Israel's Security Requires a Sturdy Fence

April 14, 2002

Israel's Security Requires a Sturdy Fence

By EHUD BARAK

EL AVIV — For 18 months now, Israel has been engaged in a war with the Palestinian Authority, which harbors and executes terror in order to achieve its political objectives. This is a bloody struggle against a bitter rival that is ready to murder civilians and tries to turn suicide bombing into a legitimate tool. The aim of the Palestinian terror is not just to kill Israelis but also to break the will of Israeli society in order to dictate a political solution. Israel should never yield to this terror campaign.

The Palestinians should realize that terror could not yield any gain beyond what Israel was ready to negotiate at Camp David in July 2000. In the aftermath of Sept. 11, rewarding suicide terror generates a major risk for the free world as a whole, not just for Israel.

We can win this struggle against terror. That struggle must take place on three levels: the war against terror, the struggle for the moral high ground of international legitimacy, and the efforts to keep unity and cohesion within Israeli society.

For Israel, this struggle involves making clear that our enemy is not the Palestinian people but only Palestinian terror. The focus of our struggle is not on smashing Yasir Arafat to the wall; it is about trying to push the Palestinian leadership toward the resumption of negotiations.

There is an urgent need to shape a coherent Israeli strategy, which is now absent. Such a strategy should be based on three pillars: a tough campaign against terror, an open door for resumption of negotiations and physical disengagement from the Palestinians.

First, there must be a focused and determined campaign against terror from all sources: Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, Tanzim, the Security Services of the Palestinian Authority. Any terrorist, in any place, at any time, including those coming out of the Palestinian Authority infrastructure, will be stopped for as long as the Palestinian Authority continues to guide and execute terror.

Second, we should leave open the door for resumption of negotiations, at any moment, without any precondition beyond a complete halt to violence, based on the principles presented at Camp David. If Palestinian terror continues in spite of this opened door, the whole world will know that terror is Mr. Arafat's choice, and he will have to bear the consequences. If the Palestinian leadership is ready to resume negotiations based on Camp David, that will signal a major achievement in the world struggle against terror because an entity supporting terrorism will have been brought back to negotiations without gaining anything by this evil endeavor.

Third, Israel must embark on unilateral disengagement from the Palestinians and establish a system of security fences. Israel's very future depends on this. Only such a border could secure a solid Jewish majority inside Israel for generations to come, and in so doing secure Israel as a democracy and its identity as a Jewish state.

If Israel does not find the way to disengage from the Palestinians, its future might resemble the experience of Belfast or Bosnia — two communities bleeding each other to death for generations. Alternatively, if we do not disengage from the Palestinians, Israel might drift toward an apartheid state. Obviously it is better to reach disengagement by consent through an agreement. But Israel cannot impose a readiness to make peace upon Mr. Arafat. The absence of a partner should not paralyze Israel from taking defensive steps in order to protect its own vital interests, which will determine its identity and future.

The disengagement would be implemented gradually over several years. The fence would take in seven settlement areas — three of them near Jerusalem — that now make up over 13 percent of the West Bank. Currently, within these settlement blocks live 80 percent of the settlers. Israel will also need a security zone along the Jordan River and some early warning stations, which combined will cover another 12 percent, adding up to 25 percent of the West Bank.

We should not formally annex the settlement blocks and the security zone to Israel, in order not to block the possibility of further negotiations on this issue. I would avoid immediate dismantling of all other settlements so as not to reward terrorism or deepen the political divide within Israel over the settlements. However, Israel should make clear its resolve and determination to end its rule over another people. Israel can do this by making an unequivocal commitment that it would relocate isolated settlements into the settlement blocks or into Israel proper within the time frame created by the proposed plan. The freedom of the Israeli Defense Force to act against terror must be maintained as long as there is no agreement.

In Jerusalem there would have to be two physical fences. The first would delineate the political boundary and be placed around the Greater City, including the settlement blocks adjacent to Jerusalem. The second would be a security-dictated barrier, with controlled gates and passes, inside Jerusalem to separate most of the Palestinian neighborhoods from the Jewish neighborhoods and the Holy Basin, including the Old City.

The immediate and long-term result of installing the security fence, with sensors and military forces along it, would be a dramatic reduction in suicide attacks inside Israel. Around the Gaza Strip there is a fence, and there are practically no suicide attacks originating from Gaza.

Israel is engaged in a struggle for its right to live in freedom and security as a Zionist, Jewish and democratic state. We wish to have a negotiated and just settlement with our neighbors based on the principles of Camp David. But we will never yield to terror. So as long as there is no agreement, in addition to fighting terrorism Israel needs to adopt a concrete plan for unilateral separation from the Palestinians.

Only in this way, which is consistent with the world's war against terrorism, can there be long-term stability in the Middle East and a better future for all people in the region.

Ehud Barak was prime minister of Israel from 1999 to 2001.

Separation? We Have Already Seen It
Arutz Sheva | 3-12-02 | Meir Indor

Posted on 3/15/02 10:19 AM Eastern by SJackson

The new program, which recently came out of the Beit Midrash (study hall) of the Hassidim of Oslo, does not take into account that we already saw this movie, even before 1967. Separation already existed back then. However, the shootings and artillery attacks from the “West Bank” on Israel’s Mediterranean coastline showed how ineffective it was. Thus, we were forced to conquer Judea and Samaria in the first place.

All the elements that failed in the ‘separation’ of old have nowadays grown all the more apparent. At that time, the terror organizations were small. Today, we now have tens of thousands of armed terrorists with advanced communication networks. In those days, there was still some distance between the pre-1967 “Green Line” and the coastal cities. Today, the Israeli population, which has increased in the meantime, has reached the Green Line.

In the framework of my position in the reserves, we were asked years ago to prepare a position paper for creating a “secure buffer zone”. At that time, it was not called “separation,” because the meaning was obvious. Then, we did not have the question of how to invent a new, proper word for the media that would calm the public; rather, the issue was to find a way to create a buffer zone to prevent terrorist attacks on the coastal areas. The answer was obvious to the army officers of the 1967 Six-Day War: the only solution was to control those territories.

Enemy Fire

1. A fence, whose cost would be prohibitive in any case, would not present a barrier for direct ground fire from the territories behind it. There is ground fire on Neve Dekalim from territories beyond the security fence, which cannot prevent it.

2. An even-more-expensive wall would not be a barrier for fire from above and direct ground fire beyond it. In Gilo, walls have already been built and the shooting continues.

Infiltration

1. In light of the short distance between the border-line and the population centers of Kfar Saba and the settlements of the Sharon – in some places, less than one kilometer – the danger of infiltration is great.

Even if the security system could warn of an incursion, until the chase is organized, the terrorists would already have gained ingress into the Israeli town or city on his way to an attack. What if there is no warning from the security system? The results of the situation in Gush Katif show that even the armed forces are not completely immune, let alone the civilian population.

2. All along the northern border of Judea, Arab villages have taken over buildings that are ideal hiding places. Many terrorists have chosen to cross over at these places. If a fence is built there and the terrorists manage to cross it, either in plain sight or through tunnels, with ladders or hang-gliders, will the Islamic leaders in the area inform on them? Would Arab youngsters watch and inform the infiltrating terrorists about Israeli troop movements?

3. Therefore, we will have to create, in addition to the fence, a buffer zone 15-20 kilometers in width, similar to the distance between the Jordan River and the hill country of Samaria and Judea, which will give us enough time to initiate pursuit following a warning of infiltration. A zone of this size cannot be created from the territory from the West Bank to the 1967 border-line. Therefore, it would have to be east of it, from the western plain of Judea and Samaria.

It would also require a second, longer fence and security system on the eastern side of that same territorial buffer zone. The army and police, when requested to supply solutions to the problem of Arab incursion, seriously discussed the possibility of building two security fences. If so, we will also need to place armed forces along the fence, otherwise the neighboring Arabs would simply steal the fencing, as will be discussed further on.

4. However, there is a more serious problem: what to do with the Arab towns and villages that would be within that same buffer zone – should we move them? A great part of the territories needed for the buffer zone are Palestinian population centers and have become like islands wherein we cannot move freely.

5. There are areas where it is impossible to build fences, like, for instance, Jerusalem. The terrorists are also aware of this. What is the solution there? What would be the value of a fence in other places, if it can be penetrated within such a large area as Jerusalem? Is this not a waste of money?

6. Even in the Gaza Strip, where there is also a buffer zone beside the fence, it did not fulfill the hopes pinned on it. Ask Deputy Police Minister Gideon Ezra how many terrorists managed to infiltrate the “safe passages”. When we stop Arab workers from entering sovereign Israel, there is a great hue and cry from the left and the Europeans. Witness, for example, what happens when we close off the Gaza Strip for a few days following a terror attack.

7. Aside from the above, we have yet to address the issue of the “locals” in the Gaza Strip who cut the fence and steal it. According to Nahum Barnea’s and Guy Leshem’s reports, the locals have started stealing parts of the fence which divides the Sharon towns from the Palestinian Authority to the east, even before it’s cement posts have had time to dry.

8. A fence without free firing orders from it is not worth the posts on which it was built. Firing orders along the length of the border-line will be very restrictive (like along the Jordanian border, for instance), and rightly so, for most of those crossing the border areas are looking for work. The terrorists expect and exploit exactly that situation.

9. We are promised that after a border is created, we will be able to shoot at any infiltrators. However, we have already seen this movie, as well. This is what proponents of the Oslo Agreements said at the start of the talks with the PLO. When we on the right warned them about giving the Arabs more territory and weapons, for they would be used against us, we were promised that if the PLO would even dare to do such a thing we would re-conquer them.

Ever since, we have had a great many killed and many reasons to re-conquer the territories. Oslo promises have yet to be fulfilled.

Thus, we are back to the starting point - the return of security control of Palestinian Authority-controlled territories into Israeli hands. While there are also limitations to this plan, they are preferable to the dangers of the “Separation Plan”.

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The writer, a lieutenant-colonel in the IDF reserves, is Director of the Terror Victims Association.

I am in favor of this. The continued dispute over cities like Tulkarm and Ramallah and Jenin only fuels those who claim Israel's desire is to commit genocide.

The right thing to do is to let them live in their own state. Of course, Israel's security concerns must be paramount in any decision. Since the primary security concern of the moment are the homicidal bombers, the effort must be made to minimize it. If they don't want to make peace, force an imposed peace upon them by separating the populations.

Large scale invasion seems only a remote possibility, and with technology it will be impossible for any state to mobilize a surprise attack. Israel will know the moment any Arab state mobilizes and will be prepared to defend against it.

In the final analysis, with a separation, it will be impossible for the propagandists to complain about occupation, and international pressure will be upon the Palestinian leadership to come to the table and negotiate a final settlement. The sooner this happens, the less land the Palestinians will be able to achieve because of the distrust and the history of violence. The longer they wait, the more entrenched the settlements will become, making it more difficult to give them away. It's not a complete panacea, but ultimately it will achieve some of the objectives of the Israeli right, and the immediate needs of the Palestinian population (and end to occupation -- which will likely prove not to be their foremost need). It will never be as good as the offer Barak/Clinton made, yet in time the Palestinian population may come to realize the mistakes they have made by not being proactive in the formation and control of their government and come to accept something close to 85% of the occupied territories in a contiguous state (no checkpoints).

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