Have a look here
http://cimsec.org/circles-surface-warfare-training/24050
Long but enlightening article the evolution of USN Bridge Officers
The Burke class has 4 Gas Turbine and when you need a kick in the ass those units can go from can't to all out, in a hurry. There is no way either of the recent collisions should have happened. Hell even if the OD & lookout misjudged the CIC watch would have been screaming. it's laughable to think a ramming situation would have taken place.
Thanks for posting. Did you see this comment by a navigator-—
http://cimsec.org/circles-surface-warfare-training/24050
What happened aboard the USS Kinkaid in 1990 sounds very much like what may have happened aboard the Fitzgerald and McCain.
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“”Jeff Bukowski August 22, 2017 at 6:35 pm
Something must be done immediately to ensure that today’s U.S. Navy bridge/combat information center (CIC) underway watch teams who serve in tough but routine conditions can safely transit busy shipping lanes and international waterways.
This article is very timely and prescient, especially with the Navy’s announcement yesterday of a fleet-wide stand down in the wake of the USS John S. McCain’s August 21, 2017 collision with a merchant vessel, leaving 10 sailors missing and presumed dead. The McCain collision occurred when the ink was barely dry on the Navy’s supplemental preliminary report on the June 17, 2017 USS Fitzgerald collision.
On Sunday afternoon, I was trying to digest the report of the supplemental preliminary inquiry on the Fitzgerald incident. Sunday evening the news reported the McCain collision. In light of these disastrous events, so close in time, I have been wondering how they occurred, what should have been done differently to avoid their tragic outcomes, and if SWO training today–both before and after junior officers reach their ships–is different from the training we had when I served on active duty (1987-1992). Then all fleet 1160 JOs left their commissioning source and attended the late-July/early August 16-week SWOS Basic course in either Coronado or Newport for training. Many attended follow-on EEOW courses before joining their ships.
I served as the navigator of a Spruance-class destroyer during our 1990 Western Pacific/Indian Ocean carrier battle group deployment. I had been aboard since February 1988 after completing SWOS Basic in Coronado. I served in several positions (communications officer, auxiliaries officer, and main propulsion assistant) in 1998-89 through the completion of the ship’s overhaul and engineering light-off and operational exams. I had earned my EEOW and SWO qualifications. In the fall of 1989, our commanding officer asked me to serve as navigator for our battle group deployment scheduled to begin in February 1990. Prior to formally assuming my duties as navigator, I attended the PACFLT Navigation and Celestial Navigation courses.
I vividly recall our transit through the Malacca Strait in late April 1990, which occurred less than six months after our brethren on USS Kinkaid (DD-965) collided with a merchant vessel there. Tragically and ironically, my counterpart, Kinkaid’s navigator, was killed in the collision. He was asleep in his stateroom near the point of impact. He was not on the bridge when Kinkaid entered restricted waters. And he was not called to the bridge by the OOD when the watch team became confused about what they were seeing, where they were, and the bridge and CIC watch teams disagreed about the ship’s location. According to the investigation report, the OOD became so preoccupied with trying to figure out the ship’s location and why it was on the wrong side of the strait that he ignored warnings another vessel was closing on Kinkaid. No one called the Kinkaid’s CO to the bridge prior to the collision. Kinkaid’s CO was detached from his command for cause and court-martialed for dereliction of duty and hazarding a vessel.
Similarly, the CO of USS Fitzgerald was severely injured by the collision while in his in-port cabin. Why wasn’t he in his at-sea cabin? Why wasn’t he called to the bridge? Why wasn’t the collision alarm sounded until after impact? Fitzgerald’s CO has been detached from his command for cause.
We do not have any details yet about the cause of the McCain collision, but the investigation will likely reveal many similarities with the Fitzgerald and Kinkaid collisions.
What are the lessons to be learned?
After the Kincaid collision, we greatly increased our preparation for the Malacca Strait transit several months later. We planned the start of our transit to begin shortly after daybreak to minimize the confusion caused by numerous lighted navigational aids and vessel lights at night, which had been a factor in Kinkaid’s collision. We held a lengthy and detailed navigation brief the day before our transit, which had been thoroughly planned in advance. We planned to accomplish the transit using a modified sea-and-anchor detail instead of our ordinary underway watch teams.
All of our advance planning was overcome by events. A day earlier we rescued 35 Vietnamese refugees in the South China Sea. We drilled holes in the ocean waiting for instructions from the UN High Commission on Refugees. We were instructed to drop off our passengers in Singapore and rejoin our battle group, which by then was in the Indian Ocean. By the time we made it to Singapore, debarked our passengers, and got back underway to begin our transit through the Malacca Strait, it was nearly midnight. Therefore, we faced a middle-of-the night transit just like Kinkaid’s.
We put our plan into action, and we safely transited the Malacca Strait and rejoined our battle group the following day.””