Why Jemaah Islamiah Targets Australians

The Australian ^ | October 15, 2002 | Rohan Gunaratna

[Shermy]

THE Bali attack came amid warnings that Australian targets were under continuing threat from al-Qaeda and its South-East Asian network Jemaah Islamiah.

The attack bears the hallmark of JI, the only group that has both the intention and the capability to conduct a mass casualty attack against the predominantly non-Western target.

The past modus operandi of JI and al-Qaeda indicates that the group invested significant time in planning and preparing for the attack. So it's a safe bet that JI was aware that the vast majority of the fatalities and casualties would be Australians and other Westerners.

Several indicators suggest an increased terrorist threat to Australia and Australian interests overseas during the past year:

Australia's high-profile participation in the US-led anti-terrorist campaign in Afghanistan and the angry reaction of Muslims, especially Australian Muslims.

Osama bin Laden claimed in November 2001 that Australia had led a crusade in East Timor. He added that Australia was part of a conspiracy to separate East Timor from the Muslim world.

A grenade was lobbed from a motorbike into the garden of the Australian International School in Jakarta in November 2001.

Large firecrackers were hurled into the Australian embassy in Jakarta in November 2001.

An al-Qaeda suicide bomber in an explosives-laden truck planned to destroy the Australian high commission in Singapore in early 2002.

Al-Qaeda and Taliban detainee and prisoner interrogation in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Camp Delta in Cuba and the US suggests that Australian Muslims trained at Camp Al Farooq in Afghanistan and were given the task of conducting terrorist operations against Australian targets.

Before al-Qaeda targeted Australians overseas, bin Laden and his contacts established a support network in Australia using its South-East Asian arm, JI. At the invitation of the JI Australia, JI founder Abdullah Sungkar and present leader Abu Bakar Bashir visited Australia.

Furthermore, JI penetration of local Muslim groups led to a significant generation of propaganda within Australia aimed at politicising and radicalising Australian Muslims.

In an interview published in the February-March 1997 issue of the Sydney-based Islamic Youth Movement magazine Nida'ul Islam (Call of Islam), Sungkar spoke of the "obligation of jihad within the framework of aiming to re-erect dawlah islamiyyah" by applying the strategies of faith and its expression in word and action and jihad.

He added: "In this, quwwaatul musallaha or military strength is essential."

In a political manifesto written in May 1998, they gave Indonesian Muslims two choices: "Life in a nation based upon the Koran and the Sunna or death while striving to implement, in their entirety, laws based on the Koran and the Sunna."

Bin Laden gave an exclusive interview to his supporters in Australia that was published on a website in Australia.

JI also raised funds in Australia and funds were transferred from Australia, first to JI Malaysia and then, with the disruption of the JI network in Malaysia, to JI Indonesia.

Australia features prominently in the JI regional structure. As such, Australia has no option but to work jointly with South-East Asian countries to detect, disrupt, degrade and destroy the JI organisation. Its failure to do so will result in further attacks in the neighbourhood of Australia and even inside Australia.

The threat is likely to develop, not diminish, with time.

Bear in mind that during the past decade Australia has been the home for several foreign terrorist groups: Hamas (Palestine), Hezbollah (Lebanon), Chechen mujaheddin (Russia), Kurdish Workers Party (Turkey), Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Spain), Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka), Babbar Khalsa International (India) and International Sikh Youth Federation (India). These groups disseminate terrorist propaganda, recruit, raise funds and procure technologies from Australia.

Although Canberra has monitored these groups, it has not disrupted their propaganda and fundraising infrastructure. As a result, several terrorists – and their supporters and sympathisers – have infiltrated Australian society, including its universities and even media organisations.

Another reason the terrorist threat is rising in Australia is that several terrorist groups in the immediate neighbourhood – notably in the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia – have stepped up their activities at home and abroad. In addition, half a dozen groups with a total strength of 400 members have benefited from training provided by al-Qaeda and its associated groups in Afghanistan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. With sustained US military action in Afghanistan, the gravity of terrorism is dispersing to South-East Asia. If the threat of Islamism is not controlled in South-East Asia, it is likely to spill into Australia.

The lesson from all of this is clear: Australia must recognise the increasing threat the country faces from terrorism. It has no alternative but to disrupt these networks' operations inside Australia.

For strengthening security in the Asia-Pacific, Australia and the South-East Asian region must improve co-operation. In Australia, there is a poor understanding of the threat. The Australian malaise is one of not being sufficiently educated on the Asia-Pacific region, with a poor understanding of the culture, politics and economics of its neighbours. A "she'll be right" attitude just isn't good enough.

As a technologically advanced country with significant economic, political, diplomatic and military capabilities, Australia could also assist countries in South-East Asia – especially Indonesia – to improve their capability to fight terrorism. Australia can make a significant contribution to the ensuing criminal investigation into the Bali attacks.

Australia should take a leadership role in the region as a whole, especially with its South-East Asian friends, in goading Indonesia into action. The weekend's tragic event could lead to the rapid development of co-operation in the region, spurred on by Australia.

Rohan Gunaratna, a former principal investigator of the UN Terrorism Prevention Branch, is author of Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (Columbia University Press, 2002)

[Shermy]

Another editorial:

http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/10/16/1034561212030.html

"Fighters of terror must adapt as quickly as the enemy"

October 17 2002

Al-Qaeda is like the Hydra - cut off one of its many faces and two more spring up, writes Ahmed Rashid.

The more al-Qaeda is whittled down - its cells broken up, its leaders captured - the quicker it transforms itself into new forms to survive. The bombing in Bali demonstrates that al-Qaeda no longer has a central core as existed in Afghanistan, but is a global movement whose essence is now local. Its belief system is still rigid in its hatred towards the United States but it is also adaptable to local circumstances, causes and issues.

Al-Qaeda has become a multi-headed monster much like a transformer toy. Twist the toy and it shows up different faces and egos.

The Bali bombing was preceded by attacks on US troops in Kuwait, Afghanistan and the Philippines, several suicide attacks against foreigners and Christians in Pakistan and the assault on the French oil tanker outside Yemen. Then there were the attempted attacks foiled by security forces in Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Germany.

All these attacks fit the al-Qaeda picture as we have come to know it - kill Americans, attack large economic targets symbolic of capitalism, attack to embarrass pro-Western rulers in the Muslim world.

But there is also a local picture that needs to be understood. In Bali the target was Australians whom Indonesian extremists - nationalist and religious - blame for the country's debacle over East Timor.

In Pakistan the target has been Pakistani Christians, whom local militant groups believe are being funded by the Pope, the Archbishop of Canterbury and almost everyone else, to Christianise the country.

This local agenda has come about in the aftermath of al-Qaeda's defeat in Afghanistan. Thousands of al-Qaeda militants fled, either back home or to neighbouring countries where they were told to co-ordinate with local groups and to reorganise.

Pakistan is the prime example of this style of co-operation because of the needs of international and domestic jihads. Pakistani militant groups, which had fought and trained with al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, had long been targeting Christians, Shia Muslims and other minority religious groups in Pakistan. They provided the fleeing al-Qaeda with safe houses, communications, exit strategies and papers if they wanted to return to the Middle East.

Those militants who remained organised traditional al-Qaeda hits against targets such as the suicide attack in Karachi in May that killed 11 French engineers. But al-Qaeda also helped and perhaps encouraged local groups to step up attacks - thus the spate of recent attacks on Pakistani Christians.

American security officials now say there was an attempt to attack the US embassy in Jakarta on the anniversary of September 11. That failure by al-Qaeda may have prompted local militant groups to go for an easier strike - Australians at a nightclub in Bali.

It is clear that some al-Qaeda leaders are hiding in Pakistan, including Khaled al-Sheikh Mohammad, a Pakistani born in Kuwait who is believed to be directing some of al-Qaeda's worldwide operations. Osama bin Laden or one of his sons may be in Pakistan or on its border with Afghanistan. The presence of such leaders takes foot soldiers to new heights of bravado and it may be implied from the Bali attack that some al-Qaeda chiefs are in Indonesia.

Just as extremists transform themselves, so the war against terrorism has to be constantly transforming itself.

A Western attack on Iraq risks making life even more difficult for other Muslim regimes with the threat of their people taking to the streets in anti-Western demonstrations. It may provide more recruits for extremist groups and make the task of counter-terrorism and intelligence gathering more difficult.

There has been little of the nation building in countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan or the Central Asian Republics that the West had promised. Nation building includes not just providing economic aid, but concentrating international effort on dictatorial leaders to open up their economies and political systems.

There will be many more Balis to come unless the world gets back to the business of beating terrorism, by first catching the terrorists and then helping governments in the Muslim world to improve their performance and commitment to their people.

Telegraph, London

[Shermy]

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