Occupational Safety and Health Administration: 1975.2 - Basis of authority. (surprise...the Commerce Clause)

The power of Congress to regulate employment conditions under the Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, is derived mainly from the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. (Sec. 2(b), Public Law 91-596; U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 3; "United States v. Darby," 312 U.S. 100.)

The reach of the Commerce Clause extends beyond Federal regulation of the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce so as to empower Congress to regulate conditions or activities which affect commerce even though the activity or condition may itself not be commerce and may be purely intrastate in character. ("Gibbons v. Ogden," 9 Wheat. 1, 195; "United States v. Darby," supra; "Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 117; and "Perez v. United States," 91 S. Ct. 1357 (1971).)

And it is not necessary to prove that any particular intrastate activity affects commerce, if the activity is included in a class of activities which Congress intended to regulate because the class affects commerce. ("Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States," 379 U.S. 241; "Katzenbach v. McClung," 379 U.S. 294; and "Perez v. United States," supra.)

Generally speaking, the class of activities which Congress may regulate under the commerce power may be as broad and as inclusive as Congress intends, since the commerce power is plenary and has no restrictions placed on it except specific constitutional prohibitions and those restrictions Congress, itself, places on it. ("United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co.," 315 U.S. 110; and "United States v. Darby," supra.)

Since there are no specific constitutional prohibitions involved, the issue is reduced to the question: How inclusive did Congress intend the class of activities to be under the Williams-Steiger Act?

Once again, the Commerce Clause is shown as the most abused part of the Constitution. The CC is supposed to be an enumerated power - instead we get

"the class of activities which Congress may regulate under the commerce power may be as broad and as inclusive as Congress intends,"

For a legitimate opinion on this matter, I present Madison via Federalist 42:

The defect of power in the existing Confederacy to regulate the commerce between its several members, is in the number of those which have been clearly pointed out by experience.

To the proofs and remarks which former papers have brought into view on this subject, it may be added that without this supplemental provision, the great and essential power of regulating foreign commerce would have been incomplete and ineffectual. A very material object of this power was the relief of the States which import and export through other States, from the improper contributions levied on them by the latter. Were these at liberty to regulate the trade between State and State, it must be foreseen that ways would be found out to load the articles of import and export, during the passage through their jurisdiction, with duties which would fall on the makers of the latter and the consumers of the former. We may be assured by past experience, that such a practice would be introduced by future contrivances; and both by that and a common knowledge of human affairs, that it would nourish unceasing animosities, and not improbably terminate in serious interruptions of the public tranquillity.

To those who do not view the question through the medium of passion or of interest, the desire of the commercial States to collect, in any form, an indirect revenue from their uncommercial neighbors, must appear not less impolitic than it is unfair; since it would stimulate the injured party, by resentment as well as interest, to resort to less convenient channels for their foreign trade. But the mild voice of reason, pleading the cause of an enlarged and permanent interest, is but too often drowned, before public bodies as well as individuals, by the clamors of an impatient avidity for immediate and immoderate gain. The necessity of a superintending authority over the reciprocal trade of confederated States, has been illustrated by other examples as well as our own. In Switzerland, where the Union is so very slight, each canton is obliged to allow to merchandises a passage through its jurisdiction into other cantons, without an augmentation of the tolls. In Germany it is a law of the empire, that the princes and states shall not lay tolls or customs on bridges, rivers, or passages, without the consent of the emperor and the diet; though it appears from a quotation in an antecedent paper, that the practice in this, as in many other instances in that confederacy, has not followed the law, and has produced there the mischiefs which have been foreseen here. Among the restraints imposed by the Union of the Netherlands on its members, one is, that they shall not establish imposts disadvantageous to their neighbors, without the general permission.

I agree, that if Bidet uses OSHA and not the legislative process to implement forced shots, the legal case will turn on whether or not such a sweeping "emergency" mandate, that is not limited in time, (can) be authorized by the president without explicit legislation by Congress.

But let's at least state for the record, that OSHA shouldn't even exist...thanks Nixon.

“Article I

Section 8

The Congress shall have the power to...regulate commerce with foreign nation, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes....

Section 9

The migration or importation of such persons as any of of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year 1808.”

Section 9 is an undisputable indication of the intended scope of the commerce clause. Congress was not intended to have the power to set the labor conditions on a tobacco plantation or any other workplace. Congress never had the power to require slaves to have a 40-hour work week or $15/hour pay at a minimum.

“The Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (84 Stat. 1590 et seq., 29 U.S.C. 651 et seq.) requires, in part, that every employer covered under the Act furnish to his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees.”

https://www.osha.gov/laws-regs/regulations/standardnumber/1903/1903.1

Ms. Covid Vaccine Holdout works for Big Bank, with 3000 employees, at its Smalltown branch along with one other employee, who was fully vaccinated against Covid.

Is that other employee likely to suffer death or serious physical harm if Ms. Covid Vaccine Holdout continues working at that branch, Secretary Walsh?

Is it not true that your vaccination mandate is too broad, Secretary Walsh?

“Martin J. Walsh was sworn in as the 29th Secretary of Labor on March 23, 2021. A lifelong champion of equity and fairness
....
In 1997, he was elected to serve as a State Representative for one of the most diverse districts in Massachusetts....investing in public transit
....
While mayor, he....established Universal, high-quality Pre-Kindergarten for all children, and free community college for low-income students
....
he rose to head the Building and Construction Trades Council from 2011 to 2013
....
Secretary Walsh is a survivor of Burkitt lymphoma and is a proud member of the recovery community who has worked to expand addiction treatment throughout his career. While working full-time as a legislator, he returned to school to earn a degree in Political Science at Boston College.”

https://www.dol.gov/agencies/osec

I thought Roberts killed this about the commerce clause in his Obamacare ruling?

" 2. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS concluded in Part III–A that the individual mandate is not a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. Pp. 16–30.

(a) The Constitution grants Congress the power to “regulate Commerce.” Art. I, §8, cl. 3 (emphasis added). The power to regulate commerce presupposes the existence of commercial activity to be regulated. This Court’s precedent reflects this understanding: As expansive as this Court’s cases construing the scope of the commerce power have been, they uniformly describe the power as reaching “activity.” E.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549, 560. The individual mandate, however, does not regulate existing commercial activity. It instead compels individuals to become active in commerce by purchasing a product, on the ground that their failure to do so affects interstate commerce.

Construing the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to regulate individuals precisely because they are doing nothing would open a new and potentially vast domain to congressional authority."

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/11-393c3a2.pdf

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