Here’s a repost of a summary I did back on Nov. 5:
Alpha6, thanks for pointing me back to MacDonald’s “Time For Trumpets.” Wow. I had forgotten how good that book is. Anyway, to sum up Chapter 3, What Did The Allies Know:
1. The Allies intercepted Hitler’s order in September to pull all the panzer and panzergenadier divisions out of the line for reconstitution
2. The allies in fact noted that most of the German panzer units had been pulled out of the line
3. The allies knew the Germans were concentrating the panzer reserves in the northern Eifel area across from American VIII Corps in the Ardennes
4. Until early December, the general consensus was that the Germans were most likely holding these divisions for a counter-attack, or in the less likely alternative, planning a limited spoiling attack in the Aachen area
5. The information contained above was known to all Allied intelligence officers at SHAEF, 12th Army Group, 1st Army and 3rd Army. And the consensus was held by all of them
6. It was only in the first week of December that it begn to dawn on allied intelligence offices that the Germans could lauch an offensive in the Ardennes
7. Bradley was sufficiently concerned that he got Ike’s consent to send the newly arrived 9th Armored Division to VIII Corps and engage in some deception to get the Germans to believe the 75th Infantry Division was in the area (it was still in England).
8. Patton first began to worry about the Ardennes on Nov. 24, but the real red alert was raised by Patton’s G2, Col. Koch, who held a briefing for Patton and his staff on December 9. Koch outlined the attack that was about to happen, although he thought it was meant to spoil Patton’s Saar offensive.
9. Patton was determined to proceed with the Saar offensive, but did order the preliminary planning for contingencies should the German attack take place. And this was what allowed Patton to start his counterattack so quickly.
10. The last guy to realize the danger was Middleton at VIII Corps, but when he did, he asked for reserves but Bradley had none to give.
11. Monk Dickson’s final intel report on the eve of the attack was not well written or focused. He was still not sure whether there would be an attack or a counterattack.
It appears that the Americans knew a good deal about German dispositions, but didn’t have a good grasp of their intentions. When they did start to figure it out, it wasn’t with a complete grasp of what was going to happen, there was no consensus among the intelligence officers, and it was too late to do anything anyway.
Actually, there are many similarities btween the intelligence failures in the Ardennes and Pearl Harbor.
Hodges wasn’t much help the first few days either.
From Atkinson’s The Guns at Last Light:
This was from Sunday, today is Tuesday, so we are 3 days into the Offensive.
Perhaps the prospect of a similar discomfited General Hodges, for at midday on Sunday he closed his office door in the Britannique, sat at his desk, and laid his head in his arms. He took no calls, and for the better part of two days showed symptoms of incapacitation. The precise combination of fatigue, illness, and despair would never be clarified; Major General Ernest N. Harmon, among the Army’s toughest combat commanders, later claimed that Hodges was ‘probably the most shaken man I have ever seen anywhere who pretends to have the carriage necessary for high command.” Eisenhower and Bradley apparently considered relieving Hodges, by one account, but chose to wait while General Ridgeway’s XVIII Airborne Corp rushed to reinforce the front. First Army’s capable if autocratic chief of staff, Major General Bill Kean, effectively took command until late Monday, December 18, when Hodges recovered his balance enough to order Spa evacuated.
This will bee seen again in my tomorrows post.
What I see in all of this, not only are our troops having a hard time with the campaign, but the top brass are feeling the strain of a prolonged campaign and how it affected them.
In this book, Atkinson talks about a time when Ike refused to have his blood pressure checked, knowing it was pretty high, in fear it would cause Marshall to relieve him and send him home.
I had forgotten the specifics of Nos. 8 and 9. It is very interesting that Patton's G-2 put the pieces together such that preliminary planning was done for move to the Ardennes.
But, Hodges, Bradley and Ike didn't get that far.
I agree this has to go down as an intelligence failure.