Replies

5-014 To General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, January 8, 1945
1945

Publisher: The Johns Hopkins University Press
Date: January 8, 1945
Subject: World War II
Collection: Papers of George Catlett Marshall, Volume 5: The Finest Soldier

Summary

To General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower

January 8, 1945 Radio No. W-88482. Washington, D.C.

Top Secret

For General Eisenhower for his eyes only.

All here are pressing every effort to get you what you need at the earliest possible date. The best guidance for our efforts comes from messages such as your S-74003.1

In regard to Gasser, he and his aides are leaving at once. I believe he is the tough, experienced individual you need. However, he can only point the finger. The hatchet men must follow close behind. By the time his work is completed we should know what more needs to be done about manpower.2

If Bull and Tedder are unable to obtain a satisfactory answer in Moscow as to Russian action, I will make certain that the matter is pressed at the forthcoming conference. It may be possible to do something between now and then. It would appear that unseasonable thaws have been at least in part responsible for the delay.3

The only divisions now in the United States not already allocated to you are the 86th and 97th Infantry Divisions which are set up for another theater. Action is being initiated in the Joint Chiefs to have these two divisions allocated to you at once. They are fully trained and should be able to arrive in your theater about the middle of March. Of the divisions allocated to you which are still in the United States, the 65th and 89th Infantry Divisions sail this week, the 13th Armored and the 71st Infantry Division in late January, the 13th Airborne and 16th and 20th Armored in early February. We are investigating the possibility of accelerating the sailings of the airborne and armored divisions if you will accept a delay in the movement of service units mentioned in my W-82742 of 27th December.4 I presume you are moving to the Continent in the near future the two divisions now in the U.K.

With regard to the Army ceiling, this is being increased to take care of the patient factor and some other ineffectives. It seems, however, that this action would not help the flow of replacements for nearly six months. The Defense Commands, other installations in the U.S., the Panama and Alaska garrisons are being combed for men for infantry replacements.

Somervell will tell you personally the full story of the drastic efforts we are making to speed up the flow of critical ammunition and other types of supplies. Our efforts along this line are continuous.

As we see it here, getting new French divisions quickly into the fight, is going to be dependent primarily on the ability of the French, the British and ourselves to provide the minimum essential equipment. Much can be done in providing essential equipment for these divisions by using obsolete, obsolescent, and renovated equipment and by a drastic review of the percentage of reserves held by both the British and ourselves behind critical items of equipment. Somervell’s people are pressing this whole matter hard at our end. We will give you definite information very soon.

On the matter of additional divisions from Italy, it appears at first glance exceedingly doubtful that we can get real assistance for you from there in the near future. I intend to take up with the U.S. Chiefs at once the necessity of implementing to the maximum degree our agreed basic strategy that the main effort is in Europe and specifically on the Western Front.

I have given strict orders that no one here will add to the great load you carry by asking you questions. It may be, however, that we now face a situation requiring major decisions in order to prevent this war from dragging on for some time. Your personal estimates are the best guidance to crystallize ideas on actions which need to be taken. Can you some time in the next week set down and send to me for my personal use in discussions with the other Chiefs of Staff your broad personal estimate of the resources required and the steps which need to be taken to bring this war in Europe to a quick conclusion.5

Document Copy Text Source: George C. Marshall Collection, Eisenhower, George C. Marshall Research Library, Lexington, Virginia.

Document Format: Typed radio message.

1. See note 3, Marshall to Eisenhower, January 6, 1945, Papers of George Catlett Marshall, #5-012 [5: 18].

2. Ibid.

3. Deputy Supreme Commander Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder and Major General Harold R. Bull, chief of the Operations Division at S.H.A.E.F., were delayed by weather en route to Moscow. Meanwhile, on January 6, Prime Minister Churchill asked Marshal Stalin if the Allies could count on a major Russian offensive during January. The next day Stalin replied that they were preparing an offensive, but the weather had been unfavorable. Nevertheless, regardless of the weather, the Russians would “commence large-scale offensive operations against the Germans along the whole Central Front not later than the second half of January. You may rest assured that we shall do everything possible to render assistance to the glorious forces of our Allies.” (Winston S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, a volume in The Second World War [Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953], pp. 278-80.)

4. On December 27, 1944, General Marshall had written to General Eisenhower that the War Department would accelerate the departure of the Thirteenth Airborne Division, Seventy-first Infantry Division, and the Sixteenth and Twentieth Armored divisions. While the accelerated schedule would displace an equivalent number of service units, it would not effect the flow of replacements. (Radio No. W-82742, December 28, 1944, In Log, p. 64, DDEL/W. B. Smith Collection [Cable Log].)

5. Eisenhower replied on January 15 that requirements there depended on action along the Russian front. “If a markedly successful Russian offensive is maintained and if the Rhine can be substantially closed our planned strength should be sufficient, if fully maintained and supported.” Requirements included “provisions of existing critical shortages in equipment and ammunition and provision of additional supporting and service troops for any additional divisions allocated.” He also listed additional air forces requirements with an emphasis on jet propelled aircraft. (Papers of DDE, 4: 2430-35.)

Recommended Citation: ThePapers of George Catlett Marshall, ed.Larry I. Bland and Sharon Ritenour Stevens(Lexington, Va.: The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1981- ). Electronic version based on The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 5, “The Finest Soldier,” January 1, 1945-January 7, 1947 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), pp. 20-22.

http://marshallfoundation.org/library/digital-archive/to-general-of-the-army-dwight-d-eisenhower-7/