Posted on 09/02/2017 6:21:23 AM PDT by Presbyterian Reporter
On Wednesday, the U.S. Navy's top officer said that post-accident investigations have turned up no evidence of a cyberattack in the collisions involving the USS John S. McCain and USS Fitzgerald.
The two collisions each involved an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer and a merchant vessel, and the similarity of the circumstances led many to speculate that the casualties might have been caused by hacking. In an address to Navy staff, chief of naval operations Adm. John S. Richardson moved to dispel these rumors. He said that the accident investigators have given cyber factors "an amazing amount of attention," but so far they have found no evidence of any form of cyber intrusion.
In an initial investigative report on the Fitzgerald casualty, the Navy's Seventh Fleet suggested that the incident was due in large part to human factors. "The collision was avoidable and [the mariners involved] demonstrated poor seamanship. Within Fitzgerald, flawed watch stander teamwork and inadequate leadership contributed to the collision," Seventh Fleet said.
Seventh Fleet held several servicemembers accountable for the incident. Fitzgerald's commanding officer, Cmdr. Bryce Benson, executive officer Cmdr. Sean Babbitt and Master Chief Petty Officer Brice Baldwin have been relieved of their duties. The junior officers on watch the night of the collision were also relieved due to "poor seamanship and flawed teamwork as bridge and combat information center watch standers."
On August 22, just a few days after the McCain collision, Seventh Fleet commander Vice Adm. Joseph Aucoin was relieved of duty "due to a loss of confidence in his ability to command." He was due to retire in September.
On Wednesday, Adm. Richardson said that to prevent future accidents, the Navy has to fight back against a "do more with less" mentality and must maintain its high standards. "We have to make sure that we're properly resourced, whether that be fuel, whether that be parts, whether that be people," he said. Otherwise, he warned, a decline in readiness "sneaks up on you.”
The Navy faces new scrutiny over training and readiness after the deadly collisions, and House Armed Services Committee Chairman Mac Thornberry (R-Tx) has scheduled an oversight hearing on the accidents for next week. He called for a thorough internal review, but he also echoed the Navy’s long-running call for more resources. "We ask a lot of our men and women in the Navy. The time they spend at sea is increasing, while their ships age and their funding gets cut. These are just the conditions that can lead to an increase in the kinds of accidents we are witnessing," Thornberry said in a statement. "Congress has a duty to provide our Sailors with the additional resources they so clearly need, and to do so immediately.”
Navy announces independent fleetwide review
On Friday, Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer announced the formation of an independent team to conduct a Strategic Readiness Review in response to the recent series of surface vessel accidents. "These incidents are unacceptable and demand a thorough and comprehensive review, which is why I have formed an independent subject matter expert team to conduct a Strategic Readiness Review,” he said. “As we mourn the loss of our Sailors, we must improve upon the way we operate." The independent review will complement the Navy’s own examination of the factors behind Pacific Fleet’s recent casualties.
would the Navy admit it if there was hacking? I don’t think so.
I think you are right.
LOL
Rear Adm. Richard Brown, commander of Naval Personnel Command and Deputy Chief of Naval Personne tapped to lead an investigation into the collision between guided-missile destroyer USS John S. McCain (DDG-56)
James Kallstrom was Assistant Director of the FBI in New York when he was appointed to lead the FBI’s criminal investigation into the crash of flight 800.
The cakes were already baked. These guys are the executive chefs.
The people want the TRUTH ...... “Let them eat cake!”
Here is another study of accidents in the Singapore Straits.
“Firstly, the annual maritime accident occurrence frequency in the Singapore Strait ranges 25 from 17.6 to 33.0, namely, only not more than 0.005% vessels could be involved in an accident when passing through the Strait.””
Given there are 80,000 ships passing thru the Singapore Strait each year, being one of those 18 to 33 ships who gets involved in an accident is significant.
http://docs.trb.org/prp/12-1030.pdf
"In an initial investigative report on the Fitzgerald casualty, the Navy's Seventh Fleet suggested that the incident was due in large part to human factors. "The collision was avoidable and [the mariners involved] demonstrated poor seamanship. Within Fitzgerald, flawed watch stander teamwork and inadequate leadership contributed to the collision," Seventh Fleet said."
Then they need to be ordered TO COLLIDE with cargo ships, that will ensure this never happens again.
Seems to me this is like the OJ jury, we never get to see just what kind of imbeciles are making decisions.
How many men, women, transgenders, homosexuals, minorities, functional retards etc were on the bridge of our navy ships, especially in these collisions that KILLED 17 sailors?
Have a look here
http://cimsec.org/circles-surface-warfare-training/24050
Long but enlightening article the evolution of USN Bridge Officers
No explanation of the 8 ships showing up at an airbase simultaneously while using common navigation system.
I'm painfully familiar with a case where a highly technical team was formed of (literally) hand-picked new recruits with at least three years of college, high IQs, and upper 10 percentile entrance exam scores -- and, "to fill slots", teamed with NCOs -- literally from Supply, Motor Pool, etc.
Worse, they were all put through a 4X accelerated electronics course together -- where the mental incompetence of the NCOs was blatantly obvious to the recruits.
"Fully staffed", indeed.
~~~~~~~~
How do you think that worked out?
The Burke class has 4 Gas Turbine and when you need a kick in the ass those units can go from can't to all out, in a hurry. There is no way either of the recent collisions should have happened. Hell even if the OD & lookout misjudged the CIC watch would have been screaming. it's laughable to think a ramming situation would have taken place.
That is a training and assignments issue. The reports of an undermanned Navy are being used as an explanation for these destroyers hitting tankers.
However, if it was fully manned, then manning was not the issue.
FWIW, I know some extremely bright motor pool NCOs, and the logistical side of the army is the most important. Can’t fight if you’re out of bullets.
But even an 18 year old flunky on watch can see an approaching tanker.
I’m thinking there was no physical watch.
Kim and the NORKs have already benefitted from some key vessels from our already depleted fleet (thanks 0bama!) being put out of action.
Ramming a Navy destroyer with a cargo ship is like using a Zamboni to ram a Lamborghini. Yes, it will cause a lot of damage — but the driver of the Lamborghini is either retarded or is complicit in the attack.
~~~~~
That was an old video of a complete (rudder hard-over) steering failure -- dredged up, and dishonestly misinterpreted and posted by imbecilic conspiracy- hungering, imbecilic a$$#0|3s.
Are you aligning with them?
FRiendly advice: Give up the conspiracy BS!!
~~~~~
I've spent many, many hours analyzing the evidence. I'll try to remember to ping you to the results...
“”it’s laughable to think a ramming situation would have taken place.””
Especially by the tanker Alnic MC traveling at a brisk 9.2 knots per hour.
And, your analytical expertise for determining that is...?
And, the manhour total you've expended on analyzing the physical evidence is...?
~~~~~~~~
I'll try to remember to put you on the (growing) list of folks to ping when I publish my analysis summary...
Of course not.
The best hacks leave no foot print.
Thanks for posting. Did you see this comment by a navigator-—
http://cimsec.org/circles-surface-warfare-training/24050
What happened aboard the USS Kinkaid in 1990 sounds very much like what may have happened aboard the Fitzgerald and McCain.
“
“”Jeff Bukowski August 22, 2017 at 6:35 pm
Something must be done immediately to ensure that today’s U.S. Navy bridge/combat information center (CIC) underway watch teams who serve in tough but routine conditions can safely transit busy shipping lanes and international waterways.
This article is very timely and prescient, especially with the Navy’s announcement yesterday of a fleet-wide stand down in the wake of the USS John S. McCain’s August 21, 2017 collision with a merchant vessel, leaving 10 sailors missing and presumed dead. The McCain collision occurred when the ink was barely dry on the Navy’s supplemental preliminary report on the June 17, 2017 USS Fitzgerald collision.
On Sunday afternoon, I was trying to digest the report of the supplemental preliminary inquiry on the Fitzgerald incident. Sunday evening the news reported the McCain collision. In light of these disastrous events, so close in time, I have been wondering how they occurred, what should have been done differently to avoid their tragic outcomes, and if SWO training today–both before and after junior officers reach their ships–is different from the training we had when I served on active duty (1987-1992). Then all fleet 1160 JOs left their commissioning source and attended the late-July/early August 16-week SWOS Basic course in either Coronado or Newport for training. Many attended follow-on EEOW courses before joining their ships.
I served as the navigator of a Spruance-class destroyer during our 1990 Western Pacific/Indian Ocean carrier battle group deployment. I had been aboard since February 1988 after completing SWOS Basic in Coronado. I served in several positions (communications officer, auxiliaries officer, and main propulsion assistant) in 1998-89 through the completion of the ship’s overhaul and engineering light-off and operational exams. I had earned my EEOW and SWO qualifications. In the fall of 1989, our commanding officer asked me to serve as navigator for our battle group deployment scheduled to begin in February 1990. Prior to formally assuming my duties as navigator, I attended the PACFLT Navigation and Celestial Navigation courses.
I vividly recall our transit through the Malacca Strait in late April 1990, which occurred less than six months after our brethren on USS Kinkaid (DD-965) collided with a merchant vessel there. Tragically and ironically, my counterpart, Kinkaid’s navigator, was killed in the collision. He was asleep in his stateroom near the point of impact. He was not on the bridge when Kinkaid entered restricted waters. And he was not called to the bridge by the OOD when the watch team became confused about what they were seeing, where they were, and the bridge and CIC watch teams disagreed about the ship’s location. According to the investigation report, the OOD became so preoccupied with trying to figure out the ship’s location and why it was on the wrong side of the strait that he ignored warnings another vessel was closing on Kinkaid. No one called the Kinkaid’s CO to the bridge prior to the collision. Kinkaid’s CO was detached from his command for cause and court-martialed for dereliction of duty and hazarding a vessel.
Similarly, the CO of USS Fitzgerald was severely injured by the collision while in his in-port cabin. Why wasn’t he in his at-sea cabin? Why wasn’t he called to the bridge? Why wasn’t the collision alarm sounded until after impact? Fitzgerald’s CO has been detached from his command for cause.
We do not have any details yet about the cause of the McCain collision, but the investigation will likely reveal many similarities with the Fitzgerald and Kinkaid collisions.
What are the lessons to be learned?
After the Kincaid collision, we greatly increased our preparation for the Malacca Strait transit several months later. We planned the start of our transit to begin shortly after daybreak to minimize the confusion caused by numerous lighted navigational aids and vessel lights at night, which had been a factor in Kinkaid’s collision. We held a lengthy and detailed navigation brief the day before our transit, which had been thoroughly planned in advance. We planned to accomplish the transit using a modified sea-and-anchor detail instead of our ordinary underway watch teams.
All of our advance planning was overcome by events. A day earlier we rescued 35 Vietnamese refugees in the South China Sea. We drilled holes in the ocean waiting for instructions from the UN High Commission on Refugees. We were instructed to drop off our passengers in Singapore and rejoin our battle group, which by then was in the Indian Ocean. By the time we made it to Singapore, debarked our passengers, and got back underway to begin our transit through the Malacca Strait, it was nearly midnight. Therefore, we faced a middle-of-the night transit just like Kinkaid’s.
We put our plan into action, and we safely transited the Malacca Strait and rejoined our battle group the following day.””
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.