I did not know Patton was planning that early. What did his intel people base that Dec. 9 briefing on?
Here’s a repost of a summary I did back on Nov. 5:
Alpha6, thanks for pointing me back to MacDonald’s “Time For Trumpets.” Wow. I had forgotten how good that book is. Anyway, to sum up Chapter 3, What Did The Allies Know:
1. The Allies intercepted Hitler’s order in September to pull all the panzer and panzergenadier divisions out of the line for reconstitution
2. The allies in fact noted that most of the German panzer units had been pulled out of the line
3. The allies knew the Germans were concentrating the panzer reserves in the northern Eifel area across from American VIII Corps in the Ardennes
4. Until early December, the general consensus was that the Germans were most likely holding these divisions for a counter-attack, or in the less likely alternative, planning a limited spoiling attack in the Aachen area
5. The information contained above was known to all Allied intelligence officers at SHAEF, 12th Army Group, 1st Army and 3rd Army. And the consensus was held by all of them
6. It was only in the first week of December that it begn to dawn on allied intelligence offices that the Germans could lauch an offensive in the Ardennes
7. Bradley was sufficiently concerned that he got Ike’s consent to send the newly arrived 9th Armored Division to VIII Corps and engage in some deception to get the Germans to believe the 75th Infantry Division was in the area (it was still in England).
8. Patton first began to worry about the Ardennes on Nov. 24, but the real red alert was raised by Patton’s G2, Col. Koch, who held a briefing for Patton and his staff on December 9. Koch outlined the attack that was about to happen, although he thought it was meant to spoil Patton’s Saar offensive.
9. Patton was determined to proceed with the Saar offensive, but did order the preliminary planning for contingencies should the German attack take place. And this was what allowed Patton to start his counterattack so quickly.
10. The last guy to realize the danger was Middleton at VIII Corps, but when he did, he asked for reserves but Bradley had none to give.
11. Monk Dickson’s final intel report on the eve of the attack was not well written or focused. He was still not sure whether there would be an attack or a counterattack.
It appears that the Americans knew a good deal about German dispositions, but didn’t have a good grasp of their intentions. When they did start to figure it out, it wasn’t with a complete grasp of what was going to happen, there was no consensus among the intelligence officers, and it was too late to do anything anyway.
Actually, there are many similarities btween the intelligence failures in the Ardennes and Pearl Harbor.
There were lots of indicators of a German attack. Most notably, German railroad Enigma. The Wehrmacht (for once) maintained good operational and communications security prior to the Bulge, put even without ULTRA, there were indications that the Germans were up to something.
The First Army G2, Colonel Benjamin “Monk” Dickson was warning of a German offensive before Christmas, and on December 14, stated unambiguously, “It’s the Ardennes!”. He was sent to Paris to rest.
Eisenhower’s G2, Kenneth W. Strong, also believed that the Germans were likely to make a final gamble, most likely in the Ardennes or the area around Achen. Strong was sent to brief Bradley (who dismissed his warning) and Patton, who took it half seriously.