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The Aftermath: broken aircraft at Desert One. |
Posted on 09/12/2002 3:19:06 PM PDT by vannrox
On November 4, 1979 a mob in Iran stormed the US Embassy and took the staff and USMC security contigent hostage. In all, 52 Americans were captured and were being held by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and it was unclear whether they were being tortured or readied for execution. Within hours, the newly certified US Army Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (Airborne) was on full alert and plans were being drawn up for a rescue.
Delta's commander, Colonel Charles Beckwith, was intimately involved with the rescue attempt. The Americans faced a daunting task. Tehran is well inside Iran and away from friendly countries. The hostages were not held at an airport as in Israel's earlier Entebbe raid. Good intelligence was hard to come by about forces inside the embassy and in Tehran. And of course, all the planning and training had to be carried out in complete secrecy.
What was ultimately decided on was an audacious plan involving all four services, eight helicopters (USMC RH-53's), 12 planes (four MC-130's, three EC-130's, three AC-130's, and two C-141's), and numerous operators infiltrated into Tehran ahead of the actuall assault. The basic plan was to infiltrate the operators into the country the night before the assault and get them to Tehran, and after the assault, bring them home.
The first night, three MC-130's were to fly to an barren spot in Iran and offload the Delta force men, Combat Controllers, and translators/truck drivers. Three EC-130's following the Combat Talon's would then land and prepare to refuel the Marine RH-53's flying in from the US Carrier Nimitz. Once the helicopters were refuled, they would fly the task force to a spot near the outskirts of Tehran and meet up with agents already in-country who would lead the operators to a safe house to await the assault the next night. The helicopters would fly to another site in-country and hide until called by the Delta operators.
On the second night, the MC-130's and EC-130's would again fly into the country, this time with 100 Rangers, and head for Manzariyeh Airfield. The Rangers were to assault the field and hold it so that the two C-141's could land to ferry the hostages back home. The three AC-130's would be used to provide cover for the rangers at Manzariyeh, support Delta's assault, and to supress any attempts at action by the Iranian Air Force from nearby Mehrabad Airbase. Delta would assault the embassy and free the hostages, then rendevous with the helicopters in a nearby football stadium. They and the hostages would be flown to Manzariyeh Airfield and the waiting C-141's and then flown out of the country. All the aircraft but the eight helicopters would be flown back, the helicopters would be destroyed before leaving.
What actually happened was far different from what was planned.
A month before the assault a CIA Twin Otter had flown into the first landing area, known as Desert One. A USAF Combat Controller had rode around the landing area on a light dirt bike and planted landing lights to help guide the force in. That insertion went well, with no contact, and the pilots reported that their sensors had picked up some radar signals at 3,000 feet but nothing below that.
Despite these findings, the helicopter pilots were told to fly at or below 200 feet to avoid radar. This limitation caused them to run into a haboob, or dust storm, that they could not fly over without breaking the 200 foot limit. Two helicopters lost sight of the task force and landed, out of action. Another had landed earlier when a warning light had come on. Their crew had been picked up but the aircraft that had stopped to retrieve them was now 20 minutes behind the rest of the formation.
Battling dust storms and heavy winds, the RH-53's continued to make their way to Desert One. After recieving word that the EC-130's and fuel had arrived, the two aircraft that had landed earlier started up again and resumed their flight to the rendevous. But then another helicopter had a malfunction and the pilot and Marine commander decided to turn back, halfway to the site. The task force was down to six helicopters, the bare minimum needed to pull off the rescue.
The first group of three helicopters arrived at Desert One an hour late, with the rest appearing 15 minutes later. The rescue attempt was dealt it's final blow when it was learned that one of the aircraft had lost its primary hydralic system and was unsafe to use fully loaded for the assault. Only five aircraft were servicable and six needed, so the mission was aborted.
Things got worse, though, when one of the helicopters moved to another position and drifted into one of the parked EC-130's (in the pilot's defense, it was dark and his rotors kicked up an immense dust cloud, making it difficult to see). Immediately both the C-130 and RH-53 burst into flames, lighting up the dark desert night. The C-130 was evacuated and the order came to blow the aircraft and exfiltrate the country.
However, in the dust and confusion the order never reached the people who would blow the aircraft. There were wounded and dying men to be taken care of and the aircraft had to be moved to avoid having the burning debris start another fire. Because of this failure to destroy the helicopters, top secret plans fell into the hands of the Iranians the next day and the agents waiting in-country to help the Delta operators were almost captured.
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The Aftermath: broken aircraft at Desert One. |
All told, five Air Force personnel and three Marines lost thier lives and dozens more were injured. The Iranians scattered the hostages around the country afterwards, making any further rescue attempts impossible. They would be released later, after ??? days of imprisonment.
Insufficient information and bad planning played a key role in the failure of the rescue. The planners had calculated that it would take the eight RC-53's four hours and twenty minutes to make the flight; it had taken five hours twenty minutes. The Air Weather Service had not been able to predict the low level dust storms that hampered the mission. If they had, some more low-level bad weather flight training might have made the flight easier and have prevented the fatal crash that killed eight people.
Also, the helicopter crews had been thrown together at the last minute after it was discovered that many of the Marine pilots lacked the skills necessary to complete the mission. It was a combination of Air Force, Navy, and Marine pilots who flew the mission. In one case, unfamiliarity with the aircraft caused one pilot to ground the aircraft when it could have flown the mission.
If you want to help the children of the soldiers who died at Desert One please click HERE or HERE to read their history of the tradgedy.
The Marine Corps at that time did not fly RH-53s. The Corps received its first RH-53Ds in 1990 when the Navy started to transition to MH-53Es. The Marine choppers, CH-53Ds, that were used to train for the mission were all left in the States. The RH-53s belonged to the Navy, were stored on the hangar deck of the Nimitz and received very little maintenance. Adequate time required for check flights and tweaking of the helicopters by their mechanics and crew chiefs wasn't factored in. Two or three days prior to the mission a fire alarm was pulled on the hangar deck of the Nimitz and most if not all of the helicopters were covered with PKP - purple k powder - a highly corrosive fire extinguishing chemical. Rudimentary inspections, another mistake, followed, pronouncing the helicopters as ready for the mission. The reason that the helicopter that struck the C-130 had to lift off was that it had a flat nosewheel and couldn't ground taxi in the sand. The whole thing was one big cluster f***
Two, that final helo that crashed, did so because he was relocating to the opposite side of the staging area to be refueled for the flight back to the Nimitz, not because of any nosewheel damage. A C-130 had some damage, but they were still able to fly out, is that what you were thinking of?
http://rescueattempt.tripod.com/hostagerescueattempt
And this, in turn, was caused by an extremely low morale after the Vietnam War, exacerbated by the Commander-in-Chief that did not stand firmly behind the troops. Had Carter chosen the best people for the job and given them a free hand, this would not have happened.
Not true. Crew selection began before Thanksgiving, 1979, and were training since then. Also, there was one Navy pilot, and the rest Marine. I have heard one pilot was Air Force, this article falsely claims, or infers, it was a mixed crew, that is entirely false, these men trained for months together before taking off for Desert One. The final selection of pilots was not complete until Christmas 79 or so, and members of all branches were tested and weeded out of the selection.
As for unfamiliarity with the aircraft, the BIMS indicator indicates that nitrogen has leaked from the spar of the rotor blade. In layman's terms, that means the spar cracked/blade broken/helicopter fall down go boom.
What is interesting to note, however, is that in all recorded incidents of a BIMS indicator going off, is that all inspections of the blades for each recorded instance, shows there were never any cracks. The pilot who left his aircraft after this warning went off was unaware of Sikorsky's findings, and had every reason to not take the chance.
Carter had nothing to do with the mission failure. He did get out of the way, and General Vaught had free rein to train and select people and aircraft for the mission. All military considerations were paramount in planning and operation of this mission. Carter supported the troops and Generals all the way in this.
And before everyone else jumps on my head like on the other thread that forced me to type so much on this, I wa one of the Marines off the coast of Iran for this, and I know what I am talking about.
That's a definitive statement you can't make. PKP has the ability to work it's way into nooks and crannies undetected. In fact the pilot's spotlight onboard helo #1 was found to be inoperative on the deck of the Nimitz prior to launch and had to be replaced. Not long after the flight crossed the coast problems were being experienced with both the PINS and Omega systems onboard all helos. The TACAN in #5 had failed shortly after leaving the Nimitz and it also was having yaw problems from the AFCS. The BIM failure on #6 was never troubleshot because that bird was abandoned. What caused #2 to lose it's second stage hydraulics? What caused the AH and the electric compass on #5 to fail?
Two, that final helo that crashed, did so because he was relocating to the opposite side of the staging area to be refueled for the flight back to the Nimitz, not because of any nosewheel damage. A C-130 had some damage, but they were still able to fly out, is that what you were thinking of?
No. Helo #3, piloted by Jim Schaefer, had both nosewheel tires damaged and deflated upon landing at Desert One. Because of this Schaefer had to air taxi a short distance, set down and let the dust settle and then repeat, a technique he called "wounded frog." The same thing happened to Seiffert when he landed Helo #1. Schaefer was maneuvering his bird to the northeast so one of the C-130s, #4 piloted by Hal Lewis, could taxi and takeoff. He was low on fuel and had to leave before Oldfield, in Helo #6, could finish getting refueled. Schaefer had already been refueled. It is believed that due to density altitude and weight limits on performance that Schaefer wasn't able to develop enough power to lift off and fly over the C-130. Had he been able to make a rolling takeoff, which he couldn't due to the nosewheel problems, he probably would have cleared the C-130.
The embassy guards were fully capable of repelling the attack but were stopped for fear of causing an international incident.
IMHO if they would have waxed the first 10 or so fence climbers the whole incident would have ratcheted down real fast.
\ But seriously, how can a flame retardant seep into an avionics cabinet and destroy the afcs and TACAN on one, and the bims on another?
The country should also note that carter kissed the Khomeini’s butt for 444 days without results. But the 52 hostages were released the same day as Ronald Reagan’s inauguration - the Iranians were smart enough to know that a real shit-storm was on the way if they didn’t.
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