Attack Written Deep And Crimson

Texas Colonel William Rogers falls, mortally wounded, on the front parapet at Battery Robinett. Union forces immediately counterattacked and recaptured the works, effectively ending the battle. Deeds of "cool and brilliant daring" were common. (Library of Congress)

Attack Written Deep And Crimson

The strategic railroad town of Corinth was a key target for Confederate armies hoping to march north in support of General Braxton Bragg's invasion of Kentucky.

By Robert Collins Suhr

In late summer 1862, Confederate armies were on the march everywhere. The most notable advance, that of the Army of Northern Virginia, ended in stinging defeat along the banks of Antietam Creek, Maryland, in mid-September. Southern hopes, therefore, turned to the West.

Western Action

In the western theater, General Braxton Bragg prepared to take his Army of Tennessee north into Kentucky. He hoped to exploit a division in the Union command -- Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell commanded eastern Kentucky and Tennessee, and Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant the western end of both states -- and defeat Buell before Grant could reinforce him.

The ambitious operations in the West eventually would involve all four armies in Bragg's district. Major General Kirby Smith's command at Knoxville was to join Bragg in Kentucky, while Maj. Gen. Sterling Price's Army of the West and Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn's Army of the Mississippi kept Grant busy in northern Mississippi.

When he heard that Grant was reinforcing Buell, Price launched an attack toward Iuka, Miss., but two Union columns, one led by Grant himself, almost trapped his army on September 19. Five days later, Price decided to join Van Dorn so they could attack Grant in force.

Assessing The Situation

With Union interest concentrated chiefly on Bragg's invasion of Kentucky, Grant's command was scattered about western Tennessee and northern Mississippi in several garrisons. Impetuous and aggressive (he was a former Indian fighter), Van Dorn evaluated potential objectives before deciding to attack the strongest, the one at Corinth, Miss. Two strategic railroads, the Mobile & Ohio and the Memphis & Charleston, linked up there, and control of the rails was, as always, a paramount concern in the war.

After the Battle of Iuka, Grant transferred his headquarters to Jackson, Tenn., leaving Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans in command at Corinth. Both Rosecrans and Van Dorn had graduated from West Point in the class of 1842, Rosecrans near the top of the class and Van Dorn near the bottom. Rosecrans was an army engineer for 10 years before resigning his commission to go to work for a railroad. In 1861, he re-entered the army as a colonel of engineers under his friend, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, in West Virginia. The army transferred him west, and when Maj. Gen. John Pope conversely went east, Rosecrans became commander of the Army of the Mississippi.

Rosecrans missed the Mexican War, whereas Van Dorn was in the thick of the fighting, being brevetted twice for bravery. He had risen to the rank of major (in the elite 2nd U.S. Cavalry) when the Civil War broke out. Originally assigned to the East at the request of General Joseph E. Johnston, his prewar regimental commander, Van Dorn was transferred west after being in almost constant conflict with Confederate authorities over his rank and command. He later commanded the Army of the West at the Battle of Pea Ridge, and the District of Mississippi at Vicksburg during the summer of 1862.

Van Dorn Marches

Van Dorn knew that Rosecrans had 15,000 troops at Corinth, with another 8,000 at the nearby garrisons at Iuka, Burnsville, Rienzi, Danville and Chewalla. If Van Dorn moved quickly, he could strike before Rosecrans consolidated his forces. With 22,000 men, he would have a numerical advantage of about 3-to-2.

To be successful, Van Dorn had to achieve surprise. At first, he did. Without Rosecrans being aware of it, he moved his army from LaGrange to Ripley, where Price joined him on the 28th. The combined army consisted of divisions under Maj. Gen. Mansfield Lovell, Brig. Gen. Dabney Maury and Brig. Gen. Louis Hébert.

On the 29th, Van Dorn's army marched north toward Pocahontas, thereby threatening the Union garrison at Bolivar. The effort to conceal his objective failed, however, as the canny Grant saw through the feint. On October 1, Grant ordered Rosecrans to concentrate his forces, and the next day the Union units began marching toward Corinth.

Rosecrans' Defense

Rosecrans' army consisted of two divisions of his own Army of the Mississippi, those of Brig. Gens. David Stanley and Charles Hamilton, as well as two from the Army of the Tennessee, under Brig. Gens. Thomas Davies and Thomas McKean.

Rosecrans had one advantage of which Van Dorn was completely unaware. A Confederate spy, Amelia Burton, sent information to Van Dorn indicating that the Union defenses were weakest on the northwest side of town. Unknown to the Confederates, her message was intercepted, copied and sent along. When Rosecrans took command at Corinth of September 26, he immediately began improving the town's defenses in that direction.

Three lines of fortifications protected Corinth. The old Confederate works (from earlier in the year), several miles from town, were on good defensive ground but encompassed a front too wide for Rosecrans to defend with his small army. The "Halleck Line," a mile and a half from Corinth, was also too long. The inner line lay immediately outside town where there were five batteries (or forts) on what was called the "College Hill Line."

The weak points of the Union defenses were where Chewalla Road in the center and Purdy Road on the right pierced the lines. Battery Robinett, a fort with three siege guns, dominated Chewalla Road. Battery Williams, with seven guns, was on the other side of the road and somewhat to the rear of Battery Robinett. The guns in both batteries were manned by regulars from the 1st U.S. Infantry.

Federal General William Starke Rosecrans was better known to his men as "Old Rosy." Even after his defeat at Chickamauga in 1863, Rosecrans remained wildly popular with his troops. (Library of Congress)

Bridges Destroyed

On the right, Battery Powell was built where Purdy Road came down into the Union lines. The ground about it was open and without rifle pits.

On the 29th, Rosecrans' cavalry began skirmishing with the Confederates. In the most damaging action, a detachment from the 3rd Michigan Cavalry drove off the Confederates guarding Davis' Bridge over the Hatchie River near Pocahontas, and destroyed it.

Van Dorn needed to move quickly, but had to wait while his men rebuilt the bridge. The same thing occurred a few miles down the road at Young's Bridge over the Tuscumbia River, but when his men tried to work, Union skirmishers opened fire, delaying work further until the cavalry could drive them off.

Unclear Instructions

To guard against a surprise attack, on October 1 Rosecrans sent Colonel John Oliver to Chewalla with three regiments from McKean's division, and two 12-pound howizers. The morning of the 2nd, a patrol heard drums on a road leading into Oliver's rear. Fearing that the Confederates might cut him off from Corinth, Oliver began a withdrawal toward Corinth.

Van Dorn camped at Chewalla on the 2nd. That night he held a council of war with his generals and laid out his plan for attacking Corinth. Though he had one or two good maps, Van Dorn drew a crude sketch on paper indicating how he wanted the army to maneuver. His division commanders thus went into combat the next day without a clear understanding of what Van Dorn wanted them to do.

To cut off Rosecrans from reinforcements, Van Dorn sent his cavalry to strike the railroad during the night, but by then it had lost its tactical importance. When the last supply train arrived in Corinth on the 2nd, the engineer had orders to return to Jackson that day, as Grant expected the Confederates to seize the rail line.

Retreat And Hold

At dawn on October 3, Lovell's division led the Confederate army down the road toward Corinth. Five miles from town, Hebert's and Maury's divisions left the road to form a line of battle on the east. At 10 a.m., Lovell advanced, driving into Oliver's skirmishers. Under pressure, the Union troops retreated, losing a howitzer with a broken axle. Rosecrans reported that Oliver "acted feebly and fell back," but in reality, he faced thousands of Confederates with only 500 men.

Oliver retreated to a new position on a hill near the old Confederate line. Rosecrans, thinking this might only be a screen to cover a Confederate attack in some other direction, ordered him to keep up resistance. When Oliver reported he needed reinforcements if he was to hold the hill, Rosecrans moved his units forward to the old Confederate line, Brig. Gen. John McArthur reinforcing Oliver with another of McKean's brigades, under Davies, to their right, and Hamilton on his right.

Rosecrans ordered Davies and MacArthur to maintain contact with one another, but as the Union lines advanced, the units radiated outward from Corinth so a gap appeared between the two units. When Oliver requested more help, Davies sent him Baldwin's brigade and a pair of 20-pound rifles.

Confederate Assault

An initial Confederate advance down the railroad tracks was driven back by cannon fire alone. Lovell then threw his whole division at the hill while Maury attacked Davies' left.

As Lovell's men emerged from cover, Union artillery tore holes in their ranks. Brigadier General Albert Rust's brigade suffered 100 casualties within seconds. Knowing he could not afford to stop the attack, Rust ordered his men to fix bayonets and continue forward. Swinging wide to their left to avoid the railroad cut, the men charged forward with cheers and yells. The 9th Arkansas and 22nd Mississippi raced toward the crest, each unit trying to be the first there.

Facing the attack, MacArthur abruptly fell back, exposing Davies' left. Davies ordered his troops to retreat to the division's original position at the junction of Chewalla and Columbus roads, but a wounded messenger brought word that they were cut off from Davies, and would have to retreat with MacArthur. Davies coolly retreated in stages to a line 725 yards in front of Battery Robinett.

About 1 p.m., Rosecrans finally decided Corinth was Van Dorn's objective. He ordered MacArthur and Oliver to retreat to a ridge and form on Davies' left. At the same time, he ordered Stanley's division to move up to support Davies.

Opportunity Lost

Rosecrans saw the Confederate success that afternoon as an opportunity to attack. The Confederate left flank hung in the air, with Hamilton's division behind Hébert's lines. Rosecrans ordered Hamilton to attack the exposed enemy flank.

With an opportunity not merely to defeat the Confederates but to destroy their army, Hamilton fumbled his chance. When he received Rosecrans' order to attack (after some confusion), he ordered his division to pivot to the left. Brigadier General Jeremiah Sullivan's brigade was soon in position, but Brig. Gen. Napoleon Buford's was delayed by Confederate skirmishers. Thinking they screened the Confederate lines, Buford followed them away from Sullivan. Because of the heavy forest, Hamilton had only one battery of field artillery. With only one small brigade and one battery, he decided not to attack.

On the Confederate right, Lovell stopped short of the Union lines when he encountered a half-mile-wide abatis. He thought the position too strong to attack, but saw that there were no defenses to his left, in front of Maury. He reported this information to Van Dorn.

At about 3 p.m. the Confederates attacked. For an hour and a half, Davies' 11 guns kept them at bay, firing over 1,500 rounds. Twice Davies had to resupply them. When they finally ran out of ammunition, Davies ordered his gunners back to the line at Battery Robinett. "The artillery filed slowly to the rear, men looking more like coal-heavers than soldiers, with perspiration streaming down their faces blackened with gunpowder, and the wounded horses leaving a stream of blood in the road," he reported.

Next: The Attack Continues