Pakistan - Why Musharraf clings to power

General Pervez Musharraf tells the world that he must perpetuate military rule in order to save Pakistan from two scourges: corrupt, money-grubbing politicians and Islamic extremists.

But one of the key reasons why he is so determined to hold on to power is that the generals like the smell of money just as much as the politicians. As chief of staff of the armed forces, Musharraf presides over a vast industrial, commercial and real estate empire under direct military control with assets and investments of at least $5 billion.

As for Islamic extremists, despite promises of a crackdown designed to please foreign listeners, he has done little for fear of alienating powerful hard-line generals who want to continue using Islamic militants to destabilize India.

Shielding the business activities of the armed forces from the prying eyes of civilian government ministers and parliamentary committees has been a preoccupation of the four military regimes that have ruled Pakistan. Musharraf's rigged presidential referendum last week will give him the power to curb the investigative activities of the lawmakers scheduled to be elected in October.

The core of the military business empire is a little-known network of four foundations that were originally created to promote the welfare of retired servicemen but have since branched out into multifarious money-making ventures manned by 18,000 serving and retired military officers.

The biggest of these, the Fauji Foundation, is the single largest business conglomerate in Pakistan, with assets of $200 million. Fauji operates 11 enterprises ranging from cereal, cement and fertilizer companies to sugar mills and oil storage terminals. Three other foundations, Shaheen, Bahria and the Army Welfare Trust, run everything from banks and insurance companies to airlines, all under the control of the Defense Ministry or one of the three services.

In addition to the foundations, the armed forces also control a variety of large independent business activities, notably the National Logistics Cell, a trucking and transportation giant, and the Frontier Works Organization, which has a virtual monopoly in road-building and construction. Both were established to serve military needs but grew so fat with military contracts that they moved into the civilian economy and have gradually squeezed out most private competitors.

Musharraf would no doubt say that the armed forces know how to run business ventures more efficiently than civilians. But the Pakistani defense analyst Ayesha Agha-Siddiqa demonstrated in her carefully documented study, "Soldiers in Business," that "most of these business ventures have been suffering losses that are covered by financial injections from the national exchequer," either from the defense budget or from various public sector enterprises vulnerable to military pressure.

Agha-Siddiqa, former director of naval research for the Pakistan Navy, points to the opportunities for corruption resulting from the military business empire's exempttion from "even a trace of public accountability."

Whether or not they are a cover for large-scale corruption, it is clear that the foundations provide perks, privileges and fancy salaries for serving and retired officers, beyond public scrutiny, that give the armed forces a powerful vested interest in retaining power. Moreover, the constant flow of public resources from the national budget to military-controlled ventures to cover their losses constitutes a financial drain that a deeply indebted, bankrupt country like Pakistan, dependent on U.S. and International Monetary Fund aid, cannot afford.

Musharraf's claim that military rule is needed to combat Islamic extremism is increasingly implausible. After making a big show of arresting 2,000 Islamic militants immediately after his Jan. 12 speech pledging a crackdown, most of them were released with a "conditional amnesty" on March 7, provided they agreed to sign a statement declaring that they would give up extremist activities.

Among those released were the leaders of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, Hafiz Mohammed Saeed and Maulana Masood Azhar. These groups, which have close ties with Al Qaeda, are on the State Department list of foreign terrorist organizations. Both send Pakistani Islamic militants into Indian-held areas of Kashmir to carry out terrorist attacks against state officials and other Kashmiri civilians who refuse to support Pakistani-sponsored Kashmiri insurgent groups. Saeed is in a Pakistan government guest house where he has a telephone. Azhar is under house arrest but can receive his Jaish-e-Mohammed lieutenants.

When a key Qaeda fugitive, Abu Zubayda, was captured with his henchmen by FBI agents and Pakistani police in early April, the Pakistani authorities, ignoring American protests, released 16 of the captured Pakistanis who were suspected to be Lashkar-e-Taiba members.

To give Musharraf his due, he has made good on his Jan. 12 pledge to crack down on one type of Islamic extremism: the destructive sectarian warfare between militant Shia and Sunni groups within Pakistan that target each other, undermining Pakistan's internal stability. But he has pointedly stopped short of dismantling the Islamic extremist groups that target India and the United States.

The reason is that the Pakistan armed forces and intelligence agencies are still riddled with Islamic extremist sympathizers such as General Mohammed Aziz, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. Perpetuating military rule will not cleanse Pakistan of corruption or Islamic extremism. It will intensify the danger of another war between the forward-deployed armies of South Asia's nuclear-armed neighbors and it will assure that Qaeda fugitives hiding out in Pakistan will continue to have protectors in high places.

The writer, director of the Asia Program of the Center for International Policy, contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune.

Aah, the money! Business Week had a good expose of the Fauji Foundations's tentacles throughout the pakistani economy. Selig does a good job of showing the economic underpinnings of the pakistani regime's ISI, the military and al-qaeda.

Why would we assume that democratic elections are a good thing for every nation? Look at Algeria, where they elected an extreme Islamicist party. A functioning democracy presupposes certain shared values and a certain minimum of public education. Without these, it is simply one more road to tyranny.

The evidence seems overwhelming that predominantly islamic countries have a rough time with democracy. The only solution may be that of a benevolent despot. Harrison's solution is certainly not feasible in the short term in Pakistan; a democratically elected government of Pakistan would not have been able to support the US. Public pressure against it would have been too much to handle. But Musharraf's allegiance to us is questionable at the very least.

Without reading the article in detail, this is money well spent. The West is better off without democracy in most Islamic countries sad to say. Just read Robert Kaplan's latest book for that perspective.

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