Posted on 10/21/2017 11:21:10 AM PDT by be-baw
The United States Air Force could recall as many as 1,000 retired military pilots to active-duty service to address an acute shortage in its ranks.
President Donald Trump signed an executive order Friday allowing the Air Force to call back to service up to 1,000 retired aviation officers who wish to return, the White House and the Pentagon announced.
(Excerpt) Read more at abcnews.go.com ...
Ummm, there might be good reasons to occupy one place or another. I do believe that military doctrine must be ready to shape the strategy to whatever situation arises. That could range from very low intensity surgical operations to slagging the place. Wouldn’t each situation come with its own demands?
“They couldn’t fight the war so far away; ...
Can you envision any scenario under which Britain could win? ...”
I beg the forum to forgive me. The “cities-hinterland” comparison reached my ears as something of a joke (apparently, kearnyirish2 missed the word “wittily” in the first phrase of that single-sentence paragraph): hadn’t intended it to be a summation of AWI that was both accurate and complete. However funny they get, one-liners have to leave out a lot.
Imperial Britain not only could fight a war “so far away”, they had recently done so with enormous success, not once but twice: the Seven Years War, ending in 1763, during which they terminated French presence in North America; and they had attained victory on the subcontinent of India in 1755 - a locale somewhat farther from the British Isles than the North American colonies.
The Continental Army never had “everything needed.” I will risk another generalization here, by describing the first two years of AWI thus: Americans run out of ammunition, and the British take the field. The first time that didn’t happen was Monmouth, summer 1778.
After the American invasion of Canada was driven back in 1776, there was no need for the British to defend it in any strength. Instead, Canada became the launch point for the three-pronged invasion of New York, intended to split the New England Colonies from the Middle and Southern Colonies.
The British were fortunate in having Sir Guy Carleton in the post of Governor-General of Quebec and then all of Canada; possessing possibly the finest strategic mind serving under the British flag, he also was a talented diplomat, convincing the Quebecois to avoid aiding the Americans. “Savior of Canada” is not an inaccurate honorary title; he finished AWI as commander-in-chief of all British forces in North America. Had senior British political leaders been possessed of better foresight, they’d have appointed him to overall command in 1775 and there is every chance the American Rebellion would have petered out to become a minor footnote in history.
The employment of German mercenaries meant less than kearnyirish2 thinks it did. It was a common practice during the 18th century.
We don’t have to imagine a scenario in which the British might have won AWI. They nearly did on several occasions. The resolute toughness of the Continental soldiers, ably led by sharp-minded and canny officers (George Washington, Nathanael Greene, Benjamin Lincoln, Richard Montgomery, Anthony Wayne are just a few better-known names) played a central role, but all of the sacrifices of the troops who actually marched and fought would have meant little, had France, Spain, and Holland not become involved.
If that wasn’t clear enough, try this: Americans did not win on their own. And modern-day Americans need to stop patting themselves on the back, smug in the mistaken assumption that they did.
The narrative about AWI that paints the whole affair as Divinely ordained, providential, miraculous, inevitable, and all that was invented by religious leaders and propagandists over the half-century following the establishment of independence. Some of it might be of use as moral indoctrination for schoolchildren, but it intersects with the historical record only coincidentally.
As a purely technical aside - and an attempt to return this portion of the thread to the original topic - American successes were greatest, and the American spirit shone at its brightest, when the branches of armed forces, naval and land, worked together to accomplish joint objectives. For more complete descriptions of how this was done, see _George Washington’s Secret Navy_, _Benedict Arnold’s Navy_, and _George Washington’s Great Gamble_ by James L Nelson. _Rise and Fight Again_ by Charles Bracelen Flood describes one incident where it went wrong, badly. A series of lessons about functional specialization in the military establishment that might actually make the grade as “timeless.”
“So why not get rid of the Air Force? Navy, Army, and Marines all need the equipment and the pilots.”
Still smarting from the sting of the insult, I see: when USAAF came out of nowhere to win WWII. Some transgressions can never be forgiven.
And, of course, it makes much more sense to let the senior armed services, who cling to two-dimensional thinking and worship backward gazing as holy tradition, to take over the activities of the one armed service that makes a point of thinking in three dimensions. Or four, if one chooses to define space as a dimension distinct from the atmosphere. And possibly five - or maybe even six - depending on how one defines electronic combat and digital/cyberspace environments.
Interservice rivalry is unending. It also predates the founding of the country. A price we must pay, perhaps, to retain control of the military under civilian leadership. Better the service departments contend with each other, than to join hands and seek to dominate the entire nation. A matter of some concern to the Founders, as I recall.
One thing is for sure: the logic of functional organization is incontrovertible. See the history of Britain’s RAF. In civilian terms, this means that allowing the Army and Navy to own and operate airplanes is a poor idea. Tends to lose wars.
Many of the obstacles faced by the British in the American Revolution would re-surface a century and a half later when we went to South Vietnam. There was just no blueprint for a victory; if it was a peninsula like South Korea, it could work - but the large unsecured land border could never be overcome. Even with the VC smashed in Tet, there was no way to stop the NVA from getting into the country.
Thank you for that. I asked my son if he got to see any A-10’s in Afghanistan and he said no. He’s a former Marine.
“In Vietnam, I saw Army pilots flying fixed wing U-21 and OV-1 aircraft. I don’t know if they still have any fixed wing aircraft, but they did then.”
Service department roles & missions were last set in the late (”Key West Agreement” comes to mind) and have not been significantly altered since.
According to those, and other provisions of public law, US Army is barred from owning & operating armed aircraft. US Navy and USAF do so according to applicable regulations and statutes.
At the time, helicopters were not very far past their experimental stage; powered by piston engines, they labored under severe performance limitations and were unable to haul of any significance. engines were just being invented; no one foresaw the degree to which they would revolutionary aircraft design and performance.
The French fielded the first known armed during their intervention in Algeria during the ; and Sikorsky platforms were tried, both of which were piston-powered.
“...I believe it was USAF fast movers, that were instrumental, in saving USMC lives at Khe Sanh, ...”
Mark17 believes in error.
The bulk of close air support for the Khe Sanh garrison was provided by B-52Ds, Es, and Fs.
“...a century and a half later when we went to South Vietnam. There was just no blueprint for a victory; ... the large unsecured land border could never be overcome. ... there was no way to stop the NVA from getting into the country.
There were a number of “blueprints” for victory but American political leadership declined to use them.
Sealing borders and preventing enemy infiltration posed neither “inherent” limitations nor did they present insurmountable technical problems. Plenty of methods and countermeasures were available, but leadership at many levels shrank from using them. See IGLOO WHITE.
US loss in Southeast Asia was a failure of willpower, not of capability.
“...I wonder if they are getting some old B-52s out of the boneyard?”
Can’t be done.
The B-52B through F series enjoys almost no parts commonality with the G and H series: almost a completely different aircraft. B-52H models are the only ones still flying.
“... there might be good reasons to occupy one place or another. ... doctrine must be ready ... whatever situation arises. ... Wouldn’t each situation come with its own demands?
Of course each situation is different. Not a one can be perfectly planned for in advance.
But traditionalists ought not worship footsoliders as the solution for any and all problems. In so doing, they reveal that their thinking has not yet reached the first decade of the 19th century.
Infantry has less mobility and puts forth less firepower per individual than any other US military capability. Without extensive and detailed support, they aren’t anything more than targets, too easily held hostage by the situation and any enemy present.
It’s never stated just what footsoldiers can do, that other branches and other force capabilities cannot. “Holding ground” is endlessly spoken of, but the truth is that infantry cannot even do that, unless all support is on the scene. And if infantry are committed, all attention turns their way and the situation is in peril of falling apart: the objective is transformed from performing the original mission, to bailing out the troops in trouble. Resources that were accomplishing the original mission get diverted.
Traditionalist thinkers need to stop repeating “boots on the ground” as if it were Holy Writ, or some magical mantra, and inform themselves about the changes wrought over the past two centuries.
I guess I will just as soon as I am actually convinced otherwise. ;-D
Yeah, the Buffs were there, but I personally knew F-4 pilots at Mountain Home, who said they also provided close air support to Khe Sanh.
Buffs were fast movers, compared to helicopters. The F-4s were just faster movers. Where I was, we had Vietnamese F-5s and USAF Dragon Flys. I got to fly with them a couple of times. It was quite exciting, especially when they lit the afterburners.
Cost.
The pipeline is pretty narrow to become a military pilot. The payoff is flying cool jets and a good contract with an airline after you retire.
Airlines needed pilots, so they built a pipeline outside of the military. Now many pilots are not from the military, but they also make much less.
At some point, people who wanted to be pilots went to more stable and lucrative professions
I’m an engineer.
I would not recommend to most kids. It is difficult, doesn’t pay as well long term as other jobs, and is not a “high status” profession.
Now, if you are the wrong sex or color, getting a seat at an engineering school is difficult.
>>Of course not everyone wants a flight slot.
"accept diversity - or GET OUT", commands the 3 star L.I.F.E.R. standing in front of the 1 star abomination and personification of Romans 1:26.
https://duckduckgo.com/?q=Lesbian+commander+USAFA
Awe Jeeez - Nothing could possibly go wrong with that in the context of Romans 1:25...
Nothing New Under the Aten!
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Vr-EKwC8YU
...Again. Could it?
If you judge what the article actually says, versus what the Title implies, they are two different animals.
“May recall”, “no plans to do it”, “only if the pilots want to return to the service”...phrases like that from the article don’t shouldn’t invoke all
the questions the title provokes.
“I guess I will just as soon as I am actually convinced otherwise ...”
You may look forward, or you may look backward.
The first stance may lead to effectiveness.
The second stance may be more satisfying in terms of morality, tradition, self-righteousness, self-congratulation, and similar good feelings. But chances for success diminish.
“...I personally knew F-4 pilots at Mountain Home, who said they also provided close air support to Khe Sanh....”
I did too. At least, they said they did and I never corroborated their stories.
Each B-52 could drop 50,000-60,000 pounds of munitions on one sortie. Each F-4 could drop 6,000-8,000 pounds. B-52s had better CEAs. Do your own math to decide which platform was more effective.
” “May recall”, “no plans to do it”, “only if the pilots want to return to the service” ...”
USAF leaders hate to be mean to pilots, and talk to them accordingly.
In 2010, USAF faced a shortage of navigators. A voluntary recall was announced. Additional verbiage in the announcement warned the community that if insufficient volunteers came forward, involuntary recall would be resorted to.
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