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Posts by PeterPrinciple

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  • Scorching ‘heat dome’ over Middle East sees temperatures soar to 165°F in Iran

    08/01/2015 10:35:47 AM PDT · 28 of 46
    PeterPrinciple to Olog-hai

    The heat index


    Folks, this is heat index, not actual temperature. I can cook chicken in the oven at 160 degrees. I have been in Mongolia and Africa but couldn’t relate to the Celsius scale. It was hot and cold there but I functioned because I didn’t know the temp. You adjust and adapt.

    It is not a record:
    It is just a few degrees lower than the highest ever recorded heat index, which was 178F (81C) in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia on July 8, 2003.

    The heat index is a relative number

    the heat index contains assumptions about the human body mass and height, clothing, amount of physical activity, thickness of blood, sunlight and ultraviolet radiation exposure, and the wind speed. Significant deviations from these will result in heat index values which do not accurately reflect the perceived temperature.[4]

  • NAGOYA AREA HEAVILY BOMBED AGAIN; BIG 3 RECONVENE, MAY END TASK TODAY (8/1/45)

    08/01/2015 9:45:04 AM PDT · 25 of 43
    PeterPrinciple to PeterPrinciple

    And yet another source regarding the bombing warnings.

    http://www.amnation.com/vfr/archives/008604.html

    Interesting aspects?

    “What the CIA article reveals is that the leafleting of August 1 was the culmination of a months’-long campaign by the U.S. Office of War Information to give the Japanese people true information on the status of the war (which they were not getting from their own government) and to persuade them to surrender. “

    Lemay was in charge of leaflets (at lease those dropped by his command)?

    “Even today, members of the B-29 crews recall their fears that the warnings would make them easier targets for Japanese planes and antiaircraft artillery. However, they concurred with Gen. Curtis LeMay’s proposal at the time. Military newspapers featured the unprecedented action under such headlines as “B-29 Command Now Calling Its Shots” and “580 B-29s Follow Up Leaflet Warnings With 3800 Tons Of Fire And Explosives….”

    “Postwar surveys showed that the Japanese people trusted the accuracy of the leaflets and many residents of the targeted cities prepared immediately to leave their homes. The Japanese government regarded the leaflets with such concern that it ordered the arrest of those who kept or even read the leaflets and did not turn them in to their local police stations. Outside Japan, leaflets promoting the surrender of individual Japanese soldiers and civilians were dropped near cave and tunnel hideouts on islands that had been captured by the Allies.5”

    The specific warning issue was an early discussion by the scientific committee:

    “No one at this time, or later in the conference, raised the question of whether the Japanese should be informed of the existence of the bomb. That question, it will be recalled, had been discussed by the Scientific Panel on 16 June and at the White House meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service Secretaries, and Mr. McCloy on 18 June. For a variety of reasons, including uncertainty as to whether the bomb would work, it had been decided that the Japanese should not be warned of the existence of the new weapon. The successful explosion of the first bomb on 17 July did not apparently outweigh the reasons advanced earlier for keeping the bomb a secret; and evidently none of the men involved thought the question needed to be reviewed. The Japanese would learn of the atomic bomb only when it was dropped on them. “

  • NAGOYA AREA HEAVILY BOMBED AGAIN; BIG 3 RECONVENE, MAY END TASK TODAY (8/1/45)

    08/01/2015 9:07:35 AM PDT · 24 of 43
    PeterPrinciple to PeterPrinciple
  • NAGOYA AREA HEAVILY BOMBED AGAIN; BIG 3 RECONVENE, MAY END TASK TODAY (8/1/45)

    08/01/2015 8:58:25 AM PDT · 23 of 43
    PeterPrinciple to henkster

    The LeMay Bombing Leaflet


    http://www.smv.org/blog/2011-01-12/lemay-bombing-leaflet

    Here it says the leaflet was dropped over Hiroshima. It is not specific and couldn’t be but we did warn them...........

  • NAGOYA AREA HEAVILY BOMBED AGAIN; BIG 3 RECONVENE, MAY END TASK TODAY (8/1/45)

    08/01/2015 8:47:53 AM PDT · 22 of 43
    PeterPrinciple to henkster

    Interesting info here:

    http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_23.htm

    There was a lot of discussion about warning here by Stinson. But no documentation of what was actually done.

    I guess this this was logical operations but we don’t think about it. It was very dependent on weather.

    At General Arnold’s insistence, the responsibility for selecting the particular target and fixing the exact date and hour of the attack was assigned to the field commander, General Spaatz. In orders issued on 25 July and approved by Stimson and Marshall, Spaatz was ordered to drop the “first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945 on one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata and Nagasaki.” He was instructed also to deliver a copy of this order personally to MacArthur and Nimitz. Weather was the critical factor because the bomb had to be dropped by visual means, and Spaatz delegated to his chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, the job of deciding when the weather was right for this most important mission.

    There was a warning.

    From the dating of the order to General Spaatz it has been argued that President Truman was certain the warning would be rejected and had fixed the date for the bombing of Hiroshima even before the issuance of the Potsdam Declaration

  • NAGOYA AREA HEAVILY BOMBED AGAIN; BIG 3 RECONVENE, MAY END TASK TODAY (8/1/45)

    08/01/2015 8:08:33 AM PDT · 21 of 43
    PeterPrinciple to henkster
  • NAGOYA AREA HEAVILY BOMBED AGAIN; BIG 3 RECONVENE, MAY END TASK TODAY (8/1/45)

    08/01/2015 8:05:32 AM PDT · 20 of 43
    PeterPrinciple to henkster

    Here is a bit more controversial site regarding the bombing warnings.

    http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2013/04/26/a-day-too-late/

    There is confusion. Multiple leaflet drops? Some say 40 cities were warned. The article today does not mention 40, but as editor, wouldn’t you shorten to key cities?

  • NAGOYA AREA HEAVILY BOMBED AGAIN; BIG 3 RECONVENE, MAY END TASK TODAY (8/1/45)

    08/01/2015 7:52:58 AM PDT · 19 of 43
    PeterPrinciple to henkster

    Hiroshima was not on the warning list.


    My first thought in reading this was that we were “training” the Japanese to believe us when we said we were going to bomb. A little bit like getting them used to the 3 plane b-29 squadrons.

    and we did warn them:

    http://www.damninteresting.com/ww2-america-warned-hiroshima-and-nagasaki-citizens/

  • NAGOYA AREA HEAVILY BOMBED AGAIN; BIG 3 RECONVENE, MAY END TASK TODAY (8/1/45)

    08/01/2015 7:47:31 AM PDT · 18 of 43
    PeterPrinciple to Tax-chick

    Quartermasters of WW2 (an American report)

    http://www.diggerhistory.info/pages-conflicts-periods/ww2/qm-ww2.htm

    Anticipation is key to good logistics. Yet, at times, Quartermasters had little advanced warning of what was to come next, hence almost no time to prepare. The 7th Quartermaster Company, for example, underwent several weeks of intense planning and preparation in late summer 1944 getting ready for the projected Yap campaign. The company did not learn until mid-September – after the division was already at sea! – that the plan had been radically altered. Instead of attacking the small island of Yap, they found themselves heading hundreds of miles west to a much larger and more heavily defended Leyte.


    Loss of Food. For much of the war the Pacific Theatre experienced persistent heavy losses of food, resulting in unbalanced stocks in certain areas, chronic shortages elsewhere, and routine cycles of “feast-and-famine” among some unit messes. The problem of food loss – which some observers claimed ran as high as 40 percent at times – stemmed from a number of sources:


    Class II and IV supplies usually did not enjoy high-priority status for overseas shipping. Among commanders, delays in receipt of clothing and equipment did not seem to arouse the same level of anxiety as that caused by almost any perceived shortage in food or petroleum products. The latter were deemed bona fide “war stoppers” and took first priority. As a result, Quartermasters in the Pacific often found that their requisitions for clothing, footwear, cots, tents, mess equipment and the like, in effect, had been placed on the back burner. When initial issue stocks wore out, it sometimes took exceeding long for replacement goods to arrive. On such occasions, troops necessarily bore a certain amount of hardship and discomfort.


    Tentage and canvas material seemed to suffer the worst. In the course of heavy campaigning, combat divisions sometimes found that virtually their entire allotment of tents had become damaged or completely deteriorated in relatively short order. In fact, there was a chronic shortage of tents throughout the war. Moisture-saturated stocks got mouldy and leaked. Even when they arrived in the field in sufficient quantities, they often failed to serve the purpose for which they were intended. A group of Australian observers in mid-1943, for instance, concluded that almost all the tents in New Guinea leaked. Field Quartermasters used various expedients to try to “tropic proof” canvas goods to reduce mildewing, but had very limited success.


  • NAGOYA AREA HEAVILY BOMBED AGAIN; BIG 3 RECONVENE, MAY END TASK TODAY (8/1/45)

    08/01/2015 7:09:50 AM PDT · 14 of 43
    PeterPrinciple to Homer_J_Simpson

    An afteraction report on logistics. The following statement caught my attention.

    With the war’s end, only an administrative landing was required in Japan.

    http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/BigL/BigL-6.html

    Redeployment—Preparations for Invasion of Japan

    This operation, had it taken place, would have been the largest and most involved logistics operation ever engaged in by the U.S. military. It entailed the redeployment of 1.2 million troops from Europe to the Pacific. It was envisioned that 400,000 would come directly from Europe and 800,000 via the U.S. Ten million tons of equipment and supplies were to be transferred out of Europe, 5 million tons to the Pacific and 5 million tons to the U.S. After V-E day the 8th Air Force redeployed to the Pacific and troops began to be staged in the Philippines and on Okinawa. Planning called for the first landing on November 1, 1945 on Kyushu. General MacArthur was to be the Supreme Allied Commander for the operation; however in this restructuring of the Pacific, Admiral Nimitz did not become subordinate to MacArthur, but a “coordinating commander.” Because General MacArthur’s command had never achieved any significant degree of jointness in logistics, or at least not to the extent achieved by Admiral Nimitz’ command, logistics for this final operation represented a step back to each Service doing its own logistics planning. With the war’s end, only an administrative landing was required in Japan.77

    Conclusion

    From the standpoint of joint logistics, it can be said that they never approached the level of unification envisioned by General Somervell or as agreed by Admiral King and General Marshall, nor should they have. The Army Services Forces organization was designed for the support of a European style land war. In the Pacific

    —335—

    it was more or less suitable for the Southwest Pacific, but it would not have worked for the Navy. What worked best for the Navy in the Pacific was a decentralized flexible system, in spite of the fact that there was duplication particularly as regards shipping and port facilities. The logistics systems that evolved in the Pacific resulted in large measure from the unique requirements of the theaters and subtheaters. Jointness in logistics planning as well as in other functions was best achieved on the CINCPAC Staff. Cross servicing agreements, formal and informal, were in place at various levels, and probably worked best at the tactical level. Could logistics have been more joint in the Pacific? Certainly. Did logistics work about as well as could be expected owing to the circumstances? Probably. Fleet Admiral King, in his Second Report to the Secretary of the Navy Covering Combat Operations 1 March 1944 to 1 March 1945 summed them up as follows:

    Supply operations in the Pacific are not solely naval. The Army has a task of at least equal magnitude in supplying its air and ground forces. The supply systems of the two services have been merged together, as much as possible, under Fleet Admiral Nimitz in the Central Pacific and General of the Army MacArthur in the Southwest Pacific. In some cases, in which only one service uses an item, that item is handled entirely by the service concerned . . . In other instances, it has been found convenient to have one service look out for the needs of both.78

    Although the 50 years since the end of World War II have witnessed considerable consolidation of logistics functions in the Armed Forces, they have vet to reach the level of centralized control as envisioned by General Somervell, nor should they. The unique requirements of the Services dictate flexibility. The Services are responsible for providing, equipping, and training forces for the CINCS. The CINCS have limited control over logistics. The system is far from perfect and needs to be continually improved. Many of the improvements made in logistics over the years have been as a result of lessons learned in World War II, particularly in the area of transportation and common user supply.

    —336—

    Whether the Europe First strategy was a limiting factor in the War in the Pacific, or diversions of resources to the Pacific put an undue strain on the war in Europe, is still being debated. In the early days of the war, the Pacific was a priority area by necessity in order to contain Japan. Pacific Theater priorities also became convenient for the U.S. in order to dampen the British focus on the gradual approach to Germany through the Mediterranean. The strong personalities of both Admiral King and General MacArthur also had much to do with resource allocation for the Pacific. One thing is certain, the key decisions of the war were logistical decisions dictated by logistics considerations, and the continuing debates over priorities between the war against Germany and the war against Japan as well as the intra-theater debates, precluded any long-range logistics planning.79

  • NAGOYA AREA HEAVILY BOMBED AGAIN; BIG 3 RECONVENE, MAY END TASK TODAY (8/1/45)

    08/01/2015 6:50:17 AM PDT · 12 of 43
    PeterPrinciple to Tax-chick

    Quartermasters of WW2 (an American report)

    http://www.diggerhistory.info/pages-conflicts-periods/ww2/qm-ww2.htm

    Anticipation is key to good logistics. Yet, at times, Quartermasters had little advanced warning of what was to come next, hence almost no time to prepare. The 7th Quartermaster Company, for example, underwent several weeks of intense planning and preparation in late summer 1944 getting ready for the projected Yap campaign. The company did not learn until mid-September – after the division was already at sea! – that the plan had been radically altered. Instead of attacking the small island of Yap, they found themselves heading hundreds of miles west to a much larger and more heavily defended Leyte.


    Loss of Food. For much of the war the Pacific Theatre experienced persistent heavy losses of food, resulting in unbalanced stocks in certain areas, chronic shortages elsewhere, and routine cycles of “feast-and-famine” among some unit messes. The problem of food loss – which some observers claimed ran as high as 40 percent at times – stemmed from a number of sources:


    Class II and IV supplies usually did not enjoy high-priority status for overseas shipping. Among commanders, delays in receipt of clothing and equipment did not seem to arouse the same level of anxiety as that caused by almost any perceived shortage in food or petroleum products. The latter were deemed bona fide “war stoppers” and took first priority. As a result, Quartermasters in the Pacific often found that their requisitions for clothing, footwear, cots, tents, mess equipment and the like, in effect, had been placed on the back burner. When initial issue stocks wore out, it sometimes took exceeding long for replacement goods to arrive. On such occasions, troops necessarily bore a certain amount of hardship and discomfort.


    Tentage and canvas material seemed to suffer the worst. In the course of heavy campaigning, combat divisions sometimes found that virtually their entire allotment of tents had become damaged or completely deteriorated in relatively short order. In fact, there was a chronic shortage of tents throughout the war. Moisture-saturated stocks got mouldy and leaked. Even when they arrived in the field in sufficient quantities, they often failed to serve the purpose for which they were intended. A group of Australian observers in mid-1943, for instance, concluded that almost all the tents in New Guinea leaked. Field Quartermasters used various expedients to try to “tropic proof” canvas goods to reduce mildewing, but had very limited success.


  • NAGOYA AREA HEAVILY BOMBED AGAIN; BIG 3 RECONVENE, MAY END TASK TODAY (8/1/45)

    08/01/2015 6:39:15 AM PDT · 10 of 43
    PeterPrinciple to Tax-chick

    Quartermaster Supply in the Pacific During World War II

    http://www.qmfound.com/qmcpacific.htm

    Amphibious operations and fighting along narrow strips of beach, or continuous movement through dense jungles and over steep mountain ranges discouraged the use of A-Rations (fresh foods) or B-Rations (canned stores) both of which had to be prepared by a trained cook. In such circumstances, mobile kitchens could not have kept up, and roads would not have allowed even quarter-ton trucks loaded with marmite cans to reach everyone. Harsh weather and terrain oftentimes precluded even the carrying of hot food by hand or with pack animals. The only solution was to provide combat troops with sufficient amounts of individual rations, which they could carry and prepare themselves.

    Quartermaster R&D food specialists labored to meet the specialized needs and unique requirements of troops fighting in the Pacific. They came up with much improved C-Rations; lightweight “jungle rations” and K-Rations (both of which troops regarded as “picnic lunches”); high-energy, chocolate bars called D-Rations (for emergency uses only); and Assault Rations (often referred to as “candy rations”) tailor made for amphibious warfare. These helped ease the storage and distribution burden, while providing commanders with increased flexibility.


    The one item that proved to be most useful and popular among combat was a rectangular, blanket-like, rubberized poncho. It was issued early in the war to all troops embarking for the South and Southwest Pacific areas in the place of a raincoat. They quickly learned though that ponchos could be adapted to a multitude of uses – such as effective ground cover, foxhole “roof,” tarpaulin, shelter half, and any number of other things. By war’s end an even lighter weight nylon poncho had been developed.


    The Packaged Alternative. The virtual absence of permanent type bulk storage facilities and pipelines throughout the Pacific meant that almost all POL was stored and distributed in containers – mostly in 55-gallon drums. This contrasted sharply with experience in Europe. There QM Gasoline Supply Companies received most of their POL from huge fixed storage facilities, barges or railroad tanker cars, and promptly decanted it into 5-gallon jerricans. These were stacked in warehouses, open dumps, and along roads. And moved to user units in 2 ½-ton trucks and ¼-ton trailers. In the Pacific, they found the use of the much smaller jerricans neither practical nor desirable.


    They learned from after action reports, for example, that most individual duffle bags and interchangeable pouches (which held all the soldiers’ personal goods) deteriorated in almost no time when dumped on beaches without proper storage. Or quickly got lost, or mixed up in the mayhem. Or they were shamelessly pilfered there on the beach, or while en route to unit dumps, due to lax security. After witnessing this experience, supply personnel gradually moved away from the use of individual bags, and came up with new methods of storing personal clothing and equipment in easier to control and protect squad-size bags. pacific19.jpg (62889 bytes)This was only one of many lessons – big and small – learned by Quartermaster supplymen during the war.

  • Occupational Licensing Hurts Just About Everyone, Says White House

    07/31/2015 3:41:05 PM PDT · 34 of 38
    PeterPrinciple to Forgotten Amendments

    FROM THE ARTICLE:

    They hit some populations especially hard, including...

    Immigrants: In many cases, immigrants with education and training from their home countries are expected to “complete duplicative and costly requirements in order to acquire a U.S. license in their chosen career,” write the report authors. This makes “it difficult for immigrants to work in fields where they have valuable experience and training” which “deprives the U.S. market of a large share of their skills, and makes it difficult for these workers to make their full contribution to the workforce.”

    People with criminal convictions: In 25 states, occupational licensing can be denied if an applicant has any kind of criminal conviction, regardless of how long ago that conviction was or whether it’s at all relevant to the job in question.

    Military spouses: Around 35 percent of working military spouses are in professions that require state licensing or certification. Military spouses “are ten times more likely to have moved across State lines in the last year than their civilian counterparts,” making it especially difficult for those who need occupational licenses to easily transfer jobs between states.

    People who default on student loans: In 21 states, defaulting on student loans is sufficient grounds for the suspension or revocation of person’s occupational license. The policy is “misguided,” suggest the study authors, “as losing an occupational license may make it more difficult for the worker to repay the student loan.”

  • Climate models are even more accurate than you thought

    07/31/2015 3:29:47 PM PDT · 32 of 39
    PeterPrinciple to Oldeconomybuyer

    As Hawkins notes, the remaining discrepancy between modeled and observed temperatures may come down to climate variability; namely the fact that there has been a preponderance of La Niña events over the past decade, which have a short-term cooling influence on global surface temperatures. When there are more La Niñas, we expect temperatures to fall below the average model projection, and when there are more El Niños, we expect temperatures to be above the projection, as may be the case when 2015 breaks the temperature record.

    We can’t predict changes in solar activity, volcanic eruptions, or natural ocean cycles ahead of time


    So if we could control the weather we could predict what happens but we can’t control the weather.

    Statistics and modeling do not apply to complex systems, only controlled sytems. Complex systems include human physiology, human behavior, climate and weather, etc................

  • U.S. DESTROYERS SHELL JAPANESE CITY; NAVY PLANES HIT 60 HONSHU AIRFIELDS (7/31/45)

    07/31/2015 9:55:42 AM PDT · 21 of 42
    PeterPrinciple to Homer_J_Simpson

    Helicopters seen as aid to combat


    Interesting that the coast guard took the lead on helicopters? Training program at Floyd Bennett Field.

    http://www.helis.com/database/org/us_united_states_coast_guard/History/

  • U.S. DESTROYERS SHELL JAPANESE CITY; NAVY PLANES HIT 60 HONSHU AIRFIELDS (7/31/45)

    07/31/2015 9:35:42 AM PDT · 20 of 42
    PeterPrinciple to Homer_J_Simpson

    Iwo P51s are in the news a lot. Captured airmen were allowed to give any info to ease their situation. Good info here:

    http://506thfightergroup.org/mustangsofiwo.asp

    In July, the last full month before the Japanese agreed to unconditional surrender, the Iwo Jima fighter groups received some P-51D-25s as replacement aircraft. Many of these had the lead-computing K-14 gyro gunsight in place of the old N-9 which required a good deal of skill and “Kentucky Windage” in making deflection shots. The K-14 required a smooth touch on the controls to be truly effective, but was deadly accurate in nearly any tactical situation. It could only be defeated if the target aircraft rapidly reversed its turn in a curving combat, momentarily tumbling the gyros when the P-51 attempted to follow.

    One 21st group pilot familiar with the K-14 was shot down and captured by the Japanese. Under standing authority from intelligence officers, captured airmen were allowed to divulge almost any information which would ease their situation, and the 21st pilot explained about the K-14.

    The Japanese took this information as a lesson learned, but the tale has an ironic and—to the Mustang pilots—a humorous end. In one of the last large dogfights the Mustangs fought over Japan, at least eight Franks were shot down because their pilots assumed all P-51s now had the K-14 when actually only a relatively few replacement aircraft had the lead-computing sight. When the Franks reversed their turns to topple the K-14 gyros they presented their pursuers with a brief no-deflection shot for which the N-9 was ideally suited! Had the Franks kept turning in their original direction they would have stood a good chance of outmaneuvering the 51s.

  • U.S. DESTROYERS SHELL JAPANESE CITY; NAVY PLANES HIT 60 HONSHU AIRFIELDS (7/31/45)

    07/31/2015 9:17:24 AM PDT · 18 of 42
    PeterPrinciple to PeterPrinciple
  • U.S. DESTROYERS SHELL JAPANESE CITY; NAVY PLANES HIT 60 HONSHU AIRFIELDS (7/31/45)

    07/31/2015 9:15:53 AM PDT · 17 of 42
    PeterPrinciple to Homer_J_Simpson

    Churchill Refuses Knighthood Honor


    He is not a alone. But it has been diluted much in lately?

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Declining_a_British_honour

    Info on the order of the garter which Churchill declined:

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Order_of_the_Garter

    Here is info on British honors:
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orders,_decorations,_and_medals_of_the_United_Kingdom

  • U.S. DESTROYERS SHELL JAPANESE CITY; NAVY PLANES HIT 60 HONSHU AIRFIELDS (7/31/45)

    07/31/2015 8:49:35 AM PDT · 15 of 42
    PeterPrinciple to PeterPrinciple

    There is an adding machine in the press room but it only goes up to millions............................

  • U.S. DESTROYERS SHELL JAPANESE CITY; NAVY PLANES HIT 60 HONSHU AIRFIELDS (7/31/45)

    07/31/2015 8:39:24 AM PDT · 14 of 42
    PeterPrinciple to Homer_J_Simpson

    Stalin Ill


    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Stalin

    Death and legacy

    Joseph Stalin, lying in state in Hall of Columns of the House of Unions in Moscow.
    Stalin’s health deteriorated towards the end of World War II. He suffered from atherosclerosis from his heavy smoking, a mild stroke around the time of the Victory Parade, and a severe heart attack in October 1945.[301]

    In the early morning hours of 1 March 1953, after an all-night dinner and a movie,[302] Stalin arrived at his Kuntsevo residence 15 km west of Moscow centre, with interior minister Lavrentiy Beria and future premiers Georgy Malenkov, Nikolai Bulganin, and Nikita Khrushchev, where he retired to his bedroom to sleep. At dawn, Stalin did not emerge from his room.

    Stalin’s grave in the Kremlin Wall Necropolis
    Although his guards thought that it was strange not to see him awake at his usual time, they were strictly instructed not to bother him and left him alone the entire day. At around 10 p.m., he was discovered by Peter Lozgachev, the Deputy Commandant of Kuntsevo, who entered his bedroom to check on him and recalled the scene of Stalin lying on his back on the floor of his room beside his bed, wearing pyjama bottoms and an undershirt, with his clothes soaked in stale urine. A frightened Lozgachev asked Stalin what happened to him, but all he could get out of him was unintelligible responses that sounded like “Dzhhhhh.” Lozgachev used the bedroom telephone to frantically call a few party officials; he told them that Stalin may have had a stroke and asked them to send good doctors to the Kuntsevo residence immediately.[303][304] Lavrentiy Beria was informed and arrived a few hours afterwards. The doctors arrived in the early morning of 2 March when they changed Stalin’s bedclothes and tended to him. They diagnosed him with a cerebral hemorrhage (stroke) caused by hypertension (high blood pressure), with stomach hemorrhage facilitating.[305] He was treated in his dacha with leeches, as was customary at the time.[306] On March 3 his double Felix Dadaev was called back from vacation to Moscow “to be ready to stand in for Stalin if needed”, but he never needed to. On March 4 Stalin’s illness was broadcast in the media with surprising detail such as pulse, blood pressure and urinalysis; for convenience the time of his stroke was said to be March 2 and his location as Moscow. The bedridden Stalin died on 5 March 1953, at the age of 74.[1]

  • FLEET PLANES POUND TOKYO AREA; BATTLESHIPS SHELL HAMAMATSU; BIG 3 CLOSE TO ACCORD ON REICH (7/30/45)

    07/30/2015 3:25:52 PM PDT · 47 of 57
    PeterPrinciple to Hebrews 11:6

    leadership


    George Washington turned down a third term for the good of the nation.

  • FLEET PLANES POUND TOKYO AREA; BATTLESHIPS SHELL HAMAMATSU; BIG 3 CLOSE TO ACCORD ON REICH (7/30/45)

    07/30/2015 1:12:37 PM PDT · 39 of 57
    PeterPrinciple to henkster

    The following was interesting to me. I wonder how many of the crew were replaced? Another factor was that this was an untrained crew?


    Indianapolis was then sent to Guam where a number of the crew who had completed their tours of duty were replaced by other sailors. Leaving Guam on 28 July, she began sailing toward Leyte for training.

  • FLEET PLANES POUND TOKYO AREA; BATTLESHIPS SHELL HAMAMATSU; BIG 3 CLOSE TO ACCORD ON REICH (7/30/45)

    07/30/2015 12:58:50 PM PDT · 38 of 57
    PeterPrinciple to Hebrews 11:6

    So, the drunkard and the shirker went undisciplined?


    we learned that only after info had been declassified, don’t know how much time had passed, so yes................

  • FLEET PLANES POUND TOKYO AREA; BATTLESHIPS SHELL HAMAMATSU; BIG 3 CLOSE TO ACCORD ON REICH (7/30/45)

    07/30/2015 12:55:55 PM PDT · 37 of 57
    PeterPrinciple to colorado tanker

    their hands full just invading Sakhalin and the Kuriles.


    It appears they lost a few of the ships we gave them in those operations.

  • FLEET PLANES POUND TOKYO AREA; BATTLESHIPS SHELL HAMAMATSU; BIG 3 CLOSE TO ACCORD ON REICH (7/30/45)

    07/30/2015 12:54:12 PM PDT · 36 of 57
    PeterPrinciple to henkster

    I believe the torpedo hits knocked out the ship’s electrical power. No distress call was sent. At least, that’s my recollection.


    It was the abandon ship call that could not be put on the speakers so was by word of mouth.

  • FLEET PLANES POUND TOKYO AREA; BATTLESHIPS SHELL HAMAMATSU; BIG 3 CLOSE TO ACCORD ON REICH (7/30/45)

    07/30/2015 12:21:49 PM PDT · 29 of 57
    PeterPrinciple to Hebrews 11:6

    Good info here?

    http://www.ussindianapolis.org/mcvay.htm

    Perhaps the most egregious aspect of McVay’s ultimate conviction for failing to zigzag, however, was in the phrasing of the charge itself. The phrase was “during good visibility.” According to all accounts of the survivors, including eye-witness accounts of survivors only recently declassified and not made available to McVay’s defense at the trial, the visibility that night was severely limited with heavy cloud cover. This is pertinent for two reasons. First, as stated in an earlier section, no Navy directives in force at that time suggested, much less ordered, zigzagging at night with visibility limited. Second, McVay’s orders were “to zigzag at his discretion.” Thus, when he stopped zigzagging, he was simply following procedures set forth by Navy directives.

  • FLEET PLANES POUND TOKYO AREA; BATTLESHIPS SHELL HAMAMATSU; BIG 3 CLOSE TO ACCORD ON REICH (7/30/45)

    07/30/2015 12:13:34 PM PDT · 28 of 57
    PeterPrinciple to Hebrews 11:6
    https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Indianapolis_(CA-35) Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz remitted McVay's sentence and restored him to active duty. McVay retired in 1949 as a Rear Admiral.[20] While many of Indianapolis‍‍ '​‍s survivors said McVay was not to blame for the sinking, the families of some of the men who died thought otherwise: "Merry Christmas! Our family's holiday would be a lot merrier if you hadn't killed my son", read one piece of mail.[21] The guilt that was placed on his shoulders mounted until he committed suicide in 1968, using his Navy-issue revolver. McVay was discovered on his front lawn with a toy sailor in one hand.[21] He was 70 years old. The day the Indianapolis was sunk was his 47th birthday.
  • FLEET PLANES POUND TOKYO AREA; BATTLESHIPS SHELL HAMAMATSU; BIG 3 CLOSE TO ACCORD ON REICH (7/30/45)

    07/30/2015 12:11:14 PM PDT · 27 of 57
    PeterPrinciple to Hebrews 11:6

    https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Indianapolis_(CA-35)

    The Indianapolis sent distress calls before sinking. Three stations received the signals; however, none acted upon the call. One commander was drunk, another had ordered his men not to disturb him and a third thought it was a Japanese trap.[18] For a long time the Navy denied that a distress call had been sent. The receipt of the call came to light only after the release of declassified records.

  • FLEET PLANES POUND TOKYO AREA; BATTLESHIPS SHELL HAMAMATSU; BIG 3 CLOSE TO ACCORD ON REICH (7/30/45)

    07/30/2015 8:54:20 AM PDT · 24 of 57
    PeterPrinciple to PeterPrinciple
  • FLEET PLANES POUND TOKYO AREA; BATTLESHIPS SHELL HAMAMATSU; BIG 3 CLOSE TO ACCORD ON REICH (7/30/45)

    07/30/2015 8:46:31 AM PDT · 23 of 57
    PeterPrinciple to PeterPrinciple

    Read Aftermath and Conclusion at the above. I can’t get it to post for some reason.

    Lend lease required the return of ships after the war. How do you think that went after the war?

    If they had used them for invasion with japan, how would that have gone?

  • FLEET PLANES POUND TOKYO AREA; BATTLESHIPS SHELL HAMAMATSU; BIG 3 CLOSE TO ACCORD ON REICH (7/30/45)

    07/30/2015 8:27:53 AM PDT · 22 of 57
    PeterPrinciple to PeterPrinciple

    More info on Project Hula here:

    https://pediaview.com/openpedia/Project_Hula

  • FLEET PLANES POUND TOKYO AREA; BATTLESHIPS SHELL HAMAMATSU; BIG 3 CLOSE TO ACCORD ON REICH (7/30/45)

    07/30/2015 8:24:32 AM PDT · 21 of 57
    PeterPrinciple to Homer_J_Simpson
    Project Hula https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_Hula Project Hula was a secret program of World War II in which the United States transferred naval vessels to the Soviet Union in anticipation of the Soviets eventually joining the war against Japan King officially established the transfer-and-training program as Project Hula in mid-February 1945 and ordered Fletcher to commence the rehabilitation of the United States Army facilities at Cold Bay‍ '​s Fort Randall, which had been closed in November 1944. He advised Fletcher that an officer appointed to take charge of the training and his staff would arrive at Cold Bay by 24 March 1945, and that the first 2,500 Soviet trainees would arrive by 1 April 1945, with 550 more to follow by 1 May and another 2,000 by 1 June.[8] As the plan was finalized, the United States was to transfer 180 ships – 30 Tacoma-class patrol frigates (U.S. Navy hull classification symbol PF), 24 Admirable-class minesweepers (AM), 36 auxiliary motor minesweepers (YMS), 30 large infantry landing craft (LCI(L)), 56 submarine chasers (SC), and four floating workshops (YR) – to the Soviet Union by 1 November 1945, The 30 Tacoma-class patrol frigates were the largest, most heavily armed, and most expensive ships scheduled for transfer in Project Hula
  • FLEET PLANES POUND TOKYO AREA; BATTLESHIPS SHELL HAMAMATSU; BIG 3 CLOSE TO ACCORD ON REICH (7/30/45)

    07/30/2015 8:08:45 AM PDT · 19 of 57
    PeterPrinciple to Homer_J_Simpson

    Matsushiro Underground Imperial Headquarters

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matsushiro_Underground_Imperial_Headquarters

    Construction began on November 11, 1944[2] and continued until Japan’s surrender on August 15, 1945. Construction was 75% completed at the end of the war, with 5,856.6 square meters (63,040 sq ft) of floor-space (59,635 cubic meters (2,106,000 cu ft) of volume) excavated.

    in March 1945, secret orders were issued to add a palace to the complex.[

  • FLEET PLANES POUND TOKYO AREA; BATTLESHIPS SHELL HAMAMATSU; BIG 3 CLOSE TO ACCORD ON REICH (7/30/45)

    07/30/2015 7:56:47 AM PDT · 18 of 57
    PeterPrinciple to PeterPrinciple

    OPERATION KETSU-GO

    Other tidbits:

    Deployed throughout Kyushu and on adjacent islands, the Sixteenth Area Army had three armies and two special forces with a total of 15 divisions, 7 independent mixed brigades, 3 independent tank brigades and 2 fortress units.

    In late 1944, the Japanese also sent a team of officers to debrief the Germans on their defenses at Normandy and how the Allies assaulted to gain a foothold in Europe.

    Inaccessible high ground should be selected as protection against flame throwing tanks.(19)

    At the end of the war, Japan had approximately 12,725 planes. The Army had 5,651 and the Navy had 7,074 aircraft of all types.(25) While many of these were not considered combat planes, almost all were converted into kamikaze planes. The Japanese were planning to train enough pilots to use all of the aircraft that were capable of flying.

    there would be rows of suicide frogmen called “Fukuryu” in their diving gear 30 feet or so beneath the water. The outermost row of Fukuryu would release anchored mines or carry mines to craft that passed nearby. Closer to shore, there would be three rows of divers, arrayed so that they were about 60 feet apart. Underwater lairs for the Fukuryu were to be made of reinforced concrete with steel doors. As many as 18 divers could be stationed in each underwater “foxhole”.(26) Clad in a diving suit and breathing from oxygen tanks, a Fukuryu carried an explosive charge, which was mounted on a stick with a contact fuse. He was to swim up to landing craft and detonate the charge. The Navy had hoped for 4,000 men to be trained and equipped for this suicide force by October.

    The Japanese were determined to fight the final and decisive battle on Kyushu.

  • FLEET PLANES POUND TOKYO AREA; BATTLESHIPS SHELL HAMAMATSU; BIG 3 CLOSE TO ACCORD ON REICH (7/30/45)

    07/30/2015 7:33:24 AM PDT · 16 of 57
    PeterPrinciple to Homer_J_Simpson

    OPERATION KETSU-GO

    http://fas.org/irp/eprint/arens/chap4.htm

    in the summer of 1945 Japanese strategists identified the will of the American people as the U.S. strategic center of gravity and a critical vulnerability as the infliction of high casualties.(12)

  • FLEET PLANES POUND TOKYO AREA; BATTLESHIPS SHELL HAMAMATSU; BIG 3 CLOSE TO ACCORD ON REICH (7/30/45)

  • FLEET PLANES POUND TOKYO AREA; BATTLESHIPS SHELL HAMAMATSU; BIG 3 CLOSE TO ACCORD ON REICH (7/30/45)

    07/30/2015 7:08:43 AM PDT · 14 of 57
    PeterPrinciple to Homer_J_Simpson

    Lots of reference to navel mining operations which I started to research. But found the following reference, note it is dated 1943. This was used mostly in WWI but interesting it was considered in WWII.

    Made me think that it was a good think the Japanese didn’t use this technique like they could have on Iwo Jima and other islands and maybe the homeland.

    “Underground Mining Operations in Warfare” from Tactical and Technical Trends

    http://www.lonesentry.com/articles/ttt07/mining-in-warfare.html

  • FLEET PLANES POUND TOKYO AREA; BATTLESHIPS SHELL HAMAMATSU; BIG 3 CLOSE TO ACCORD ON REICH (7/30/45)

    07/30/2015 6:59:06 AM PDT · 12 of 57
    PeterPrinciple to Homer_J_Simpson

    Little things

    Iwo Mustangs:
    Lt O’Hearn was unable to drop a wing tank, and faced the prospect that his plane’s fuel consumption would not permit him to complete the return trip to Iwo. Captain Clark knocked the loose tank from O’Hearn’s plane with his wingtip.

    Three Japanese Planes in Air:
    “I saw a ten car passenger train heading into the sw end of one of the tunnels for all it was worth, said Lt Morris, “The way it was traveling, the engineer couldn’t have stopped before he reached the other end. And we had the ne end plugged tight. There must have been quite a train wreck inside.”

    Japanese turn down surrender:
    At least the stock market was up.....

    Division change in Prospect:
    Tanks, tank destroyer , and anti aircraft made integral to division. More riflemen in each division.

  • FLEET PLANES POUND TOKYO AREA; BATTLESHIPS SHELL HAMAMATSU; BIG 3 CLOSE TO ACCORD ON REICH (7/30/45)

    07/30/2015 6:37:18 AM PDT · 8 of 57
    PeterPrinciple to Homer_J_Simpson

    JAPAN: The Japanese reject the Potsdam ultimatum. Nevertheless General of the Army George C Marshall, Chief of Staff, US Army, directs General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commanding General US Army Forces in the Pacific, Lieutenant General Albert C Wedemeyer, Commanding General, US Forces in the China Theater, and Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief Pacific, to proceed with plans for a surrender.


    proceed with plans for surrender....................

  • BOMBER HITS EMPIRE STATE BUILDING, SETTING IT AFIRE AT THE 79TH FLOOR; 13 DEAD, 26 HURT (7/29/45)

    07/29/2015 5:26:38 PM PDT · 31 of 44
    PeterPrinciple to henkster

    B-32 info here:

    http://www.joebaugher.com/usaf_bombers/b32.html

    In August of 1944, the popular name of the B-32 was changed to Dominator. However, in August of 1945, this name was officially dropped because of objections made by the State Department at a United Nations conference. I am not sure of the reasons for the objection, but the name “Dominator” must have been deemed to be “politically incorrect” for the postwar environment. After that, the aircraft was officially referred to as simply B-32.

    The last Dominator mission of the war was flown by four B-32s on August 28 in a reconnaissance mission to Tokyo. The mission was a disaster, although not because of any enemy action. 42-108544 lost an engine on takeoff and skidded off the runway. All 13 men aboard perished when the aircraft exploded and burned. On the way back from the target, 42-108528 lost power on two of its four engines. The plane’s pilot ordered the crew to bail out, but two men were killed.

    Although its brief combat career was unspectacular, it did have the distinction of flying the last aerial combat mission against Japan.

  • Pa. Congressman Fattah indicted on corruption charges from 2007 mayor’s race

    07/29/2015 4:23:35 PM PDT · 44 of 56
    PeterPrinciple to centurion316

    . Differences of opinion have been long been a positive attribute of this forum.


    We still have a lot of opinions but we lost the informed opinions......................

  • This gun "math" problem works great if you leave out a little thing like logic...

    07/29/2015 11:37:03 AM PDT · 22 of 28
    PeterPrinciple to PeterPrinciple
  • This gun "math" problem works great if you leave out a little thing like logic...

  • BOMBER HITS EMPIRE STATE BUILDING, SETTING IT AFIRE AT THE 79TH FLOOR; 13 DEAD, 26 HURT (7/29/45)

    07/29/2015 8:30:36 AM PDT · 18 of 44
    PeterPrinciple to Tax-chick
  • BOMBER HITS EMPIRE STATE BUILDING, SETTING IT AFIRE AT THE 79TH FLOOR; 13 DEAD, 26 HURT (7/29/45)

    07/29/2015 8:19:09 AM PDT · 17 of 44
    PeterPrinciple to Homer_J_Simpson

    uss cusk launched


    http://usscusk.com/

    First sub to launch a missile. The updated v-1 rocket?

    http://usscusk.com/loon.htm

  • Ex-Wife: Donald Trump Made Me Feel ‘Violated’ During Sex

    07/27/2015 6:32:04 PM PDT · 6 of 253
    PeterPrinciple to NKP_Vet

    Might this not be more of a reflection of the ex than of Trump?

  • CHURCHILL IS DEFEATED IN LABOR LANDSLIDE; ATTLEE PROMISES PROSECUTION OF PACIFIC WAR (7/27/45)

    07/27/2015 7:39:58 AM PDT · 26 of 70
    PeterPrinciple to PeterPrinciple

    And here is another view of Attlee:

    http://www.conservapedia.com/Clement_Attlee

    Attlee explained his policies in 1947, noting that the chief challenge which faced Britain was the need for a transition from a war to a peace economy, and for a transition from capitalism to socialism. However the nation had been impoverished by the war and was unable to hold its increasingly expensive and restive British Empire. Attlee’s solutions were to make India independent, to pull out of Palestine, to nationalize major industries and begin socialized medicine, and to turn to the sympathetic liberal government of President Harry Truman to pay for it all.

  • CHURCHILL IS DEFEATED IN LABOR LANDSLIDE; ATTLEE PROMISES PROSECUTION OF PACIFIC WAR (7/27/45)

    07/27/2015 7:24:22 AM PDT · 25 of 70
    PeterPrinciple to Homer_J_Simpson

    In public, Attlee appeared modest and unassuming; he was ineffective at public relations and lacked charisma. His strengths emerged behind the scenes, especially in committees where his depth of knowledge, quiet demeanour, objectivity and pragmatism proved decisive. He saw himself as spokesman on behalf of his entire party, and successfully kept its multiple factions in harness. His reputation among scholars in recent decades has been much higher than during his years as Prime Minister, thanks to his role in forging the welfare state and opposing Stalin in the Cold War.[1] In 2004 he was voted the greatest British Prime Minister of the 20th Century by a poll of 139 academics organised by Ipsos MORI.[2]

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clement_Attlee


    A view of Attlee 70 years later from Wikepedia

  • CHURCHILL IS DEFEATED IN LABOR LANDSLIDE; ATTLEE PROMISES PROSECUTION OF PACIFIC WAR (7/27/45)

    07/27/2015 6:49:07 AM PDT · 23 of 70
    PeterPrinciple to Homer_J_Simpson

    THE U.S. ARMY IN THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY
    1944-1946

    http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/Occ-GY/index.htm#contents


    I would encourage all to read the above. A lot of the current news article will mean more, it explains a lot of the beginning of the cold war. This was implementation of the Yalta Agreement.

  • CHURCHILL IS DEFEATED IN LABOR LANDSLIDE; ATTLEE PROMISES PROSECUTION OF PACIFIC WAR (7/27/45)

    07/27/2015 6:34:32 AM PDT · 21 of 70
    PeterPrinciple to PeterPrinciple

    http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/Occ-GY/ch21.htm

    “The question who is a Nazi is often a dark riddle,” Third Army G-5 reported more than a month after V-E Day, adding, “The question what is a Nazi is also not easy to answer.” 1 In official terms, however, the questions were not difficult to answer at all. SHAEF had long ago worked out automatic arrest categories ranging from the top Nazi leadership to the local Ortsgruppenleiter, from the top Gestapo agents to leaders of the Hitler Youth, the Peasants’ League, and the Labor Front. Furthermore, thousands of suspects were being arrested: 700 a day in May and June, and a total of over 18,000 in August. In September, 82,000 suspects were being held in internment camps, away from the political scene and available for possible trial and sentencing as members of criminal organizations.2 They were all presumed to be confirmed Nazis and, with some allowance for excessive zeal on the part of the Counterintelligence Corps (CIC), the vast majority doubtless were. Usually, of course, they did what they could to conceal their identities and their pasts. Some succeeded no doubt, but most were not hard to find. Capt. Arthur T. Neumann, whose detachment’s out-of-the-way Landkreis, Alzenau in northwestern Bavaria, was a favorite refuge for those fleeing automatic arrest, reported that nearly all suspects, once they were identified, could be brought in by postcards telling them to report to the detachment office at a specified time.3 Finding out who had been party members, whether important enough to merit arrest or merely rank and file, was also not difficult. The party had kept excellent records, which often passed into military government’s hands intact. The detachment at Wasserburg am Inn, for example, had twenty-eight lists and rosters covering everything from party and Hitler Youth membership to deliveries of boots and uniforms.4 The best evidence, the party’s entire central registry of 12 million cards with photographs, turned up in Munich in a pile of wastepaper waiting to be pulped.5