Separation? We Have Already Seen It

Arutz Sheva ^ | 3-12-02 | Meir Indor

[SJackson]

The new program, which recently came out of the Beit Midrash (study hall) of the Hassidim of Oslo, does not take into account that we already saw this movie, even before 1967. Separation already existed back then. However, the shootings and artillery attacks from the “West Bank” on Israel’s Mediterranean coastline showed how ineffective it was. Thus, we were forced to conquer Judea and Samaria in the first place.

All the elements that failed in the ‘separation’ of old have nowadays grown all the more apparent. At that time, the terror organizations were small. Today, we now have tens of thousands of armed terrorists with advanced communication networks. In those days, there was still some distance between the pre-1967 “Green Line” and the coastal cities. Today, the Israeli population, which has increased in the meantime, has reached the Green Line.

In the framework of my position in the reserves, we were asked years ago to prepare a position paper for creating a “secure buffer zone”. At that time, it was not called “separation,” because the meaning was obvious. Then, we did not have the question of how to invent a new, proper word for the media that would calm the public; rather, the issue was to find a way to create a buffer zone to prevent terrorist attacks on the coastal areas. The answer was obvious to the army officers of the 1967 Six-Day War: the only solution was to control those territories.

Enemy Fire

1. A fence, whose cost would be prohibitive in any case, would not present a barrier for direct ground fire from the territories behind it. There is ground fire on Neve Dekalim from territories beyond the security fence, which cannot prevent it.

2. An even-more-expensive wall would not be a barrier for fire from above and direct ground fire beyond it. In Gilo, walls have already been built and the shooting continues.

Infiltration

1. In light of the short distance between the border-line and the population centers of Kfar Saba and the settlements of the Sharon – in some places, less than one kilometer – the danger of infiltration is great.

Even if the security system could warn of an incursion, until the chase is organized, the terrorists would already have gained ingress into the Israeli town or city on his way to an attack. What if there is no warning from the security system? The results of the situation in Gush Katif show that even the armed forces are not completely immune, let alone the civilian population.

2. All along the northern border of Judea, Arab villages have taken over buildings that are ideal hiding places. Many terrorists have chosen to cross over at these places. If a fence is built there and the terrorists manage to cross it, either in plain sight or through tunnels, with ladders or hang-gliders, will the Islamic leaders in the area inform on them? Would Arab youngsters watch and inform the infiltrating terrorists about Israeli troop movements?

3. Therefore, we will have to create, in addition to the fence, a buffer zone 15-20 kilometers in width, similar to the distance between the Jordan River and the hill country of Samaria and Judea, which will give us enough time to initiate pursuit following a warning of infiltration. A zone of this size cannot be created from the territory from the West Bank to the 1967 border-line. Therefore, it would have to be east of it, from the western plain of Judea and Samaria.

It would also require a second, longer fence and security system on the eastern side of that same territorial buffer zone. The army and police, when requested to supply solutions to the problem of Arab incursion, seriously discussed the possibility of building two security fences. If so, we will also need to place armed forces along the fence, otherwise the neighboring Arabs would simply steal the fencing, as will be discussed further on.

4. However, there is a more serious problem: what to do with the Arab towns and villages that would be within that same buffer zone – should we move them? A great part of the territories needed for the buffer zone are Palestinian population centers and have become like islands wherein we cannot move freely.

5. There are areas where it is impossible to build fences, like, for instance, Jerusalem. The terrorists are also aware of this. What is the solution there? What would be the value of a fence in other places, if it can be penetrated within such a large area as Jerusalem? Is this not a waste of money?

6. Even in the Gaza Strip, where there is also a buffer zone beside the fence, it did not fulfill the hopes pinned on it. Ask Deputy Police Minister Gideon Ezra how many terrorists managed to infiltrate the “safe passages”. When we stop Arab workers from entering sovereign Israel, there is a great hue and cry from the left and the Europeans. Witness, for example, what happens when we close off the Gaza Strip for a few days following a terror attack.

7. Aside from the above, we have yet to address the issue of the “locals” in the Gaza Strip who cut the fence and steal it. According to Nahum Barnea’s and Guy Leshem’s reports, the locals have started stealing parts of the fence which divides the Sharon towns from the Palestinian Authority to the east, even before it’s cement posts have had time to dry.

8. A fence without free firing orders from it is not worth the posts on which it was built. Firing orders along the length of the border-line will be very restrictive (like along the Jordanian border, for instance), and rightly so, for most of those crossing the border areas are looking for work. The terrorists expect and exploit exactly that situation.

9. We are promised that after a border is created, we will be able to shoot at any infiltrators. However, we have already seen this movie, as well. This is what proponents of the Oslo Agreements said at the start of the talks with the PLO. When we on the right warned them about giving the Arabs more territory and weapons, for they would be used against us, we were promised that if the PLO would even dare to do such a thing we would re-conquer them.

Ever since, we have had a great many killed and many reasons to re-conquer the territories. Oslo promises have yet to be fulfilled.

Thus, we are back to the starting point - the return of security control of Palestinian Authority-controlled territories into Israeli hands. While there are also limitations to this plan, they are preferable to the dangers of the “Separation Plan”.

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The writer, a lieutenant-colonel in the IDF reserves, is Director of the Terror Victims Association.

[Snake65]

Man, he sure shot my personal theory of a Berlin-wall style separation all to hell.