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ANCIENT ROMAN MILITARY
(continuation)
PART II-C: ROMAN TACTICS
From Creasy's Battle of the Metaurus (http://www.standin.se/fifteen04a.htm ) The tactics of the Roman legions had not yet acquired that perfection which it received from the military genius of Marius, and which we read of in the first chapter of Gibbon. We possess, in that great work, an account of the Roman legions at the end of the commonwealth, and during the early ages of the empire, which those alone can adequately admire who have attempted a similar description. We have also, in the sixth and seventeenth books of Polybius, an elaborate discussion on the military system of the Romans in his time, which was not far distant from the time of the battle of the Metaurus. But the subject is beset with difficulties; and instead of entering into minute but inconclusive details, I would refer to Gibbon's first chapter as serving for a general description of the Roman army in its period of perfection, and remark, that the training and armor which the whole legion received in the time of Augustus was, two centuries earlier, only partially introduced. Two divisions of troops, called Hastati and Principes, formed the bulk of each Roman legion in the second Punic war. Each of these divisions was twelve hundred strong. The Hastatus and the Princeps legionary bore a breast-plate or coat of mail, brazen greaves, and a brazen helmet, with a lofty upright crest of scarlet or black feathers. He had a large oblong shield; and, as weapons of offence, two javelins, one of which was light and slender, but the other was a strong and massive weapon, with a shaft about four feet long, and an iron head of equal length. The sword was carried on the right thigh, and was a short cut-and-thrust weapon, like that which was used by the Spaniards. Thus armed, the Hastati formed the front division of the legion, and the Principes the second. Each division was drawn up about ten deep, a space of three feet being allowed between the files as well as the ranks, so as to give each legionary ample room for the use of his javelins, and of his sword and shield. The men in the second rank did not stand immediately behind those in the first rank, but the files were alternate, like the position of the men on a draught-board. This was termed the quincunx order. Niebuhr considers that this arrangement enabled the legion to keep up a shower of javelins on the enemy for some considerable time. He says, " When the first line had hurled its pila, it probably stepped back between those who stood behind it, and two steps forward restored the front nearly to its first position; a movement which, on account of the arrangement of the quincunx, could be executed without losing a moment. Thus one line succeeded the other in the front till it was time to draw the swords ; nay, when it was found expedient, the lines which had already been in the front might repeat this change, since the stores of pila were surely not confined to the two which each soldier took with him into battle. " The same change must have taken place in fighting with the sword, which when the same tactic was adopted on both sides, was anything but a confused mêlée. on the contrary, it was a series of single combats." He adds, that a military man of experience had been consulted by him on the subject, and had given it as his opinion " that the change of the lines as described above was by no means impracticable; but, in the absence of the deafening noise of gunpowder, it cannot have had even any difficulty with well-trained troops." The third division of the legion was six hundred strong and acted as a reserve. It was always composed of veteran soldiers, who were called the Triarii. Their arms were the same as these of the Principes and Hastati, except that each Triarian carried a spear instead of javelins. The rest of the legion consisted of light-armed troops, who acted as skirmishers. The cavalry of each legion was at this period about three hundred strong. The Italian allies, who were attached to the legion, seem to have been similarly armed and equipped, but their numerical proportion of cavalry was much larger. Information about tactics can be derived from accounts of battles, but the very military manuals known to have existed and to have been used extensively by commanders, have not survived. Perhaps the greatest loss is the book of Sextus Julius Frontinus. But parts of his work were incorporated in the records of the historian Vegetius. The importance of the choice of ground is pointed out. There is an advantage of height over the enemy and if you are pitting infantry against cavalry, the rougher the ground the better. The sun should be behind you to dazzle the enemy. If there is strong wind it should blow away from you, giving advantage to your missiles and blinding the enemy with dust. In the battle line, each man should have three feet of space, while the distance between the ranks is given as six feet. Thus 10'000 men can be placed in a rectangle about 1'500 yards by twelve yards, and it was advised not to extend the line beyond that. The normal arrangement was to place the infantry in the centre and the cavalry on the wings. The function of the latter was to prevent the centre from being outflanked and once the battle turned and the enemy started to retreat the cavalry moved forward and cut them down. - Horsemen were always a secondary force in ancient warfare, the main fighting being done by the infantry. It was recommended that if your cavalry was weak it was to be stiffened with lightly armed foot soldiers. Vegetius also stresses the need for adequate reserves. These could prevent an enemy from trying to envelope one's own forces, or could fend off enemy cavalry attacking the rear of the infantry. Alternatively, they could themselves move to the sides and perform an enveloping manoeuver against an opponent.
The position to be taken up by the commander was normally on the right wing.
The tortoise was a essentially defensive formation by which the legionaries would hold their shields overhead, except for the front rows, thereby creating a kind of shell-like armour shielding them against missiles from the front or above. The Tortoise
 The wedge was commonly used by attacking legionaries, - legionaries formed up in a triangle, the front 'tip' being one man and pointing toward the enemy, - this enabled small groups to be thrust well into the enemy and, when these formations expanded, the enemy troops were pushed into restricted positions, making hand-to-hand fighting difficult. This is where the short legionary gladius was useful, held low and used as a thrusting weapon, while the longer Celtic and Germanic swords became impossible to wield. The Wedge
 The saw was opposite tactic to the wedge. This was a detached unit, immediately behind the font line, capable of fast sideways movement down the length of the line to block any holes which might appear to develop a thrust where there might be a sign of weakness. In the case of two Roman armies fighting each other in a civil war, one might say that the 'saw' inevitably was the response to a 'wedge' by the other side. The skirmishing formation was a widely spaced line up of troops, as opposed to the tighter packed battle ranks so typical of legionary tactics. It allowed for greater mobility and would have found many uses in the tactical handbooks of Roman generals. Skirmishing Formation
 The order to repel cavalry brought about a the following formation. The first rank would form a firm wall with their shields, only their pila protruding, forming a vicious line of glistening spearheads ahead of the wall of shields. A horse, however well trained, could hardly be brought to break through such a barrier. The second rank of the infantry would then use its spears to drive off any attackers whose horses came to a halt. This formation would no doubt prove very effective, particularly against ill-disciplined enemy cavalry. Repel Cavalry
 The orb is a defensive postition in the shape of a circle taken by a unit in desperate straits. It allows for a reasonably effective defence even if parts of an army have been divided in battle and would have required a very high level discipline by the individual soldiers. The Orb
Here are seven specific instructions by Vegetius regarding the layout before battle: 1 On level ground the force is drawn up with a centre, two wings and reserves in the rear. The wings and reserves must be strong enough to prevent any enveloping or outflanking manoeuvre. 2 An oblique battle line with the left wing held back in a defensive position while the right advances to turn the opponent's left flank. Opposition to this move is to strengthen your left wing with cavalry and reserves, but if both sides are successful the battle front would tend to move in an anti-clockwise direction, the effect of which would vary with the nature of the ground. With this in mind it is as well to attempt to stabilize the left wing with the protection of rough or impenetrable ground, while the right wing should have unimpeded movement. 3 The same as No 2 except that the left wing is now made the stronger and attempts a turning movement and is to be tried only when it is known that the enemy's right wing is weak. 4 Here both wings are advanced together, leaving the centre behind. This may take the enemy by surprise and leave his centre exposed and demoralized. If, however, the wings are held, it could be a very hazardous manoeuvre, since your army is now split into three separate formations and a skillful enemy could turn this to advantage. 5 The same tactic as No 4, but the centre is screened by light infantry or archers who can keep the enemy centre distracted while the wings engage. 6 This is a variation of No 2 whereby the centre and left wing are kept back while the right wing attempts a turning movement. If it is successful, the left wing, reinforced with reserves, could advance and hop to complete the enveloping movement which should compress the centre. 7 This is the use of suitable ground on either flank to protect it, as suggested in No 2 All these tactics have the same purpose , that of breaking the enemy battle line. If a flank can be turned, the the strong centre has to fight on two fronts or is forced to fight in a restricted space. Once an advantage like this has been gained it is very difficult to correct the situation. Even in the highly trained Roman Army it would have been difficult to change tactics during the course of the battle and the only units which can be successfully deployed are those in the reserves or that part of the line not yet engaged. Thus the most important decision a general had to make concerned the disposition of the troops. If a weakness could be detected in the enemy line, it was exploited by using a stranger force to oppose it. Likewise, it was necessary to disguise one's battle line - even troops were disguised to delude the enemy. Often the very size of the army was skillfully hidden, troops packing tightly together to make it appear small, or spreading out to appear large. There were also many examples of surprise tactics made by detaching a small unit which suddenly emerged from a hidden place with much dust and noise to make the enemy believe that reinforcements had arrived. Vegetius (Frontinus) is full of the oddest stratagems to mislead the enemy or demoralize his troops. Once the enemy cracked, however, they were not to be surrounded, but an easy escape route left open. The reasons for this were that trapped soldiers would fight to the death but if they could get away, they would, and were exposed to the cavalry waiting on the flanks. This important section of Vegetius closes with the tactics to be used in the case of a withdrawal in the face of the enemy. This highly difficult operation requires great skill and judgement. Both your own men and those of the enemy need to be deceived. It is suggested that your troops be informed that their retirement is to draw the enemy into a trap and the movement can be screened from the enemy with the use of cavalry across the front. Then the units are drawn off in a regular manner, but these tactics can only be employed if the troops have not yet been engaged. During a retreat units are detached and left behind to ambush the enemy if there is a hasty or incautious advance, and in this way tables can often be turned. On a wider front, the Romans used tactics of denying their opponents the means of sustained warfare. For this they employed the tactic of vastatio. It was in effect the systematic revaging of an enemy's territory. Crops were destroyed or carried off for Roman use, animals were taken away or simply slaughtered, people were massacred or enslaved. The enemy's lands were decimated, denying his army any form of support. Sometiems these tactics were also used to conduct punitive raids on barbarian tribes which had performed raids across the border. The reasons for these tactics were simple. In the case of punitive raids they spread terror among the neighbouring tribes and acted as a deterrent to them. In the case of all-out war or the quashing rebels in occupied territories these harsh tactics denied any enemy force the support they needed to sustain a lengthy struggle.
One of the major elements in military superiority of the Romans was their development of the manipular system of organization. In the beginning the Roman army presumably used the hoplite tactics of the Greek world. The main force would then have consisted of a long line, five to ten men deep, of heavily armed troops (the line is called the phalanx). Presumably, the top three census classes were expected to provide the heavy equipment of the hoplite soldier, and the other two classes served as skirmishers. Thus, the kind of service a soldier performed depended on how much equipment he could provide (and the numbers of centuries assigned to the classes in the centuriate assembly reflected the relative importance of these different kinds of service). By the third century, the Romans had replaced the old phalanx with a much more flexible arrangement. Each legion consisted of 4200 infantrymen. They were distributed mainly on the basis of age, though a bit of the old distinction of wealth still played some role. The youngest (and those who could afford only the minimum equipment) served as velites or squirmishers. They numbered 1200 and fought in front of the main force and were to protect it against bowmen and slingers. Once the main action started the velites retreated behind the main force. The main force consisted of three parallel lines of troops. The youngest of the main body were called hastati and formed the first line. There were 1200 of these. The oldest 600 troops were placed in the last line and called the triarii. The remaining 1200 were in the prime of life, being more seasoned than the first line but not worn out like the last. These troops are the single strongest segment and are called the principes. Each line is divided into ten units called maniples, and each maniple consists of two centuries, which fought side by side. Thus each maniple of the hastati and principes had 120 men divided among two centuries of 60 men, while the triarii had half as many. When the three battle lines were drawn up for battle, they did not form a continuous line like the phalanx. Instead, there were noticeable gaps between each maniple, which was commanded by the centurion of the right-hand century. This made the Roman line much more manoeuvrable than the phalanx, which tended to loose cohesion on rough ground. Furthermore, the maniples could operate independently and seize an opportunity presented by an opening in the opposing line. When second line was drawn up behind the first, its maniples were placed behind the gaps between the maniples of the first, and the third was drawn up behind the gaps in the second. This arrangement prevented the enemy from making use of the gaps, since any attempt to break through the gap in front could be countered by the maniple drawn up behind it. This three-line arrangement in effect meant that the Romans had an immediately available reserve. The phalanx committed all troops to battle at the start, and while its great depth of men meant that their collective weight had a certain amount of momentum, the troops in back could not readily be brought into contact with the enemy and certainly could not be shifted elsewhere once the battle started. In the Roman system, the youthful hastati first joined battle. If successful, fine; but if they were defeated, the weakened enemy now had to face the fresh strength of the most seasoned troops, the principes of the second line. Or if the hastati were close to victory but did not have sufficient strength themselves, the principes could enter battle to provide the decisive factor. If even the principes were worsted, there was still a final reserve in the triarii of the last line. There was a Roman adage that "matters had reached the triarii," which meant the situation had become desperate. The legions would each be drawn up into three lines, and if multiple legions were in a battle, they would be drawn up side by side, with the cohorts of the Italian allies intermixed in between.
Byzantine Tactics By the time of the so-called Byzantine era (the surviving eastern Roman empire) true power on the battle field had long since passed into the hands of the cavalry. If there was any infantry, it was made up of archers, whose bows had longer range than the smaller bows of the horsemen.
Handbooks were published, most famously by the general and later emperor Maurice (the strategicon), the emperor Leo VI (the tactica) and Nicephorus Phocas (the updated tactica). As with the old Roman legion, the infantry still fought at the centre, with the cavalry at the wings. But often now the lines of the infantry stood further back than the cavalry wings, creating a 'refused' centre. Any enemy who would try and attack the infantry would have to pass between the two wings of the cavalry.
In hilly ground or in narrow valleys where the cavalry could not be used, the infantry itself had its lighter archers at the wings, whereas its heavier fighters (scutati) were placed at the centre. The wings were positioned slightly forward, creating a kind of crescent-shaped line. In case of an attack on the centre of the infantry the wings of archers would send a storm of arrows upon the attacker. Though in case the infantry wings themselves were attacked they could retire behing the heavier scutati. Often though infantry was not part of the conflict at all, with commanders relying entirely on their cavalry to win the day. It is in the tactics described for these occasions that the sophistication of Byzantine warfare becomes apparent. The manuals indicate that a cavalry force fought in a formation looking much like this.
An example based on a force of 20 small warbands (bandae), or 4600 cavalrymen.
Though in greater or lesser numbers, and with infantry or not, it is likely the Byzantine army would fight in similar array. The main force would be the Fighting Line (ca. 1500 men) and the Supporting Line (ca. 1300 men).
The Supporting Line might have gaps in it to allow the Fighting Line to widthdraw through if necessary.
The Wings (2 x 400 men), also called the liers-in-wait tried to get behind or into the flank of the enemy in a sweeping move around the forces, far out of sight.
The Flanks (2 x 200 men) either side of the main Fighting Line were meant to prevent the enemy's wings or flanks from circling one's own force. Often the right Flank was also used to attack the side of the opponent's main body. Striking from the right it drove into the left of the opponent which was harder to defend as most warriors would bear their weapons with their right arm.
At the back of the force a Third Line or Reserve (ca. 500 men) would be posted out to the sides, ready either to help defend the Flanks, to help steady any forces of the Fighting Line driven back through the Supporting Line, or to intervene in any flanking assaults on the enemy.
This leaves the general's own escort which would most likely lie to rear of the force and would consist of about 100 men.
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