Posted on 01/06/2020 7:30:55 AM PST by Kaslin
The report established that the special counsels office was complicit in the FISA abuse, the probe was a witch hunt, and its report was a cover-up for systematic government malfeasance.
Shortly after the release of the special counsel report last year, I posited that Robert Muellers failure to investigate whether Russia interfered with the 2016 presidential election by feeding dossier author Christopher Steele disinformation established that Mueller was either incompetent or a political hack. Now, with the release of the inspector generals report on FISA abuse, we know the answer: He was both.
The IGs report on the U.S. Department of Justice and FBIs handling of the Carter Page surveillance applications established 17 significant inaccuracies and omissions in the FISA application and renewals. (Eighteen if you include the one the IG missed). The 400-page report also established that the special counsels office was complicit in the FISA abuse, the probe was a witch hunt, and Muellers report was a cover-up for systematic government malfeasance.
Muellers appointment as special counsel prompted bipartisan praise, with the accolades focusing on his stellar reputation as the FBI director under Republican President George W. Bush and Democrat President Barack Obama. But Inspector General Michael Horowitzs report revealed a sad reality: The special counsels office under Muellers charge was just as inept at investigating the false charges of Russia collusion as the FBI was under James Comeys lead.
As the IG report noted, on May 17, 2017, the Crossfire Hurricane cases were transferred to the Office of the Special Counsel, and the FBI agents and analysts then began working with the special counsel. A little more than a month later, the FBI asked the Department of Justice to seek a fourth extension of the Page surveillance order. That fourth renewal obtained under Muellers leadership included the 17 significant inaccuracies and omissions the IG identified.
Further, it wasnt merely a matter of Muellers team repeating the same falsehoods. Several of the inaccuracies and omissions presented to the FISA court in the late-June renewal application arose in mistakes or misconduct that occurred after Mueller took the reins of the investigation.
Most significantly, in June 2017, the FBIs office of general counsel falsely represented that Page had not been a source for another federal agency, when, in reality, Page had been approved as an operational contact and the FBIs attorney had been told so in an email. Yet the final surveillance renewal application failed to inform the FISA court that, while Page had connections with individuals connected to Russian intelligence, he had provided information about those contacts to another agency as an approved source.
While blame for this mistake might be put down to the malfeasance of the attorney who altered the email to obscure Pages relationship with the other agency, given that Page publiclyand likely in private interviews with the FBIparaded his relationship with the unnamed U.S. agency, Muellers team should have done morenot just for purposes of the FISA application, but as part of the special counsel investigation.
Muellers inept team instead parroted the point in the special counsel report, stating Russian intelligence officials had formed relationships with Page in 2008 and 2013 and Page acknowledged that he understood that the individuals he had associated with were members of the Russian intelligence services, but he stated that he had only provided immaterial non-public information to them. But Mueller made no mention of Pages status as an operational contact for another agency.
Not only did Muellers team continue to push the same inaccuracies and omissions to the FISA court in the June 2017 renewal, the FISA court was not informed of the many mistakes and omissions for another yeareven though the special counsels investigation should have uncovered many of the errors contained in the applications early on in the probe.
For instance, the IG noted that the FBIs interview with Steele in September 2017 was conducted by an FBI agent and analyst on assignment to the Special Counsels Office. That interview further highlighted discrepancies between Steeles presentation of information in the dossier reports relied upon in the FISA applications, and what Steeles primary sub-source had told FBI agents. Yet the FISA court was not provided this information until July 2018.
Muellers team also knew, by July 2017 at the latest, that Joseph Mifsudthe Maltese professor who supposedly tipped then-Trump aide George Papadopoulos to the Russians having dirt on Hillary Clintonhad denied telling Papadopoulos that the Russians could assist the Trump campaign by leaking negative information on Clinton. Prior to the special counsels appointment, the FBI had interviewed Papadopoulos and Mifsud, but it would be the special counsels office that indicted Papadopoulos in late July 2017, charging him with lying to the FBI.
By that time, then, the special counsels team must have reviewed the notes from the Papadopoulos and Mifsud interviews. Yet Mueller did nothing at that point to ensure the FISA court learned of Mifsuds denials. The IG found the omission of Joseph Mifsud’s denials to the FBI that he supplied Papadopoulos with the information Papadopoulos shared with the FFG (suggesting that the campaign received an offer or suggestion of assistance from Russia) was a significant omission.
In short, the special counsels team proved itself equally incompetent in investigating and screening the intel used to obtain the Page surveillance orders, and in failing to accurately and fully inform the FISA court (FISC) of the evidence gathered by the FBI. As the IG noted that so many basic and fundamental errors were made on four FISA applications by three separate, hand-picked teams, on one of the most sensitive FBI investigations that was briefed to the highest levels within the FBI and that FBI officials expected would eventually be subjected to close scrutiny, raised significant questions regarding the FBI chain of commands management and supervision of the FISA process. That also means Mueller and his chain of command.
It also wasnt mere incompetence on display: The special counsels office also engaged in much of the same misconduct the IG identified. For instance, emblematic of Muellers complicity in misconduct Horowitz identified is the fact that the special counsel continued to use Bruce Ohr as a conduit to feed intel to the FBI from Steele after Steele was terminated as a confidential human source.
The IG concluded that while the Crossfire Hurricane team did not initiate direct contact with Steele after his closure, it responded to numerous contacts made by Steele through Ohr. While Ohr himself was not a direct witness in the Crossfire Hurricane investigation, his purpose in communicating with the FBI was to pass along information from Steele.
The IG concluded that given that there were 13 different meetings with Ohr over a period of months, the use of Ohr as a conduit between the FBI and Steele created a relationship by proxy that should have triggered, pursuant to FBI policy, a supervisory decision about whether to reopen Steele as a CHS or discontinue accepting information indirectly from him through Ohr.
Significantly, the IG noted that after June 2017, an agent from the Special Counsels Office became Ohrs final point of contact through November 2017. Thus, Muellers team made a concerted decision to continue to use Ohr to obtain intel from Steelea decision the IG condemned.
In fact, the special counsels use of Ohr appears even more problematic than the FBIs prior mishandling of their meetings with Ohr: At least prior to Muellers appearance, the FBI documented the details of their conversations with Ohr in FD-302 forms, but as the IG report noted, while Ohr continued to communicate with Steele through the end of November 2017 and passed on the details of those conversations to the FBI, the FBI did not memorialize any meetings its agents had with Ohr after the Crossfire Hurricane investigation was transferred to the Special Counsels Office in May 2017.
Further, while the special counsels team continued to meet with Ohr during this time, no one from Muellers group informed DOJ leadership of Ohrs involvement in the investigation nor his meetings with Steele until after Congress requested information from the Department regarding Ohrs activities in late November 2017.
That the special counsels team engaged with Ohr without notifying to Ohrs superiors shouldnt surprise, though, as that was the M.O. of Muellers pit bull, lawyer Andrew Weissmann. The IG report exposed this reality, in detail. Specifically, the IG report explained that shortly after Trump was elected president
between November 16, 2016 and December 15, 2016, Ohr participated in several meetings that were attended, at various times, by some or all of the following individuals: Swartz, Ahmad, Andrew Weissmann (then Section Chief of CRM’s Fraud Section), Strzok, and Lisa Page. The meetings involving Ohr, Swartz, Ahmad, and Weissmann focused on their shared concern that the [Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section] MLARS was not moving quickly enough on the Manafort criminal investigation and whether there were steps they could take to move the investigation forward. The meetings with Strzok and Page focused primarily on whether the FBI could assess the case’s relevance, if any, to the FBI ‘s Russian interference investigation. MLARS was not represented at any of these meetings or told about them, and none of attendees had supervisory responsibility over the MLARS investigation .
On January 31, 2017, one day after Yates was removed as DAG, Ahmad, by then an Acting CRM Deputy Assistant Attorney General, after consulting with Swartz and Weissmann, sent an email to Lisa Page, copying Weissmann, Swartz, and Ohr, requesting a meeting the next day to discuss a few Criminal Division related developments. The next day, February 1, Swartz, Ohr, Ahmad, and Weissmann met with Strzok, Lisa Page, and an FBI Acting Section Chief. None of the attendees at the meeting could explain to us what the Criminal Division related developments were, and we did not find any.
Meeting notes reflect, among other things, that the group discussed the Manafort criminal investigation and efforts that the Department could undertake to investigate attempts by Russia to influence the 2016 elections. MLARS was not represented at, or told about, the meeting.
The IG report further revealed that, even though Weissmann had no role or responsibility in the MLARS investigation of Manafort, he arranged to meet an AP reporter in late March or early April to obtain information from the media contact regarding Manafort having a storage locker in Virginia. This meeting and the collective interest Weissmann, Ohr, Swartz, and Amhad had in the MLARS investigation prompted the IG report to note that given their high-ranking positions in the Department, their unusual level of interest in the Manafort investigation could create a perception that the Department was investigating Manafort for inappropriate reasons.
The acting chief of the MLARS also indicated concern about the meetings between Ohr, Swartz, Weissmann, and Amhad, telling the IG that she had only learned about those November 2016 to February 2017 meetings as a result of her IG interview.
Ohr, Swartz, Ahmad, and Weissmann also told the IG that they had not advised their supervisors of their meetings concerning Manafort, and senior department officials were also unaware of them. Swartz stated that he specifically did not advise political appointees leading the Criminal Division of the meetings, because he sought to keep the MLARS investigation from being politicized. While Weissmann claimed that he thought not telling Department leadership was an incorrect judgment call, he did not remember telling Swartz or Ahmad that, and instead kept their conversations concerning Manafort secret.
The IG report noted that after [Obama Deputy Attorney General Sally] Yates learned during her OIG interview of the meetings involving Ohr, Swartz, Ahmad, and Weissmann, she stated that a decision not to advise political appointees trouble[d] her because the Department does not operate that way. There is not a career Department of Justice and a political appointees Department of Justice. It’s all one DOJ, Yates told the IG.
The IG agreed with these concerns, stating Department leaders cannot fulfill their management responsibilities, and be held accountable for the Departments actions, if subordinates intentionally withhold information from them in such circumstances, such as Weissmann had.
These details from the IG report raise further concerns about Weissmanns involvement in the special counsel probe, which prompts two other questions: Besides Weissmann, how many other DOJ employees or FBI agents responsible for the inaccuracies and omissions identified in the IG report moved over to the special counsel team? Did those individuals cause the special counsels report to include significant inaccuracies and omissions?
While it may be some time before we know whether the special counsel report included significant inaccuracies, given the details contained in the IGs report, it is now clear that the Mueller report omitted significant evidence relevant to whether there was collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia. In fact, while the special counsel report claimed this report embodies factual and legal determinations that the Office believes to be accurate and complete to the greatest extent possible, the IG report provided more perspective on the question of Russia collusion than the entire $30-million special counsel probe.
In fact, Muellers failure to address the veracity, or rather the fallacy, of Steeles dossier cements the reality that the special counsel sought not to discern the truth, but to bury Trump. As the Wall Street Journal editorial board recognized, the Steele dossier was central to obtaining the Page warrant, and the leaks about the dossier fanned two years of media theories about Russian collusion that was one reason Mr. Mueller was appointed as special counsel. Mr. Mueller owed the public an explanation of how much of the dossier could be confirmed or repudiated.
Yet, as the Horowitz report makes clear, the FBI knew that most of the Steele dossiers claims were unreliable, and Team Mueller made a deliberate choice to tiptoe around it, even telling Congress in his opening statement, that he would not address matters related to the so-called Steele dossier, which he said were out of his purview.
This makes no sense, the editorial board reasoned. But it does. It makes eminent sense once you realize the special counsel office served to continue a witch hunt, and once those efforts proved unsuccessful, Muellers team reverted instead to obscuring that fact.
Whatever
Some people did things...
At this point, what difference does it make?
No reasonable prosecutor... Blah blah blah.
L
Bookmark
Blah blah blah...
We all know this. We have seen it before.
I am just waiting for something besides talk to happen. Right now I am expecting old age to catch me sooner.
And yet members of “The Club” still walk free.
So Mueller was a deep stater and anti-Trump, we knew that.
The FBI has proven itself to be populated by liars and criminals.
Burn the swamp.
That deserves its own thread.
Arrest the criminal “special “ council.
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