, in this instance, would, of itself, be abundantly sufficient, to repel such a charge, bottomed on such evidence. Upon all of these circumstances Mr. Gruber relies for his defence; and I now proceed more particularly to state them, as you will by and by hear them in proof.
You have already been told, that Mr. Gruber is a minister of the Methodist Episcopal Church. And it is not necessary to tell you, that the religious society to which he belongs, is nearly as numerous as any other society of Christians in this state; and the equal of any other, in the general order and decorum of their behaviour, in their moral deportment, and in [36] their habits of obedience to the laws. It was, at a very early period of his life, that Mr. Gruber became a member of this society, and took upon himself, the duties of a minister of the gospel. In this vocation, he has faithfully laboured, for more than twenty years; and he now fills a post of high rank, and great confidence, in his church; the reward of his fervent piety and unwearied zeal. We shall also prove to you by a most respectable witness, a minister of the same church, whose duty it has often been, according to the discipline of that society, to examine into the conduct and character of the accused, that during the whole course of his ministry, the Reverend gentleman who is now on his trial, has sustained a character of spotless integrity.
It is well known, that the gradual and peaceable abolition of slavery in these states, is one of the objects, which the Methodist society have steadily in view. No slave-holder is allowed to be a minister of that church. Their preachers are accustomed, in their sermons, to speak of the injustice and oppressions of slavery. The opinion of Mr. Gruber on this subject, nobody could doubt. And if any slave-holder believed it dangerous to himself, his family, or the community, to suffer his slaves to learn, that all slavery is injust and oppressive; and persuade himself, that they would not of themselves, be able to make the discovery: it was in his power to prevent them from attending the assemblies, where such doctrines were likely to be preached. Mr. Gruber [37] did not go to the slaves: they came to him. They could not have come, if their masters had chosen to prevent them.
In August, 1818, a Camp-meeting of the Methodist society was held in Washington county. At this meeting, it was the duty of Mr. Gruber to attend. He did attend, and from his official station in the society, the general superintendance, and direction of the meeting, was in his hands. On one of the days of the meeting, when the usual hour of evening preaching had arrived, the gentleman who had been depended upon to fulfil that duty, was prevented by indisposition. It was the duty of Mr. Gruber, to provide for this unexpected emergency. He applied to several of his brethren, and requested them to address the congregation. But it so happened, that from different causes, not now material to be stated, he was unsuccessful in all his applications: and as nobody else could be found to supply the place of the sick brother, Mr. Gruber was compelled to do it himself. He undertook the task without preparation, without time for reflection, and upon the sudden and unexpected call of the moment. I state, said Mr. Taney, these facts, so much in detail, because this sermon, is the sole foundation of the charge against him. The language used on that occasion, is the only fact, relied upon to prove him guilty of the wicked intention of raising an insurrection among the slaves: and converting this peaceful and flourishing state into a horrible scene of rapine and murder.
[38] At the time this sermon was preached there were present about three thousand persons, of whom only about four hundred were people of colour, as they are now generally called. These were separated from the whites, according to the custom on such occasions, and placed together, behind the stand, from which the preacher addressed the congregation. Many of the most respectable gentlemen of Washington county, and many of the principal slave-holders were there, when the sermon in question was delivered. Yet it is at this meeting, thus constituted, that he is accused of conspiring against the peace of this state. It is, in his public address, to this assembly, that he is said to have developed his profligate designs. If he did mean to stir up the slaves to insurrection, it must, at least, be admitted, that he at the same time put the masters on their guard.
The address of Mr. Gruber, occupied rather more than one hour. His subject was national sin; and after enumerating and rebuking some offences which, he supposed, the people of this country to be but too prone to commit, he, in the conclusion of his discourse, spoke about fifteen minutes and no more, on slavery, and the treatment of slaves. It is not alledged, that he said any thing in the preceding part of his sermon, calculated, in any degree, to support the prosecution. During all that time, he made no allusion to the condition of master or slave. And in the latter part of his discourse, when he did speak of them, and used the language on which this prosecution [39] is founded, he addressed himself particularly to the masters. His appeal to his hearers, on this subject, was directed exclusively to the whites. The impression was intended to be made on them. And when the language used by him, shall be detailed to you by the witnesses, you will find, that he could not have designed, in that part of his discourse, to influence the conduct of the slaves, but was obviously, and clearly, seeking to reform the hearts of the masters.
There may, and probably will be, a difference among the witnesses, as to the words used on this occasion, by the Reverend preacher. There will always be this difference, where there are many hearers. For some will be negligent, while others are attentive: some hear only detached parts: others hear the whole: some are roused to attention, only when the angry passions are inflamed by an expected attack on some favourite opinion; and others, listen to the whole discourse, in the spirit of soberness and humility, for the purpose of receiving and profiting by the instruction. And in this case, a difference is more especially to be looked for, because the sermon produced a good deal of excitement, and much warm conversation among different persons, even on the ground: so that the remarks of irritated individuals, became intimately blended in the mind, with the language of the preacher, and make it difficult, after the lapse of some months, for those who had listened carelessly, to separate the one from the other. But [40]we shall be able to fix, beyond doubt, the language actually used by him. For we shall produce a most respectable witness, who listened attentively to the whole discourse, who was near the preacher during the whole time, and who, on the day afterwards, while it was yet fresh in his mind, wrote down the heads of the discourse, and wrote out, in full, what may be termed the offensive part of it. His statement too, will be corroborated by the testimony of a multitude of other witnesses, concurring with him in all the material parts. We shall, therefore, confidently rely on it, as containing truly and accurately the words delivered. And from such a sermon, as the witness will detail, preached by such a man, on such an occasion, and under such circumstances, without any other act of his life, to aid the prosecution: I must be allowed to say, continued Mr. Taney, that no intelligent mind, free from the influence of passion and prejudice, can infer the guilty design charged in this indictment.
The learned District Attorney has said, that the language of Mr. Gruber was injudicious: that it was not calculated to do good: that it would necessarily irritate and offend the masters, and make the slaves more dissatisfied with their unhappy condition. And it may, in the progress of this trial, be argued on the part of the prosecution, that, his principles on the subject of slavery, were wrong; that the assertion of his opinions, to a congregation mixed, like the one to which he was speaking, was impolitic and dangerous, [41] and likely to produce insubordination and disturbance among the slaves. Now, if all this could be truly said of this memorable sermon; if the Reverend preacher merited all these reproaches, yet, if you should believe that his motives were pure, if you think him innocent of any design to produce this mischief, he would, still, be entitled to a verdict of acquittal. For he is not now on trial, for preaching doctrines calculated to disturb the peace and order of society. That is not the offence charged in this indictment; and you are well aware, that a man indicted for one offence, cannot, on his trial, on that indictment, be convicted of another and a different offence. And if the learned attorney for the state, shall be able to satisfy you that the opinions of Mr. Gruber on slavery, and the treatment of slaves, are unsound: that his arguments were injudicious and impolitic: that his language was inflamatory, and calculated to produce evil: still he will not have advanced one step towards the accomplishment of his object, until he can prove to you, that these opinions were uttered, these arguments were used, and this language employed, with the criminal intention, and for the wicked purpose laid in this indictment. I might, therefore, safely rest the defence on this ground, and yield to the attorney for the state all the advantage, he can derive, from placing my client, in this respect, in the wrong. For the circumstances I have before stated, will, in my humble judgment, put the integrity of his motives, beyond all question. And whatever may be thought, or said, of the intemperance of his zeal, no [42] body, who listens to the proof, will be able to doubt the sincerity of his heart.
But the Reverend gentleman, continued Mr. Taney, merits a defence on very different principles. The counsel, to whom he has confided his cause, cannot content themselves with a cold and reluctant acquittal, and abandon Mr. Gruber, without defence, to all the obloquy and reproach, which his enemies have industriously, and most unjustly heaped upon him. We cannot consent to buy his safety by yielding to passion, prejudice, and avarice, the control of future discussions, on this great and important question. He must not surrender up the civil and religious rights, secured to him in common with others, by the constitution of this most favoured nation. Mr. Gruber feels, that it is due to his own character; to the station he fills; to the respectable society of Christians in which he is a minister of the gospel, not only to defend himself from this prosecution, but also to avow, and to vindicate here, the principles he maintained in his sermon. There is no law that forbids us to speak of slavery as we think of it. Any man has a right to publish his opinions on that subject whenever he pleases. It is a subject of national concern, and may at all times be freely discussed. Mr. Gruber did quote the language of our great act of national independence, and insisted on the principles contained in that venerated instrument. He did rebuke those masters, who, in the exercise of power, are deaf to the calls of humanity; and he warned them of [43] the evils they might bring upon themselves. He did speak with abhorrence of those reptiles, who live by trading in human flesh, and enrich themselves by tearing the husband from the wife -- the infant from the bosom of the mother: and this I am instructed was the head and front of his offending. Shall I content myself, continued Mr. Taney, with saying he had a right to say this? that there is no law to punish him? So far is he from being the object of punishment in any form of proceeding, that we are prepared to maintain the same principles, and to use, if necessary, the same language here in the temple of justice, and in the presence of those who are the ministers of the law. A hard necessity, indeed, compels us to endure the evil of slavery for a time. It was imposed upon us by another nation, while we were yet in a state of colonial vassalage. It cannot be easily, or suddenly removed. Yet while it continues, it is a blot on our national character, and every real lover of freedom, confidently hopes that it will be effectually, though it must be gradually, wiped away; and earnestly looks for the means, by which this necessary object may be best attained. And until it shall be accomplished: until the time shall come when we can point without a blush, to the language held in the declaration of independence, every friend of humanity will seek to lighten the galling chain of slavery, and better, to the utmost of his power, the wretched condition of the slave. Such was Mr. Gruber's object in that part of his sermon, of which I am now speaking. Those who have complained of him, [44] and reproached him, will not find it easy to answer him: unless complaints, reproaches and persecution shall be considered an answer.
I have now done, continued Mr. Taney, with stating the testimony we are about to offer, and marking out the grounds on which our defence will be taken. But there is one other topic, on which it may be proper to remark, before I conclude the opening of the case.
The sermon in question, was preached in Washington county, and this indictment was found by the Grand Jury for that county. The cause has been removed to Frederick, upon the application of the accused. This circumstance, sometimes creates suspicions unfavourable to the character and standing of the party who applies for the removal. If he has been long an inhabitant of the county in which he is indicted, there may be some ground for these suspicions: but even then, they cannot be allowed, in the least degree, to affect the verdict. In this case, however, Mr. Gruber was as much a stranger in Washington, as he is in Frederick. He never resided in that county, and therefore, has not shunned the decision of the men who knew him. He has removed his cause from one body of strangers, to be decided, indeed, by another body of men, who are equally unacquainted with him. His motive for doing so, I will briefly explain to you. Mr. Gruber, as I have already told you, was a [45] stranger in Washington, and consequently incapable of deciding how far, a fair and impartial trial, could be there expected. He, of course, submitted himself on this point, to the decision of his counsel, and formed his own opinion upon the advice and information derived from them. I am by no means prepared to say, that if he had gone to trial in Washington, his cause would not have been patiently heard, and impartially decided, by a jury of that county. But it was well known that great pains had been taken to inflame the public mind against him. The Grand Jury of that county had found this indictment to be true: and on that jury were men of high standing and great influence in the county. Many of the members of that body, I know personally, and respect highly. They are incapable, I am sure, of wilfully doing wrong. Yet they are like the rest of us, but men! frail men! and liable to be influenced by the impulse of passion or prejudice without being aware of it. Knowing, as I did, all the circumstances of this case and being firmly convinced that there was no just cause for instituting this prosecution, the finding of this indictment, by a body of men so respectable as the Grand Jury, was of itself sufficient evidence to my mind, that the liberty and reputation of Mr. Gruber, ought not to be hazarded on a trial there. I so advised him, said Mr. Taney, in the strongest terms; and if blame is to rest upon any one, for the removal of the cause, I acknowledge that to me, and not to Mr. Gruber it ought to be imputed. Yet, I cannot think, that the exercise of a constitutional right can be [46] matter of censure against the client or his counsel: nor can it be a reproach to any one, that he is willing to abide the verdict of a jury of Frederick county.
That sounds just like Dan Rather on C-BS. The source was phoney and fraudulent, but the argument which relies upon the phoney, fraudulent source should be considered on its merits.
Do you remember this reference I provided in the deleted 4,000 post thread:
"Just Because John Marshall Said it, Doesn't Make it So: Ex parte Bollman and the Illusory Prohibition on the Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners in the Judiciary Act of 1789" by Eric M. Freedman
Freedman makes the case in the article that Marshall mucked things up in his Bollman habeas dicta.
"There is certainly much force in this argument, and it receives additional strength from the consideration, that if the power be denied to this court, it is denied to every other court of the United States, the right to grant this important writ is given, in this sentence, to every judge of the circuit, or district court, but can neither be exercised by the circuit nor district court. It would be strange if the judge, sitting on the bench, should be unable to hear a motion for this writ where it might be openly made, and openly discussed, and might yet retire to his chamber, and in private receive and decide upon the motion. This is not consistent with the genius of our legislation, nor with the course of our judicial proceedings."
Another aspect of the case concerned Federal versus state jurisdiction. But the gist of the case was that the Court released the prisoners from an indictment for treason.
The power of suspension of (the privilege of) the writ was not an question before the court, because it had not been suspended with regard to the case. Any mention by Marshall is in dicta. And that is why the Bollman case was brought up in the first place. It is claimed that Bollman provides irrefutable proof that only Congress may suspend the privilege of the writ. That was not an authoritative finding in this case.
I clearly corrected myself from "Hamdi decision" to "Hamdi documentation." There was nothing phoney or fraudulent, as the quotation showed. You still fail to address the point of that post; nor do I expect you to do so. You would "rather" play games.
I did not cite the authority of Freedman's opinions. But even a moron such as you must admit that a court decision which occupies three chapters in a book about habeas corpus, is a case about habeas corpus.
Nahhhh, you can still try to say Bollman was not about habeas corpus.
You put too much stock in lawyers. Klinton was a lawyer. Some source of authority, huh?
[cr #1606] How very embarrassing it must have been to you all to have been so unceremoniously slam dunked. Not only did the moderators not pull my posts, they pulled the whole thread instead. It seems your "tight-fisted temper tantrums" did not account to a hill of beans.
[nc] Nothing you have said in your #1636 or elsewhere has responded to the substance of my #1594. I repeat the essence of it here in condensed form.
I have not read Mitchell, but the description in the Hamdi footnote is that the plantiff was a US citizen.
-- capitan_refugio, #1370, 09/18/2004
The provided description is not in a footnote to anything. It is not from any Supreme Court decision. It was written by a public defender attorney and runs from the bottom of page 24 through the beginning of page 25 within the Petitition for a Writ of Certiorari.
Bollman was not about habeas corpus....
-- capitan_refugio, #237, 08/29/2004
Eric M. Freedman in Habeas Corpus, Rethinking the Great Writ of Liberty, devotes his chapters 3, 4, and 5 exclusively to Ex Parte Bollman.
Lemmon v the People was a case which foreshadowed Dred Scott. The Taney Court overturned a New York State statute which immediately freed slaves brought into the state. The decision guaranteed "sojourn and transit" and transit rights to slave-owners through free states. It did not address, to my knowledge, the issue of residence.
-- capitan_refugio, #386, 03/31/2004
The Supreme Court case of Lemmon v. The People does not exist.
Thank you for chiming in> I refer you to the text of Amy Warwick (1862): "But chiefly, the terms of the President's proclamation instituting [67 U.S. 635, 641]...."The Supreme Court finds:
(1) The rebellion is an insurrection and not a war betwenn countries,
(2) The "so-called blockade" was not a blockade under international law, and (3) Closing the ports was a valid exercise of executive authority.
-- capitan_refugio, #649, 09/03/2004
On FINDLAW, bracketed comments in text of case [67 U.S. 635, 641] indicate this report starts at Volume 67, page 635 and you are at the beginning of page 641.
[nc] cr quotes are from pp. 640-642 of the Supreme Court Reporter.
The entirety of the quoted matter was from the Court Reporter's recitation of the Argument of Mr. Carlisle which runs from page 639 to 650. The Opinion of the Court by Mr. Justice Grier starts at page 665.
All of the findings attributed to the Court are argments of Mr. Carlisle. None was adopted by the Court.
| 635 | 639 | 640 | 641 | 650 | 665 | 682 | 699 |
[court reporter at p. 638] "The case of the Amy Warwick was argued by Mr. Dana, of Massachusetts, for Libellants...."
[court reporter at p. 639] "The Brilliante, by Mr. Eames, of Washington City, for Libellants, and by Mr. Carlisle, of Washington City, for Claimants."
[court reporter at p. 639] "One argument on each side is all that can be given. Those of Mr. Dana and Mr. Carlisle have been selected...."
[court reporter at p. 639] Begins presentation of argument by Mr. Carlisle.
[court reporter at p. 650] Ends presentation of argument by Mr. Carlisle.
[court reporter at p. 650] Begins presentation of argument by Mr. Dana.
[Opinion of the Court] Mr. Grier pp. 665 - 682.
[Dissenting Opinion] Mr. Nelson pp. 682 - 699.
Make your case on legal merits. Offer a legal argument to supplement your incessant flow of unsupported crap.
[cr #1370 -- 09/18/2004 12:20:00 AM CDT] I have not read Mitchell but the description in the Hamdi footnote is that the plaintiff was a U.S. citizen.
[nc #1402 -- 09/18/2004 6:26:43 AM CDT] I proved with images and links that the quote was not from the Hamdi decision as alleged on 9/16/2004 and I proved it was not from a footnote as alleged on 9/18/2004. I proved it was from the main text of a Petition for a Writ of Cert.
[GOPcap #1419 09/18/2004 10:20:16 AM CDT] You did it with the attorney arguments in the Prize Cases.
You did it with the dissent in Bollman
You did it with the dissent in Hamdi
Now you're doing it with the petition in Hamdi.
Simply put, it would seem that you are intentionally perpetrating a fraud and hoping that nobody will double check your work to catch it. But we all know that perpetrating frauds is what Stalinists do, so you get caught every single time.
[capitan_refugio #1462 09/19/2004 12:17:17 AM CDT] Yes, my statement that it was from the Hamdi "decision" was in error. It was from the Hamdi "documentation" on Findlaw.com and I mistook it for the decision or the dissent. Big deal.
No capitan. The images shown in my #1402 prove beyond a doubt that the Petition for a Writ of Cert cannot be mistaken for either the decision or the dissent. It looks nothing like a decision of the Supreme Court. It bears no resemblance to a court decision. It looks nothing like any court decision on FINDLAW. Court decisions on FINDLAW are single-spaced in HTML. This Petition was double-spaced in PDF.
It is text spanning the width of the page, ending page 24 and continuing on page 25. It bears no resemblance to any footnote ever seen.
Hairball
No. Freedman is not talking about dicta and he tried to make the case that Marshall made errors. Thus far Marshall's opinion has stood for nearly two centuries.
For example, Freedman offers, "There is good evidence that the framers of the Judiciary Act expected that the federal courts would exercise common-law criminal jurisdiction." And Freedman concludes his discussion of Bollman by writing, 'We can, however, say with some confidence that Marshall's assertion in Bollman that the federal courts could exercise no 'jurisdiction not given by the constitution, or by the laws of the United States' was an inaccurate description of original intent."
Marshall did not offer a description of "original intent." He did not opine on the intent of the lawgiver, but the law that was actually given.
Whether it be true or not that some framers expected the federal courts would exercise common-law criminal jurisdiction, Marshall's contention that the Supreme Court is -NOT- a common law court is beyond dispute. The Supreme Court did not exist before the Constitution and was created and defined by the Constitution. There is no external metaphysical source of jurisdiction, no legal potency detectable only as a normative aura.
"There is no federal general common law." (Erie R. Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)
[cr #1606 to nolu chan, Admin Moderator, All]
[cr #1606] For a person who proclaims his hatred of Lincoln
I have not proclaimed any hatred of Lincoln, but disdain for the fabricated mythology that some have adopted, and the nonsensical and/or illogical apologies in defense thereof. In so doing, I quote extensively from Lerone Bennett, Jr., a Black historian and editor of Ebony magazine for about a half-century.
[cr #1606] his endorsement of legal slavery
I have not endorsed legal slavery. I have observed the historical fact that the Constitution recognized and protected the institution of slavery.
My #710 acts as a complete refutation of your unsupported allegation, "I'm a Yankee, native New Yorker, now residing in Arkansas. I do not mind talking the slavery issue. Slavery was wrong, it was always wrong, and never could be justified. It does not speak to the legal issue of secession. If secession was a legal right, it was no less a right whether its purpose was good, bad, or dumb."
Quote me endorsing legal slavery or please admit this is another of your smears and false accusations.
[cr #1606] your modus operandi is to smear and misrepresent
That is what I just documented you doing. Your allegation provides no documentation.
[cr #1606] You revel in quoting Hitler
Quote me quoting Hitler, or please admit this is just another of your smears and false accuations.
[cr #1606] You'll find in four years I have had exactly two pulled - neither for overt profanity.
The total text of your #1488 read "GFY". I am sure you intended it to mean "Good for you" and its was pulled in error.
[cr #1606] If you can not debate the issues, then I suggest you stay off of these threads.
I am debating the legal issues. You have been consistently losing that debate. You have thus resorted to the imaginary case, attributing argument of attorney to the Supreme Court, attributing argument by a public defender in a Petition to an opinion of the Supreme Court, and attributing comment from a dissenting opinion to the opinion of the Supreme Court, and denying the seminal case on habeas corpus was about habeas corpus. In arguing about the Supreme Court case of Scott v. Sandford, you provided quotes from Fehrenbacher pertaining only to the Missouri case of Scott v. Emerson.
If you cannot debate legal issues without misrepresenting what has been said by others as the opinion of the court, or opining upon non-existent court decisions, or opining about decisions you have not bothered to read, I would recommend you stay out of those legal discussions.
[cr #1606] You have chosen the loathsome task of defending the actions and the principles of the Confederacy.
I have chosen to debate the legal issues and whether secession was legal. Whether slavery was legal is not debatable. It was. However wrong and unpleasant that may be, it is historical fact. Whether slavery was right or wrong is not debatable. It was wrong. You only inject that issue as a diversion when you are losing the argument on the legality of secession.
But as you correctly pointed out, on more than one occasion afterwards, only one side held that their acts of secession were legal. I just assumed that we were back in the real world with the south believing that their actions were legal and the rest of the world believing that they were not. If you want to return to the original arguement about ownership of federal property in Texas in the absence of payment for it then let me know.
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