'Heavy' Invasion Is Best Option

London Daily Telegraph | August 6, 2002 | John Keegan

[Stand Watch Listen]

John Keegan, Defence Editor, says straws in the wind suggest Britain and America may be preparing to attack Iraq

There are as yet no firm signs that a war against Iraq is in the offing but there are straws in the wind. The departure of the aircraft carrier Ark Royal to the Mediterranean is one.

The Ministry of Defence insists that it has gone to take part in a Nato exercise but, nevertheless, it is headed for what would be the operational area if an attack on Iraq is launched.

Trains loaded with armoured vehicles have been seen leaving the Salisbury plain area recently. Rumours in the Army speak of tank regiments beginning special training. These are all unusual developments.

On the other hand, there is undoubtedly a campaign of disinformation in progress, probably intended to alarm and unsettle Saddam Hussein. What is described as a "debate" within the Washington policy community is in full flood.

It may be the product of real disagreement within the administration and between it and Congress. It may, however, be deliberately orchestrated by the president's information service.

Several schools of thought have been identified. The Pentagon, led by Donald Rumsfeld, the defence secretary, is alleged to want an early and decisive military strike.

The State Department, under Colin Powell, is said to prefer negotiation and its lobby may have been encouraged by last week's offer by Saddam to start "technical" talks on the readmission of United Nations weapon inspectors, even though the offer was rejected.

Nor is there any agreement apparently between those who want military action rather than a diplomatic solution. The idea of a "heavy" war has strong support, particularly among conventional military thinkers at the Pentagon and elsewhere.

A "heavy" war would require the deployment of up to 250,000 soldiers and large quantities of armour and artillery. Their attack would be preceded and accompanied by major air strikes. It would be a repetition of Desert Storm in 1991, with the difference that America would not plan to include allied contingents in large numbers.

The argument advanced for a "heavy" war is that it promises a quick and clear solution against the Iraqi armed forces, which have actually declined in quality and size since 1991, when they collapsed very quickly.

The opposed school of thought argues for a "light" war, mounted largely by special forces which would look to the support of dissidents to rise against the administration, sow confusion and create resistance.

An intermediate plan, said to have been recently favoured by Mr Rumsfeld and other Pentagon hawks, envisages a surprise attack by a medium-sized force on Iraqi command centres in or near Baghdad, aimed at destabilising Saddam's administration and destroying his power to react.

Arguments for the "light" and "intermediate" solutions must cause unease. Both seem based on the dangerous supposition that what appears desirable from the attacker's point of view - a war which does not entail heavy investment or cost - is also likely to succeed.

The contrary point of view is equally valid: that what seems to suit the attacker may suit the defender equally well or better. The awful danger of a "light" or "intermediate" war is that either might be defeated. Weak and ineffective though Saddam's army is, it could quite possibly find the strength and competence to fight decisively against an intervention force that it outnumbered.

Moreover, even if the "intermediate" option were chosen, the forces available to mount it are few. They consist of the US 82nd and 101st Airborne and Air Assault divisions, perhaps assisted by the British 16th Air Assault Brigade.

They are heavy in helicopters but light in armour. Moreover, though highly mobile, they have large base requirements and it is difficult to see where such bases could be found. Indeed, if bases within operational range of Baghdad are made available - by Turkey or Kuwait - then so might bases for the tank divisions needed in a "heavy" war.

In short if it proves possible to mount an "intermediate" operation, it would probably also be possible to have a "heavy" operation with an altogether more certain prospect of success at lower cost in equipment lost and loss of lives - Iraqi and allied alike.

The military argument therefore would be for the "heavy" solution, for a variety of reasons. The first is that Saddam cannot defeat a "heavy" invasion. The second is that the decision in a "heavy" war would be quick and clear cut.

It would cause the least political fallout in neighbouring countries. Thirdly, victory would vastly enhance western prestige generally and American prestige particularly, in the Middle East. Half-hearted allies would be brought back on side, Islamic moderates would be encouraged.

The only difficulty about the "heavy" solution is the line of departure. To launch an army of 250,000 on Baghdad would require bases close to the Iraqi heartland. They might be found in Turkey or in Kuwait. Both seem disinclined at present.

Kuwait might be persuaded by hard-nosed diplomacy. Turkey could be bribed, particularly if America's allies in the European Union were to make promises about accelerating Turkey's admission to the EU.

Given Europe's preference to hope that the Iraqi problem, if ignored, will go away, such co-operation seems improbable. In the end therefore, the United States - perhaps with British support - may have to resort to old-fashioned Second World War strategy and mount a large-scale amphibious landing at the head of the Gulf.

It would not be an easy undertaking. There is only about 30 miles of ground, and that swampy, on which to land. However, Saddam might reflect that the US Marine Corps made a brilliantly successful landing at Inchon in Korea in similar but even more difficult circumstances in 1951 and drove the North Koreans beyond the 38th Parallel. The Americans would be able to do it again if they so decide.

[robowombat]

This has already posted once today.