NASA blames disaster on foam

USA Today ^ | Posted 4/22/2003 5:02 PM Updated 4/23/2003 1:00 AM | Alan Levin and Traci Watson

[jpthomas]

HOUSTON

[jpthomas]

Administrator Sean O'Keefe derided critics who had placed blame on the foam as "foamologists."

Looks like the "foamologists" were right all along.

[KellyAdmirer]

The real question is why so many at NASA dismissed the foam concept so quickly. Seemed too obvious? Assuming this and that about the foam (so little mass couldn't cause any damage, it couldn't accelerate quickly enough to do any damage, etc.) just assumed the problem away. That's not good science. If NASA is not practicing good science, that is the real problem.

[RedBloodedAmerican]

Are you a NASA scientist, perhaps? It appeared even to me to be a sheet of ice dislodged. If the foam builds up in layers like ice, then their scenario, even to the common man, appears right.

I wouldn't second guess these engineers.

[So Cal Rocket]

Not much has been said about this in the press, but Boeing played a huge part in this disaster.

Boeing was asked to do an analysis during the first few days of the mission - after several NASA people expressed concern about the "foam hit" on the wing. This analysis was to determine what damage the foam would cause to the wing, and whether it was safe to re-enter. You would expect that Boeing would use the most experienced engineers to don this analysis, wouldn't you? Well, Boeing used engineers that HAD NEVER RUN the simulation software used to model any potential damage. That's right... the engineers who did the analysis had NEVER done this kind of analysis before - and came up with the clearly wrong result that it was safe to re-enter.

Now, why would Boeing use these engineers instead of those who had done the analysis hundreds of times before? Well, it's simple - they don't work there anymore. You see, Boeing move it's Shuttle Engineering function from Huntington Beach, California to Houston, Texas in 2001 in order to save NASA money. Of the 400 engineers in Huntington Beach, LESS THAN 100 of them decided to move to Houston.

Which ones stayed in California and left the company? The answer is obvious: those who were most employable - the engineers with the most experience, skills and talent. And yes... among those who left the program in order to stay in California where the ones who had run that particular software program hundreds of times before... in fact, the ones who WROTE the program to start with.

I'm really surprised that this situation hasn't been given much air time - its almost criminal that in order to save a few bucks, a major NASA contractor was willing to make a move in which 3/4 of their engineering experience would be lost - a move that may have cost 7 brave souls their lives.

As my name may suggest... I speak from experience on this subject.

FRegards!

SC Rocket

[aristeides]

I think it was typical CYA as practised by bureaucrats. If it was the foam, it was the result of the (politically correct) failure to go back to the old foam after the EPA granted a waiver. That spells blame for some bureaucrats. It also potentially spells liability.

[RedBloodedAmerican]

74 deformities in the foam

Woodpeckers.

Told ya so :o)

[aristeides]

By the way, there was a space reporter on Imus this morning who said that it would have been perfectly possible to find a way to save the astronauts: another shuttle could have been sent up to rescue them in about two weeks, and in the meantime they could have gotten supplies from rockets.

[Dead Dog]

The CFC nazis killed Columbia.

The Asbestos Nazis doomed the WTC.

[jpthomas]

The NASA Administrator is a "bean-counter", not an engineer. I can understand NASA not wanting to leap to a premature conclusion as to the root cause of the accident, but there was no reason to mock those who suspected the impact of the insulation as "foamologists".

I worked on aerospace structures for more than twenty years before I retired from the Air Force, including work on the hot structures design of the National AeroSpace Plane (NASP). I have "eyeballed" the thermal tiles on a shuttle undergoing overhaul in the VAB at KSC. I suspected the foam impact played a significant role in the disaster as soon as I saw the video of the event. There may have been other contributing factors, but an anomalous event like that has to be given serious consideration from the get-go.

[TexasCajun]

I can't recall where I read that the foam insulation was installed to replace some type of freon coolant system.

That under pressure from enviromental wacko's, NASA designed an 'earth-friendly' alternative to the freon system.

Anyone else know of this?

[Fred Mertz]

I didn't realize a rescue was possible. Thanks for that info.

[jpthomas]

I may be wrong, but I read that the situation was even worse than you describe. The reports I read were that no real aero-structural impact simulation was even run, and that instead the potential damage was assessed using an empirical spreadsheet that incorporated historical datapoints from previous debris impacts on the thermal protection system.

[battlecry]

SC Rocket: I'm not sure of the timing, but didn't the CA electrical power fiasco impact the decision to move?

My company worked with a number of aerospace firms and I know that Raytheon and Boeing were hit with enormous power bills and they had to cut their shift operations markedly. Moving operations that support JSC to JSC doesn't sound like a bad decision. That is not to say that other decisions might have been stupid.

Regards

[So Cal Rocket]

It wasn't a freon coolant system. Freon was used as in an aerosol form to apply the "old" foam insulation onto the Booster. When "ozone depleting substances" (ODS's) were outlawed a few years back, a different method was developed that did not use freon - this new method was not as efficient as the freon method and often led to debonding of the insulation from the skin of the booster.

[Flyer]

I haven't followed these Columbia threads and I don't pretend any knowledge, but as an easy fix to the problem could the leading edges and other sensitive areas be covered with something sturdy (that would perhaps burn off early in re-entry)?

[mikegi]

That's right... the engineers who did the analysis had NEVER done this kind of analysis before - and came up with the clearly wrong result that it was safe to re-enter.... a move that may have cost 7 brave souls their lives

How did Boeing's move "cost 7 brave souls"? Let's assume that Boeing had the experienced engineers run the simulation and conclude that the Columbia was damaged, how would that have changed what happened? It's not like the Columbia could have remained in orbit and, from what I've read, there was no way to rescue them. At best, NASA would have been able to tell the crew that they were toast and give them time to say goodbye to their families from orbit.

[jpthomas]

It would have been possible, but "risky", as they would have had to forego a lot of the prelaunch testing of the rescue shuttle's systems.

What burns me about this rescue option are the reports that some NASA engineers tried to get the NASA program manager to request imagery of the shuttle wing by Air Force "overhead assets", but were shot down by the shuttle program manager. Those images might have shown enough damage to the leading edge to provide a good judgement call on whether to risk a rescue mission.

[aristeides]

Were they shot down because of an unwillingness to have NASA pay the other agency for the costs of the examination?

[leadpenny]

Good morning, Fred. If you have C-SPAN3 or NASA-TV, the CAIB is in a live 3-hour hearing that started at 10 Eastern.

[So Cal Rocket]

I'm sure that the power crisis in CA had some play in moving the program from CA to TX... since the decision was made in order to save costs, it certainly had to come into the equation.

While moving a program that supports JSC to JSC sounds like a good decision - it only makes sense if you look at engineers as a "commodity" and that one engineer is equally capable as another. I personally don't think this is the case, since there is so much "tribal knowledge" that a person gets by working on a program for 20 years that can't be picked up by an engineer right out of school. The fact that over 3/4 of the staff had to be replaced as a direct result of the move suggests the experience level of the analysts who were making these "life or death" decisions.