Posted on 12/17/2006 4:03:30 PM PST by DAVEY CROCKETT
Taliban spokesman had 'anthrax packets'
http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=128086&version=1&template_id=41&parent_id=23
Taliban spokesman had 'anthrax packets'
Published: Thursday, 18 January, 2007, 08:31 AM Doha Time
JALALABAD: An Afghan governor showed the media yesterday photographs of
a Taliban spokesman arrested this week, claiming he had been picked up
in a house containing packets of anthrax powder.
Gul Aghar Sherzai, governor of the eastern province of Nangarhar, where
Mohamed Hanif was arrested late Monday, did not say how it had been
proven the powder was the deadly anthrax bacteria or what quantity had
been found.
Intelligence officials involved in the arrest and police would not
confirm the discovery of anthrax, which would be a first for
Afghanistan.
Another of the Taliban's purported spokesmen said meanwhile the arrest
announced on Tuesday was not important, and issued the appointment of a
replacement.
Hanif was arrested late Monday with two other men in a house in
Nangarhar's Rodat district, about 80km from the border with Pakistan,
Sherzai told reporters.
"We arrested with him two other people, recovered three Kalashnikovs
and
some packets containing anthrax powder were also found with him,"
Sherzai said.
Documents found in the house included leaflets calling for an uprising
against the government and others alleging well-known Taliban commander
Dadullah Dadullah was linked to the killing last month of another key
commander, he said.
US-led forces killed Mullah Akhtar Mohamed Osmani, a key associate of
Taliban chief Mullah Mohamed Omar, in an airstrike in the southern
province of Helmand on December 19.
The governor did not show the documents or the powder to media, and
their authenticity could not be verified.
Sherzai said Hanif, whose real name was Abdul Haq Haqiq but was also
known as Mansoor, was about 26 years old and had been born in
Nangarhar,
from where he had operated.
The photographs presented to the media showed a young-looking man with
a
light beard.
Hanif regularly contacted the international and Afghan media from
secret
locations about Taliban engagements in eastern Afghanistan.
He was one of the most high-profile Taliban spokesmen, along with
Yousuf
Ahmadi, who usually speaks about insurgency-related issues in southern
Afghanistan.
Ahmadi said that the capture of Hanif was insignificant.
"He is just one spokesman and not a very important member of the
Taliban," he said, adding the capture meant nothing to Taliban
activities.
He said a man named Zabihullah Mujahed had already been appointed the
new Taliban spokesman for eastern and northern Afghanistan. - AFP
The anti-mullah site has more info on the mercury incident here:
http://alanpetersnewsbriefs.blogspot.com/
[there are too many hidden urls in this, to post]
Somalia, Iraq and the Price of Defeat
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/g/a/2007/01/17/cstillwell.DTL
Somalia, Iraq and the Price of Defeat
One of the claims critics of the war in Iraq like to make is that
American
involvement there is somehow prohibiting it from pursuing the war on
terrorism on a wider scale. Yet even as U.S. troops continue to fight
in
Iraq, another front has opened in the war on terror. Somalia has become
the
latest battleground in the struggle between freedom and tyranny or,
more
specifically, the spread of radical Islam throughout the African
continent.
Nigeria: Daily Trust Director Arraigned for Link With Al-Qaeda
http://allafrica.com/stories/200701170559.html
Nigeria: Daily Trust Director Arraigned for Link With Al-Qaeda
A Director of Media Trust Limited., publishers of Daily Trust
Newspaper,
Alhaji Mohammed Damagun, was yesterday arraigned on a three-count
charge of
terrorism.
Damagun, 50, pleaded not guilty to the charge and was admitted on bail
by
Justice Binta Murtala-Nyako who presided over the trial.
Damagun, who was docked before a Federal High Court in Abuja, allegedly
belongs to an illegal terrorist organisation known as "The Nigerian
Taliban".
Charged under the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act 2004,
the
accused was alleged to have willfully received $300,000 from an
international terrorist organisation, Alqaeda World Network, Sudan.
The money, allegedly meant for use in the execution of acts of
terrorism,
was said to have been deposited with Habibsons Bank Ltd, Windson House,
London in Account Number, 21067695.
Damagun was alleged to have recruited, sponsored and ferried some
members of
the militia arm of the Nigerian Taliban to receive combat training on
terrorism from a terrorist network known as Ummul Qurah Islamic Camp at
Mauritania.
The members allegedly sponsored for training between August and
September
2003 in Kano, included Nura Umar, Abdul Hamza Mohammed Ibrahim and 14
others.
The accused was also alleged to have given various sums of money, a ten
seater bus with registration number KADUNA AN 379 ANC and 30 public
address
system to a suspected operative of the Nigerian Taliban, Muhammed
Yusuf.
The items were allegedly given to facilitate the spread of extremism
and
various acts and techniques on terrorism.
According to agency reports the accused who appeared, in a white
flowing
regalia calmly took a plea of not guilty, when the registrar read the
charges to him.
Prosecution counsel, Abdullahi Mikailu asked that the case be adjourned
for
further mention to enable them complete investigations in the case.
He requested for three weeks and asked the court to remand the accused
in
the custody of the State Security Services (SSS).
Counsel to the accused, Abbas Ibrahim, said the prosecution was not
serious
about the case, adding that it was wrong to have detained and arraigned
the
accused when investigation had not been concluded.
He contended that the procedure contravened the provision of Section 19
of
the EFCC Act under which the accused was charged and asked the court to
strike out the charge in its entirety.
Alternatively, Ibrahim asked the court to admit the accused on bail
until
the time the prosecution would be ready for trial.
He said that his client was detained for 12 days and granted bail by
the SSS
on December 29.
He argued that the accused was entitled to bail because he voluntarily
came
to court from his house for trial.
Justice Murtala-Nyako granted him bail in the sum of N1 million and two
sureties in like sum.
The sureties she directed should be owners of landed property in Abuja
the
while Certificates of Occupancy she said must be in the custody of the
court.
The judge ordered the accused to deposit his travelling documents with
the
court and that he should report daily to the SSS.
She adjourned the case till Febuary. 24 for definite trial and directed
the
prosecution to prepare for trial on that day, otherwise she would
strike out
the case.
The trial was witnessed by the Chairman of Media Trust, Abdulmumuni
Bello,
the Managing Director, Kabir Yusuf and other directors of the
organisation.
Hamas-linked suspects retract confessions
http://www.jordantimes.com/thu/homenews/homenews3.htm
Hamas-linked suspects retract confessions
By Rana Husseini
AMMAN --- Three Jordanians accused of plotting terror attacks in the
Kingdom on behalf of Hamas retracted their confessions on Wednesday and
informed the State Security Court (SSC) they wished to present new
statements.
Ayman Naji Hamadallah, 34, Ahmad Abu Rabieh, 27, and Ahmad Abu Diab,
29,
are charged with conspiracy to carry out terrorist acts and illegal
possession of explosives and weapon.
The three defendants, who pleaded not guilty to the charges in
December,
appeared on Jordan television last May and confessed to plotting to
kill
senior officials in the intelligence services.
During yesterday's two-hour court session, they informed the tribunal
they wished to provide new written testimonies.
The court accepted their request and set January 31 as the day to hear
their new testimonies.
Earlier in the session, an explosives expert told the tribunal he
examined rockets, detonators and explosive substances given to him by
the SSC prosecutor that allegedly belonged to the suspects.
The expert told the court he examined four RBJ18 and N72A2 rockets, 20
explosive shells, around 22 kilos of TNT explosive, and 20 detonators.
"The explosives and rockets are extremely dangerous to humans, tanks
and
property," he said.
The state prosecutor rested his case opening the way for the defence to
start preparing their evidence and arguments.
The suspects were arrested in April and May as part of a sweep that
netted 20 people.
In a second high-profile case on Wednesday, the attorney of Iraqi Ziyad
Khalaf Karbouli, who is accused of murdering a Jordanian citizen in
Iraq
in 2005, told the court he received information that his client was
detained at the time of the incident.
"I received an e-mail from Karbouli's father that included a letter
from
Akashat Police Station in Iraq stating that my client was in custody
from September 21 to 24 for not possessing an identification card,"
lawyer Adel Tarawneh told the court.
The lawyer said he intends to obtain an official copy of the letter to
submit as evidence, "since the dates falls within the period the
Jordanian driver was allegedly murdered by Karbouli."
The tribunal agreed and adjourned the session until next Wednesday.
Karbouli, 23, appeared on Jordan Television in May 2006 and confessed
to
shooting Khaled Dasouqi, a driver who worked on the Baghdad-Amman
highway, and kidnapping two Moroccan diplomats in Iraq last year.
Karbouli and 13 others, who are being tried in absentia, are charged
with plotting subversive acts that lead to the death of an individual,
possessing explosives with illicit intent and belonging to an illegal
organisation (Tawhid and Jihad) affiliated to Al Qaeda network in Iraq.
Thursday, January 18, 2007
3 Killed, More than 70 Injured in Thai Train Crash (back)
January 14, 2007
Three Thai railway workers were killed and more than 70 passengers injured on Sunday when a train on the wrong line crashed into another at a station south of Bangkok , a railway official said.
One train was waiting at Nongkae station, on the main route south near the resort town of Hua Hin , for the other to pass through first, but the second train was diverted onto the same track, the official said.
'We are now investigating the cause of the crash,' he said.
The driver and a female worker on the waiting train were killed and another male railway worker died on the way to hospital. More than 70 injured passengers were taken to nearby hospitals, the official said.
Traffic was held up for several hours, but the track had been cleared and normal services had resumed, he added.
Source: http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile= data/theworld/2007/January/theworld_January 375.xml§ion=theworld&col
Eight Killed as Train Derails (back)
January 14, 2007
At least eight people were killed when a goods train derailed in Jharkhand on Friday evening. Parts of a goods train ferrying coal fell into a river from a bridge near Heheragaha railway station in Latehar district. The train was going to Panipat in Haryana from Khelari in Jharkhand.
he eight were unauthorised travellers in the brake van of the goods train that derailed on Friday and efforts were on to ascertain whether any one else was still trapped under the wagons, he said.
The train's guard and the driver of the pilot engine were also injured.
Railway officials told the news agency that the body of another man who was killed in the accident on Friday night was still stuck under the derailed wagon.
Indian Railways, which runs one of the largest rail networks in the world, reports an average of 250 accidents each year.
Every day more than 8,500 trains carry 13 million passengers over 63,000 kilometres of railway track criss-crossing India .
Source: http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile= data/subcontinent/2007/January/subcontinent_January462.xml §ion=subcontinent&col
Train Derailment Kills at Least Five (back)
January 16, 2007
A carriage of a crowded Indonesian passenger train plunged into a dry river bed on Java island on Tuesday, killing at least five people and injuring nearly 100, a police official said on Tuesday.
The accident happened before dawn about 11 km (7 miles) west of the town of Purwokerto in Central Java . The train was heading to the capital Jakarta .
'Survivors said the train was very crowded and it stopped before one of the carriages derailed and toppled over,' police official Darkoni said by telephone.
Train crashes and other transport accidents are relatively frequent in the sprawling country, where infrastructure has strained to keep pace with population and economic growth.
Source: http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xf le=data/theworld/2007/January/theworld_January43 2.xml§ion=theworld&col
Lessons Not Learned (back)
January 1, 2007
Produced to answer distress calls from commanders in Iraq , the Army's new counterinsurgency manual fails to map a response to 21st century enemies.
After four years of fighting, the world's most technologically advanced and best trained and equipped military has proved incapable of defeating the Iraqi insurgency. Instead, the number and capability of insurgents have increased. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps have produced a new counterinsurgency manual to aid in the struggle against a complex mix of guerrilla networks and cells in Iraq . But experts say the manual falls short in the one area the military is most lacking: human intelligence. Instead of providing troops the tools they need to develop human sources and informants to infiltrate the insurgency, it restricts them from developing this key component of successful intelligence operations.
By the most telling measure of military effectiveness - the ability of guerrilla fighters to conduct attacks across Iraq , the mostly Sunni insurgency's strength increases nearly monthly. In a September press briefing in Washington , retired Army Gen. Montgomery Meigs, who now directs the Pentagon's Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, showed a graph depicting IED attacks on American troops from summer 2003 through August 2006. The trend line increased sharply. Meigs said IED attacks were at record highs, 'three to four times' the number in early 2004. When asked to assess whether those statistics showed the military to be winning or losing, he declined, saying the answer would be too political.
The war in Iraq has revealed that the American military is woefully ill-prepared for guerrilla warfare, says Andrew F. Krepinevich, a retired Army officer now executive director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a Washington think tank that advises the Pentagon. The American military was blinded by its success in 1991, when it destroyed Iraq 's Republic Guard in high-tempo battle using the latest technology. Convinced of its battlefield prowess, the military changed little from its Cold War days, he says.
The problem came when substantial ground forces were needed to occupy Iraq and battle a growing insurgency. America had few options but to send what it had available: an Army crafted to repel a Warsaw Pact armored onslaught on the central European plains, Krepinevich says.
During the 1990s, while the defense establishment embraced a capital-intensive, technology-driven revolution in military affairs, small groups of fighters with limited budgets from Somalia , Chechnya , Afghanistan and Lebanon studied and traded low-tech, unconventional tactics that could nullify American advantages.
The U.S. military has been transforming itself into irrelevancy for the wars it is most likely to fight, says counterinsurgency expert Frank Hoffman, a researcher with the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, a Marine Corps in-house think tank in Quantico, Va. America's enemies learned an important lesson from Desert Storm: Don't try to take on the United States in a stand-up fight. Instead, lure soldiers into close-quarters firefights in urban terrain where the advantages of technology and U.S. firepower are less pronounced.
In 1996, RAND Corp., a think tank headquartered in Santa Monica , Calif. , issued a warning in a report presciently titled 'The Urbanization of Insurgency: The Potential Challenge to U.S. Army Operations.' It said the Army was so ill-suited to urban counterinsurgency that policymakers would be forced to limit American involvement in such operations to assisting a friendly foreign government with training, equipment and financial support. The 'doctrine, training and equipment [of U.S. troops] are not geared to counterinsurgency, particularly urban counterinsurgency,' the report noted.
The Army took away one central lesson from its painful experience in Vietnam : The best way to deal with counterinsurgency is to avoid it. The Army sought to purge the Vietnam experience from its memory by configuring itself to fight and win large-scale, World War II-style tank battles. But Army officers, particularly Iraq veterans, are realizing that this time around, the Army won't be able to turn its back on another lost counterinsurgency, because the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are likely archetypes of 21st century warfare.
'Intellectual Vacuum'
Army officers finally are shelving books about World War II tank battles and dusting off studies of counterinsurgency. Topping the reading list is former French soldier David Galula, whose book on Algeria in the 1950s, Counterinsurgency Warfare (Praeger, 1964), remains the classic source of lessons learned. A veteran of French colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria , Galula wrote that officers fighting communist insurgents in Algeria operated in an 'intellectual vacuum.'
'The sad truth was that, in spite of all our past experience, we had no single, official doctrine for counterinsurgency warfare. Instead, there were various schools of thought, all unofficial,' he said. The French were a battle-hardened force, fresh from the Indochina battlefield. But because they lacked a counterinsurgency doctrine, units in different parts of the country pursued different approaches. Some officers argued for large military operations, big sweeps to round up or kill suspected insurgents. Others, impressed with the spread of communist ideas through Indochinese society, advocated a hearts-and-minds approach they hoped would spread ideas of Western liberal democracy.
'With all these fantasies, frustration was most intense at company level,' wrote Galula, who commanded an infantry company for two years in a rural area near Algiers . The company commander, who had direct contact with the local population and could gauge the mood on the street, had the most important job in counterinsurgency, he wrote. 'In the absence of sensible orders from above, he had to make his own if he wanted to achieve anything.'
To fill a similar intellectual vacuum in Iraq today, the Pentagon produced a new counterinsurgency manual, titled FM 3-24, the first new manual devoted to the subject in 20 years. It is intended 'to fill a doctrinal gap,' wrote the two generals who oversaw the effort, Army Lt. Gen. David Petraeus and Marine Corps Lt. Gen. James Amos, and establish the fundamental principles for fighting counterinsurgency that have been 'generally neglected . . . since the end of the Vietnam War.' While drafts could be found on the Internet last summer, the final version had been held up by substantial revisions following extensive critiques, says Steven Metz of the U.S. Army War College. The manual is unique in U.S. military history, he says, in that it was produced as a result of clamoring from officers in Iraq and Afghanistan for something they could use to guide their forces.
But some military and civilian officials say the manual comes up short. A primary criticism is that it is too full of the concepts of a Maoist-style people's war and so is more instructive on how to win a Vietnam-style counterinsurgency than those in Southwest Asia and the Middle East .
The manual overly focuses on a single, unified insurgency, and thus fails to adequately capture the complexity of the enemy America faces in Iraq and Af-ghanistan, critics say. Multiple internal enemies with many different faces are fighting many internal wars there, says retired Army Maj. Gen. Eric Olson, who commanded the 25th Infantry Division in Afghanistan and is now director of the National Coordination Team in Iraq , intended to manage U.S. civilian and military efforts.
In Iraq , Sunni Arab Baathist networks are fighting to regain the power that they long held under Saddam Hussein. Al Qaeda-related terrorist cells stoke the flames of sectarian war. Tribes battle for territory and smuggling rights, and criminal gangs operate primarily for profit in Iraq 's lawless environment. Shiite militias fight on behalf of powerful warlords, both inside and outside of the Iraqi government.
Iraqi insurgents are organized entirely differently from those of the Vietnam era. Instead of a pyramid-like structure with a dominant leadership at the top and the group expanding in size at each lower level, guerrilla networks in Iraq are highly decentralized and lack hierarchy. Instead, fighters join small, adaptive cells that operate independently. Olson says defeating Islamic guerrilla fighters requires a deep understanding of clan and kinship ties, values, foreign support, religious inspiration and the motivations that come from deeply held tribal concepts such as blood feuds, honor and revenge killings. A senior military officer, who requested anonymity, criticized the manual for failing to even examine the scourge of Islamic suicide bombers, an enemy the U.S. military is likely to confront for the foreseeable future.
'Blind Boxer'
Some military officials say the most grievous shortcomings of the manual are restrictions it places on developing human intelligence sources for accurate collection and analysis of information about an enemy that can stage hit-and-run attacks and remain hidden among the local population. Absent precise intelligence, 'a counterinsurgent is like a blind boxer, wasting energy flailing at an unseen opponent,' the manual says.
But human intelligence remains the biggest challenge in Iraq , says a senior Army officer who has already served two tours there and is preparing to return: 'We still don't have the intelligence we need on the ground in Iraq . Our lack of [human intelligence] remains the major problem four years into the war.'
The American military is designed to fight a mirror-image enemy armed with big pieces of equipment that can be spotted by overhead sensors and who talks on radios whose signals can be intercepted and locations triangulated. Baghdad is undoubtedly the most heavily scrutinized piece of terrain in the world. Its skies are flooded with all manner of surveillance: satellites, countless aerial drones, jet aircraft and even blimps festooned with cameras, all trying to spot insurgents placing a roadside bomb, or firing mortar rounds into American bases. Missing is the human element, agents and paid informants who can infiltrate armed groups and collect information at the street level.
'I would trade all of that high-tech shit, I would trade it all for an informant. I would trade every [sensor] in the sky for an informant,' says Lt. Col. Ross Brown, who commanded a squadron in the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Iraq . 'I can win this war with informants. Satellites in the sky aren't going to help me win this war; it's all about people.' Brown says he constantly battled with his superiors for money to pay informants to be his eyes and ears on the street. But apart from what are called micro-awards, $20 that can be paid to individuals for tips, the rules say Army officers are not allowed to pay informants. Still, some officers in Iraq said they paid informants larger sums out of their own pockets.
A particularly illuminating 2006 documentary film, Meeting Resistance, by journalists Molly Bingham and Steve Connors, who spent 10 months interviewing insurgents in Iraq, revealed that the weapon the insurgents hated and feared most was the American dollar. Dollars could buy people, Iraqi informants, who could identify the insurgents who otherwise blend into the population.
According to the manual: 'All soldiers and Marines may record information given to them by walk-up contacts, including liaison relationships, but they may not develop [human intelligence] sources or networks.' That function is reserved for trained counterintelligence personnel. But the Army and Marines have precious few of those troops. Military officials say the regulations against developing informant networks must be reconsidered.
The report of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, issued in December 2006, found that the military's efforts and resources devoted to human intelligence collection in Iraq are inadequate. 'They are not doing enough to map the insurgency, dissect it, and understand it on a national and provincial level,' the group found.
Because the military lacks agents and sources, and thus precise intelligence, 'You end up throwing big what we called 'block parties' - searching hundreds of homes in a night to find that holy grail: that one guy. And in the process, you ticked off a lot of people,' says an Army officer who commanded a brigade in Baghdad . The net result, he says, is that Iraqis who might have been on the fence about helping Americans will help the enemy. Galula called it the 'vicious cycle' that arises when the military's actions turn the population against it, and soldiers then view the population as hostile, leading them to make more mistakes that alienate the population even further.
'It's curious to me that, at the five-year mark in this war, we still get our best [human intelligence] not from the conventional technique, that is, by sending agents in to penetrate their networks, but rather by slicing up parts, small bits, of their network and detaining those guys and getting the [human intelligence] as part of the interrogation process,' said Army Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute, director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during a Nov. 15 speech sponsored by the Association of the U.S. Army's Institute of Land Warfare. 'It's a clumsy way to do [human intelligence], and it is not very effective.' He said the military is hindered by a lack of language and cultural expertise.
In the early 1970s, the British army made many of the same mistakes in its fight against Irish Republican Army guerrillas in Northern Ireland , says Andrew Garfield, a retired British military and civilian intelligence officer. The British army operated with imprecise intelligence and favored internment sweeps and poorly targeted cordon-and-search operations that did little more than alienate the citizenry. The British began to make real progress only after they painstakingly built a detailed picture of the IRA and its network of supporters. That allowed the British to then infiltrate the IRA with their spies. The effort took many years, Garfield says, and the IRA was much, much smaller than the Iraqi insurgency.
The U.S. Army also is particularly hobbled by a Cold War-style, top-down intelligence structure, said Maj. Gen Thomas Turner, commander of the 101st Airborne Division, on Oct. 10 at the Association of the U.S. Army annual convention in Washington . All the intelligence collection and analysis expertise is concentrated at the higher command levels. To be effective, 'counterinsurgency warfare requires inverting that pyramid' and pushing the intelligence experts to the lowest levels, he added.
'Target the Network'
An officer who commands Special Operations forces in Iraq and Afghanistan says his troops weren't burdened by the same restrictions that govern the regular Army. They used only precise intelligence they gathered themselves by running their own networks of informants. One of the first things Special Operations units did when the insurgency began in Iraq in 2003 was create scout platoons of Iraqis, 'I-scouts,' whom they taught targeting and tracking techniques and sent out to gather intelligence. I-scouts proved highly effective. The officer, who, because of the sensitivity of his position, preferred to remain anonymous, says the regular Army might get the same intelligence, but because of its hierarchical structure, that information doesn't filter down to companies and platoons on the street.
While the counterinsurgency manual says additional intelligence analysts are needed at the battalion and brigade level, too few are called for, experts say, and there's no recommendation to push them all the way down to units patrolling the streets.
Meanwhile, the Army is adding intelligence operatives, but not in sufficient numbers or fast enough. Speaking at a defense communications conference on Nov. 1, Collin Agee, the Army's intelligence director, said the service had doubled the number of personnel trained in human intelligence, adding 2,400 people since the beginning of the Iraq war.
But the numbers allocated to combat units remain low. Agee said Army brigades that used to have eight intelligence experts would increase that number to 30 by 2011. Battalions would add five operatives each, bringing them to nine by 2011.
Comparing these numbers with the British army in Northern Ireland is instructive. Garfield says the British inverted their traditional ratios of intelligence professionals who support regular soldiers. Whereas a typical 5,000-person British brigade would have six to eight intelligence professionals, equivalent units in Northern Ireland had up to 500. And intelligence professionals could not be on short-term rotations. The majority served for at least two years, he says, while those in the most sensitive areas stayed in place even longer.
The Iraq Study Group found that there are fewer than 10 analysts at the Defense Intelligence Agency with more than two years of experience in analyzing the insurgency, and capable analysts are rotated to new assignments much too frequently.
The new catchphrase in military intelligence circles is: 'Target the network.' The intent is to penetrate Iraqi insurgent cells and attack them from the inside out. But until the military develops the expertise, enlarges the human intelligence corps and allows military commanders on the ground to develop their own sources, that goal is likely to remain unattainable.
Galula knew that only the locals could provide the intelligence the French required to penetrate insurgent networks. But the locals would not throw in with the French unless they feared them less than the rebels, whose cells always were watching, Galula wrote. 'Not until these cells were destroyed could the French hope to break through that barrier of silence.'
Source: http://www.govexec.com/features/0107-01/0107-01s1.htm
[end of article]
But has the U.S. , by being in Iraq , shortchanged Afghanistan and handed the Taliban an opportunity to re-emerge?
Here we can turn to Gen. Peter Pace, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, who was also in New York late last week. At an event sponsored by the Oxonian Society, Gen. Pace offered a few facts to rebut the claim that the administration is distracted. Approximately 80% of Afghans are illiterate, he said, suggesting that rebuilding the country will require building a viable public education system just as much as launching military offensives.
But combat operations are far from being wrapped up. He noted that there are now two types of Taliban operating in the country. The first is the faction led by Mullah Omar, which would like to retake control of the country. The second, which the general calls 'the small-t taliban,' is really a bunch of drug lords trying to protect their turf. Neither group is good for the country. But, Gen. Pace said, even as the illicit heroin trade remains a significant portion of the economy--at $2 billion a year--it hasn't grown in recent years, even as the overall economy has.
Come spring, he said, there will be a military offensive. The question is this: 'Will it be ours or theirs?' He wouldn't say precisely what the U.S. is planning once the winter snows begin to recede. But it's clear by raising the question that he's watching what's happening on the ground there even as the U.S. surges in Iraq . The general was, however, willing to draw a direct parallel between the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan . If the U.S. is pushed out of Iraq , he said, the next stop for al Qaeda and other insurgents is Afghanistan . If the U.S. is pushed out of Afghanistan , he said to a hushed room in New York on Friday, the next stop is here.
Source: http://www.opinionjournal.com/columnists/bminiter/?id=110009528
[end of article]
Over the past week, the U.S. Navy has given orders to the U.S.S. John Stennis carrier battle group, based in Bremerton , WA , to steam toward the Persian Gulf , where it will join the U.S.S. Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Navy sources say the Pentagon is getting ready to announce the dispatch of a third carrier battle group – the U.S.S. Ronald Reagan – from San Diego . That will make three carrier battle groups in the region starting at around the end of January.
Oh, and along with them is the amphibious assault group led by the U.S.S. Boxer, which can land several thousand U.S. Marines to seize and destroy strategic sites near the coast at a moment’s notice. (Busheir? Bandar Abbas? Jask? The three Persian Gulf islands Iran seized from the UAE in the 1990s and has since fortified to harass Gulf shipping? Your pick).
Victory in Iraq cannot come until the United States makes it clear to Iran – even more than Syria , since the Syrians will take their lead from Tehran – that we will no longer tolerate their intervention in Iraqi affairs.
The president has now said this. And the U.S. military is beginning to back it up.
Source: http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=26416
[end of article]
Solaiman was also blamed for the Philippines ' worst terror attack, the bombing of a ferry off Manila Bay in 2004 that killed 200 people.
Batara said the military was sure the dead man was Solaiman, but previous claims by the government that it had killed militants have sometimes been incorrect.
U.S. Embassy spokesman Matthew Lussenhop congratulated the Philippine government, describing Solaiman's killing as 'a major success,' according to The Associated Press. However Reuters said the the embassy was still awaiting confirmation of the dead man's identity.
Buddy Recio, who was taken hostage along with his wife and son by the Abu Sayyaf for a week in 2001, said Solaiman provided an ideological inspiration to rebel recruits.
'His death means the loss of one master planner for the Abu Sayyaf,' Recio told AP. 'I remember we couldn't have small talk with that guy. It's always about business or their ideology.'
Other most wanted
Abu Sayyaf leaders remaining on the U.S. wanted listed are:
Amir Khadafi Abubaker Janjalani, a.k.a. Abu Muktar (Khadafi Montanio, Jimar Manalad)
Aldam Tilao, a.k.a. Abu Sabaya (Abu Ahmad Salayuddin)
Isnilon Totoni Hapilon, a.k.a. Abu Musab (The 'Deputy,' Abu Tuan)
Hamsiraji Marusi Sali, a.k.a. Jose Ramirez (Sitti Birkis, 'Tiberkis')
Janjalani may be removed from the list soon. The Philippine government recently sent the remains of a body believed to be his to the FBI to confirm its identity.
Source: http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/01/17/philippin es.abusayyaf/index.html
The Threat of Terrorism and the Year Ahead (back)
January 16, 2007
by Maria A. Ressa
The Philippines turned out to be a testing ground for many of (Al Qaeda’s) pivotal plots, including spectacular attacks using airplanes. In August 2006, a plot using liquid bombs on airplanes - tried and tested in the Philippines in 1994 again surfaced – this time in London . For several days, airline travel globally was affected after authorities in Britain discovered a reincarnation 12 years later of a 1994 attack carried out in the Philippines !
2006 was a pivotal year for what US President Bush called 'the war on terror.' Five years after 9/11, members of the US military are now calling it a 'global counterinsurgency.' That change in terminology reflects the altered perspective at the Pentagon, which many hope would lead to a change in US policies globally.
That’s certainly what Americans demanded at this year’s mid-term elections, voting against Republican decision-making and paving the way for the resignation of US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Under Rumsfeld, the US military embraced a narrow approach to war-fighting, focusing on 'shock and awe' military tactics, often lacking a holistic approach to fighting the root causes and methods which spread the virulent ideology behind Islamic terrorist attacks.
Still, the Rumsfeld approach has been successful in degrading the old infrastructure. Al-Qaeda forces before 9/11 are drastically reduced. By 2004, its estimated 3,000 to 4,000 forces were cut down to about 300 to 400. However, although the numbers are down significantly, Al-Qaeda’s influence has actually grown in the Muslim world, further magnifying its message to local groups to 'join a global jihad.' Radical Islamist movements now extend across the globe, from North America to Europe, Africa, Asia and the critical Middle East .
Iraq , as well as events in Afghanistan , Pakistan and Iran will help determine the role played in 2007 by the old Al-Qaeda (often identified as Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda). In Afghanistan , Al-Qaeda members integrated with Taliban and Hezbi Islamic forces, making Iraq-style suicide bombings more common. Former Al-Qaeda members also integrated further with Pakistani jihadist groups, further complicating President Pervez Musharraf’s task. Finally, many operational and family members of top Al-Qaeda leaders have taken refuge in Iran . US policies towards these three states will help determine how much political will and support the old Al-Qaeda will have to re-mobilize its forces.
Iraq has become a key battlefield, and with the wrong policies and a lack of understanding of local culture, perceived US and allied victories often turned into losses.
The death of the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq , Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, while billed as a victory for Allied forces, actually made Al-Qaeda stronger because it removed a growing rift within its organization between al-Zarqawi and Osama bin Laden’s #2, Ayman al-Zawahiri (seen in letters between the two men).
Al-Zarqawi engineered the civil war between the Sunnis and Shiites. With his death, experts say Al-Qaeda is moving quickly to heal the rift and unite its forces.
Major Trends: Ideology & Propaganda
Two major trends became apparent in 2006: a clearer idea of the core conflict; and the growing emphasis on propaganda.
The core conflict is ideological – a war of ideas. This is a struggle for power, with religion, language and culture as the primary weapons. This is not a fight between Islam and America , between Islam and the West as Al-Qaeda and its associate groups would have us believe. It is a battle inside the Muslim world for the future of Islam – between a radical minority and a moderate majority.
What’s become clear globally is that US policies and actions have elicited such anger in the Muslim world that even the moderates began to empathize with the radicals. In rhetoric and reality, the United States has become the strongest weapon for recruitment used by the radicals. That is why a shift in US strategy and policies could alter the landscape dramatically.
Globally, it has become a propaganda war, with Al-Qaeda and its associate groups harnessing the power of the internet to spread their radical ideology. According to Singapore ’s Institute of Defense & Strategic studies, there are more than 1,000 radical websites compared to about 5 moderate websites in Indonesia alone.
Al-Qaeda & Jemaah Islamiyah
Jemaah Islamiyah, Al-Qaeda’s arm in Southeast Asia , was discovered after 9/11. Since then, about 330 Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members have been arrested. More than 250 have been tried, sentenced and convicted. Like Al-Qaeda, JI’s centralized command structure has been degraded and its operational capabilities hampered.
What happened to Al-Qaeda after 9/11 is much like what happened to JI after its Bali 2002 attacks. The groups’ top leaders were arrested, but the cell networks remain and continue to spread their radical ideology. The cells carry out attacks without central leadership. Like the communists, it became like guerrilla warfare – Robert Taber’s war of the flea. The threat is more dispersed, and I would argue, harder to track down. In both cases, as members and leaders of Al-Qaeda and JI were arrested, others stepped up to take their places.
That is because the ideological battle has largely been ignored. The spread of the radical ideology has allowed Al-Qaeda to morph from one group to a global movement. The moment of awareness was 9/11 – which now serves as an inspiration for this a global jihad. The danger has gone from old Al-Qaeda to homegrown groups – some of whose members have no physical connection to Al-Qaeda.
Homegrown Terrorists
The pattern of attacks in recent years shows this evolution. Homegrown groups whose members were inspired and trained by Al-Qaeda or its associate groups carried out recent bomb plots. Since July last year, western security agencies have broken up homegrown cells in Sydney, Melbourne, Miami, Toronto, two in London and a cell in Lebanon planning attacks in the United States.
This is a pattern that Al-Qaeda tried and tested in the Philippines . When Arab operatives were discovered and their plots disrupted here in the mid 90’s, Al-Qaeda merged with local groups. It discovered that it was far more effective to inspire and work with locals.
The Philippines turned out to be a testing ground for many of its pivotal plots, including spectacular attacks using airplanes. In August 2006, a plot using liquid bombs on airplanes - tried and tested in the Philippines in 1994 again surfaced – this time in London . For several days, airline travel globally was affected after authorities in Britain discovered a reincarnation 12 years later of a 1994 attack carried out in the Philippines !
In 1994, top Al-Qaeda operatives were in Manila to carry out its plots to assassinate Pope John Paul II, former US President Bill Clinton, to blow up 11 US airliners over the Pacific, and to harness homegrown groups. The key figure was Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, who would later mastermind the 9/11 attacks using lessons he learned in the Philippines- from how to get through airport security to using liquid bombs on planes. His nephew, Ramzi Yousef, who bombed the World Trade Center in 1993, carried out a successful liquid bomb explosion mid-air in the Philippines on Philippine Airlines Flight 434 - the first time liquid bombs were used for an airplane explosion. It was a trial run for their bigger plot – Oplan Bojinka – to bomb 11 US airplanes enroute to the United States .
An accidental kitchen fire in Dona Josefa Apartments on Quirino Avenue foiled their plans. When the cell was discovered and the plots foiled, they found it was easier to work through locals. So Al-Qaeda worked through JI and the Abu Sayyaf, and JI worked through Filipino groups like the MILF, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).
As with Al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan , JI is now now more deeply intertwined with local groups. When the government of former president Joseph Estrada attacked the MILF’s Camp Abubakar in 2000, it forced JI members to go deeper underground and to work more closely with the MILF and later, the Abu Sayyaf. According to JI members in custody, it was actually JI which forged the operational relationship between the MILF and the ASG that allowed the ASG to train in MILF camps – a development the MILF had long resisted because it looked down at the ASG. In an interview with ABS-CBN’s Jay Ruiz, Rohmat, the Indonesian JI officer assigned to ASG said he effectively became a member of ASG.
These alliances allowed the ASG to expand to central Mindanao and gave JI the opportunity to pass on its bomb-making skills and technology, its computer and propaganda skills and its ideology.
Getting More Sophisticated
Until recently, the Abu Sayyaf used small pipe bombs or bombs strapped to motorcycles. Now bombs have become far more sophisticated. The ‘lunchbox’ bombs or ‘tupperware’ bombs found in Azahari Husin’s safehouse when he was killed last November in Indonesia were field tested in the Philippines . These were the same bombs used in the Bali 2005 suicide bombings.
Officials say JI trained Filipinos to make the truck bombs used in the Bali 2002 bombings. One man arrested in the Philippines carried diagrams for a car bomb. This year in Jolo – as part of the military operations codenamed Oplan Ultimatum – the military found bombs unfused with ball-bearings – designed to give a 150 meter kill zone – just like bombs used by suicide bombers in the Middle East . These show it may only be a matter of time before these bombs are used in the Philippines and in the capital, Manila .
After the Al-Qaeda plots were disrupted in the mid-90’s, the Abu Sayyaf turned into a kidnap-for-ransom gang. Now JI has helped turn the Abu Sayyaf back into a full-fledged terrorist organization under the leadership of Khadaffy Janjalani.
In 2004, the ASG carried out the world’s worst maritime terrorist attack when it bombed and sank Superferry 14, killing as many as 190 people (according to ABS-CBN’s count). A year later, the ASG claimed responsibility for three near-simultaneous bombs on Valentine’s Day – which included a bus in Makati . That showed a technical sophistication the group had never displayed before, but it is a trademark of JI and Al-Qaeda.
Forging Alliances
Labels are now deceptive because the principle is ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend.’ JI, MILF and ASG have worked together in bombing operations for several years now. Since 1999, the MILF had been training members of the Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM) – Christian converts to Islam. In 2003, the Abu Sayyaf began actively recruiting members of RSM, expanding ASG’s potential reach into the Christian north. The bomb for the 2004 Superferry bombing was planted by an RSM member recruited into the ASG. RSM members also played key roles in the 2005 Valentine’s Day bombings.
This year, numerous terrorist plots have been foiled involving an alliance between JI, ASG and RSM – including 'Madrid-style' bombings, a plot to bomb the US embassy, a plot to assassinate selected officials and several plots involving suicide bombers.
The use of suicide bombers brought in from Indonesia was the scenario for a foiled bombing plot led by alleged RSM leader Ahmed Santos, who is now in custody. Like many members of JI and Al-Qaeda, he is bound to the network by interpersonal and family links. RSM is largely built upon the network set up by Osama bin Laden’s brother-in-law in the early 90’s. Santos is a Muslim convert and married into the top ranks of the ASG. The sister of his second wife is married to ASG leader Khadaffy Janjalani while another sister is married to Abu Solaiman, the ASG’s second-in-command.
By accounts of JI and Abu Sayyaf members in custody, Khadaffy Janjalani drove the merging of JI, other Indonesian groups like Kompas, and ASG. He was key in working with alleged Bali bombers and JI members Dulmatin (who has a $10 million reward on his head) and Omar Patek (who carries a $1 million reward) to forge alliances with Indonesians like Abdullah Sonata, who funnelled money and recruits into the southern Philippines. When Sonata was arrested in 2005, it led to the arrests of 10 Indonesians slated to become suicide bombers in the Philippines .
Janjalani also recruited members of RSM like Ahmed Santos, who according to interrogation reports obtained by ABS-CBN, had just taken over as the head of the Abu Sayyaf’s Media bureau and was poised to begin a massive propaganda campaign – in line with JI and Al-Qaeda priorities which set propaganda as a key tactic. Globally, this conflict has turned into a propaganda war – and the West and its allies are losing.
MILF Kicks Out JI, ASG
The relationship between the Abu Sayyaf and the Indonesians became even more crucial after June 27, 2005, when eyewitnesses said the MILF pushed JI and ASG members out of their camps – according to documents obtained by ABS-CBN.
If it is indeed Janjalani’s body that was exhumed in Patikul, Sulu, then the ASG may suffer a temporary setback before the leadership vacuum is filled – a process that would have started last September. However, the landscape is far more complicated than in 2000, when five factions of Abu Sayyaf fought for leadership. We cannot discount the possibility that the Indonesians are now fully integrated and may play a far greater role in bringing Abu Sayyaf closer to the global jihad.
At the same time, the role of ideology as a motivating force for jihad is probably weakest in the Philippines , where economics have provided a greater push. Again, we cannot discount the role the Indonesians are playing in trying to change that in the future.
MILF & the Peace Process
The last key factor to watch in the Philippines in 2007 is the MILF and the peace process. Despite its past institutional links to JI, the MILF now seems sincere in negotiating an agreement, particularly after it pushed JI members Dulmatin, Omar Patek and ASG leaders Khadaffy Janjalani out of its main camps in 2005. Still, JI members captured this year say several commands are still giving sanctuary and support to JI and its associate groups.
That brings us to the paradox of a peace agreement for the Philippines today: for the future, it’s necessary to bring in much-needed development that would address a root cause for terrorism in the country; yet, right now given the JI and foreign presence, it could prevent the military from actively pursuing terrorists and create safe havens.
If a peace agreement is negotiated, the more radical members may split off – mirroring what happened in the 1996 peace pact with the MNLF. The MILF refused to sign, and the same dynamics remain today: there are two schools of thought within the MILF – the secularists who are serious in wanting peace and who call the JI ideology a 'virus,' and the Islamists, the more radical extremist members who are being heavily courted by the Abu Sayyaf.
The fear is that if a peace agreement is worked out, JI and its associate groups may work to unite the extremists in the MILF with the ASG and RSM.
If that is the case, then authorities must be prepared because a peace agreement is integral to any long-term solution in the southern Philippines .
(Maria A. Ressa is the author of Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda's Newest Center of Operations in Southeast Asia , published by Simon & Schuster in 2003. She reported on Southeast Asia for nearly two decades for CNN and is now the Head of ABS-CBN News & Current Affairs.)
Source: http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/storypage.aspx?StoryId=61345
US to Start Predator Ops on Canadian Border (back)
January 16, 2007
by Peter La Franchi
US Customs and Border Protection (USCBP) will commence a UAV surveillance programme along the Canadian border in August-September this year using a single General Atomics Aeronautical Systems (GA-ASI) Predator B aircraft.
In parallel new Ku-band satellite communications ground infrastructure will be developed at the USCBP’s existing air and marine operations centre at Riverside , California , at an estimated cost of $105 million to allow improved co-ordination of UAVs operated by the service within the US national airspace.
That new infrastructure will support existing Predator B surveillance operations along the US-Mexican border as well as the new northern programme.
USCBP UAVs used on the Canadian border will operate out of existing US National Guard facilities at Grand Forks in North Dakota .
In a USCBP statement released 8 January, Michael Kostelnik, assistant commissioner USCBP Air and Marine says that as 'unmanned aircraft have proven to be effective on our southern border, this first step in North Dakota will lay the foundation to expand unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operations along the nation's northern border. As CBP expands air operations along the northern tier, the presence of the UAS will further enhance our situational awareness.'
USCBP anticipates having four Predator Bs in operation by September this year. The sole existing aircraft, part of a two-UAV order, was delivered in late September 2006 and commenced operations in early October (pictured below). The initial aircraft was delivered in September 2005 but was lost seven months later due to operator error. GA-ASI confirms discussions are continuing on replacement arrangements: '[ US ]CBP is still negotiating the settlement with us,' it says.
The agency placed a $33.9 million order for its third and forth Predator Bs on 9 October with the first of these to be delivered just ahead of the commencement of the Canadian pilot project.
The agency is also exploring a third order to support expansion of surveillance operations to include the Caribbean region as well as provide additional aircraft for existing operations. The US Congress plans to provide USCBP with a dedicated $10 million annual funding line for UAV operations on a recurring basis.
USCBP and the US National Guard have been in discussions about roles for the Grand Forks base since early 2006. This includes consideration of options for a partnering arrangement under which Guard personnel would directly support USCBP Predator Bs performing the northern border mission. GA-ASI says that it is not a party to those talks, but confirms that it is in discussion with USCBP on the operation of its existing logistics support contracts with the USAF.
All current USCBP Predator B border surveillance operations are carried out using GA-ASI pilots and sensor operators. However the agency is looking to commence training its own crews once UAV operations are normalised as part of its command and control systems.
Grand Forks is separately being assessed by the US Air Force as the focus for a new UAV flight training centre, potentially including basic operator training for crews for its Northrop Grumman RQ-4B Global Hawk aircraft prior to commencement of advanced training at Beale Air Force base in California . Northrop Grumman is known to be participating in three way talks involving the USAF, the US National Guard, and North Dakota government authorities on the possible initiative.
Source: http://www.flightglobal.com/Articles/2007/01/12/Navigation /177/211476/US+Customs+and+Border+Protection +to+start+Predator+ops+on+Canadian.html
Blocking Turkey Keeps Islam Out of the European Union (back)
January 16, 2007
by Emmanuelle Landais
Nicolas Sarkozy's recent comment that Turkey does not have its place in the European Union is just to keep Islam out of Europe , according to the former editor of Le Monde Diplomatique.
Currently on a three day tour of the UAE, Alain Gresh, former editor and author of several books on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and expert on the Middle East , on Monday said problems associated with Islam are socio-economic rather than religious.
In France today, as in other Western countries, the simple mention of Islam can cause a debate, at least a concern, and even sometimes an unconscious fear, added Gresh.
'Religious differences have replaced the social differences in the public speech, and there lies the real threat,' he said.
'Personally I'm against any enlargement of the European Union. They expanded to 25 countries too fast, no decisions are made because it is too big. To keep Turkey out of Europe is a way political parties think because it is popular to talk about it,' said Gresh.
'In France Muslims tend to be poor immigrants. They were discriminated against because they are Arab and now they are being discriminated against because they are Muslim.'
Source: http://www.gulfnews.com/world/France/10097209.html
Criminal Backgrounds not Checked in UK (back)
January 15, 2007
by Brendan Carlin and Caroline Davies
A fresh row over criminal databases broke out last night with the revelation that immigration officials frequently cannot check on the criminal past of European Union citizens entering Britain .
The admission is contained in a letter seen by The Daily Telegraph and written by Joan Ryan, the Home Office minister caught up in the criminal records row.
John Reid, the Home Secretary, yesterday announced a 'root and branch' review of criminal databases as a senior Home Office official was suspended over the affair.
That came after the official 'volunteered information' about the department's failure to enter details of the convictions of Britons abroad on to the national police computer.
Mr Reid, with his ministerial colleagues Miss Ryan and Tony McNulty, have been under increasing pressure since last week over the failure to update the police national computer with details of more than 500 British serious offenders who committed crimes overseas.
It emerged that there was a backlog of 27,500 cases that had not been entered.
Last night, the row broadened to include access to criminal records on people from the entire European Economic Area (EEA) -- including all EU states -- coming into Britain .
In a letter dated last June and addressed to the Labour MP Chris Mullin, Miss Ryan admitted: 'The UK Immigration Service is unable to routinely access details of an EEA national's personal information or criminal record in their country of origin.'
David Davis, the shadow home secretary, said the admission showed 'shocking complacency towards the matter of stopping dangerous criminals at our borders'. At the weekend, a judge reportedly called for an EU-wide criminal record system after problems checking previous convictions on two Lithuanians convicted of gun-running.
By coincidence, Miss Ryan is in Dresden today to argue with other EU interior ministers for better criminal record sharing.
Source: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/n ews/2007/01/15/ncrims15.xml
Military Examining Bank Records in Terror Fight (back)
January 16, 2007
by Keith Regan
The Pentagon and CIA are using a little-known governmental power to obtain and review the financial records of Americans in an effort to uncover potential terrorist threats. The practice -- which is legal under the Patriot Act -- has been criticized by civil rights groups, although Vice President Cheney has defended the surveillance as necessary.
Utilizing a little known Pentagon power, the military and the CIA are obtaining and scrutinizing the banking and credit records of Americans in their search for terrorist and spying suspects.
Officials confirmed over the weekend that the practice of using 'national security letters' to obtain financial records has been taking place. High-ranking members of the Bush administration, including Vice President Dick Cheney, were quick to defend the surveillance as a necessary part of the broader fight against terrorism.
The practice can be carried out without violating any right to privacy, but some members of Congress are vowing to take a closer look at the actions of the Pentagon and the intelligence agency, Cheney remarked.
Cheney Defends Activity
'The Department of Defense has legitimate authority in this area,' Cheney said during a recent television appearance. 'This is an authority that goes back three or four decades. It was reaffirmed in the Patriot Act. It's perfectly legitimate activity. There's nothing wrong with it or illegal. It doesn't violate people's civil rights.'
The Pentagon's power stems from the fact that it operates scores of military bases across the country that are on U.S. soil and are likely terrorist targets, giving it domestic anti-terrorism responsibilities similar to that of the CIA or other agencies, he added.
Democratic Congressman Silvestre Reyes (D-TX), who recently took over the post of chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, said he intends to have his committee examine the practice.
'Any expansion by the Defense Department into intelligence collection, particularly on [ U.S. ] soil, is something our committee will thoroughly review,' Reyes said. 'We want our intelligence professionals to have strong tools that will enable them to interrupt the planning process of our enemies and to stop attacks against our country. But in doing so, we also want those tools to comply fully with the law and the Constitution.'
Expanding Story
Word that the Pentagon and CIA are using bank records to actively spy on Americans could represent a significant expansion of the controversial domestic spying already taking place.
Civil liberty groups have already filed suit against telecommunications companies that have cooperated with the FBI by saving records of millions of phone calls. The FBI is also known to have sought bank records as part of its surveillance efforts, citing the need to track the source of funding that is the lifeblood of terrorist attacks.
The national security letters have been used by the FBI as well as the Pentagon and, more rarely, the CIA. The Pentagon has issued approximately 500 of these letters over the last five years, The New York Times reported Sunday.
Civil liberties groups were quick to call on Congress to use its oversight powers to ask tough questions.
'This country has a long tradition of rejecting the use of the CIA and the Pentagon to spy on Americans, and rightfully so,' said Caroline Fredrickson, director of the legislative office of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).
The use of the letters raises a host of new questions, including in what circumstances the letters are being issued, what information is being gathered and how widely it is being shared, Frederickson said.
'Congress should investigate these issues immediately, especially in light of previous revelations that the Pentagon compiled anti-terrorism dossiers on domestic organizations that had done nothing more than peacefully exercise their constitutional right to protest,' she added.
The ACLU is also concerned that the security letters are being accompanied by gag orders preventing those who receive them from acknowledging that they are turning over records to the government. The ACLU noted that as a result of two suits it has brought, such gag orders have been ruled unconstitutional when used in other settings.
Escalation or Status Quo?
The new spying revelations make for a 'dramatic story' but the efforts were part of a 'legitimate security effort that's been under way for a long time,' Cheney said, adding, 'It does not represent a new departure from the standpoint of our efforts to protect ourselves against terrorist attacks.'
The Bush administration has criticized the reporting of past spying revelations, as well, with Bush himself lashing out at media reports about the FBI-enabled surveillance of phone records.
Although the passage of the controversial Patriot Act gave the executive branch broad powers of surveillance, Bush has repeatedly said those powers would not be used to spy on ordinary Americans.
Meanwhile, privacy experts say the practice of obtaining financial records is likely legal under existing law. In fact, many banks' privacy statements include an exemption for instances when government agencies seek those records.
The issue for lawmakers, however, may be the legitimacy of the Pentagon's use of powers set aside for anti-terrorism efforts on domestic soil.
Source: http://www.technewsworld.com:80/story/T9hdaVC1I57Hu9/ Military-Examining-Bank-Records-in-Terror-Fight.xhtml
Bin Ladin Money-laundering Case Dropped (back)
January 9, 2007
French judges have dismissed a four-year money-laundering investigation targeting Osama bin Laden's half-brother, Yeslam Binladin, for lack of evidence.
Judge Renaud Van Ruymbeke opened an inquiry in December 2001 after the French authorities were alerted of suspect transactions involving companies linked to Mr Binladin's Saudi Investment Company.
In particular, he was investigating a transfer of $US300 million ($385 million) from Switzerland to Pakistan , which could have benefited the al-Qaeda chief.
On December 27 Judge Ruymbeke was forced to dismiss the case for lack of evidence after the Swiss authorities refused to supply him with bank documents relating to the case, a judicial source said.
Mr Binladin, a Saudi-born businessman with Swiss nationality, insists on the different spelling of his family name and has denied having any contact at all with his half-brother.
He said they shared a common bank account in connection with the inheritance from his father, a rich Saudi businessman, which was split between 54 brothers and sisters.ml
Source: http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,20867,2103 1761-1702,00.html
Lawyers of Allah (back)
January 16, 2007
by Kemal Silay
The Mutating Faces of Islamist Terror and Organized Crime in Turkey
'We are the Soldiers of Allah! Allah is Great!' These were the words of a Turkish lawyer named Alparslan Arslan who, on May 17th, 2006, entered the Second Bureau of the Turkish Council of State with a Glock hand gun and opened fire on five judges who were then in session. Their 'crime,' as stated by the assailant, was to have upheld a court order banning a teacher from wearing the headscarf. Arslan, age 29, with a law degree from Istanbul’s Marmara University, attempted to take the lives of the judges, inspired by the instructions of a medieval 'law' and the front page of the jihadist newspaper Vakit, which had published their pictures and signaled them as targets. He succeeded in killing Judge Mustafa Yücel Özbilgin and wounding the four others. Immediately after the attack, he was arrested by the police.
Ideologically speaking, Arslan has an Islamist background but his political foundations were heavily influenced by the ülkücü movement, a racist offspring of Turkish/Turkic ultranationalism, with an increasing record of violence and militancy. The ideology of hate that he espouses is known as 'Türk- slam Sentezi' ('Turkish-Islam Synthesis'). He regularly attended Turkish Hezbollah meetings in Istanbul ’s Üsküdar Gökçen Dormitory during his student years and he was subsequently sent to Iran for Hezbollah training. Arslan is also involved in the wide-spread Turkish organized crime called 'çek-senet tahsilat ' or 'çek-senet mafyas ' ('check mafia'). Members of this mafia intimidate and/or punish those individuals who have 'missed their deadlines' in making their 'promised' payments to the Islamofascist business establishments. These Islamist terror networks do their jobs so 'well' that more and more businesses are seeking their 'services.'
Depending on the militant power and 'connections' (usually involving powerful people from the government or the state) that a given mafia has and based on their previous 'success record,' they can receive significant commissions from the Islamofascist businesses upon a 'successful' operation. This can include anything from financial repercussions and psychological terror (surveillance, intimidation, threats of harming, kidnapping, or raping the debtor’s family members, including wives and children), to the confiscation of their homes at gunpoint, and ultimately to murder, to name but a few of their 'methods.' Many of these mafia funnel the proceeds of their unlawful activities into organizations with known ties to international terror networks.
For example, the same law firm that Arslan worked for, the Yeditepe Hukuk Bürosu, is under investigation by Turkish law enforcement and anti-terror units for its connections with the Turkish Hezbollah, the most violent Islamist terror organization of Turkey .
Why did Arslan target the judges? After his capture, Arslan allegedly shouted out the motivations for his crime. His attack certainly illustrates the kind of retribution called for in the pages of the Qur’an: 'Those that make war against Allah and His apostle and spread disorders in the land shall be put to death or crucified or have their hands and feet cut off on alternate sides, or be banished from the country. They shall be held to shame in this world and sternly punished in the next: except those that repent before you reduce them. For you must know that Allah is forgiving and merciful' (Al-Ma’ida, V:33, The Koran, translated with notes by N. J. Dawood, New York: Penguin Books, 1987, pp. 390-391).
It is highly probable that Arslan decided to declare jihad against the judges because he perceives them to be spreading 'disorders in the land.' Thus, in the usual Islamist manner, he reduces Islam to the pages of the Qur’an, to a piece of cloth called the headscarf, or any other icon. Islamism neither historicizes nor contextualizes the Qur’an, only its apologists do. In order to read an Islamist’s mind, one needs to decontextualize the sources and icons of Islam. Though wrong in its essence, decontextualization would help an analyst get a handle on an Islamist’s psyche. If an Islamist reads a line in the Qur’an which starts something like 'today we should …' he does not contextualize the word 'today' as 'thirteen hundred some years ago' but actually reads it as today, like 2001, or 2006. An Islamist’s mind is constructed around binary oppositions. For him, any given issue is either black or white. Contemporary methodologies which try to examine the gray areas often fail to understand this black-and-white mindset, thus resulting in apologetic explanations for the actions of an Islamist’s unbending mentality. Especially when it comes to the Turkish Hezbollah, killing a judge or any other 'enemy of Islam' is justified, and indeed this barbaric practice is an integral part of the organization’s essence.
The Islamofascist qualifications of Arslan perfectly reflect the political, social, and economic realities of the Republic of Turkey since the 1980s. The September 12, 1980 military coup successfully crushed the Turkish 'leftist danger' but also opened up unlimited opportunities for all forms of Islamism and organized crime to flourish. Coupled with the implementation of a primitive version of Western capitalism, these Islamofascist groups have taken advantage of the situation and have become an integral part of the economic development of Turkey over the course of the past twenty years. At the same time, they have used their newly found economic power to disseminate their seeds of hatred and destruction more widely throughout society.
Turkish legal and media records of the last decade especially are filled with stories of human devastation at the hands of these underground and quasi-legitimate crime organizations. There is almost no scholarship published on the organizational nature and hierarchal structures of these groups or their connections to international Islamist terror networks, but almost every other month there pops up a new mafia or, as it is commonly referred to in Turkish, a new 'çete.' There are literally hundreds of these so-called çetes in present-day Turkey and, with the exception of some successful law enforcement operations to crush them, the overwhelming majority of these organizations have been operating in Turkey freely and with the state’s knowledge of their existence and operations. There is little evidence that Turkey ’s efforts have even begun to weaken the power of these networks. Victims of these organizations are often afraid of going to law enforcement officials or hiring a lawyer to receive help, since many events have proven that these çetes frequently receive significant assistance from the law enforcement officials themselves or from high-level bureaucrats.
Since Alparslan Arslan and his accomplices were taken into custody and as the investigation continues to unfold, the world has been watching to see how Turkey will deal with this Islamist attack. It remains to be seen whether the government will properly punish the perpetrators involved and crack down on the ideology behind which they hide.
A similar case occurred in 1995 when a Turkish jihadist named zzet K raç killed the Head of the Gümü hane Bar Association, Judge Ali Günday, in the name of Allah. Ali Günday had approved the court decision to ban the entrance of lawyers into court if they were wearing a headscarf. Before the jihadist attack, the Akit daily (now known as Vakit) had signaled Judge Günday as a target with the headline 'Sick Minds.' It is a known fact that when such a powerful radical Islamist newspaper targets a secular intellectual with such headlines, that person usually becomes the next victim of Islamist terror. zzet K raç was sentenced to life in prison but ultimately spent only 6 and ½ years behind bars. Now a free man, Kiraç continues to assert: 'I do not recognize any other law but shari’a!' K raç, like the majority of other Islamists, cannot change or go through any kind of genuine transformation or 'rehabilitation,' since the universal ideology of Islamism that they believe in requires a blind and rigid acceptance and practice of it.
The long list of Turkish victims of Islamist terror ranges from journalists to university professors, to musicians and poets to judges and ordinary businessmen, is chilling, and there is little evidence that the Republic of Turkey is working hard enough to stop this nightmare. Twenty years ago, literary classics and handbooks of philosophy were bestsellers in Turkey ; today, translations of jihadist tracts from Arabic, and Hitler’s Mein Kampf are among the bestselling publications. The level of anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism is skyrocketing, as well.
The Alparslan Arslan event is a wake-up call that symbolizes what has become of Turkey in the last twenty years. Unfortunately, this traditional ally of the West, the United States , and Israel is beginning to resemble its totalitarian and theocratic neighbors more so than the State that was defined and shaped by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.
However, this latest attack on Turkish secularism is also awakening the masses and mobilizing them against Islamism. At the funeral for Judge Özbilgin, thousands of people joined the mourners and turned the event into a protest against the government. The funeral procession-turned-protest made its way into the streets of the capital city, Ankara , and hundreds of thousands continued on to the mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Modern Turkish Republic .
After the funeral for the slain judge, Hilmi Özkök, Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces and Chief of the Turkish General Staff, openly encouraged the secular crowds to continue their demonstrations on a regular basis against those who pose a serious threat to the secular and democratic foundations of the Turkish State . He interpreted the demonstrations against Islamism as 'hopeful' and congratulated those who participated in them. Özkök, sometimes criticized for not being tough enough towards Islamists, has certainly upset many of them with such a straightforward stance against Islamism. Many in Turkey seem to hope that Özkök’s very recent successor, General Ya ar Büyükan t, will have a much more rigid approach in dealing with the Islamist danger in Turkey . Büyükan t has been known as an uncompromising protector of Atatürkism and Turkish secularism. Despite the Islamofascist networks’ anti-Semitic propaganda alleging that 'Büyükan t is Jewish' and a 'Zionist' and therefore 'should not be appointed as the Chief of the Turkish General Staff,' on July 31st, 2006, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer approved the decision in appointing him as Özkök’s successor.
Sezer himself not only strongly condemned the attack but also stated that he 'damned' the 'ideology it represents.' He did not hesitate to link this attack with the previous Islamist assaults against the Republic and its secular and democratic formation. He underlined that these attempts to cripple the secular Republic will be answered with determination. Büyükan t’s appointment certainly seems to uphold the promise he made over two months ago.
Those who watched and listened to these two most respected representatives of Turkish secularism, Özkök and Sezer, had no doubt that the warnings were being leveled at the Islamist networks of Turkey . Curiously, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo an chose not to attend the slain judge’s funeral because of a previously scheduled appearance at a tourism event in Antalya . Some of his ministers who did attend the obsequies were attacked by the secular crowds who called Erdo an a 'murderer' and chanted slogans exhorting the government to resign. The Minister of Justice, Cemil Çiçek, tried to sneak out the rear doors of a mosque in order to avoid facing the crowds.
In the subsequent days and weeks following the Arslan event, the Erdo an government attempted to establish that the attack was not necessarily on Turkish secularism but rather on the government itself, thus suggesting that the orchestration was organized by some retired hardcore members of the Turkish Armed Forces. In an accelerated manner, several ex-members of the Turkish army were arrested, and an effort was made to try to establish their connections with some other mafias.
Among the most interesting of these new mafias that the government is cracking down on is the Atabeyler Çetesi. The government’s police forces moved in quickly to execute a raid on the headquarters of this group in Ankara and arrest its members, some of whom possessed military identification cards, discovering various forms of weaponry and militant materials. The following day, Turkish newspapers published drawings of Prime Minister Erdo an’s house that were allegedly confiscated from the headquarters of the Atabeyler mafia, some with headlines reading 'Assassination Attempt on Erdo an.' Many in the Turkish media have argued that these drawings were not authentic but that they were later planted among the items confiscated from the Atabeyler headquarters and that they were handed over to the media by some members of the police who are loyal to the Erdo an government and its ideology.
On February 28, 1997, a 'soft' coup d'état had put the brakes on Islamism when the Turkish National Security Council issued eighteen directives to the Islamist Necmettin Erbakan government. Today, it is hard to imagine a similar military intervention taking place due to the European Union process and the fact that Recep Tayyip Erdo an has been struggling to eliminate the image of his Islamist past and his ties with Erbakan’s radical Islamist National Vision (Millî Görü ) ideology.
Indeed, except for the headscarf (türban) issue, he has been surprisingly conformist (most critics and analysts interpret this 'conformity' as part of Erdo an’s takiyye ‘political hypocrisy’ policy) to the demands and expectations of the President and the Turkish Armed Forces, and political observers have noted that he has recently pronounced the words 'Atatürk' and 'secularism' with respect more frequently than he ever had before in his long political career. After the Islamofascist attack, Prime Minister Erdo an passionately declared: 'We are going to make [ Turkey ] a safer country in order to protect the supremacy of laicism, democracy and law.'
In contrast, on the issue of the headscarf ban in Turkish schools, Erdo an has been outspoken against the decisions of Turkey ’s highest courts, the President, and the Turkish Armed Forces. Erdo an and the Head of the Turkish Parliament, Bülent Ar nç, are on record making numerous inflammatory statements regarding the unchangeable definition of laicism of the Turkish Constitution. The majority of Turks interpret their boldness as 'irresponsible' and 'provocative.' The names of these two politicians have been circulating as candidates for the position of Turkey ’s President. The replacement of Ahmet Necdet Sezer with either of these individuals will no doubt create further discomfort and fear among the secular public, as the President has significant powers when it comes to the veto of decisions of the Turkish Parliament.
During the last four months, and especially after the recent Islamofascist attack by Alparslan Arslan, the debate over the headscarf issue in particular and the interpretation of Turkish secularism in general have resulted in a high level of disorder and large public demonstrations throughout the country. Although Erdo an is not directly blamed for Arslan’s attack, politicians and the military, many leading journalists, the opposition party, and the hundreds of thousands of Turks who protested in the streets have looked to Erdo an as being responsible for the creation of the social and political climate that has allowed Islamism to operate and flourish. It has already been suggested that Erdo an is in the process of orchestrating a 'silent' Islamist revolution in Turkey with the help of the political freedom that he has gained through his democratically elected government, and, of course, the European Union process, which automatically eliminates the possibility of another military coup.
It seems likely that, with the direct encouragement and support of the Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces and President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, along with the recent public reaction to the attack on the judges, a new kind of civil activism has already started curbing the power of the Justice and Development Party in the Turkish political and cultural arenas. Fears of Islamism and further Islamofascist terror, coupled with what Erdo an calls Turkey’s 'excellent' relations with the Palestinian government led by the Hamas terrorist organization and the Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, have brought Atatürkism to a level of appreciation that has not been seen in recent memory. In less than two days following the funeral, almost 300,000 Turks in Ankara visited the An tkabir, Atatürk’s mausoleum, as a manifestation of their respect and gratitude to the secular founder of their Republic. This indeed may be the harbinger of a major political turning point in Turkey unlike any other since the 1980s.
Kemal Silay is the Ottoman and Modern Turkish Studies Professor at Indiana University , Bloomington
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Source: http://www.ajc.org/site/c.ijITI2PHKoG/b.1026767/k.7854 /Counterterrorism_Watch.htm
Fanatic's Mosque Hideout (back)
January 17, 2007
by Michael Lea
A British Muslim fanatic broke his control order and evaded cops by hiding in a mosque.
It is feared he has fled to Pakistan . He told pals he plans to train at an Afghanistan terror camp.
The man vanished this month — four days after a bid to prevent him leaving the country, Home Secretary John Reid said.
He is the third extremist to disappear while under a control order and his actions heap more pressure on Mr Reid — who is already rocked by the overseas crimes fiasco.
Security sources said the recently-radicalised suspect was bent on fighting a jihad holy war.
The Home Office is keeping his identity a secret.
But he is believed to be a 26-year-old of Pakistani origin, living in Manchester .
Shadow Home Secretary David Davis said the man could be a 'threat to British troops abroad'.
He said: 'If there is sufficient suspicion this man is involved in terrorist activities, there is sufficient suspicion to name him.'
Mr Reid told MPs in a written statement that the fanatic 'wanted to travel abroad for terrorism-related purposes'.
He was supposed to report daily to police, hand in his passport and stay at a given address.
But Mr Reid admitted he had absconded. He said: 'He is not believed to represent a direct threat to the public in the UK at this time.'
Cops traced the man to a local mosque but he is thought to have already made his way to Pakistan using somebody else’s passport.
In October, two suspected Muslim terrorists under control orders went on the run. The orders impose a loose form of house arrest on suspected international terrorists.
Mr Reid is under fire following revelations that offenders who committed crimes abroad had their details left off the national police computer when they returned here.
Nine offenders got jobs in Britain as the vetting system could not see their backgrounds.
Source: http://www.thesun.co.uk:80/article/0,,2-2007020632,00.html
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