Posted on 10/02/2002 9:31:49 PM PDT by VaBthang4
Force Reconnaissance Missions
1st Force Reconnaissance Platoon operated in support of 15th MEU(SOC) during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.
The 1st Force Reconnaissance Company (1st Force) Marines of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (15th MEU(SOC)) were the best-trained, best-equipped Marines fighting in Afghanistan. We had the most experienced small unit commanders and the newest specialized equipment within all of the Department of Defense for conducting combat operations. As the assault element in the maritime special purpose force (MSPF), the platoon gained the confidence of the Marine air-ground task force commander early in the predeployment training cycle. During the course of the deployment the platoon would perform all three of their distinct and separate missions: the deep reconnaissance mission, the direct action mission as a maneuver element, and specialized independent missions as directed.
Before attaching to the 15th MEU(SOC), the platoon trained together for a year and focused primarily on long-range reconnaissance operations according to the unit training plan. The platoon trained in full mission reconnaissance profiles to include the specialized insertion and extraction techniques during deployments to the Joint Readiness Center in Louisiana, as well as Nailand, Bridgeport, China Lake, and Twentynine Palms, CA. Prior to this yearlong unit practical application training, a phase dedicated to schoolhouse training developed the core competencies for 1st Force Marines on an individual basis. Many of these Marines were honor graduates of schools such as combatant dive, basic reconnaissance course, static line jump master, and breacher schools, among others. The Marines comprising 1st Force were generally experienced (50 percent previously deployed as 1st Force) and mature staff noncommissioned officers (SNCOs) and senior NCOs. My platoon’s average age was 28 and average rank was staff sergeant. The average number of specialized schools my Marines had attended was six. I had but one Marine on his first float (more about my “boot” later). We had 7 school trained snipers, 10 rangers, and 20 military free fall school graduates. The entire unit had completed platoon parachute insertions from 25,000 feet with full combat equipment at night. Confidence ran high; all were up to the challenge of facing any enemy. The platoon was ready to fight the moment we left Hawaii in late August 2001. We had perfected the basics, integrating our skills into complex, highly demanding, full mission profiles.
After conducting humanitarian operations in East Timor, prehostility training in Bahrain, shaping operations in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, and prestaging for the assault into Afghanistan, the force reconnaissance Marines were on the edge of their seats for the opportunity to hunt down the enemy.
Hours after the assault into Afghanistan, the first two teams would leave on the first long-range zone reconnaissance patrol of the 15th MEU(SOC). This patrol was among the most active of the platoon’s actions supporting Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. They implanted sensors in two separate areas, called for an armed reconnaissance mission of AH–1W gunships, then maneuvered to within 10 kilometers of enemy armor units that were later engaged by AH–1W gunships. While validating the basics of the unit’s patrolling standing operating procedures, there were a number of lessons reinforced. Our ability to monitor the primary tactical air direction proved the critical communications net time and again. Friendly aircraft relayed information regarding the reconnaissance patrol’s movement through the vast desert, and it was a great benefit that the team leader communicated directly with aircraft overhead. Information was passed regarding contacts in the area and locations and movement of friendly reconnaissance patrols.
Accurate position reporting to aircraft proved challenging. Standard position reporting to aircraft was in latitude/longitude, not grid. The force solution required two global positioning systems (GPSs). Fortunately each Marine was issued a Garmin 12 GPS at 1st Force. One GPS was set for grid while a second was set for latitude/longitude. Accurate 1:50,000 scale maps of Afghanistan were unavailable. The only available grid maps were 1:100,000 scale that were difficult for use in microterrain planning. Aircrews did not have grid maps at all thus creating a seam in air-to-ground coordination.
Employment of ground sensors in the Afghanistan desert was tenuous at best. The sensors proved ineffective in the desert terrain and were unable to sense the vibrations through the loose, powdery desert floor. They failed at the published distance of operational performance. Cold weather pushed in as the weeks passed deeper into winter. High desert regions around the globe routinely experience temperatures well below freezing. Enhanced cold weather gear needs to be included in west coast MEU(SOC) deployments. The flexibility demanded in expeditionary warfare dictates that the Marines need to be prepared to operate in extreme cold requiring individual and team cold weather equipment.
The performance of the M–2120 (SOPHIE), a thermal imaging device, was very impressive in the desert environment of southern Afghanistan. Like the Garmin 12 GPS, the SOPHIE was specialized equipment acquired and utilized only by 1st Force. The SOPHIE, in the hands of reconnaissance Marines, successfully identified man-sized contacts at approximately 2,200 meters under nighttime conditions. Our best night vision goggle’s (PVS–17B, another specialized optic only at 1st Force) performance was limited to approximately 400–500 meters under like conditions. In addition, the PVS–14s could see about 200 meters. SOPHIE permitted low-level light operations that sister Services and coalition forces could not match. On nights when illumination was low or when overcast with low clouds, patrols were only visible with vehicle-mounted infrared or forward looking infrared systems. The standard Javelin thermal sight command launch unit (CLU) ranged approximately 800–1,000 meters during these dark nights. While effective, the CLU simply could not match the SOPHIE range.
The interim fast attack vehicle (IFAV) proved a workhorse in the desert environment. Challenges faced related to sourcing sufficient quantities of proper tires and filters. The spare parts block for IFAVs was still in its infancy. With the stresses on the air bridge into Afghanistan it was difficult to get special items into Camp Rhino. Nonetheless, the IFAV proved itself to be a great patrolling tool and mobility platform, not an armored vehicle. 1st Force has already modified 15 items from our after-action report to improve the vehicle.
Communications electronics proved highly reliable. Superior training and top of the line equipment are credited for this success. The PRC–117F, the PRC–138V2 (automatic link establishment), and PRC–148 were unique to 1st Force and allowed us to communicate across the full spectrum to include joint forces. An augment to the communications equipment suite should include an encrypted, wireless, global satellite phone. This addition would enhance maneuverability, cutting by two the four separate radios on the previously described patrol, as well as the battery demand, also a significant weight and space consideration.
1st Force was the only unit with the special operations forces laser marker (SOFLaM) capability. This capability enabled them to designate and lase a target for destruction by laser guided munitions. Enhancement in the fielding of SOFLaM, or a like capability, would be a great stride toward much greater joint interoperability in ground marking of laser guided munitions. The enemy threat from ground fired, wire guided weapons is approximately 6 kilometers. The capability to laser mark targets beyond this range would be well within SOFLaM capabilities. Utilized in conjunction with the SOPHIE, the reconnaissance teams had a huge advantage over any other forward air controller (FAC).
On 6 December 2001, members of the 15th MEU(SOC) force reconnaissance platoon were assigned the mission of interdicting Highway 1 in order to destroy any Taliban or Al Qaeda forces fleeing from Kandahar to Lashkar-Gar. During the ambush patrol the platoon assaulted a Taliban or Al Qaeda vehicle and became engaged in close quarters combat with approximately seven to nine of the enemy. The platoon destroyed the enemy embarked in the vehicle using small arms fire.
The ambush site was designed to interdict rather than ambush convoys of fleeing enemy between Kandahar and Lashkar-Gar. The ambush patrol consisted of an element of the force reconnaissance platoon as the assault force, supported by elements of the light armored reconnaissance company and combined antiarmor team providing security and support. This was not a typical ambush site. Established rules of engagement (ROE) prohibited application of deadly force until forces entering the ambush site exhibited hostile acts or hostile intent. Another friendly force disadvantage was the terrain. The entire route was located in the middle of an open, desolate desert plateau, very undesirable for an ambush site. Undeterred by these challenges, the teams engaged and destroyed the enemy in a close quarters battle igniting the vehicle loaded with rocket propelled grenades and ammunition. Working with a ground FAC, the force reconnaissance team coordinated a call for close air support that destroyed both the pickup truck that had been ensnared in the roadblock as well as an enemy convoy following this vehicle as the convoy attempted to evade north of the roadblock.
The learning points are many, but these are the highlights. First, train as you will fight. We had conducted live fire vehicle assaults during the special operations training group close quarters battle training package. This was the main reason the force reconnaissance Marines were chosen to “ambush” the enemy. All of the Marines were highly trained gunfighters and performed as they were trained once the rounds began to fly. Second, muscle memory is important. One Marine experienced a type one malfunction. A tap, rap, bang and the Marine was killing the enemy. Only after the gunfight, when questioned by his peers, did he realize he cleared his weapon. Third, the Marines on the line all talk about audio exclusion and giving a nonstandard response (multiple rounds to the enemy’s chest) to each of their targets before immediately moving to head shots on the subsequent targets. The Marines shot what they were conditioned to fire, and the 5.56mm round will not put a man to the ground with two shots to the chest. Fourth, the coordination with the sniper was not adequate. The platoon talked about using a sniper to overwatch their movement. However, no one in the assault element instructed the sniper on his engagement criteria. In fact, no one knew that there was a sniper shooting until after the assault was complete. The coordination must be complete before crossing the line of departure. Fifth, the M4 with optical suite (Aim Point M2, advanced combat optical gunsight, or PVS–17B/C) is a great weapons system for reconnaissance and is used by every coalition special warfare unit that I observed in Afghanistan. (British Special Air Service (SAS), Australian SAS, Germans, SEALs, Air Force combat controller teams/parajumpers and special forces teams are all carrying the M4 with optical suite.) Force reconnaissance needs one simple system for the two separate and distinct missions (long-range reconnaissance and direct action raids). The M4 must have a complete optic suite of gear for each weapon, or we are not progressing toward the future. The use of iron sights will get our Marines killed.
Finally, the ROE were continuously changing. In the beginning a special forces team could engage anyone with weapons, but the ROE changed to only crew-served weapons in vehicles, then only to hostile intent. Each day the Marines were being restricted on whom they could engage. The better equipped and more experienced force reconnaissance Marines were chosen to interdict the vehicles because the ROE via higher than Task Force 58 (TF 58) were changing. Yet, with the original ROE the light armored reconaissance company could have destroyed all of those vehicles without endangering any Marines along a road.
After the gunfight on Highway 1, the platoon returned to Camp Rhino where we sent out two more long-range zone reconnaissance patrols and conducted live fire training. The patrols searched for any enemy personnel infiltrating through the TF 58 area of operation. During the last two long-range reconnaissance patrols, the MSPF was stood up again to conduct raids. However, as in training and in combat, the “word” changed along with the intelligence picture. Yet another opportunity to conduct specialized missions as directed presented itself.
The force reconnaissance platoon (minus/reinforced) with a translator and Army specialist went into a village looking for special items—military operations other than war at its best. Again, the platoon was being used as a maneuver element with myself as the mission commander. The platoon had an entire company as a quick reaction force with the company commander, fire support team, and assault platoon (airborne) riding in helicopters. The platoon was very well supported. The use of 1st Force as a maneuver element conducting special missions or missions as directed would be a recurring theme for the 15th MEU(SOC). One of the biggest learning points is that 1st Force is capable of performing missions that are usually dedicated to a rifle company (minus) or a platoon (reinforced). In addition, a recurring problem during planning and conduct of the mission was the lack of a dedicated combat search and rescue (CSAR) helicopter. The Marine Corps needs to invest in a dedicated CSAR helicopter. The Navy’s HH–60H is outfitted with better navigational equipment and is more modern than anything the Corps is currently flying.
And, as I promised, remember the “boot” corporal? Well, he turned 21 after Christmas, picked up sergeant, won the meritorious sergeant board for the MEU, and was awarded the I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Marine of the Year. Not only were the members of the platoon the best trained and best equipped, but most importantly, they were all exceptional Marines.
There are numerous learning points throughout this article. Take away what will help. However, think about the future and where the Marines as a whole should develop. Why don’t the grunts have hand-held SOPHIEs? Why don’t all Marines have optics on their primary weapons? Why not night vision for each Marine and an optical sight for night engagements? Why doesn’t the Marine Corps have SOFLaMs for the battalion landing teams? Why do we help Marines clear malfunctions on the rifle range or any live fire ranges? Why don’t we expand 1st Force to participate as a full-fledged member of Special Operations Command? Why don’t we demand more money for training so Marines get to conduct live fire training three times a week while on float and conduct live fire and maneuver training at least once a month during workups? Why don’t we bring the major subordinate element going on float to table of organization strength 1 year prior to chopping to the MEU?
Capt Treglia was a platoon commander with 1st Force and is currently assigned to the Special Operations Training Group, I MEF.
That's a good question... I take it when their weapons jam on the firing range one of the range safeties comes over and supervises (or physically does) the procedure? Hmmm. That's a bit overbearing IMHO.
Col John Jogerst, USAF*
* Colonel Jogerst is the Special Operations Chair to Air University, on the faculty of Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.
Watching the war in Afghanistan and listening to speculation about future US moves, one hears a lot of discussion about US special operations forces (SOF). The consensus seems to be that these forces are tailor-made for the unconventional nature and uncertainty of this war. Every war is unique, but if the uncertainty and chaos of the current war are characteristic of future conflicts, it is important to consider potential lessons from SOF’s success. Lessons learned by SOF over the last two decades and demonstrated in Afghanistan provide some signposts for future conventional forces and the ongoing transformation of the US military.
Lesson One
You don’t know what you need until you need it. A wide range of capabilities in effective quantities is a good hedge against tomorrow’s threat.
Predicting the future is an enterprise with a very poor record unless predictions are so broad as to be useless for setting priorities. The takedown of Manuel Noriega in Panama did not look like any mission the United States had prepared for during the 1980s. Combat in Somalia, the Balkans, and now Afghanistan has differed from the set-piece armored battle Saddam Hussein presented to the coalition in Kuwait and Iraq. Yet, for the most part, the US military force built for the NATO/Warsaw Pact and Korean theaters has provided the right conventional and specialized forces, in sufficient numbers, to fight these conflicts. In each one, SOF provided the commander a critical edge by supplying a variety of niche capabilities and the ability to develop new capabilities rapidly. In the large, conventional conflict of the Gulf War, SOF capabilities proved strategically crucial, though not tactically decisive. SOF’s biggest contribution may have been preventing Israel from attacking Iraq in reaction to the latter’s Scud missile attacks against Israel. Offensive Israeli involvement in the war could have fractured the coalition, but this alliance demonstrated its resolve to defend Israel and defeat the Scud threat by deploying recognized, elite forces and allocating hundreds of sorties to hunt Scud launchers aggressively. Although the number of Scuds killed may be in dispute, the result is not. Israel remained on the sidelines, and the coalition held.
In Afghanistan, SOF began by waging an unconventional warfare (UW) campaign- a mission that has remained low on US Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM) priority list for the last decade.1 The utility of UW as part of the national strategy seemed low, and threat scenarios requiring these skills seemed unlikely. Yet, the skill sets needed to wage UW- from the Army, Navy, and Air Force- have fitted the conditions in Afghanistan.
Lesson Two
Network-distributed may be more effective than network-centric warfare. The best way to speed up the observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) loop is to shorten it by getting it into the field.
Much of the work in transforming future US military capability focuses on command and control- getting more and better information to the commander so he or she can see and direct the battle. Although this is important, it is also very challenging if the concept requires collecting and passing information to headquarters, analyzing it, and then passing direction back to the battle. John Boyd’s description of the OODA loop in command and control makes this point. Both human action and the mechanical passing of information consume critical time in the cycle. Centralizing control of the battle means that these actions are multiplied at each echelon of command. Field observation and orientation are passed to higher levels of decision making, where another cycle takes place until they reach the command authority. Decisions and actions then repeat at each level in return until they arrive at the battlefield.
One must synchronize and centrally direct a battle against large, conventional forces- those that mass and move relatively slowly. A battle against small, independent, and mobile formations may change too rapidly to allow centralized control in detail. The lesson from Afghanistan is that, with clear mission orders and appropriate technology, each tactical element can become a command, control, and execution node, greatly shortening the OODA loop while still allowing the passing of information on tactical actions and results to higher levels for operational and strategic analysis.
SOF personnel have proven uniquely suited for this networked, distributed warfare. Special forces (SF) teams with embedded Air Force air-control elements provide a tactical force with a broad range of skills and the maturity to execute mission orders without detailed oversight. They can move, shoot, and communicate while employing supporting fires from any source- land, sea, or airpower from US or coalition forces. SOF teams can do this because they are interoperable.
Lesson Three
Interoperability comes by interoperating regularly, routinely, and often. No royal road exists.
Forging an interoperable force is a big job. Interoperability in equipment requirements and design is only a start. Real interoperability requires constant testing and training not only to work out equipment problems, but also- and more importantly- to work out the human problems of command, control, and communications as well as unit tactics.
USSOCOM and its predecessors have spent the last 20 years forging a joint team with interoperable service components. SOF personnel jointly conduct virtually all training above the individual skill level. This training program is tough, extensive, and expensive, but it has succeeded in forging a truly interoperable team. SOF communications link SOF service components- and extend to parent service forces as a result. SOF personnel conduct operations with elements from all services directly integrated in tactical formations- from SF or SEAL teams with integral Air Force air-control elements to tactical helicopter formations combining Army and Air Force aircraft.
This makes SOF ideal for the kind of chaotic and diffuse warfare that probably awaits us in the future. Fighting this kind of war requires coordinated, dispersed teams- not traditional massed forces. In this kind of war, a defined battlefront or safe rear area may not exist.
However, the most probable conflict is not the only type of conflict- and may not represent the most significant threat to the nation. Organized, heavy enemy forces remain a threat in some theaters, and heavy, combined-arms air and surface assets may still be the force of choice for fighting them. The challenge of these conflicts lies in adapting the fundamental lessons learned from Afghanistan to local conditions.
Lesson Four
Existing forces are nothing more than tools to provide the commander with combat capability. This capability and the ability to employ it are what matters- not the specific tool.
The war in Afghanistan has seen Army, Navy, and Air Force helicopters, fighters, and long-range bombers providing interdiction and close air support to US, allied, and associated forces fighting from foot, horseback, high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWV), or light armored vehicles (LAV). The joint special operations team has been the key to linking these forces into an effective, interoperable tool to achieve the joint force commander’s objectives. But interoperable does not mean identical. Each of these disparate forces brings particular capabilities as well as definite strengths and weaknesses to the fight.
The Air Force’s long-range bombers provide large weapons loads, precision, and endurance. Navy fighters provide forward forces in-theater, precision, and reconnaissance. AC-130 gunships provide endurance; immediate, direct fire support; and real-time overwatch of operations. Army and Marine conventional forces provide quick-reaction firepower and the ability to secure ground. The only important criterion for the joint force commander and troops on the ground is their ability to use these capabilities effectively.
Lesson Five
The “tooth to tail” ratio may no longer be a relevant measure of merit because it draws an artificial distinction between integral elements of US combat power.
If the only “teeth” in Afghanistan were the few hundred SOF personnel and aviators who initially engaged the Taliban and al Qaeda, then the tooth-to-tail ratio was minuscule. Tens of thousands of US personnel flew reconnaissance, ran ships, moved logistics, processed intelligence, and moved information to support those few hundred troops at the sharp end. However, precisely because of that intricate and massive support structure, the few hundred troops on the ground were able to topple the Taliban regime in a few months with almost no US casualties. That same support structure allowed the US military to reach halfway around the world; commence combat operations in an unexpected, austere theater within weeks; and succeed on an extremely chaotic battlefield.
The only relevant measure of merit is the effectiveness of the entire US force structure. Is there enough “tail” to support full use of US teeth? Is the United States building enough of the “enablers” (tankers; airlifters; airborne warning and control system [AWACS] aircraft; joint surveillance, target attack radar system [JSTARS] aircraft; unmanned aerial vehicles [UAV]; communications bandwidth; information analysis capabilities; etc.) to allow effective employment of the latest generation of “shooters”? Does the force provide a complete capability worth the cost in people and materiel?
Lesson Six
Human beings are more important than hardware.
The war in Afghanistan and the larger global war against terrorism are wars of people. The key to defeating the Taliban and al Qaeda lies in coordinating and supporting the Afghan opposition forces in their fight for their country. The language skills, cultural orientation, maturity, and adaptability of SOF enabled the joint force commander to effectively co-opt Afghan anti-Taliban forces and incorporate them into his campaign. Their success is a result of human action and initiative in employing an extremely wide range of hardware- from horse cavalry to joint direct attack munitions (JDAM)- to conduct the campaign.
Fundamentally, the global war against terrorism- indeed, any war- is about individuals. The war on terrorism features few traditional military targets, such as large military formations or key national infrastructure. The first step in conducting this war is to determine who the enemies are (either an individual or a group of individuals) and what we want them to do- or not do. The second step is to determine how we can get them to do our will (e.g., co-opt, persuade, coerce, or kill them). The United States will need a range of tools- political, military, economic, legal, and informational- to exploit these individuals’ vulnerabilities and achieve national objectives.
The final lesson from the war in Afghanistan may be that the revolution in military affairs has already happened.
Like most revolutions, this one went from the bottom up- not from the top down. While the generals debated how to mandate a revolution, the captains and majors quietly implemented one. Despite a decade of downsizing, parts of the US military have learned to exploit networked information and precision weapons to conduct real-time, coordinated, and precision joint/combined operations against an enemy dispersed over complex terrain in a chaotic theater on the other side of the world. Troops have learned to use a networked, distributed force of coordinated but independent joint combat elements with a wide range of capabilities. They have demonstrated that command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) can be fused and focused directly on a small, effective formation at the tip of the spear, allowing US forces to apply the right tool at the right time in the right place. Ultimately, this capability will prove itself more important than raw firepower.
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
Note
1. “[Unconventional warfare encompasses] a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. Also called UW.” Joint Publication 3-05.5, Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures, 10 August 1993, GL-13, on-line, Internet, 5 March 2002, available from http://www. dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_05_5.pdf.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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